Position paper for Historical Commission of Inquiry of 2005
| Country: | Brazil |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
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| Preparatory Statement â International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
As of 25 October 2004, the situation in Darfur remains defined by large-scale displacement, widespread allegations of human rights and humanitarian law violations, and a deteriorating security environment affecting civilians, humanitarian personnel, and local communities. Multiple players including Government forces, associated militias, and armed opposition groups continue to shape the conflict aspect, while African Union monitoring initiatives and humanitarian operations face persistent limitations. The Commission is mandated to establish a detailed factual record, clarify the nature and scope of violations, and identify conditions necessary to support accountability, protection, and lasting peace. To fulfill this mandate, a clearer picture of responsibility, chain-of-command structures, and the lived realities of affected populations remain essential. I. Major Unanswered Questions for the Commission To direct early fact-finding and hearing priorities, the Commission may focus on the following core questions: · Command Responsibility and Coordination o What formal or informal command structures exist among state and non-state actors, and to what extent do they direct, tolerate, or fail to prevent violence against civilians? o Were there identifiable orders, motives, or exclusions that enabled patterns of attack, forced displacement, or obstruction of humanitarian access? · Patterns and Intent of Violence o Are there consistent and widespread patterns of village destruction, targeting specific groups, and interference with aid deliveries, and what motivations or strategic objectives may underlie these actions? · Humanitarian Access and Civilian Protection o What factors continue to obstruct humanitarian access and protection efforts, and what conditions would be necessary to ensure safe return or resettlement of displaced people? · Accountability and Justice Pathways o What mechanisms domestic, regional, or international are viable for holding perpetrators accountable, and what gaps exist in current judicial or investigatory processes? The answers to these questions will shape the Commissionâs ability to form a coherent narrative of events and identify credible, actionable recommendations. II. Obstacles to Fulfilling the Mandate Several challenges may hinder the Commissionâs work moving forward: · Restricted Access to Sites and Populations: Limited mobility, insecurity, and state or local resistance may restrict investigations and evidence collection. · Protection and Intimidation Concerns: Witnesses and local officials may fear retaliations, affecting the safety and reliability of testimony. · Multiple Stakeholders and Varied Tedtimonies: Multiple armed groups and competing claims complicate the establishment of a verified factual record. · Evidence Preservation: Ongoing violence risks the loss or contamination of documentary, testimonial, and physical evidence. · Sensitive Regional and Diplomatic Dynamics: Neighboring states and regional entities may influence cooperation, information sharing, and access. The Commission may consider recommending additional security guarantees, enhanced cooperation mechanisms, or technical assistance to address these barriers. III. Potential Witnesses, Experts, and Information Needs To best inform its work, the Commission may wish to hear from: · Government Officials and Local Authorities: To clarify command structures, security policies, and state responses to alleged violations. · Community and Displacement Representatives: To provide firsthand accounts of violence, displacement, and ongoing protection concerns. · African Union Monitors and UN Field Personnel: To supply verified observations on ceasefire implementation and humanitarian access challenges. · NGOs, Humanitarian and Medical Organizations: To present data on displacement patterns, injury documentation, and aid obstruction. · Subject Experts: Including specialists in international humanitarian law, forensics, arms flows, and conflict mapping. Each category of witness can address specific gaps in fact-finding and help the Commission cross-verify claims. IV. Suggested Lines of Inquiry for the Commission In its upcoming work, the Commission may wish to: · Prioritize documentation of patterns of attack and displacements. · Compare testimony across multiple groups to identify inconsistencies or verification. · Assess the adequacy of state protection measures and humanitarian guarantees. · Explore approaches for accountability that balance impartiality, practicality, and the needs of affected communities. Conclusion The Commissionâs effectiveness will depend on its ability to gather credible evidence, safeguard cooperation from all parties, and remain impartial in its pursuit of truth. By addressing unanswered factual questions, overcoming access and security obstacles, and engaging a diverse set of witnesses, the Commission will be positioned to help clarify the situation in Darfur and contribute to future accountability and reconciliation efforts. | |
| Country: | Brazil |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| Preparatory Statement â Commission of Experts on the Prosecution of Serious Violations of
Human Rights in Timor-Leste (1999)
As of 25 October 2004, the Commission faces an accountability aspect still marked by incomplete judicial processes, unresolved questions about responsibility for violence in 1999, and ongoing coordination challenges between national, regional, and international mechanisms. The events following the 30 August 1999 Popular Consultation characterized by widespread violence, forced displacement, destruction of property, and alleged systematic targeting of civilians continue to shape political and social conditions in Timor-Leste. While national institutions and the United Nations have initiated legal proceedings, significant concerns remain about the success, reach, and impartiality of existing accountability efforts. The Commissionâs mandate to review these processes requires a comprehensive assessment of the facts, judicial responses, and remaining gaps obstructing justice and reconciliation. I. Major Unanswered Questions for the Commission To establish a clear record and inform future recommendations, the Commission may consider examining the following outstanding issues: · Command Responsibility and Coordination of Violence o What degree of coordination existed between militia groups and elements of the Indonesian security system before, during, and after the referendum? o Were acts of violence spontaneous or premeditated, and what evidence exists to clarify planning or intent? · Accountability and Judicial Adequacy o Have national, regional, and international judicial mechanisms sufficiently identified and prosecuted those bearing the greatest responsibility? o What structural or legal gaps have prevented the prosecution of key suspects, particularly individuals outside Timor-Lesteâs jurisdiction? · Cross-Border Dynamics o To what extent do developments in West Timor, including the presence of displaced populations and militia elements, continue to affect accountability efforts? o What role can regional cooperation play in facilitating justice and witness access? · Victim and Witness Inclusion o Have victims and displaced people been adequately included in accountability and truth- seeking processes? o What further measures are necessary to ensure safe, meaningful participation? The answers to these questions will likely influence the Commissionâs evaluation of the adequacy of past prosecutions and its recommendations for future mechanisms. II. Obstacles to Fulfilling the Mandate Several challenges may disrupt the Commissionâs work and the pursuit of justice more widely: · Limited Jurisdiction and Political Constraints: Some suspects remain outside Timor-Leste, making prosecution dependent on cooperation and extradition structures. · Institutional Capacity: Judicial and investigative bodies, though progressing, continue to face resource and expertise limitations. · Witness Protection and Security: Fear of retaliations may disrupt testimony, particularly for individuals living in vulnerable communities or across the border. · Incomplete Evidence: Passage of time, displacement of communities, and destruction of records complicate efforts to verify events and assign responsibility. · Diplomatic Sensitivities: The bilateral relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia affects the political environment surrounding accountability efforts. The Commission may consider ways to encourage cooperation, increase protection mechanisms, and support institutional capacity as part of its recommendations. III. Potential Witnesses, Experts, and Information Needs To address remaining gaps, the Commission may hear from: · Timor-Leste Judicial and Government Officials: To clarify the status, limitations, and achievements of domestic prosecutions. · United Nations Mission Personnel (UNTAET / UNMISET): To provide insight into early investigative efforts and transitional justice measures. · Human Rights Organizations and NGO Observers: To supply documentation, field reports, and patterns of violations. · Victim and Displacement Representatives: To ensure firsthand accounts inform the factual record and highlight ongoing needs. · Regional and Legal Experts: To advise on cross-border issues, international cooperation, and accountability options. Each category of witness can help verify facts, assess judicial performance, and guide improvements. IV. Suggested Lines of Inquiry Going Forward The Commission may: · Compare findings from national and international proceedings to identify gaps in accountability. · Clarify the roles and chains of command associated with the 1999 violence. · Assess protection and participation mechanisms for victims and witnesses. · Examine pathways for increased regional and international cooperation in ongoing or future prosecutions. Conclusion To fulfill its mandate, the Commission must establish a verified factual record, evaluate the adequacy of existing accountability mechanisms, and propose realistic recommendations that support justice, stability, and reconciliation. Through impartial investigation, cooperation with key actors, and careful consideration of remaining obstacles, the Commission can contribute to a more complete and enduring foundation for the rule of law in Timor-Leste. | |
| Country: | Egypt |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
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| The situation in Darfur presents a grave humanitarian crisis with significant regional
implications. As a neighbor to Sudan and a member of the African Union, Egypt recognizes
both the urgent need to address violations of human rights and the importance of
preserving Sudanâs stability and sovereignty. The Commission must approach its mandate
with fairness, ensuring that findings are based on verifiable facts and consistent with
international law. Egyptâs Questions for the Commission: 1. What evidence establishes
whether the Sudanese governmentâs actions in Darfur constitute crimes under
international law, and what threshold is required to define genocide under the Genocide
Convention? 2. To what extent is violence the result of government policy, militia activity,
or intercommunal disputes? 3. How can the humanitarian crisis be alleviated without
undermining Sudanâs sovereignty or destabilizing the wider region?
Obstacles to Fulfilling the Mandate: 1. The Commissionâs access to Darfur may be restricted by ongoing insecurity and governments sensitivity. 2. Overemphasis on punitive measures or premature determinations of genocide could hinder cooperation from Sudan and weaken African-led mediation. 3. Any potential regional rivalries. Potential Witnesses and Experts: 1. African Union Ceasefire Commission officials with direct knowledge of ceasefire violations. 2. Humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur and refugee camps in Chad, who can provide data on displacement, famine, and patterns of attack. 3. Local community leaders testify on the nature of violence in rural areas. 4. Sudanese government and military representatives to clarify the chain of command and state policy. Key Areas of Inquiry: 1. Whether the violence in Darfur constitutes genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, and how these distinctions affect an international response. 2. What role regional actors, not limited to but particularly the African Union should play in mediation and monitoring. 3. How to balance accountability for violations with the broader objective of achieving a lasting peace agreement in Sudan. Egypt stresses that the Commissionâs role should be to establish facts and propose constructive recommendations, supporting African-led initiatives while avoiding steps that may escalate instability in Sudan or the wider region. | |
| Country: | Egypt |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| The events surrounding the 1999 referendum in East Timor demonstrate the challenges
of balancing accountability for past crimes with the principles of sovereignty and
reconciliation. Egypt recognizes the importance of justice for the victims of violence while
also affirming that long-term stability in both East Timor and Indonesia must remain a
priority. The Commission must therefore carefully assess whether existing judicial
processes are capable of doing enough, and if not, what constructive alternatives can be
pursued.
Egyptâs Questions for the Commission: 1. Have the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor functioned effectively to ensure accountability? 2. To what extent was Indonesian state or military involvement in the post-referendum violence direct or indirect, and how has this been addressed in judicial proceedings? 3. What measures can promote justice without undermining Indonesiaâs sovereignty or harming the fragile political stability of East Timor? Obstacles to Fulfilling the Mandate: 1. Indonesiaâs reluctance to extradite suspects poses challenges to the Special Panels in Dili. 2. The limited resources and capacity of East Timorâs judiciary \risk delaying or weakening prosecutions. 3. The international community must balance calls for further tribunals with respect for Indonesiaâs judicial processes and ongoing reconciliation efforts. Key Areas of Inquiry: 1. Whether the combination of Indonesian and Timorese judicial processes is sufficient to meet international standards of justice. 2. How accountability efforts can be advanced in a way that promotes reconciliation and stability, rather than renewed conflict. The Commission should prioritize practical and beneficial recommendations that strengthen the credibility of justice mechanisms while respecting Indonesiaâs sovereignty and supporting the development of a stable independent East Timor. | |
| Country: | India |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
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| A major issue facing the Commission of Inquiry of 2005 is the conflict in Darfur. Ethnic and political marginalization has caused a series of violence across the western Darfur region of Sudan. Non-governmental organizations such as the Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) have launched uprisings claiming oppression of African minority groups in the Darfur territory. According to Amnesty International, the Sudanese government corroborated with local Arab militias known as the Janjaweed to carry out terror attacks against the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur. Resolutions such as the 2004 Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan (S/RES/1564) urged the need to âincrease [the United Nations] monitoring presence in Darfur.â The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) points out the intentional destruction of a people or ethnic group. This gives rise to questions over the validity of claims over the Sudanese governmentâs ties to the Janjaweed as well as the objective of the Janjaweed in spreading panic and destruction. The Republic of India wants the Commision of Inquiry to answer this: Did actions in Darfur meet the definition of genocide under the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide? | |
| Country: | India |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| A second major issue facing the Commission of Inquiry of 2005 is the debate over the independence or integration of East Timor into Indonesia. Originally under Dutch and Portuguese colonial rule, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor declared independence on 28 November 1975. On 7 December 1975, the Indonesian military carried out Operation Seroja, claiming East Timor as Indonesiaâs twenty-seventh province. In 1999, an Indonesian led-United Nations sponsored referendum was held expressing support for an independent East Timor. Between September and October 1999, elements of the Indonesian military allegedly corroborated with pro-Indonesian militias to forcibly invade the island. According to Amnesty International, thirty percent of East Timorâs population fled or were deported while militia forces carried out a violent, ravenous invasion. Order returned to the island after the United Nations authorized the deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). The Republic of India inquires to what extent the military corroborated with local militia forces and to what extent these violent policies were carried out? How can the Commission of Inquiry review the International Bill of Human Rights to determine the possibility and extent of human rights violations? | |
| Country: | Israel |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
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| The conflict in Sudanâs Darfur region exhibits a grave test for the international communityâs competence to address widespread humanitarian crises. Beginning in 2003, rebel groups in Darfur accused the Sudanese government of marginalization and launched attacks against government positions. In response to these accusations, government forces, and allied Janjaweed militias, initiated counterstrikes that escalated into systematic violence against civilians. Entire villages were destroyed, mass killings and rapes occurred, and millions were displaced into camps within Darfur and across the border into Chad. As a result, it has become one of the worldâs largest humanitarian emergencies to date. The Sudanese government asserts that its operations targeted armed rebels and not civilians. They also state that the Janjaweed were acting independently and beyond the governmentâs control. On the other side, rebel groups and international observers argue that the government organized and supported these militias in a coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing against targeted groups. Specifically, these groups were of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. The international community remains divided on whether the atrocities constitute genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, or whether they fall into the categories of crimes against humanity and war crimes. This leads to multiple questions that must be answered: Was the Sudanese government directly coordinating and supplying the Janjaweed militias, or were these groups acting independently while benefiting from indirect support? Would accountability measures risk further destabilizing Sudan and the region, or could they serve as a step toward justice and reconciliation? What steps were taken by the government to either prevent or encourage Janjaweed actions, and how much responsibility lies with senior officials versus local commanders? What processes for accountability are both just and realisticâwould it be international prosecution through the ICC, domestic trials within Sudan, or some hybrid approach combining international oversight with local participation? Beyond legal accountability, what recommendations can the Commission make to ensure humanitarian access, protection of civilians, and sustainable peace in Darfur? | |
| Country: | Israel |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
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| The violence that erupted in Timor-Leste following its 1999 independence referendum highlights how challenging it can be to enforce justice after mass atrocities. When almost 80% of people in Timor-Leste voted for independence, pro-Indonesian groups, backed by parts of the Indonesian army, started attacking. Approximately 1,400 civilians were killed, and thousands were displaced into West Timor. Along with this, much of the territoryâs infrastructure was destroyed before the arrival of international peacekeepers under the International Force for East Timor. The violence not only took a toll on the population but also left deep scars on the political relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. To address accountability, the United Nations helped establish the Serious Crimes Unit and hybrid Special Panels in Dili in 2000. Indonesia also created its own Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta. However, concerns had emerged that prosecutions were inadequate. The Serious Crimes process in Dili centered mainly on mid- and lower-level perpetrators, while Jakartaâs tribunal acquitted or gave light sentences to senior figures. This raises a sizable number of questions about selective justice and impunity. Were the prosecutions in Indonesia genuine efforts to hold perpetrators accountable, or did they constitute symbolic trials without substance? Did the Serious Crimes Unit and hybrid tribunal in Timor-Leste have sufficient resources, jurisdiction, and capacity to pursue senior figures implicated in the violence, or were they constrained by political realities? Should accountability rest primarily with Indonesian institutions, international mechanisms, or some combination of the two? To what extent can reconciliation efforts within Timor-Leste, such as the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, complement or substitute formal judicial processes? Finally, if the current processes are inadequate, should a new international tribunal be established, or would such a step risk undermining regional stability, reconciliation, and Timor-Lesteâs evolving diplomatic relationship with Indonesia? | |
| Country: | Malta |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
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| The conflict in Darfur began in 2003 when ethnically non-Arab groups such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa rebelled against the government in Khartoum. This resulted in state forces and Janjaweed militias to counter the uprising, which led to widespread killings, displacement, and the destruction of communities. The Commissionâs line of inquiry concerns whether these actions meet the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Convention, and whether there was specific intent to destroy particular ethnic groups. Some key questions to address include the degree of coordination between the Sudanese government and Janjaweed leadership, the level of civilian targeting, and whether the policies set by the state contributed to systematic violence. If these questions are resolved, they will have a large impact on how accountability is pursued, with the potential of recommending international judicial systems like the International Criminal Court. Some of the major obstacles to the Commissionâs work may include difficulty accessing affected areas, lack of cooperation from national authorities, and regional instability. The Commission might also recommend that the Security Council should support stronger field access for investigators, ways to enforce the disarmament of militias, and more assistance for evidence collecting efforts. Additionally, witnesses that would likely be of assistance to the inquiry could include survivors and displaced people from affected villages, African Union (AU) ceasefire monitors, and legal experts who specialize in international humanitarian and genocide law, whose testimony could clarify the context of violence in Darfur. | |
| Country: | Malta |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| Following the 1999 United Nations supervised referendum in which the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia, pro-integration militias, often supported by elements of the Indonesian armed forces, carried out widespread violence resulting in mass killings and displacement. The Commissionâs inquiry focuses on whether the resulting judicial processes, such as the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, have effectively ensured justice and accountability. Some key questions include the degree of prosecution of senior officials, reasons for the widespread acquittals or overturned convictions, and the obstacles faced by courts in Timor that had to do with securing suspects and protecting witnesses. The resolution of these questions will help make recommendations to strengthen judicial cooperation between Indonesia and Timor- Leste. The Commission may recommend better cooperation frameworks, stronger witness protection, and the creation of reparation programs to allow reconciliation. Additionally, witnesses and experts who could assist might include former judges, prosecutors, and Indonesian legal officials. | |
| Country: | Nigeria |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
| Paper text: | |
| Having officially declared more than 70,000 deaths in the Darfur region, the formation of the
Commission of Inquiry is an important next step for the Security Council. In light of the
photos, stories, and data coming out of this conflict zone, the Commissionâs investigation will
seek to determine if this situation should be classified as a genocide according to the
Genocide Convention of 1948. If evidence proves a genocide is being committed, the
Commission must name those responsible and their part in perpetrating this crime.
Additionally, the Commission needs to prioritize answering questions related to the funding
sources of all parties involved in the conflict, including militia and rebel groups. Finally,
accountability, justice, and security measures should be taken to address the protection of
the vulnerable civilians and the promotion of human rights.
However, the Commission faces obstacles of security, transparency, and access in effectively reporting on the conditions. The violence has become so severe that it is not safe in some areas for the UN and other organizations to operate. Furthermore, the lack of transparency from actors will limit access to information and on-the-ground movement. In attempting to address these obstacles, the Committee should ask the Council to increase security funding and urge the negotiation of a temporary ceasefire or humanitarian pause to allow investigations to be conducted. In addressing transparency, the Commission can urge the Council to pass resolutions emphasizing the responsibility of Member States to cooperate with investigations. A diversity of interviews need to be conducted to paint a complete, neutral picture of the situation. Firstly, the Sudanese government is a key party that should be represented, as they can provide information surrounding their perspective on the violence and their relationship with the Janjaweed Militias. Next, representatives of the militias and rebel groups, although difficult to access, can provide valuable information. Additionally, NGOs, regional blocs and allies, and the African Union, actively working on a peace deal, will be necessary experts. Finally, witnesses including victims, refugees, displaced persons, and workers need to testify. Their perspectives and first-person accounts of events will help the commission determine exactly what has happened. | |
| Country: | Nigeria |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| After the people of East Timor decisively determined their independence in a 1999 UN-
administered referendum vote, violence from pro-Indonesian militias, backed by the
Indonesian Military, commenced. This violence took the form of infrastructure destruction,
killings, and mass displacement. The major unanswered questions come from concerns
about the efficacy of the judicial processes used by the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights
Court on East Timor in prosecuting those believed to be responsible for the violence. If the
Commission determines that the trials did not meet international standards, the
Commission must then investigate the obstacles that hindered fair trials. These questions
impact the resolution by requiring strengthened accountability in the future and delivering
justice to the victims.
The Commission is limited by jurisdiction and resources: complications are standing in the way of the Commissionâs investigation, namely a lack of transparency and cooperation from the government of Indonesia. The Commission can ask the Security Council to engage in diplomatic conversations with regional blocs and Member States friendly to Indonesia and to pass resolutions highlighting the responsibility of States in cooperating with investigations. Additionally, increasing public transparency is a useful tool to pressure Indonesia to fully cooperate. It would be valuable to have representatives from the governments of Indonesia, East Timor, and other regional Member States involved. After receiving different answers from the above-mentioned parties, hearing each government's perspectives on the evidence of ineffective trials will better inform the Security Council of the problem. Representatives from the militias and the Indonesian Military should also be interviewed. Neutral experts from regional blocs like ASEAN, NGOs, and those affiliated with the UN during the referendum and following conflict could help conclude whether sentences applied to alleged perpetrators are accurate. Finally, witnesses including victims, the families of victims, and those who directly witnessed the fallout from the referendum should be interviewed to provide first-person testimonials. | |
| Country: | South Africa |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
| Paper text: | |
| Of paramount importance to ascertaining the nature and severity of the dangers and/or crimes occurring
in Darfur is determining whether genocide is occurring in the region. With this information, UN members
states and non-governmental organizations can better understand how to prevent further atrocities in
Darfur and begin security/recovery operations in the area. To ascertain the nature of the crisis in Darfur,
the Commission of Historical Inquiry must bring several community leaders and/or international
advocates for the people of Darfur to get their firsthand account and on-the-ground assessment of the
crisis. It may be difficult to locate and bring such representatives to the commission for consultation so
the review of reports, messages, photographs, and videos from multiple parties in Darfur may stand in
for this direct testimony in the commissionâs review. Additionally, the commission should seek to consult
officials within the Sudanese Government and military forces carrying out operations in Darfur to
understand their perspective on events. Aid groups attempting to administer aid and humanitarian
assistance in the area must also be consulted by the commission to understand the threats they face
and the events they are witnessing in Darfur.
The commission must consult experts from the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, as well as officials from the African Union that can provide valuable insights into the definition of genocide and what genocide can look like on the African continent. Genocide scholars must also be consulted to understand the mechanics of a possible extermination in Darfur and to ensure the historical record, and the future actions it motivates, remain accurate and truthful. Regarding the historic crisis in East Timor, it is similarly important to the fact-finding, and report-writing, mission of the Historical Commission of Inquiry to explore bringing a diverse set of experts and individuals with first-hand experience with the crisis to provide their insights and analysis. The commission must consult experts in international law, potentially justices or other senior officials in the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court, to understand the legal/political nature of the situation in East Timor and what future actions could look like for the UN in addressing and reconciling lingering issues. To better understand on-the-ground issues surrounding this crisis outside of an international legal- political perspective, the commission must interview/consult Indonesian government officials directly involved in the military operations, referendum, and subsequent violence across East Timor. To understand the other side of this crisis, the commission must consult citizen and community leaders from East Timor, as well as the nascent stateâs political leadership which can effectively articulate the lasting scars from the violence on the state and its people. To capture a UN perspective, the commission must also consult leaders in the United Nations Mission in East Timor and the International Force in East Timor to understand their perspective on the crisis and what they witnessed to be effective security and reconciliation techniques. | |
| Country: | South Africa |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| Regarding the historic crisis in East Timor, it is similarly important to the fact-finding, and report-writing,
mission of the Historical Commission of Inquiry to explore bringing a diverse set of experts and
individuals with first-hand experience with the crisis to provide their insights and analysis. The
commission must consult experts in international law, potentially justices or other senior officials in the
International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court, to understand the legal/political nature
of the situation in East Timor and what future actions could look like for the UN in addressing and
reconciling lingering issues.
To better understand on-the-ground issues surrounding this crisis outside of an international legal- political perspective, the commission must interview/consult Indonesian government officials directly involved in the military operations, referendum, and subsequent violence across East Timor. To understand the other side of this crisis, the commission must consult citizen and community leaders from East Timor, as well as the nascent stateâs political leadership which can effectively articulate the lasting scars from the violence on the state and its people. To capture a UN perspective, the commission must also consult leaders in the United Nations Mission in East Timor and the International Force in East Timor to understand their perspective on the crisis and what they witnessed to be effective security and reconciliation techniques. | |
| Country: | Switzerland |
| Topic: | Commission of Inquiry on Darfur |
| Paper text: | |
| According to the UNHCR, the conflict in Darfur has resulted in the internal displacement of
over one million IDPs, and over 200,000 refugees who have fled to Chad. Widespread
drought has led to famine and forced relocation. Civilians, especially women and children,
are vulnerable to daily violence, and direct assaults on humanitarian aid workers have
occurred. Sudan has failed to comply with Security Council resolution 1556, making no
substantial progress on the Janjaweedâs disarmament, or the identification and
prosecution of parties responsible for carrying out war crimes and violations of human
rights and humanitarian law.
The mandate before the Commission is to investigate these reports, determine whether genocide has occurred, and recommend further action. We should seek to establish two overarching lines of inquiry: (1) What elements under international human rights law have been violated, by whom, and to what degree were these intentional and systemic? (2) Is there evidence of genocide pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide? Additional lines of inquiry include: (3) What violations of international humanitarian law were committed, and by what actors? (4) Was the Sudanese Government responsible for arming the Janjaweed? If so, how was the armament executed? To what extent did this support contribute to their operations and the escalation of the conflict? (5) To what degree were the Janjaweed acting on their own accord, or coerced by the Sudanese Government? Did they receive compensation and/or immunity? We should interview resistance leaders, government officials, Janjaweed members, IDPs, refugees in Chad, and the Baggara. Additionally, welcoming international legal experts can offer clarification on human rights, humanitarian law, genocide, and accountability forums such as the ICC. Furthermore, we should request satellite imagery of North, South, and West Darfur, any registry of government arms movement, and NGO reports all while being cognizant of the political impact of our findings. A key testimony from former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell can unveil their independent investigationâs findings and what evidence may be useful as we proceed with our own. The Commission should seriously consider recommending the Security Council to establish a peacekeeping mission or other form of mediation, as a major concern is the political effects of our findings in Darfur. As a Commissioner, I will be dedicated to ensuring accurate information gathering, proactiveness, and a just finding. | |
| Country: | Switzerland |
| Topic: | Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 |
| Paper text: | |
| The 1999 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)-led independence referendum
resulted in an overwhelming majority vote for East Timorese independence from
Indonesia. In the days proceeding the referendum, militia members, Indonesian soldiers
and high-ranking officials forcibly displaced over 250,000 people to camps, sought out and
slaughtered supporters of independence, and carried out massacres at places of refuge.
Indonesia has been tasked with prosecuting responsible individuals in its government yet
has failed to do so in the years since.
The mandate of the Commission regarding the prosecution of serious violations of human rights in Timor-Leste is to review the progress in judicial process in Indonesia, evaluate the extent to which accountability has been achieved, and recommend measures so that justice is delivered to the people of Timor-Leste. To fulfill this mandate, we should explore, among others, the following lines of inquiry: (1) Of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the Dili Court and Ad Hoc Human Rights Court trials, who were the accused, how many were convicted, and what were their sentences? (2) To what degree did the Courts adhere to the recommendations of earlier reports documenting human rights violations, and were there inconsistencies in the severity of charges indicted? (3) Was there any relationship between the rank of Indonesian Military (TNI) officials and their sentences? (4) Was there consistent failure on the part of the Prosecution in the trials of human rights cases from 1999-2005? We should take it upon ourselves to extensively review the documentation of trials already concluded in the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court and the KKP HAM report detailing the post-referendum violence. We may wish to interview prosecutors in the concluded cases, UNAMET and UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) staff, President Gusmao, former President Habibe, and experts on human rights law and the judicial process of Indonesia. Our biggest obstacle will be the joint Indonesia and Timor-Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF), which may prefer to settle certain disagreements outside of domestic courts. I would propose mediation by making note of the CTFâs wishes in our report. | |
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