Return To: 2025 Handbook

The Security Council

Membership of the Security Councils Membership of the Security Councils

This year, AMUN is pleased to offer two concurrent simulations of the Contemporary Security Council. The information and background materials found on this page apply to both Security Council A and Security Council B.

Security Council A Membership

  • Algeria
  • China
  • Denmark
  • France
  • Greece
  • Guyana
  • Pakistan
  • Panama
  • Republic of Korea
  • Russian Federation
  • Sierra Leone
  • Slovenia
  • Somalia
  • United Kingdom
  • United States of America

Security Council B Membership

  • Algeria
  • China
  • Ecuador
  • France
  • Guyana
  • Japan
  • Malta
  • Mozambique
  • Republic of Korea
  • Russian Federation
  • Sierra Leone
  • Slovenia
  • Switzerland
  • United Kingdom
  • United States of America

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Introduction Introduction

The topics covered in this chapter are a guide to help direct your research on your State’s positions. Updates on likely topics for the Contemporary Security Council will be posted online throughout the fall. These updates will be linked at the top of this page, directly under the Security Council header as they are published. The Contemporary Security Council topics below are current as of 1 August 2025 and may not include all topics that the Council might discuss at Conference. With the ever-changing nature of international peace and security, what is important to the Council may change between now and the start of Conference. However, representatives are encouraged to be familiar with these topics and the topics addressed in the fall updates.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions to help them in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from their country’s perspective:

  • How did this situation begin?
  • Which parties are involved in the situation and what are their concerns?
  • How have similar situations or conflicts been peacefully resolved?
  • What roles can the United Nations take in the situation? What roles should the United Nations take in the situation?
  • If there are non-state actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

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The Situation in the Sudans The Situation in the Sudans

Sudan

In 2018, Sudan saw widespread protests break out against the long-time President Omar al-Bashir, who had ruled Sudan since the late 1980s. The protests, initially about the rising cost of bread and fuel, were met with a brutal crackdown by President al-Bashir’s security forces. The harsh response by President al-Bashir resulted in the expansion of protest goals to include removing him from office and instituting civilian rule. In 2019, following escalating clashes between protestors and security forces, the leadership of the Sudanese military overthrew President al-Bashir. The new military government promised the protestors they would act as a transitional government until free and fair elections could occur. As time passed, however, the military government did not hold elections, citing continued instability. During the transitional period, negotiations continued between the civilian protestors and the military government. The military government failed to address the country’s extreme inflation and widespread instability. Protests began again in October 2021 and continued throughout 2022 and into 2023. 

In April 2023, fighting broke out between two military groups, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF and RSF were previously allies who formed the military government that overthrew President al-Bashir. However, the alliance collapsed amid mutual accusations that each side was attempting to oust the other from power and influence within the transitional military government. The fighting escalated quickly, and within the first month, the capital of Khartoum was largely depopulated. An estimated 14,000 were killed and over 8 million refugees fled to neighboring countries such as Egypt and Chad during the first year of the war. Surrounding countries are struggling to support the influx of refugees: Egypt deported at least 800 Sudanese refugees and Chad asked for support from other countries. However, some refugees in Chad rejected humanitarian aid because it was sent by the United Arab Emirates, which has been accused of supporting the RSF. Over a year after it began, the conflict has largely stalled, with documented cases of ethnic cleansing, starvation and widespread sexual violence against women on all sides. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), based in Darfur, has tentatively aligned itself with the SAF against the RSF. The cooperation between the SLM and SAF occurred shortly after the RSF regained control of Darfur and restarted the violence from the early 2000s civil war where the predecessor to the RSF, the Janjaweed, were accused of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. 

In June 2024, an estimated 10 million people were internally displaced, with an additional 2 million people displaced by June 2025. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Program (WFP) have declared over 700,000 people in Sudan are facing phase five famine on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale with over 25 million estimated to be at phase three plus —high levels of acute hunger— on the IPC scale. Humanitarian aid agencies have been unable to reliably deliver aid due to the ongoing conflict. Famine is considered particularly severe in the city of al-Fasher in western Sudan due to the ongoing siege of the city by the RSF. In addition to the famine, there has been spread of diseases like malaria, measles and whooping cough. On Monday, 16 June 2025, the RSF renewed its assault on the displacement camps around al-Fasher. These assaults include the recruitment of children, sexual violence and targeting of civilians with other forms of violence. On Thursday, 19 June 2025, in retaliation to the RSF attacks, the SAF launched air strikes against the RSF in West Kordofan and North Kordofan. 

The United Nations fact-finding mission found both sides of the conflict have committed human rights violations against civilians and called for an arms embargo. As a result, the United Nations Security Council renewed its arms embargo on 11 September 2024 in S/RES/2750(2024), which is set to expire in September 2025. The current military government, led by the SAF, has rejected the fact-finding mission’s conclusions and opposes any form of United Nations intervention. 

South Sudan

In South Sudan, the government announced that the elections expected for December 2024 have been delayed for two years. The transitional government took power in 2020 after a peace agreement which called for them to hold free and fair elections. The government has not been able to complete a census, finish drafting a permanent constitution, hold registration for political parties or many other tasks considered necessary to hold a free and fair election. Being unable to complete these tasks, the transitional government has declared it a security risk to hold elections at this time. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) special representative made a statement to the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission of South Sudan (RJMEC) Plenary on 18 September 2024 in support of the transitional government’s decision to delay elections. 

However, in March 2025, the current interim President, Salva Kiir of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), had Vice-President Riek Machar of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) arrested. The SPLM-IO interpreted this move as a violation of the 2018 peace agreement. There have been numerous skirmishes between the two militias, along with fighting amongst civilians from different ethnicities. In response to the increase in violence, the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo against all of South Sudan and individually targeted sanctions against key players.

Abyei

The border region, Abyei, between present day Sudan and South Sudan has been disputed for decades. Decolonization of the region in the 1950s created one State of Sudan; South Sudan wasn’t internationally recognized as a separate State until 2011. Sudan experienced internal conflict almost constantly since the State’s founding. A temporary resolution to the conflict was reached in 2005 when the sides signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also called the Naivasha Agreement. This Agreement called for a permanent ceasefire monitored by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), a referendum vote in 2011 on whether South Sudan wanted to become an independent State and for the oil profits of the Abyei region to be split. 

The current conflict in Abyei broke out in 2011 over a dispute on the referendum vote. South Sudan was officially recognized as its own sovereign country. However, the region of Abyei was claimed by both countries. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was formed by the Security Council through Resolution 1990 due to the “violence, escalating tensions and population displacements.” UNISFA was given the mandate to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid with permission to use force as necessary to protect civilians and those delivering humanitarian aid. The current conflict between the SAF and RSF in Sudan has increased tensions in the Abyei region between different factions. Raids have become commonplace in the region between the Twic and Ngok factions.

However, even after the deployment of peacekeepers, the violence in the region continued, with violent disputes happening between various rebel and militia groups. In January of 2024, an attack occurred by the Twic faction in the village of Juba, leaving 52 dead, including two peacekeepers, and 64 wounded. There have been reports of peacekeeper vehicles being targeted. In response, the Security Council condemned the actions of the violent attacks and reaffirmed its commitment to UNISFA. UNISFA has been a stable presence as a police force throughout the Abyei region and has upheld its mission to protect civilians and distribute aid at community stations.

Bibliography

United Nations Documents

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The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question

On 7 October 2023, Hamas and allied organizations controlling the Palestinian territory of Gaza launched a coordinated attack against Israel. Many elements of the attack appear to have been chosen to inflict civilian casualties. Approximately 1,400 Israelis were killed and 251 hostages were taken. The Israeli government responded with a declaration of war against Hamas and imposed a “total siege” on Gaza, cutting off water, food, electricity and fuel. Gaza relies heavily on supplies from Israel to ensure access to food, basic emergency services and sanitation. After Israel imposed a partial blockade and land deliveries of aid to Gaza became difficult, the United States constructed a floating dock and pier to allow ships to offload aid. On 2 March 2025, Israel, with support from the United States, imposed a full humanitarian blockade on Gaza to pressure Hamas to release the remaining Israeli hostages, alleging that Hamas had been diverting previously permitted aid. 

Following heavy aerial and artillery bombardment throughout Gaza, the Israeli military surrounded Gaza City in the north and mounted military operations near the southern cities of Khan Younis and Rafah. Of Gaza’s pre-war population of 2 million, approximately 1.7 million people have fled south, primarily to the area around Rafah. On 24 May 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Israel to halt its offensive near Rafah and to keep the border crossing open. Despite the ICJ order, the Israeli government has continued to conduct airstrikes in Rafah. These airstrikes have drawn significant international scrutiny, especially concerning the safety of medics and journalists. The Ministry of Health in Gaza and Israeli authorities have reported over 53,000 fatalities and over 120,000 injured as of May 2025. 

The Secretary-General, António Guterres, warned famine in northern Gaza is imminent and 1.1 million people are facing catastrophic hunger, according to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification report. By September 2025, the entire population of Gaza—approximately 2.1 million people—is projected to face “Crisis or worse” food insecurity. In late March the World Food Programme announced in a news release that it had food stocks to continue operations for only two more weeks. As of June, the World Food Programme had stocked over 100,000 metric tons of food, but remains unable to distribute until the blockade is lifted. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the situation in Gaza is “tantamount to ethnic cleansing.”

Throughout the Israel-Hamas conflict, the United Nations Security Council has convened multiple times and voted on various resolutions. However, the Security Council has repeatedly found itself deadlocked, with permanent members exercising their veto power to block resolutions. Speakers in the General Assembly have stated that repeated vetoes of Security Council resolutions embolden the Israeli government, and Secretary-General Guterres has warned that the Council has “severely—perhaps fatally—undermined its authority”. After a draft resolution failed to pass after vetoes from Russia and China, Resolution 2728 passed when the United States abstained. However, on 4 June 2025 the United States vetoed a resolution calling for an “immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza.”

Bibliography

United Nations Documents:

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Threats to International Peace and Security Threats to International Peace and Security

Since the conflict between Israel and Palestine began in late 2023, Secretary-General Guterres has warned of the potential for the conflict to spread to the broader Middle East. His warnings proved to be largely correct. In late April 2024, following an Israeli airstrike against the Iranian consulate in Syria, Iran retaliated by launching multiple missiles at Israel, many of which were intercepted. Hostilities repeated again in July 2024 with the assassinations of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s top leader was killed in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut in late September along with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brigadier general, Abbas Nilforoushan.In retaliation, Iran launched a direct missile attack on Israel, with most missiles being intercepted. Later in the month, Israel carried out another series of airstrikes in Iran,primarily targeting military installations in an attempt to minimize civilian casualties.

Since the early 1990s, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly accused Iran of being on the brink of arming itself with a nuclear weapon. In 2015, the United States, in conjunction with the United Kingdom, Russian Federation, France, China and Germany, reached a deal with Iran on sanctions and its nuclear program, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Less than three years later, the United States withdrew from the agreement, reimposing its sanctions against Iran. In June 2025, hostilities nearly reached a boiling point. Israel began a new offensive aimed at impeding or destroying the Iranian nuclear program. On 21 June, the United States joined the operation by bombing three nuclear research facilities in Iran. In addition to the destruction of nuclear facilities, Israeli authorities report that at least 10 nuclear scientists were also killed in the campaign. 

The United States initially claimed that the Iranian nuclear program was “obliterated”, but early intelligence reports stated that Iran’s nuclear program had only been set back a few months. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has been active in Iran since a 2005 audit of its nuclear program, has also inspected the sites targeted by United States and Israeli bombs, and has repeatedly stressed the importance of not directly attacking nuclear plants.

Bibliography

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