By: Riley Ney

At the convening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), big movers emerged as the drivers of the Agency’s determination to create multilateral deals towards nuclear security.

After the lengthy imposition of the limits of debate, the IAEA committee was jolted by the vibrant resoluteness of the United States of America in spearheading plans for new treaty commitments to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation. Representative David Izzo of the United States proclaimed to the body the benefits of bilateral and international frameworks for risk mitigation. Notably, the United States affirmed the necessity of using the IAEA as an enforcement mechanism for resolving interstate disputes and conflicts of interest. Given the historically important role that the United States has held for the IAEA, this momentum carried into broader support for draft resolution AA, “a resolution with a smaller scope focused on regulating and setting standards for radioactive material in transport” according to Representative Hannah Wilhite of Belgium. 

Not all Member States were convinced. Representative Izzo was questioned by a variety of States surrounding the intentions of an IAEA framework drawn by United States leadership. Many representatives voiced concern over the history of the United States in using financial obligations for self-interested gains, the perception of hypocrisy from American proliferation efforts and the disengagement with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Many IAEA delegations refused to heed American headwinds in security efforts. For Member States like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, alternative strategies are abundant for smaller states. Representative Jayden Winter of Saudi Arabia describes their proposal of draft resolution BB, a reworking of the New Nuclear Security Initiative, including efforts towards “a culture of cooperation and transparency” in line with the policy motives of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and following limited test ban treaties. By mandating disclosures of uranium enrichment levels, the Representative forwards a mechanism for resolving security disputes absent universal membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty.

“Rather than spending exorbitant amounts of money to try and enforce these or try and cooperate with the Security Council…who may not be open to revealing their nuclear capabilities and thus would veto any enforcement mechanism; this is all about shifting the culture of what does it mean to give out nuclear information.” said Representative Winter. “States who choose not to share information with each other will essentially be isolated in that decision…”

The attempt by Saudi Arabia to correct a cultural misstep in the IAEA represents the stark divide between larger and smaller states in approaches to nuclear security. Representative Winter highlights that “our initiative is not direct enforcement…that’s going to open the door to all of these smaller nations immediately sharing information, and then slowly bringing in these larger powers into sharing.” The caucus developing draft resolution BB was explicit, however, that the move towards a culture of info-sharing is broadly supported by regional great powers. 

“…if we shoot too large, we’re not going to get too far in negotiating with a million nations here.” said Representative Corrigan Huner of Venezuela. “Some nations, especially ours, are uncomfortable with certain nations like the United States leading debate going forward. Certain nations don’t want to be held at the whim of larger countries…” This sentiment resonates broadly with delegations from the Global South as Member States like the United States reel in negotiations.

Procedural matters left the first discussions of the IAEA limited in scope, but as the Agency moves into full-swing, its products remain a question not of what, but who headlines the discussion.