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2025 Handbook Historical Commission of Inquiry of 2005
Topics
The Historical Commission of Inquiry (COI) simulates two historical commissions, each established by the United Nations Security Council to provide in-depth reporting on the facts and developments of a particular dispute. The Commissions’ mandates may also empower them to serve as mediators in negotiations between the parties to the dispute. At the United Nations, each Commission is unique in membership and purpose. At AMUN, however, two disputes that have been the subject of past Commissions will be scrutinized by the same body of experts. These experts will include representatives from States which were seated on the historical Commissions–in this case Egypt, South Africa, India, and Fiji–and representatives from States which applied for placement on the AMUN Commission.
Members of the United Nations can formally raise disputes to the Security Council through Article 35 of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council investigates those disputes through Article 34 of the Charter, historically by forming Commissions of Inquiry. The objectives of a Commission of Inquiry are to investigate the facts and allegations of a dispute, keep the Security Council informed of its findings and developments, and to tender a final report on the facts of the dispute at the conclusion of each investigation. That final report may also include recommendations for the Security Council.
At AMUN, the Commission of Inquiry is a historical simulation. History is considered to track with true events until the start date for the simulation. Events occurring after that date are subject to change through the actions of the experts and by direction of the simulation staff. This brief provides an introduction to the issues before the Commission as of the start date of the simulation. The start date for this year’s Commission is 25 October 2004.
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
Sudan’s decolonization began with the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian agreement granting self-governance, culminating in full independence on 1 January 1956. However, the newly formed republic quickly descended into conflict, as the First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) erupted between the Arab-Muslim north and the African-Christian and animist south. This war, driven by southern demands for autonomy and fueled by northern political dominance, resulted in up to a million deaths and ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted limited autonomy to the south. The fragile peace collapsed in 1983 when President Gaafar Nimeiri imposed Sharia law nationwide, igniting the ongoing Second Sudanese Civil War. This conflict, marked by scorched-earth tactics, famine and mass displacement, has claimed over one million lives by September 2004, and has devastated southern Sudan.
In 1989, Brigadier General Omar al-Bashir seized power in a military coup, establishing an Islamist regime aligned with the National Islamic Front. His government suppressed opposition, intensified the civil war and has been accused of using famine as a weapon by obstructing aid to rebel-held areas. Despite international condemnation, al-Bashir secured the presidency through elections in 1996 and 2000, both marred by opposition boycotts and allegations of fraud.
The Darfur region in western Sudan, a semi-arid plateau with sparse vegetation and seasonal rivers (wadis), became the epicenter of Sudanese conflict in 2003. Ethnically non-Arab groups like the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa—collectively represented by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—rebelled against the neglect and repression of the central government of Khartoum. The government-backed Janjaweed militia responded with violence, exploiting Darfur’s fragmented tribal geography and deep-rooted nomad-farmer tensions. Growing tensions between Chad, Libya and Sudan have increased the regional strategic importance of Darfur as well, with numerous groups seeking Darfurian tribes to identify as “pro-Arab” or “pro-African.” The conflict has and continues to create mass displacement and has received international condemnation.
In light of the increasing violence and displacement, the United Nations Security Council has sought to secure peace in cooperation with the African Union (AU). On 8 April 2004, the AU brokered the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between Sudan and the SLM, and created the African Union Ceasefire Monitoring Commission, the organization’s first major peacekeeping operation.
In further support of the ceasefire agreement, on 11 June 2004, the Security Council established a United Nations Advance Team in Sudan to prepare for a future United Nations peace-support operation following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement. While primarily focused on the broader Sudanese peace process, it also acknowledged the deteriorating situation in Darfur and the need for international attention. By the end of July, the Council demanded that the Sudanese government disarm the Janjaweed militias and imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities in Darfur.
On 18 September 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1564, requesting the Security-General to establish an international Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in Darfur and determine whether acts of genocide had occurred.
While the Sudanese government has agreed to comply with the Commission, interventions by the international community have not eased tensions in the region. If the the Commission concludes that Sudan has committed genocide against its African citizens, economic sanctions and additional peacekeeping operations may further destabilize al-Bashir’s internal regime, as well as Sudan’s regional influence amongst neighboring Chad and Libya. Conversely, if the Commission’s analysis concludes the Sudanese government is responding with appropriate military action, the political push of the SLM and JEM to increase rural representation in government may be at risk. For the militarized groups involved in the conflict, the scope of influence that each faction will hold in the future shaping of the Sudan will depend greatly on the international perception of their respective actions.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- What factors must be considered when determining whether or not genocide has occurred under the Sudanese government?
- If it is determined that genocide has occurred, how will the parties responsible be identified and held accountable? If genocide has not occurred, what steps, if any, should the international community take to address the humanitarian crisis?
- What obstacles might the Secretary-General encounter when approaching the development of possible ceasefire agreements within the region?
Bibliography Bibliography
- Agreement With the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur (28 May 2004).
- England, Andrew (21 February 2004). SLA rebels attack government convoy in western Sudan, killing 150 soldiers. The Sudan Times.
- France-Presse, Agence (14 December 2000). Vote in Sudan Starts Slowly As Opposition Calls Boycott. The New York Times.
- Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur (02 April 2004).
- Johnson, Douglas H (12 June 2021). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars.
- The Human Rights Watch (4 May 2004). Darfur Destroyed.
- The Human Rights Watch (24 November 2003). Sudan, Oil and Human Rights.
- Zirulnick, Ariel (8 July 2011). South Sudan: A Timeline to Independence. The Christian Science Monitor.
United Nations Documents United Nations Documents
- United Nations, Economic and Social Council (7 May 2004). Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan. E/CN.4/2005/3.
- United Nations, Security Council (18 September 2004). Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan. S/RES/1564.
- United Nations, Security Council (30 July 2004). Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan. S/RES/1556.
- United Nations, Security Council (11 June 2004). Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan (S/2004/453). S/RES/1547.
Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999
The island of Timor was historically divided between two colonial powers with a Dutch-ruled western half administered as part of the Dutch East Indies and a Portuguese-ruled eastern half called Portuguese Timor or East Timor. This status quo, held from the early sixteenth century until World War II, was disrupted by the Japanese invasion of European territories in the Southwest Pacific. In early 1942, Japanese troops invaded East Timor. Following the war, Portugal was quick to re-establish colonial rule over East Timor and appointed a new minister to oversee all Portuguese colonies, though East Timor remained largely neglected.
Portugal’s control in the region remained tenuous, and following the Carnation Revolution in 1974, a new Portuguese government was installed which sanctioned the creation of Timorese political parties. On 28 November 1975, Fretilin, the colony’s de facto governing party, unilaterally declared independence for East Timor. Following this declaration, which was largely unrecognized by the international community, Indonesia invaded East Timor by air and sea in December 1975. The United Nations Security Council did not recognize Indonesia’s annexation and called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces through Resolution 384. Despite this rebuke, Indonesia continued its occupation of East Timor, which was met with both covert and overt resistance.
In January 1999, the new Indonesian President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, announced that a referendum would be held in which the people of East Timor would vote on the issue of autonomous integration with Indonesia. This announcement reflected a shift in Indonesian policy and seemingly marked a new willingness to consider independence for East Timor. On 28 January 1999, Indonesian leaders indicated they would support independence for East Timor should the people vote against autonomous integration with Indonesia. In a show of good faith, Indonesia transferred the resistance leader Xanana Gusmao to house arrest from the maximum security prison where he was serving a 20 year sentence for inciting rebellion. Indonesia’s actions were met with both optimism and suspicion. The announcement incited conflict between pro-Indonesian and pro-independence groups with 30 people reportedly killed in the week following Indonesia’s announcement. As tensions continued to escalate, the viability of a peaceful referendum was questioned.
On 7 May 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1236 commending the efforts of Portugal and Indonesia in Timor and solidified United Nations oversight of the referendum. Through Resolution 1246, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to provide consultation and security for the referendum. This resolution further acknowledged the ongoing conflicts and called for demilitarization. On 4 September 1999, with a majority of votes cast against autonomous integration, the results were a de facto vote in favor of independence.
In response to the announced referendum results, pro-integration militias, with support of Indonesian soldiers, swiftly enacted a scorched earth campaign of violence and retaliation across East Timor. This violence resulted in the deaths of at least 1,300 Timorese, the displacement of approximately 30 percent of the Timorese population and the forced evacuation of UNAMET staff. Under economic and international pressure, on 12 September 1999, Indonesia announced its withdrawal from East Timor and agreed to allow international forces to restore order. Three days later, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) through Resolution 1264, and within the week, INTERFET troops were on the ground in East Timor. On 20 October 1999, Indonesia formally accepted the referendum results. On 25 October, the Security Council passed Resolution 1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to administer East Timor, which it would oversee until the declaration of East Timorese independence on 20 May 2002.
Through Regulation 2000/15, the UNTAET established the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (Special Panels) within the Dili District Court and later established the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) subordinate to the Office of the General Prosecutor of Timor-Leste to obtain justice for crimes committed during the 1999 violence. The Indonesian government, under intense international pressure, authorized an inquiry into the events of 1999 and created an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta to try individuals indicated by the inquiry. However, Indonesia faced international criticism for the court’s perceived failure to hold parties responsible. By November 2004, all individuals who had been tried were acquitted either in trial or on appeal. Additionally, concerns continued regarding the ability of the Special Panels acting within Timor-Leste to deliver justice. Following the intention of the Secretary General, a Commission of Experts was appointed on 18 February 2005 to investigate, assess and report back on the status of developments in Timor-Leste. The Commission was tasked to assess the progress made in bringing justice, to determine whether full accountability has been achieved and to recommend future actions. Representatives from India and Fiji were appointed to the Commission of Experts by the Secretary-General.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- What judicial processes have been used by the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes?
- Have these institutions functioned effectively to achieve justice and accountability for the crimes committed in East Timor? If not, what obstacles and difficulties have been encountered?
- What additional measures should be considered by the Secretary-General to hold those responsible accountable, secure justice for the victims and the people of East Timor and promote reconciliation?
Bibliography Bibliography
- Amnesty International (13 April 2003). Indonesia/Timor Leste: International responsibility for justice.
- Andelman, David A. (8 December 1975). INDONESIANS HOLD PORTUGUESE TIMOR AFTER INCURSION. The New York Times.
- France-Presse, Agence (6 November 2004). Indonesian Wins Appeal Against Rights Verdict. The New York Times.
- Indonesia Says It’s Ready to Give Independence to East Timorese (28 January 1999). The New York Times.
- JAPAN DENOUNCED BY LISBON’S PRESS; Invasion of Portuguese Timor Viewed as Aggression That ‘Cannot Be Accepted’ (23 February 1942). The New York Times.
- Mydans, Seth (13 September 1999). Indonesia Invites a U.N. Force to Timor. The New York Times.
- Mydans, Seth (4 September 1999). In East Timor, Decisive Vote for a Break from Indonesia. The New York Times.
- Mydans, Seth (11 February 1999). Rebel Leader in East Timor Moves Closer to Freedom. The New York Times.
- Nuttall, Ruth (2021). Political Continuity and Conflict in East Timor.
- Pereira, Zélia, and Rui Graça Feijó (2023). Timor-Leste’s Long Road to Independence Transnational Perspectives.
- Richardson, Michael (4 February 1999). Indonesia’s Offer of Independence Now Suspect as Violence Flares : Second Thoughts About East Timor. The New York Times.
- Richardson, Michael (29 January 1999). Possibility Raised for Territory Indonesia Invaded 24 Years Ago : Jakarta Suggests a Free East Timor. The New York Times.
- Robinson, Geoffrey (2010). “If You Leave US Here, We Will Die”: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor.
- UN Compound under Seige after Evacuation (10 September 1999). Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
- United Nations (2013). Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (20 October 1999). Humanitarian Coordinator’s Situation Report – East Timor Crisis 20 Oct 1999.
United Nations Documents United Nations Documents
- United Nations, General Assembly (12 December 1975). Question of Timor. A/RES/3485.
- United Nations, Security Council (11 January 2005). Letter dated 11 January 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2005/96.
- United Nations, Security Council (16 November 2004). Timor-Leste. S/RES/1573.
- United Nations, Security Council (25 October 1999). East Timor. S/RES/1272.
- United Nations, Security Council (15 September 1999). East Timor. S/RES/1264.
- United Nations, Security Council (27 August 1999). East Timor. S/RES/1262.
- United Nations, Security Council (3 August 1999). Timor. S/RES/1257.
- United Nations, Security Council (11 June 1999). Timor. S/RES/1246.
- United Nations, Security Council (7 May 1999). Timor. S/RES/1236.
- United Nations, Security Council (22 April 1976). East Timor. S/RES/389.
- United Nations, Security Council (22 December 1975). East Timor. S/RES/384.
- United Nations, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (6 June 2000). ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PANELS WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENCES. UNTAET/REG/2000/15.
Topics
The Historical Commission of Inquiry (COI) simulates two historical commissions, each established by the United Nations Security Council to provide in-depth reporting on the facts and developments of a particular dispute. The Commissions’ mandates may also empower them to serve as mediators in negotiations between the parties to the dispute. At the United Nations, each Commission is unique in membership and purpose. At AMUN, however, two disputes that have been the subject of past Commissions will be scrutinized by the same body of experts. These experts will include representatives from States which were seated on the historical Commissions–in this case Egypt, South Africa, India, and Fiji–and representatives from States which applied for placement on the AMUN Commission.
Members of the United Nations can formally raise disputes to the Security Council through Article 35 of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council investigates those disputes through Article 34 of the Charter, historically by forming Commissions of Inquiry. The objectives of a Commission of Inquiry are to investigate the facts and allegations of a dispute, keep the Security Council informed of its findings and developments, and to tender a final report on the facts of the dispute at the conclusion of each investigation. That final report may also include recommendations for the Security Council.
At AMUN, the Commission of Inquiry is a historical simulation. History is considered to track with true events until the start date for the simulation. Events occurring after that date are subject to change through the actions of the experts and by direction of the simulation staff. This brief provides an introduction to the issues before the Commission as of the start date of the simulation. The start date for this year’s Commission is 25 October 2004.
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
Sudan’s decolonization began with the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian agreement granting self-governance, culminating in full independence on 1 January 1956. However, the newly formed republic quickly descended into conflict, as the First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) erupted between the Arab-Muslim north and the African-Christian and animist south. This war, driven by southern demands for autonomy and fueled by northern political dominance, resulted in up to a million deaths and ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted limited autonomy to the south. The fragile peace collapsed in 1983 when President Gaafar Nimeiri imposed Sharia law nationwide, igniting the ongoing Second Sudanese Civil War. This conflict, marked by scorched-earth tactics, famine and mass displacement, has claimed over one million lives by September 2004, and has devastated southern Sudan.
In 1989, Brigadier General Omar al-Bashir seized power in a military coup, establishing an Islamist regime aligned with the National Islamic Front. His government suppressed opposition, intensified the civil war and has been accused of using famine as a weapon by obstructing aid to rebel-held areas. Despite international condemnation, al-Bashir secured the presidency through elections in 1996 and 2000, both marred by opposition boycotts and allegations of fraud.
The Darfur region in western Sudan, a semi-arid plateau with sparse vegetation and seasonal rivers (wadis), became the epicenter of Sudanese conflict in 2003. Ethnically non-Arab groups like the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa—collectively represented by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—rebelled against the neglect and repression of the central government of Khartoum. The government-backed Janjaweed militia responded with violence, exploiting Darfur’s fragmented tribal geography and deep-rooted nomad-farmer tensions. Growing tensions between Chad, Libya and Sudan have increased the regional strategic importance of Darfur as well, with numerous groups seeking Darfurian tribes to identify as “pro-Arab” or “pro-African.” The conflict has and continues to create mass displacement and has received international condemnation.
In light of the increasing violence and displacement, the United Nations Security Council has sought to secure peace in cooperation with the African Union (AU). On 8 April 2004, the AU brokered the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between Sudan and the SLM, and created the African Union Ceasefire Monitoring Commission, the organization’s first major peacekeeping operation.
In further support of the ceasefire agreement, on 11 June 2004, the Security Council established a United Nations Advance Team in Sudan to prepare for a future United Nations peace-support operation following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement. While primarily focused on the broader Sudanese peace process, it also acknowledged the deteriorating situation in Darfur and the need for international attention. By the end of July, the Council demanded that the Sudanese government disarm the Janjaweed militias and imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities in Darfur.
On 18 September 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1564, requesting the Security-General to establish an international Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in Darfur and determine whether acts of genocide had occurred.
While the Sudanese government has agreed to comply with the Commission, interventions by the international community have not eased tensions in the region. If the the Commission concludes that Sudan has committed genocide against its African citizens, economic sanctions and additional peacekeeping operations may further destabilize al-Bashir’s internal regime, as well as Sudan’s regional influence amongst neighboring Chad and Libya. Conversely, if the Commission’s analysis concludes the Sudanese government is responding with appropriate military action, the political push of the SLM and JEM to increase rural representation in government may be at risk. For the militarized groups involved in the conflict, the scope of influence that each faction will hold in the future shaping of the Sudan will depend greatly on the international perception of their respective actions.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- What factors must be considered when determining whether or not genocide has occurred under the Sudanese government?
- If it is determined that genocide has occurred, how will the parties responsible be identified and held accountable? If genocide has not occurred, what steps, if any, should the international community take to address the humanitarian crisis?
- What obstacles might the Secretary-General encounter when approaching the development of possible ceasefire agreements within the region?
Bibliography Bibliography
- Agreement With the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur (28 May 2004).
- England, Andrew (21 February 2004). SLA rebels attack government convoy in western Sudan, killing 150 soldiers. The Sudan Times.
- France-Presse, Agence (14 December 2000). Vote in Sudan Starts Slowly As Opposition Calls Boycott. The New York Times.
- Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur (02 April 2004).
- Johnson, Douglas H (12 June 2021). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars.
- The Human Rights Watch (4 May 2004). Darfur Destroyed.
- The Human Rights Watch (24 November 2003). Sudan, Oil and Human Rights.
- Zirulnick, Ariel (8 July 2011). South Sudan: A Timeline to Independence. The Christian Science Monitor.
United Nations Documents United Nations Documents
- United Nations, Economic and Social Council (7 May 2004). Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan. E/CN.4/2005/3.
- United Nations, Security Council (18 September 2004). Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan. S/RES/1564.
- United Nations, Security Council (30 July 2004). Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan. S/RES/1556.
- United Nations, Security Council (11 June 2004). Report of the Secretary-General on The Sudan (S/2004/453). S/RES/1547.
Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999
The island of Timor was historically divided between two colonial powers with a Dutch-ruled western half administered as part of the Dutch East Indies and a Portuguese-ruled eastern half called Portuguese Timor or East Timor. This status quo, held from the early sixteenth century until World War II, was disrupted by the Japanese invasion of European territories in the Southwest Pacific. In early 1942, Japanese troops invaded East Timor. Following the war, Portugal was quick to re-establish colonial rule over East Timor and appointed a new minister to oversee all Portuguese colonies, though East Timor remained largely neglected.
Portugal’s control in the region remained tenuous, and following the Carnation Revolution in 1974, a new Portuguese government was installed which sanctioned the creation of Timorese political parties. On 28 November 1975, Fretilin, the colony’s de facto governing party, unilaterally declared independence for East Timor. Following this declaration, which was largely unrecognized by the international community, Indonesia invaded East Timor by air and sea in December 1975. The United Nations Security Council did not recognize Indonesia’s annexation and called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces through Resolution 384. Despite this rebuke, Indonesia continued its occupation of East Timor, which was met with both covert and overt resistance.
In January 1999, the new Indonesian President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, announced that a referendum would be held in which the people of East Timor would vote on the issue of autonomous integration with Indonesia. This announcement reflected a shift in Indonesian policy and seemingly marked a new willingness to consider independence for East Timor. On 28 January 1999, Indonesian leaders indicated they would support independence for East Timor should the people vote against autonomous integration with Indonesia. In a show of good faith, Indonesia transferred the resistance leader Xanana Gusmao to house arrest from the maximum security prison where he was serving a 20 year sentence for inciting rebellion. Indonesia’s actions were met with both optimism and suspicion. The announcement incited conflict between pro-Indonesian and pro-independence groups with 30 people reportedly killed in the week following Indonesia’s announcement. As tensions continued to escalate, the viability of a peaceful referendum was questioned.
On 7 May 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1236 commending the efforts of Portugal and Indonesia in Timor and solidified United Nations oversight of the referendum. Through Resolution 1246, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to provide consultation and security for the referendum. This resolution further acknowledged the ongoing conflicts and called for demilitarization. On 4 September 1999, with a majority of votes cast against autonomous integration, the results were a de facto vote in favor of independence.
In response to the announced referendum results, pro-integration militias, with support of Indonesian soldiers, swiftly enacted a scorched earth campaign of violence and retaliation across East Timor. This violence resulted in the deaths of at least 1,300 Timorese, the displacement of approximately 30 percent of the Timorese population and the forced evacuation of UNAMET staff. Under economic and international pressure, on 12 September 1999, Indonesia announced its withdrawal from East Timor and agreed to allow international forces to restore order. Three days later, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) through Resolution 1264, and within the week, INTERFET troops were on the ground in East Timor. On 20 October 1999, Indonesia formally accepted the referendum results. On 25 October, the Security Council passed Resolution 1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to administer East Timor, which it would oversee until the declaration of East Timorese independence on 20 May 2002.
Through Regulation 2000/15, the UNTAET established the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (Special Panels) within the Dili District Court and later established the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) subordinate to the Office of the General Prosecutor of Timor-Leste to obtain justice for crimes committed during the 1999 violence. The Indonesian government, under intense international pressure, authorized an inquiry into the events of 1999 and created an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta to try individuals indicated by the inquiry. However, Indonesia faced international criticism for the court’s perceived failure to hold parties responsible. By November 2004, all individuals who had been tried were acquitted either in trial or on appeal. Additionally, concerns continued regarding the ability of the Special Panels acting within Timor-Leste to deliver justice. Following the intention of the Secretary General, a Commission of Experts was appointed on 18 February 2005 to investigate, assess and report back on the status of developments in Timor-Leste. The Commission was tasked to assess the progress made in bringing justice, to determine whether full accountability has been achieved and to recommend future actions. Representatives from India and Fiji were appointed to the Commission of Experts by the Secretary-General.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- What judicial processes have been used by the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes?
- Have these institutions functioned effectively to achieve justice and accountability for the crimes committed in East Timor? If not, what obstacles and difficulties have been encountered?
- What additional measures should be considered by the Secretary-General to hold those responsible accountable, secure justice for the victims and the people of East Timor and promote reconciliation?
Bibliography Bibliography
- Amnesty International (13 April 2003). Indonesia/Timor Leste: International responsibility for justice.
- Andelman, David A. (8 December 1975). INDONESIANS HOLD PORTUGUESE TIMOR AFTER INCURSION. The New York Times.
- France-Presse, Agence (6 November 2004). Indonesian Wins Appeal Against Rights Verdict. The New York Times.
- Indonesia Says It’s Ready to Give Independence to East Timorese (28 January 1999). The New York Times.
- JAPAN DENOUNCED BY LISBON’S PRESS; Invasion of Portuguese Timor Viewed as Aggression That ‘Cannot Be Accepted’ (23 February 1942). The New York Times.
- Mydans, Seth (13 September 1999). Indonesia Invites a U.N. Force to Timor. The New York Times.
- Mydans, Seth (4 September 1999). In East Timor, Decisive Vote for a Break from Indonesia. The New York Times.
- Mydans, Seth (11 February 1999). Rebel Leader in East Timor Moves Closer to Freedom. The New York Times.
- Nuttall, Ruth (2021). Political Continuity and Conflict in East Timor.
- Pereira, Zélia, and Rui Graça Feijó (2023). Timor-Leste’s Long Road to Independence Transnational Perspectives.
- Richardson, Michael (4 February 1999). Indonesia’s Offer of Independence Now Suspect as Violence Flares : Second Thoughts About East Timor. The New York Times.
- Richardson, Michael (29 January 1999). Possibility Raised for Territory Indonesia Invaded 24 Years Ago : Jakarta Suggests a Free East Timor. The New York Times.
- Robinson, Geoffrey (2010). “If You Leave US Here, We Will Die”: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor.
- UN Compound under Seige after Evacuation (10 September 1999). Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
- United Nations (2013). Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (20 October 1999). Humanitarian Coordinator’s Situation Report – East Timor Crisis 20 Oct 1999.
United Nations Documents United Nations Documents
- United Nations, General Assembly (12 December 1975). Question of Timor. A/RES/3485.
- United Nations, Security Council (11 January 2005). Letter dated 11 January 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2005/96.
- United Nations, Security Council (16 November 2004). Timor-Leste. S/RES/1573.
- United Nations, Security Council (25 October 1999). East Timor. S/RES/1272.
- United Nations, Security Council (15 September 1999). East Timor. S/RES/1264.
- United Nations, Security Council (27 August 1999). East Timor. S/RES/1262.
- United Nations, Security Council (3 August 1999). Timor. S/RES/1257.
- United Nations, Security Council (11 June 1999). Timor. S/RES/1246.
- United Nations, Security Council (7 May 1999). Timor. S/RES/1236.
- United Nations, Security Council (22 April 1976). East Timor. S/RES/389.
- United Nations, Security Council (22 December 1975). East Timor. S/RES/384.
- United Nations, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (6 June 2000). ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PANELS WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENCES. UNTAET/REG/2000/15.