



THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

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HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

The Historical Security Council (HSC) of 1994 will simulate the events of the world beginning on 1 January 1994. At the time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolved around the unrest in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslav Republics. However, the Council may discuss any issue involving international peace and security. Representatives should have a broad knowledge of the world and world events as they stood on 1 January 1994. The Security Council can, at its discretion, involve other States or parties to the dispute on a particular topic. Possible parties to the dispute may include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Somalia, Uganda, Georgia and Haiti.

The brief synopses presented here offer merely introductory coverage of prominent international issues that can direct representatives' continued research and preparation.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions, which should assist them in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from their country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin?
- Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

In 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgian colonial rule and organized as a one-party state controlled by a Hutu-dominated government. The new Rwandan government reversed colonial-era discrimination and ethnic quotas in employment and education and enforced those quotas against the minority Tutsi ethnic group. In response, Tutsi refugees in Zaire and Tanzania began attacking Hutus. The government reacted violently against Tutsi guerrilla groups. In a 1973 coup d'état, General Juvenal Habyarimana seized control of the Hutu government, promising to restore peace, national development and unity. However, preferential treatment of Hutus aggravated the ethnic tensions throughout the following years. By the end of the 1980s, nearly 500,000 Tutsis sought refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania.

In the late 1980s, individuals from the Tutsi refugee diaspora in Uganda created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political and military organization to reform the Rwandan government and return Tutsi

refugees to Rwanda. Members of the RPF blamed the government for its failure to democratize and to resolve the refugee problem. On 1 October 1990, a force of 7,000 RPF troops launched a major attack from the safe haven of Uganda onto Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) in Northern Rwanda, igniting a civil war in Rwanda. Despite their small numbers, the RPF troops' prior military experience in the Ugandan civil war allowed them to make significant gains against the Hutu forces. Their gains were short-lived, however, and the RPF was pushed back across the border by month's end. The RPF regrouped over the next three months. Under the new leadership of Paul Kagame, the RPF embarked on a more sustained campaign of guerrilla-style warfare from bases and safe havens in the Virunga Mountains. The Rwandan government sought military and financial assistance from Belgium, France and Zaire in response to the RPF attacks. The RAF launched a counteroffensive with heavy military equipment.

The civil war inflamed ethnic tensions. Tutsis inside Rwanda and moderate Hutus were labeled accomplices of the RPF and designated traitors by the government. The Hutu-run media ran a propaganda campaign aimed at promoting the superiority of Hutus and the evils of Tutsis. Ethnic tensions boiled over in the spring of 1991 when Hutu activists carried out organized killings sanctioned by local governments of roughly 1,000 Tutsis in several northern cities. Tutsis in the north were eventually allowed to relocate to safer areas, but the anti-Tutsi rhetoric only increased over the next year.

Both internal and external political pressure finally forced President Habyarimana to agree to negotiations, and lines of communication were opened between some government officials and the RPF. A ceasefire was agreed upon in July 1992, and, with the help of France, the United States and the Organisation of African Unity, peace talks were held in Arusha, Tanzania on 12 July 1992. An early agreement from these talks set a timetable for ending the fighting, promoted further peace talks between parties, addressed the repatriation of refugees and authorized the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer. The Arusha Accords concluded on 4 August 1993 with the final agreement calling for a democratically elected government and the formation of a transitional government consisting of power sharing between the current government and the RPF until elections were held and refugees repatriated. The Arusha Accords caused an open split among Hutus in power, with radical Hutu groups opposing the Habyarimana government. This led to increased anti-Tutsi propaganda, including increasingly radical radio broadcasts from Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) beginning in mid-July 1993. Activities of the Interhamwe militias, formed from internally displaced youth in 1992 by Hutu government and military leaders, also increased in late 1993.



In June 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) with the purpose of verifying that no military assistance reached Rwanda over the northern Ugandan border. In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Resolution 872 to aid in the implementation and monitoring of the Arusha Accords and to support the transitional government for an initial period of six months. UNAMIR's headquarters became operational on 1 November 1993. Shortly after arriving, UNAMIR Commander General Romeo Dallaire informed UN officials that there was the potential for large-scale, serious violence in Rwanda. However, UN officials did not respond.

On 10 December 1993, the Rwandan government, the RPF and the Special Representative of UNAMIR issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitments to the Arusha Accords and agreed to set up a broad-based transitional government before 31 December 1993. On 20 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 891 extending UNOMUR's mission for six months.

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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In 1946, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a constituent republic of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which governed numerous ethnic groups. After the death of President Josip Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia quickly plunged into political and economic turmoil. Ethnic unrest spread, and the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began declaring their independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from SFRY and became an independent state on 3 March 1992. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina's

declaration of independence was opposed by Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian-controlled federal government of Yugoslavia. Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, ethnic groups previously incorporated under the SFRY began waging war with one another in an effort to gain territorial control within the former Yugoslav territory.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence was quickly recognized by the European community and the United States. In response, Serbian National Forces immediately began strikes upon Sarajevo, the newly-declared capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over the next several months, the Serbian National Forces gained control over nearly two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Serbian forces gained territory, they drove out many non-Serbs, creating a large internally displaced persons and refugee population.

As the Serbs gained ground, reports surfaced accusing them of committing ethnic violence toward ethnic Bosnians and Croats. Accordingly, the UN passed Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, which created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the purpose of promoting peace talks and maintaining peace in UN safe-zones and no-fly zones. Initially, UNPROFOR redirected observers from other parts of Yugoslavia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it later brought in additional observers. Although UNPROFOR was able to achieve some success, continued fighting led to a series of economic sanctions against all of Yugoslavia in May 1992. Through a series of resolutions, the Security Council imposed stricter sanctions prohibiting all import, export and transportation of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; the embargo excluded weapons and military equipment intended for UNPROFOR.

UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded by a series of resolutions passed in October and November 1992. These resolutions aimed to bring stability to Bosnia by deploying additional observers and limiting military flights to only those that were part of UNPROFOR's mission. By March 1993, fighting had increased in eastern Bosnia, with Serb military forces attacking civilian populations and interfering with humanitarian operations. Fighting intensified as local Muslims from surrounding areas were driven into the town of Srebrenica by Serbian military forces.

The large populations of Croats and Serbs further complicated ethnic tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, which had also been part of the Socialist federal republic of Yugoslavia, declared its independence in 1991 and was also fighting its own war against Serbian forces. Like the war in Bosnia, the Croatian War for Independence included ethnic violence between Serbian forces and the ethnic Croat population. These ethnic tensions spilled over into Bosnia, creating a second dimension to the conflict and complicating matters on the ground. By the late spring of 1993, Muslim and ethnic Croat forces inside of Bosnia held a tenuous alliance against the Serbs.

In May 1993 fighting erupted in central Bosnia. The fighting interrupted main supply routes to northern Bosnia and disrupted UNPROFOR operations. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that a significant lack of funding for UN missions threatened to interrupt necessary day-to-day operations in the coming months. On 4 October 1993, the Security Council extended the UNPROFOR mandate for an additional six months to 31 March 1994. In November 1993, the Security Council issued statements noting its concern that increasing military actions posed significant threats to the civilian population and



demanding that the attacks stop. Numerous peace plans and ceasefires were signed in November 1993, but they have, thus far, failed to curb fighting and stop attacks on UNPROFOR.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

In the late 1980s, civil war ravaged Somalia. A weak economy, massive foreign debt and the increasingly authoritarian policies of the Siad Barre presidency led to the formation of several resistance organizations and rebel groups. One of the most organized and effective of these groups was the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The USC eventually managed to oust Barre in early 1991, but the fighting did not end with Barre's exit. The USC and other rebel groups could not come to a political agreement, and most rebel groups chose to consolidate power within their own regions rather than share power in a formal government agreement. Internal squabbles within the USC led to Ali Mahdi Mohamed being named president and the group splitting in two, with General Aidid leading the anti-Mohamed faction. As 1991 drew to a close intense fighting plagued Mogadishu and other regions, as different groups clashed in their struggle for power.

The volatile political situation combined with a severe drought led to drastic food shortages throughout Somalia. Nearly 300,000 people died of starvation by 1992. Fighting displaced nearly two million more people, driving them into different parts of Somalia or neighboring countries.

On 3 March 1992, Aidid and Mohamed signed a ceasefire agreement. The Security Council created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM I) on 24 April 1992, to provide observers and facilitate the ceasefire. Unfortunately, conditions continued to deteriorate as factions became increasingly hostile toward the UN operation. In July 1992 the UNISOM I mandate was strengthened, and four operational zones were

established. At the same time, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called for a 100-day plan to address the dire humanitarian crisis.

Concerned by the continued deterioration of the situation, the Security Council passed resolution 794 on 4 December 1992, in which the Council agreed that conditions under Article VII of the UN Charter had been met and Member States had permission to intervene and secure a safe environment for UNISOM I. The United States agreed to take control of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that was created. The presence of UNITAF in Somalia was considered a success. Humanitarian aid was reaching the people, and many of the rebel factions agreed to attend the meeting for national reconciliation convened in January of 1993 by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The reconciliation meeting eventually led to the Addis Ababa Agreement on 27 March. With a ceasefire in place and reconciliation underway, the Security Council passed resolution 814 replacing UNITAF with UNISOM II. UNISOM II was tasked with monitoring all factions' compliance with the ceasefire; preventing the resumption of violence; seizing small arms from unauthorized elements; maintaining control of heavy weapons; securing ports and means of communication necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid; protecting UN and NGO operations and their workers; demining the region; and repatriating refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

By May 1993, it became clear that not all signatories to the March Addis Ababa agreements intended to cooperate. General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of the Somali National Alliance, teamed with other factions and began engaging in armed attacks against UNISOM II, killing international troops and workers. Resolution 837 condemned these attacks and called for ground and air operations in Mogadishu to affect the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible for the attacks on peacekeepers. UNISOM II continued operations and additional ground forces from the United States were brought in for support in apprehending General Aidid and his supporters.

An increase in violence against UN and US soldiers over the summer of 1993 led to the United States sending special forces to the area specifically to neutralize General Aidid and his forces. On 3 October 1993 US Army rangers carried out a raid to capture two clan leaders. The initial mission was a success, but, on their return flight, two of the black hawk helicopters carrying the rangers were attacked and shot down by Somali militia members. The subsequent operation to rescue the downed ranger group would later be known as the Battle of Mogadishu. It extended throughout the city and lasted into the next morning when UNISOM II troops were able to carry out a rescue. The battle ended with 18 US, one Pakistani and one Malaysian fatalities in addition to more than 70 wounded. Casualty estimates from the Somalis ranged anywhere from 300 to over 2,000. Additionally, one US Army ranger was captured by the Somalis and held by General Aidid for eleven days.

As a result of the Battle, the United States abruptly changed its policy toward Somalia and General Aidid. On 6 October 1993, US President Bill Clinton ordered an end to all non-defensive US actions against General Aidid and announced that all US forces would be withdrawing from Somalia by no later than 31 March 1994. Currently, there are only a few hundred US Marines remaining. Additionally, the US sent Robert Oakley as a special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker peace.

General Aidid has agreed to stop actions against UNISOM II troops and return to the peace process. Members of the Somali factions have



been meeting to discuss peace and the future of Somalia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia since December, but progress has been slow. As the United States continues to withdraw its troops, other countries have pledged to follow suit, leaving the future of the UNISOM II and UN involvement in Somalia uncertain.

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THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

The Republic of Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, fueling separatist and nationalist concerns by citizens in the autonomous Abkhaz Republic (Abkhazia) within Georgia. The newly independent Georgia and Abkhazia were initially able to reach a power sharing agreement, but political turmoil within Georgia led to hardline Georgian nationalists taking power, which reignited the political disagreement between the two. On 23 July 1992, the Abkhaz legislature voted to return to the 1925 Soviet-era Constitution where Abkhazia was a Soviet Union republic and not part of Georgia. The State Council of the Republic of Georgia declared the act void.

Violence broke out in Abkhazia as its leadership removed Georgian officials from their offices. Separatists attacked Georgian troops who had been sent in to Abkhazia to secure main highways and railways. In August, Abkhazian separatists kidnapped 11 Georgian political negotiators, including the Interior Minister. In response, Georgia sent 3,000 troops into the capital of Sukhumi to restore order. Reports from this first offensive indicated the presence targeted violence against ethnic Abkhazians. As a result, most ethnic Abkhaz fled the capital.

Throughout the fall of 1992, several ceasefire agreements were brokered but ultimately fell apart. Both sides used the intervening months to fortify their positions and launch airstrikes on each other's positions in the towns around Sukhumi, many of which resulted in heavy civilian casualties. The heavy bombardments have left civilians cut off from basic supplies, and there have been widespread reports of both ethnic violence and looting and murder as a result of the unrest.

With the help of Russian military equipment and logistics, Abkhazian forces launched three attacks on Sukhumi in January, March and early July. Each attack was ultimately unsuccessful. On 9 July 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 849, calling for plans to dispatch military observers once a ceasefire began. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire on 27 July and on 6 August, in Resolution 854, the Security Council called for an advance team of 10 military observers to be sent to Abkhazia. On 24 August, Resolution 858 established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), authorizing 88 military observers to verify compliance with the ceasefire and investigate violations. Unrelated political unrest in Georgia hampered the Georgian forces within Abkhazia from completing their agreed withdrawal, and on 16 September 1993, Abkhazian launched another attack on Sukhumi, breaking the ceasefire. Within eleven days, Abkhazian troops were able to regain control of almost all Abkhazian territory.

The Security Council passed Resolution 881 on 4 November, approving the extension of UNOMIG until 31 January 1994. On 1 December 1993, UN-sponsored negotiations began in Geneva; Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Memorandum of Understanding and promised not to use force against each other during the negotiations. The negotiations stalled when Abkhazia refused to recognize Georgia's territorial integrity. On 22 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 892 authorizing the phased deployment of 50 additional military observers.

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

On 16 December 1990, democratic elections were held in Haiti under the supervision of the United Nations. Father Jean Aristide was elected on a platform of a new economic deal for the poor and a cleansing of the civil service. Less than a year into his presidency, on 29 September 1991, Aristide was ousted by a military coup. Aristide was allowed to escape to Venezuela after diplomatic intervention by the US, French and Venezuelan ambassadors. Under the leadership of General Raoul Cedras, the military immediately began slaughtering supporters of Aristide, killing more than a thousand people in two weeks. In response, over 200,000 people fled the capital. The Organization of American States (OAS) imposed economic sanctions on Haiti, and the United States, France and Canada suspended all economic assistance. On 8 October 1991, the OAS urged all member countries to freeze Haitian assets and proposed a civilian force that would mediate disputes and monitor compliance.

The OAS and the United States pushed for Aristide's return to power. On 23 February 1992, an OAS-mediated agreement granted amnesty to the coup plotters. However, on 27 March, the Haitian Supreme Court and Senate rejected the accord. Hostilities continued in Haiti as international pressure mounted to impose a universal trade embargo on oil and weapons. On 23 April 1993, the General Assembly authorized the United Nations to take part in a UN/OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti to deploy human rights monitors in the country, after which the Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a comprehensive fuel and arms embargo in Haiti. On 3 July 1993, Cedras and Aristide signed the Governor's Island Agreement, which stated that Aristide would resume power on 30 October 1993. On 27 August 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 861 suspending the sanctions against Haiti. Four days later, Resolution 862 was adopted, which dispatched a small contingent to assess requirements for the UN Mission in Haiti.

Prior to Aristide's return to power in October, however, violence broke out in Haiti. Anti-Aristide gunmen menaced government workers and a UN team in the area, causing the Security Council to pass Resolution 867 on 23 September to immediately dispatch the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). American and Canadian troops sailed to Haiti, but, after they were blocked from docking by anti-Aristide forces, the United States ordered the ship to return. The Security Council passed Resolution 873 on 13 October reinstating the sanctions

of Resolution 841. UN envoy Dante Caputo organized talks with the Haitian military leaders to restore Aristide to power, but the talks fell apart. With the failure of the talks and continued violence, Caputo withdrew all civilian monitors from the island by the end of October.

On 22 December 1993, the United States, France, Canada and Venezuela cautioned Haiti's military leaders that the embargo would be expanded if Aristide were not allowed to return to power by 15 January 1994. Meanwhile, Aristide announced that he was organizing a conference in Miami on 15 January 1994 to help restore democracy to Haiti.

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