



CHAPTER THREE

THE SECURITY COUNCILS

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCILS

Representatives of the Security Councils should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Unlike other Committees and Councils at AMUN, the topics listed in the Issues book do not constitute a complete list of topics the Security Councils can discuss. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Councils.

Therefore, representatives on the Contemporary Security Council must have a broad knowledge regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals and online sources are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended sources include: the *New York Times*, *United Nations Chronicle*, *The Times* of London, *Al Jazeera*, the *Mail & Guardian*, *Foreign Policy* and the *Economist*. The *UN Wire* is an excellent resource for timely information and one good way for representatives to stay abreast of the most recent reports published by the Security Council and other relevant United Nations bodies.

Historical Security Council (HSC) representatives should approach their Council's issues based on events up to the start date of the simulation and should do their research accordingly. It is strongly recommended that research be done using historical materials whenever possible. The world has changed dramatically over the years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, representatives should peruse periodicals and other primary sources from 3-5 years before the year in question that most accurately reflect the worldview at that time. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* or the *New York Times Index*, will provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts.

DECLARATIVE STATEMENTS AND OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

Security Council Members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions that will affect the course of the simulation; this ability to change reality makes these simulations different from many others. Council representatives must actively bring their State's policies and capabilities into the simulation. Representatives are welcome and encouraged to make declarative statements—including real or implied threats and deals—that do not carry operational implications outside of the United Nations; however, representatives must always consult with the Simulation Staff before making *any* operational decisions. Operational decisions include any actions that would have a real-world effect outside of the United Nations, including, for example, the announcement of movements of or actions by national military forces. In these cases, the Simulation Staff act as the home office or government of the involved Member State(s).

Simulation Staff are always available to consult with representatives as they work through their diplomatic options. Representatives are encouraged to seek out Simulation Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need to supplement their research on a situation. Simulation Staff wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for representatives about their countries and the topics at hand.

A NOTE ABOUT AMUN'S SIMULATION PHILOSOPHY

One of the core principles of AMUN is to mirror the practice and dynamics of the United Nations as much as possible. To that end, AMUN strives to create and conduct simulations that are a realistic representation of diplomacy at the United Nations and within the international system more broadly. We believe this commitment furthers AMUN's aims to create a fair and fun experience for all representatives and that it enhances the educational mission of the organization.

This commitment to realism is especially important in Security Council simulations where representatives respond to an alternate timeline and reality shifts depending on the Council's actions. Representatives are therefore asked to act within the realm of the possible.

All *actions* (as opposed to statements) proposed by Council Members must be approved by AMUN's Simulation Staff, who are charged with managing each simulation's timeline and alternate reality. As a rule, the Simulation Staff will give representatives a wide latitude in decision making. However, the Simulation Staff may deny a certain action if it falls outside of the bounds of reality or would negatively impact the realism of the simulation for all participants.

For every issue before the Council, each Member is faced with a variety of options of how to react and what policy line to take. A realistic simulation will consider only those options that would have reasonably been on the table for a State at a particular moment in time. In other words, there will always be options States do not consider or dismiss out of hand because they have limited capabilities or due to historical, cultural, or political constraints; in a realistic simulation, these options are not appropriate. These unrealistic approaches will not be permitted at AMUN.

This commitment to realism does not mean that simulations have a set trajectory they must follow. In the HSCs, there will certainly be many deviations from historical timelines, and re-thinking the way diplomacy played out in the past is encouraged. The same is encouraged in the Contemporary Council. As situations change, so do the options and attitudes of the Council Members and other countries. There are near-infinite possibilities within the bounds of realism, and our Simulation Staff will help representatives work through their options.

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

Sometimes other States will be involved in the deliberations of the Council. Delegations representing these States, if present at AMUN, will be asked to participate in deliberations by the Council. If they are not present or cannot provide a representative to address the Council, a member of the AMUN Secretariat will represent them as necessary. It is customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant Member States during discussion of a topic relevant to that State's interests, although it is not required. Any State mentioned in the background research for a specific Security Council is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any State related to a topic relevant to international peace and security. The Secretariat will notify in advance of the Conference those States likely to be asked to appear



before one of the Historical Security Councils. Those delegations should have one or more representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these States will not be involved in all issues, the representative(s) responsible for the HSC must be assigned to another Committee, preferably with a second representative who can cover that Committee while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment.

A NOTE ABOUT ROLEPLAYING IN HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCILS

AMUN's HSCs are unique not only in their topics, but also in their treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media, and they are flexible. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes; the start date for the historical simulations is provided later in this chapter. From the start date forward, what transpires will be dependent upon both Council Members' actions and Simulation Staff decisions. Council Members are encouraged to exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character, upon the capabilities of their governments and within the bounds of realistic diplomacy.

Effective roleplaying for an HSC Member State will not just be a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in that year. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations—and reevaluations—of national policies. Thus, it cannot be said that the policy course a government took in that year will necessarily be the wisest. Even were circumstances the same, it is not a sure thing that any given national government would do things exactly the same way given a second opportunity to look at events. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for second chances.

It will be the job of Council representatives to actively bring their country's policies and capabilities into the simulation when discussing problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's position on the various issues. One major factor representatives should consider when deciding whether or not to be actively involved is the cost of involvement by the United Nations. An increase in costs often causes the Security Council to re-prioritize its efforts.

While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council Members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters.

Both HSC simulations will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred and as modified by the representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism representatives must remember that they are roleplaying the individual assigned as their State's representative to the United Nations. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their States, or

they may be relatively in the dark on their State's moment-to-moment actions in the world.

OPEN ISSUES

A unique feature of each Security Council in simulations at AMUN is the Council's ability to set its own agenda. The situations outlined in the council-specific topic guides on the following pages are only a few of those facing the world at the time and each Security Council can discuss any topic that the body wishes. For the contemporary Security Council this includes any real-world event up until the day the simulation convenes. For the Historical Security Councils, representatives should have a working knowledge of the events prior to and including the start date for their respective simulation. For the Historical Security Council of 1956, the start date is 1 May 1956. For the Historical Security Council of 1994, the start date is 1 January 1994.

For the time periods in question, open issues could include any active United Nations peacekeeping operations, the work of any United Nations body active at the time, and any social or economic issue of the day. It is strongly recommended that all representatives be well versed on current and historical global events relevant to their simulation.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Councils. For the contemporary Security Council these briefs are current as of spring 2017. Information for the Historical Security Councils covers information available up until the respective start dates of each simulation. AMUN recommends that representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of the background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.



THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMBERS OF THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

BOLIVIA

CHINA

EGYPT

ETHIOPIA

FRANCE

ITALY

JAPAN

KAZAKHSTAN

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SENEGAL

SWEDEN

UKRAINE

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

URUGUAY

INTRODUCTION

The Contemporary Security Council topics below are current as of Spring 2017 and are not all-inclusive of what the Council might discuss at Conference. With the ever-changing nature of international peace and security, these four topics are a guide to help direct your research for your State's position. A more complete and updated version of likely topics for the Contemporary Security Council will be posted online this fall at www.amun.org.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin?
- Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Situation in the Middle East is dominated by two separate but interconnected topics: the Syrian Civil War and the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). International actions on either front will undoubtedly affect the other, and the geopolitical challenges that plague the region generally, and the Syrian Civil War specifically, complicate executing a more-unified effort against ISIL.

The complexities of the Syrian Civil War have been compounded and complicated by the presence of ISIL in Syria. The large number of anti-Assad factions, of which ISIL is one, has resulted in constantly-shifting tactical and strategic alliances. State-based alliances and actions in the region are also complicated—at various points, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia have all been involved in the fight against ISIL but have also supplied various sides in the Syrian Civil War as well. Generally, Sunni-dominated countries, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have supported the rebels, while Shia-controlled states, such as Iran and Iraq, have supported Assad. In short, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in a triangulated conflict and a complex proxy war for the region's and world's most powerful militaries, but one in which the alliances and goals are very murky drawn.

THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Bashar al-Assad assumed the presidency of Syria in January 2000; his father was the president of the country from 1971-2000. Assad is also

the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces and the General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath political party. Assad was once hailed as a reformer in the region, although those hopes have all but vanished since 2012.

As part of the Arab Spring movement in 2011, civilian protesters advocated for a variety of democratic and social reforms including equality for the Kurdish population, the introduction of opposition political parties and freedom of the press. Several days after the protests began, government forces opened fire on protesters in Deraa, where the movement started. The Assad regime made some small conciliatory gestures in the spring, but pressure on the Assad regime intensified and violence spread. The protest movement spread to many of Syria's major cities, including Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. In due course, members of the opposition began to arm themselves against Syrian government forces; later their aims would shift to displacing Assad's loyalist forces.

In 2012, the United Nations and the Arab League sent Kofi Annan as Special Envoy to Syria. A six-point peace plan was announced and accepted by Assad but rejected by the fractious opposition groups that lacked coordinated leadership. In April 2012, the Security Council passed Resolution 2043 to form the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor cessation of violence. Syria did not cooperate with the mission, and the mandate expired on 19 August 2012. Over time, the regime's response has been increasingly brutal and particularly devastating to Syrian civilians in besieged towns and cities.

The fighting in Syria has ebbed and flowed for more than six years, but the cumulative effects of near-constant fighting have made the humanitarian situation particularly dire. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates that more than 465,000 Syrians have died and more than 12 million have been displaced as a result of the conflict. The rising numbers of refugees and internally-displaced persons have placed pressure not only on Syria but also on neighboring countries as well as Europe. The few humanitarian aid groups and non-governmental organizations operating in Syria report catastrophic conditions related to medical care and basic sustenance needs.

Under the Obama administration, the United States held that defeating ISIL was the highest priority in the Middle East and that it would not make regime change in Syria an explicit goal. Then, in March 2017, under the new American president, Donald Trump, and following evidence that Syrian government forces had used chemical weapons against civilians, the United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles toward an airfield in Syria, the first direct attack on Assad's regime by US forces. As of May, further shifts in US policy following the Tomahawk strike were unclear.



To date, action in the Security Council has been limited under the persistent threat of Russian or Chinese veto. To date, Russia has vetoed eight resolutions on Syria; the Chinese six. Even efforts to ensure humanitarian aid in Syria have been stymied by complicated geopolitical relationships. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), and numerous United Nations aid convoys have been blocked from providing assistance to the region.

THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

The consequences of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq continue to reverberate in the Middle East. Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, a movement took hold in the region. This movement would eventually become al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Following Al-Zarqawi's death in 2006, the Sunni Awakening and the surge of American troops put added pressure on AQI. By 2008, AQI was on the brink of destruction. Nevertheless, despite the drastic pruning of the organization, it was not defeated.

Over the summer of 2010, the new leader of AQI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, worked to replenish the organization's leadership, as the US and its partners decreased their military presence and prepared to leave Iraq. After December 2011, AQI went back on the offensive. The expansion into Syria set off a series of internal power struggles between the leadership of al-Qaeda and AQI. The internal struggle gave AQI the chance to expand into Syria. Al-Baghdadi renamed AQI, calling the organization the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The organization is also known as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), IS (Islamic State), and Da'esh (an acronym of the group's Arabic name, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, but also understood as an insult). In February 2014, ISIL and al-Qaeda severed their ties, reflecting the differing goals between Baghdadi and the senior leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

With tensions high between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish population, ISIL moved to Mosul and began working to consolidate power and land. On 10 June 2014, ISIL seized Mosul. ISIL declared itself a caliphate on 29 June, claiming exclusive political and theological authority over the world's Muslim population. The seizures of the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tikrit assisted in connecting ISIL controlled territories thus helping pave the way for ISIL to access oil fields in both Syria and Iraq. Additionally, ISIL has worked to establish state institutions, such as a Council of Ministers, and to recruit additional forces internationally through social media and international media coverage.

The United States and its allies began airstrikes against ISIL territory in the fall of 2014, with minimal success. By early 2015, ISIL was in control of several key areas in Syria and Iraq, including oil fields. On 12 February 2015, the Security Council passed Resolution 2199 condemning both trade with terrorist groups and the paying of hostage ransom fees. Late in 2015, Russia announced it would begin airstrikes, ostensibly contributing to the fight against ISIS, but Russia targeted anti-Assad opposition groups more broadly, suggesting to the international community that Russia's primary interest was in supporting the Assad regime, rather than in defeating ISIL. In 2016 and early 2017, the anti-ISIL coalition made substantial gains in re-taking territory, both in Syria and Iraq—with the Assad regime touting even small victories to bolster the morale of Syrian troops.

Throughout 2016 and the beginning of 2017, ISIL began to take credit for a number of attacks outside of Iraq and Syria—both in the region (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Saudi Arabia), and outside (e.g., Germany, France, Belgium, the United States, Indonesia, Bangladesh). For the most part, these attacks appear to be planned by independent local or homegrown terrorists (rather than centrally-planned or financed by ISIL); it is only after an attack is carried out that ISIL leadership claims responsibility for the attacks. This chain of events represents a major departure from the methods of typical terrorist organizations, and it is of great concern to governments around the world. The fully-decentralized and uncoordinated nature of the planning and execution of attacks means traditional counter-terrorism approaches are less successful.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BBC News (2015). *Syria Profile-Timeline*. BBC News. 25 June.
 Gilsinian, Kathy (2015). *The Confused Person's Guide to the Syrian Civil War*. The Atlantic. 29 October.
 Glass, Charles (2015). *Syria Burning: ISIS and the Death of the Arab Spring*. New York: OR Books.
 Kan, Paul Rexton (2014). *Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy*. *Parameters*: 44(4).
 Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters (2016). *The Islamic State*. Council on Foreign Relations. 3 March.
 Lister, Charles (2014). *Profiling the Islamic State*. Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper

UN Docs

- United Nations, Security Council (2017). *The situation in the Middle East*. 23 February. S/RES/2342.
 United Nations, Security Council (2017). *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*. 13 February. S/RES/2341.
 United Nations, Security Council (2016). *The situation in the Middle East (Syria)*. 31 December. S/RES/2336.
 United Nations, Security Council (2016). *The situation in the Middle East (Syria)*. 21 December. S/RES/2332.
 United Nations, Security Council (2016). *The situation in the Middle East (Syria)*. 17 November. S/RES/2319.
 United Nations, Security Council (2016). *The situation in the Middle East (Syria)*. 31 October. S/RES/2314.
 United Nations, Security Council (2016). *The situation concerning Iraq*. 25 July. S/RES/2299
 United Nations, Security Council (2016). *The Situation in the Middle East (Syria)*. 26 February. S/RES/2268.
 United Nations, Security Council (2015). *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*. 17 December. S/RES/2253.
 United Nations, Security Council (2015). *Middle East (Syria)*. 7 August. S/RES/2235.
 United Nations Security Council (2013). *The situation in the Middle East*. 27 September. S/RES/2118.
 United Nations Security Council (2012). *Middle East*. 21 April. S/RES/2043.

THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE

Pro-Russia and pro-Western factions within Ukraine have been at odds since 2012 when Ukraine began negotiating to gain membership to the European Union. After Ukrainian independence in 1991,



Russia enjoyed a high level of influence and power in Ukraine. Ukraine's bid for membership in the European Union threatened Russia's influence. As the Ukrainian government moved to enact some of the policy changes required by the European Union, political pressure from pro-Russian groups mounted, igniting a power struggle between pro-Russian groups and those in favor of more integration into western Europe.

The political power struggle came to a head on 21 November 2013, when, in a dramatic policy reversal, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich announced that Ukraine had suspended its plans to sign the European Union agreement and would instead pursue closer ties with Russia. The announcement sparked outrage and civil unrest in many European capitals and spawned protests in Kyiv and across the Ukraine. The protest movement, named Euromaidan, called for closer ties with Europe and the removal of Yanukovich, accusing him and his government of corruption and abuses of power. Matters only worsened as many protests turned violent and clashed with the police. International concern and pressure on the Yanukovich government to respond to protesters' demands grew. On 15 December 2013, the European Union suspended negotiations with Ukraine after Yanukovich failed to address concerns about Russia's involvement in Ukraine. By February, Russian special forces extracted Yanukovich from Ukraine. Upon learning that Yanukovich had fled to Russia, the Ukrainian Parliament responded immediately by removing President Yanukovich and setting up a provisional government until elections could be held.

Following Yanukovich's removal, protesters in Crimea, an autonomous republic within Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority, made calls to rejoin Russia. The idea garnered broad support within Crimea, including within the Crimean Parliament. On 28 February 2014, Ukrainian officials accused Russia of invading Crimea and trying to incite further violence in Ukraine. Russia denied these charges and noted the troop movements were in line with the agreements with the Ukrainian government for troops stationed in the area. On 16 March, Crimea held a referendum on seceding from Ukraine and becoming part of Russia. Over 90 percent of referendum voters voted to join Russia, and Russia officially annexed Crimea two days later. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations, in A/RES/68/262, called these elections invalid and declared Russia's occupation of Crimea illegal.

Elections were held in Ukraine in May 2014, and Petro Poroshenko was elected President. Poroshenko announced that he would push for early parliamentary elections and would work to mend ties with Russia, with reconciliation contingent on Russia's recognition of Ukraine's territorial claim to Crimea. Even with this progress toward a peaceful solution, violence continued in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russia rebels. The referendum, and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, set off similar movements in two other pro-Russian oblasts (states) of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbass region of Ukraine. Both oblasts held independence referendums on 11 May 2014, which favored self-rule and eventual incorporation with Russia. Over the next few months, fighting intensified in Donbass as Ukrainian military forces clashed with separatist rebels in the region. Near the end of August, Russian forces crossed the border to secure the region for the separatists. By the end of the summer, fighting in the region left thousands of people dead or displaced.

As with Crimea, the international community called the Donetsk and Luhansk referendums invalid and condemned Russia's actions toward

annexation. These conflicts have become a flashpoint, exacerbating tensions between Russia, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The tensions have resulted in a series of economic sanctions against Russia by Western countries.

In September 2014, a ceasefire between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russia rebels was reached. Rebels in Crimea refused to acknowledge actions by the Ukrainian government. In February 2015, Ukraine, Russia and other interested parties adopted the Minsk Agreement to help stem the violence in the eastern portions of Ukraine. This agreement contained provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry by both sides to create a demilitarized zone and constitutional reform in Ukraine, among other provisions. The Security Council adopted Resolution 2202 on 17 February 2015, calling on all parties to implement the Minsk Agreement.

Despite the Minsk Agreement, fighting continued and the humanitarian situation in the region continued to erode. The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights released a report in March 2016 alleging torture and abuse on both sides of the conflict. Though the United Nations has tried to investigate these claims further, the Ukrainian government has remained largely unhelpful. This past winter, Russian forces stepped up attacks on the border regions within the Ukraine, heavily shelling border towns and intensifying the humanitarian impact of the conflict.

In a more recent move to put pressure on Russia, President Poroshenko has cut trade ties with the separatist states, hoping the fragile economies will buckle because of a dependence on Russian economic support. But this move also threatens to destabilize politics within Ukraine, as Ukraine relies on the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts for coal, the country's chief power source. The decision was unpopular with many in the Ukrainian Parliament.

The political situation in Ukraine remains largely unchanged since the Minsk agreement, though new questions about the United States' stance toward Crimea have arisen since President Donald Trump took office in January 2017. Though the Trump Administration has not made any official changes to its policy regarding Ukraine, statements President Trump has made have left many in the international community wondering how committed the United States is to restoring the borders of Ukraine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Erlanger, Steven (2015). Fragile Cease-Fire in Ukraine Inspires Little Confidence in West. New York Times. 28 March.
- Kramer, Andrew E (2017). Fighting in Ukraine may Complicate U.S. Thaw with Russia. New York Times. 31 January.
- Kramer, Andrew E (2017). Ukraine Cuts Off All Trade With Separatist Regions. New York Times. 15 March.
- Kramer, Andrew E and Michael R. Gordon (2017). Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front. New York Times. 27 August.
- McMahon, Robert (2014). Ukraine in Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations. 25 August.
- Sengupta, Somini (2015). Monitors of Ukraine Conflict Seek Help. New York Times. 24 February.
- Sengupta, Somini (2014). Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Crimea. New York Times. 15 March.



Sopova, Alisa (2016). U.N. Suspends Torture Inquiry in Ukraine. New York Times. 26 May.

Weaver, Courtney. (2014) Ukraine's Rebel Republics. Financial Times. 5 December.

UN DOCUMENTS

United Nations, Security Council (2015). Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation (The Situation in Ukraine). 17 February. S/RES/2202.

United Nations Security Council (2014). Security Council Briefed on Fast-Breaking Developments in Ukraine, as Political Official Warns Failure to Secure Russian-Ukrainian Border Obstructing Peace. 12 November. SC/11645.

NON-PROLIFERATION/DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

On 27 July 1953, the Korean War ended with an armistice after more than two years of negotiations between the North and the South regions. Since the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the armistice, a demilitarized zone has been in effect. Almost 50 years later, in June 2000, officials of the two countries signed a joint declaration intended to ease military tensions and promote economic cooperation. This cooperation was tested in 2002, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea admitted they were pursuing a nuclear program. This admission was in violation of both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the Agreed Framework that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held with the United States. As tensions mounted, it became increasingly clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea intended to weaponize this nuclear material. This threat led to the Six Party Talks in 2003, which included the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. The Six Party Talks resulted in formal economic assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in exchange for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not comply with a previous moratorium on testing long-range missiles, and launched several test missiles in July 2006. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1695, which condemned the launches and demanded that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program. Following Resolution 1695, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea began a series of test missile launches, nuclear weapons tests, uranium enrichment programs and weapon trials. These actions were met with increasingly severe condemnations by the United Nations Security Council and the larger international community. The Security Council adopted Resolutions 1718 in 2006 and 1874 in 2009 in an attempt to resume the Six Party Talks, strengthen the sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and have the Democratic People's Republic of Korea retract its withdrawal from the formerly ratified Treaty on the NPT.

On 17 December 2011, the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-il, suffered a fatal heart attack. His son, Kim Jong-un, formally took power in April 2012. The missile launches and nuclear tests continued under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, and, in October 2012, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it had a intercontinental ballistic missile capable

of reaching the mainland of the United States. This disclosure came two days after the Republic of Korea unveiled a missile deal with the United States. The Security Council continued to condemn the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ballistic missile program and urge compliance with Security Council resolutions.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Director General Yukiya Amano, has expressed deep concern over Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear program, and Member States within the Security Council are persistent with statements critical of Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "highly destabilizing behaviour."

On 30 November 2016, after numerous nuclear tests that were increasing in strength, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2321, which imposed the "toughest and most comprehensive sanctions regime ever" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, according to then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Since then, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted more tests, and state officials within the region have warned of the possibility of a "regional arms race." Between February and April 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted over half a dozen ballistic missile tests, with one test landing within 300 kilometers of Japan. On 28 April 2017, United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chaired a meeting of the United Nations Security Council stating that North Korea must take "concrete steps to reduce the threat that its illegal weapons programs pose" before cooperative denuclearization talks can begin.

On 9 May 2017, the Republic of Korea elected Moon Jae-in, who has pledged to work more closely with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un on addressing what he referred to as "the nuclear crisis."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- North Korea Profile – Timeline (2017). BBC News. 8 March.
- Korean War (2009). History. 25 April.
- Sanger, David (2002). North Korea Says It Has A Program on Nuclear Arms. The New York Times. 12 October.
- North Korea warns U.S. on missiles after South deal (2012). BBC News. 9 October.
- Security Council strengthens measures against DPRK's nuclear, ballistic missile activities (2016). UN News Centre. 30 November.
- At governing body, UN atomic energy chief airs concern over DPR Korea's nuclear plan (2017). UN News Centre. 6 March.
- Latest ballistic launches by DPR Korea raise risk of regional arms race, UN Security Council warns (2017). UN News Centre. 8 March.
- Post latest missile test, Security Council condemns DPRK's 'highly destabilizing behavior' (2017). UN News Centre. 6 April.
- Security Council condemns latest 'highly destabilizing' DPRK ballistic missile test (2017). UN News Centre. 20 April.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council (2017). Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 23 March. S/RES/2345.
- United Nations, Security Council (2016). Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 30 November. S/RES/2321.
- United Nations, Security Council (2009). Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 12 June. S/RES/1874.



United Nations, Security Council (2006). Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 14 October. S/RES/1718.

United Nations, Security Council (2006). Letter dated 4 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. 15 July. S/RES/1695.

THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

After Sudan gained independence in 1956, violence and political unrest have plagued the country and its neighbors. Two north-south civil wars, with tensions dating back to 1955, have cost the lives of over two million people. The latest north-south civil war began in 1983, following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. The agreement intended to appease concerns of the southern Sudan liberation movement, establishing the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region. Despite this degree of autonomy granted to the people of the south, increased marginalization from the north generated additional unrest and sparked the Second Sudanese Civil War.

For more than two decades, the rebel movement of the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), fought the Sudanese government over resource infringement and religious determination. On 20 July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol, which restarted the peace process in Sudan and provided that the south could seek self-determination after six years.

In February 2003, intense violence broke out in the western region of Darfur between Sudanese armed forces, local militia and other armed rebel groups. The violence forced hundreds of thousands to flee to Chad, located to the west of Darfur. As the violence escalated and the refugee crisis deepened, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1547 in (blank) of 2004, which approved a special Political Mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts between the concerned parties and prepare for the introduction of an official peace support operation. As the crisis in Darfur escalated, additional tasks were delegated to UNAMIS relating specifically to Darfur.

After continued clashes over southern autonomy, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A reached a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Two months later, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1590, which officially established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The Security Council determined that the mandate of UNMIS would be to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, along with facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, providing humanitarian and development assistance, and contributing toward international efforts to protect and promote human rights in the Sudan. The mandate of UNMIS was expanded by Resolution 1706 in 2006 to include a peacekeeping force of up to 17,300 troops to protect civilians in Darfur, but the Sudanese government strongly opposed this expansion.

On 31 July 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, which augmented the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and established a joint peacekeeping operation in Darfur: the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in

Darfur (UNAMID). Following South Sudan's independence in 2011, the Sudanese government terminated the presence of UNMIS. Currently, UNAMID is the largest peacekeeping mission in the world, with 19,248 total authorized personnel. The current authorization was established by Security Council Resolution 2296 in (blank) of 2016 and is set to expire on 30 June 2017.

Despite United Nations efforts in the region, ethnic cleansing and systematic rape continue in Darfur. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has alleged that the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, has been ordering the ethnic cleansing of non-Arab individuals in Darfur (ethnic groups such as the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa). The ICC issued an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir in 2009, but he continues to refute the charges. President al-Bashir won another five-year term in April 2015.

South Sudan

On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence. The United Nations Security Council welcomed South Sudan by adopting Resolution 1996 on (blank blank) 2011, which established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The Council determined that the mandate of UNMISS was to assist with the post-independence transition, as "the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region."

In December 2013, ethnically-charged attacks broke out in South Sudan's Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Upper Nile states, among others. President Salva Kiir accused his former vice-president, Riek Machar, of plotting to overthrow him, which resulted in fighting primarily between the Dinka, President Kiir's ethnic group, and the Nuer, Riek Machar's ethnic group. South Sudan, as the newest country in the world, is also the most under-developed. This means that the fighting is not only about ethnic and political differences, but also an overall lack of resources.

On 27 May 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2155, which reinforced UNMISS and prioritized its mandate toward the protection of civilians, promotion of human rights and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Resolution also supported the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, reached between the government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in January of 2014.

Despite the agreement, unrest in the country has continued. In March 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2206, which outlines sanctions in South Sudan including, but not limited to, a travel ban on South Sudanese entering other Member States and freezing South Sudanese assets in Member State territories.

More than 2.3 million people have been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began, including 1.66 million internally displaced people (IDPs), of which 53.4% are estimated to be children. Only 185,000 of these IDPs have sought refuge in United Nations Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites. Instability in neighboring countries has led 265,700 refugees from the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic to seek refuge in South Sudan.



As tensions continue to mount and the humanitarian crisis worsens, the United Nations Security Council has stressed that the situation in South Sudan does not have a “military solution.” Seventy nine aid workers have been killed in South Sudan since the conflict began, the most recent of which occurred in March 2017 when six aid workers were ambushed while traveling between Juba, the capital, and the town of Pibor. The current peace process within South Sudan has been described as “not dead” but in need of “significant resuscitation.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Machakos Protocol (2002). *United Nations Peacemaker*. 20 July.
- Security Council Establishes UN Mission in Sudan for Initial Period of Six Months, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1590 (2005). *UN News Centre*. 24 March.
- South Sudan – Crisis Overview (2016). *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. 5 January.
- South Sudan Profile – Timeline (2017). *BBC News*. 24 February.
- Sudan Profile – Timeline (2017). *BBC News*. 10 January.
- No Military Solution in South Sudan, Security Council Presidential Statement Stresses, Urging Immediate End to Violence against Aid Workers (2017). *UN News Centre*. 23 March.
- South Sudan ambush leaves six aid workers dead, UN says (2017). *BBC News*. 26 March.
- UN blocked from South Sudan town amid reports of killings (2017). *BBC News*. 6 April.
- South Sudan Peace Process Not Dead, But Needs ‘Significant Resuscitation’, Secretary-General’s Special Representative Tells Security Council (2017). *UN News Centre*. 25 April.
- UNAMID Facts and Figures (2017). *African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*. 3 May.
- UNAMID Background (2017). *African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*. 3 May.
- UNMIS Background (2017). *United Nations Mission in the Sudan*. 3 May.
- Protecting civilians, monitoring human rights and supporting implementation of cessation of hostilities agreement (2017). *United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan*. 3 May.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council (2004). Sudan. 11 June. S/RES/1547.
- United Nations, Security Council (2005). Sudan. 24 March. S/RES/1590.
- United Nations, Security Council (2006). Sudan. 31 August. S/RES/1706.
- United Nations, Security Council (2007). Sudan. 31 July. S/RES/1769.
- United Nations, Security Council (2011). Sudan. 8 July. S/RES/1996.
- United Nations, Security Council (2014). Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan. 27 May. S/RES/2155.
- United Nations, Security Council (2015). Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan. 3 March. S/RES/2206.
- United Nations, Security Council (2016). Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan. 29 June. S/RES/2296.
- United Nations, Security Council (2017). Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan. 23 March. S/PRST/2017/4.



THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

AUSTRALIA

BELGIUM

CHINA

CUBA

FRANCE

IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

PERU

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SERBIA

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

YUGOSLAVIA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

The Historical Security Council (HSC) of 1956 will simulate the events of the world beginning on 1 May 1956. At the time, Dag Hammarskjöld was the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolved around situations in the Middle East, the situation in South Africa, enforcement of armistice agreements, the right to self-determination, the effects of colonialism and post-colonialism, and disputes over United Nations representation for China. However, the Council may discuss any issue involving international peace and security. Representatives should have a broad knowledge of the world and world events as they stood on 1 May 1956. The Security Council can, at its discretion, involve other States or parties to the dispute on a particular topic. Possible parties to the dispute may include Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

The brief synopses presented here offer merely introductory coverage of prominent international issues that can direct representatives' continued research and preparation.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions, which should assist them in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from their country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin?
- Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict? If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

With the assistance of UN mediation, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War officially ended when Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt signed the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Pursuant to the agreements, Israel controls over 70 percent of the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River; Jordan controls the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and Egypt controls the Gaza Strip. The City of Jerusalem was intended to be an international city, but, at the end of the conflict, the Western half of the city was controlled by Israel, and the Eastern half was controlled by Transjordan, with neither side wanting to cede control of their portion. The parties intended that the Armistice agreements were only interim agreements until they could be replaced by a permanent agreement. A Palestinian state, as was originally part of the United Nations plan creating the Israeli state, was not established, and Arab states have since refused to grant recognition of Israel.

In 1949, the Security Council passed Resolution 73, to monitor the armistice and establish the United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). Despite the Armistice, armed conflict and political tensions continue in the region amid numerous violations of the agreement. Palestinian guerillas have made repeated incursions into Israel from the Gaza Strip, and Israel has responded with retaliatory attacks into Gaza. A major concern for Israel has been Jordan denying access to holy sites in East Jerusalem and Mount Scopus, in violation of the Armistice.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 1955 Israeli forces attacked and seized Syrian positions on the Northeast Corner of Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of Galilee). Israel claimed that the attack was an attempt to stop artillery attacks on Israeli fishing and police boats. On 19 January 1956, the Security Council passed Resolution 111 condemning the attack and calling for both sides to comply with their obligations under Armistice agreements with respect to the demilitarized zone.

In an effort to avert an Arab-Israeli arms race, the United States, United Kingdom and France entered the Tripartite Agreement in May 1950, committing to action both within and outside of the United Nations to prevent the violation of boundaries or armistice lines. Goals include preventing further violence, preventing stoppages of oil production and stopping the spread of Soviet communism to the region.

In response to the 750,000 Palestinian refugees that left Israel between 1946 and 1948, the United Nations General Assembly created the United Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in 1949. Currently, there are approximately 900,000 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Fisher, Sydney Nettleton & Ochesenwald, William. (2010). *The Middle East: A History Volume II*. 7th Edition. Mc-Graw Hill.
- Tessler, M. A. (1994). *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council (1956). The Palestine Question. 4 June. S/RES/114 (S/3605). United Nations, Security Council (1956). The Palestine Question. 4 April. S/RES/113 (S/3575).
- United Nations, Security Council (1956). The Palestine Question. 19 January. S/RES/111 (S/3538).
- United Nations, Security Council (1955). The Palestine Question. 8 September. S/RES/108 (S/3435).
- United Nations, Security Council (1955). The Palestine Question. 30 March. S/RES/107 (S/3379).
- United Nations, Security Council (1955). The Palestine Question. 29 March. S/RES/106 (S/3378).



United Nations, General Assembly. (1949) Assistance to Palestinian Refugees. 8 December. A/RES/302.

Tessler, M. A. (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Indiana University Press.

THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptian military suffered from inefficiency and corruption in the higher ranks, which contributed to low morale. By January 1952 tensions between the ruling Egyptian government and the military and the civilian population led to demonstrations and riots breaking out in Cairo. Demonstrators demanded an end to the British military presence in the country, the presence of foreigners and the government of King Farouk. In response to the violence, King Farouk ousted his Prime Minister, Moustafa El-Nahas, in January 1952. Despite attempts to appease the military and demonstrators, by 23 July the military had taken power, forcing King Farouk to abdicate his throne to his infant son, Prince Ahmad Fuad.

In the aftermath, a civilian cabinet was created, political prisoners were released from jails, censorship of the press was ended, elections were called for and plans for land reform were in the works. At the heart of the new government was the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led by Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became the president of Egypt in November 1954. A new constitution was ratified in 1956, giving the Egyptian president extraordinary powers.

In 1954, the United Kingdom and Egypt signed the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954, which called for the removal of all British military personnel by June 1956. The agreement does allow the UK to base forces in Egypt in an “emergency situation,” such as an attack on an Arab state or Turkey.

Complicating the relationship between the United Kingdom and Egypt is the Egyptian Government’s proposed project for the High Dam at Aswan, which would provide Egypt with a cheap source of electricity and allow cultivation and irrigation of new areas for expanded agricultural production. Despite the promise of economic benefit, the Egyptian government has been unable to finance this project on its own and has turned to the United States and the United Kingdom for financial assistance. Despite an Egyptian weapons deal with the Soviet Union, denouncements by the West and continued belligerence with the Israelis, the United States and United Kingdom have agreed to help finance the dam. The United States has been discussing providing \$1.3 billion to support the project that is estimated to take up to two decades to build. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has also made an offer of financing for the dam.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Caruthers, Osgood. (1956). Nasser Retains Soviet Dam Offer Lest West Demur. *New York Times*. 2 April.
- Fisher, Sydney Nettleton & Ochsenwald, William. (2010). The Middle East: A History. Volume II 7th Edition. Mc-Graw Hill.
- Israelis Capture Syrian Positions in Galilee Fight. (1956). *New York Times*. 12 December.
- Louis, W. R., & Owen, R. (1989). Suez 1956: The crisis and its consequences. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Parrott, Lindsey. (1956). Arab Refugees Still Big Problem for UN. *New York Times*. 8 April.
- Schmidt, Dana Adams. (1956). Foreign Aid Drive to Begin Today; Dulles to Testify. *New York Times*. 30 April.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council (1956) The Palestine Question S/RES/113 (4 April 1956)
- United Nations, Security Council (1955) The Palestine Question S/RES/106 (29 March 1955)
- United Nations, Security Council (1948) The Palestine Question S/RES/61 (4 November 1948)
- United Nations, Security Council (1948) The Palestine Question S/RES/56 (19 August 1948)
- United Nations, Security Council (1948) The Palestine Question S/RES/54 (15 July 1948)
- United Nations, Security Council (1948) The Palestine Question S/RES/50 (29 May 1948)

THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA

On 1 November 1954 fighting broke out in the French territory of Algeria between Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), an Algerian separatist group, and the ruling French government. In response, French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes France ordered three battalions of French paratroopers into the territory to quell the violence. French newspapers immediately began suggesting that other Arab states had instigated the attacks.

By early December, the French military presence had swelled to over 70,000 personnel under the pretext of protecting the Algerian people against terrorism. By August 1955, FLN forces began conducting attacks on civilian targets. The French and their civilian para-military allies, the Pied-Noir, conducted retaliatory attacks that have left between 1,200 to 12,000 dead.

On 4 January 1955, Saudi Arabia formally asked the Security Council to consider the crisis. France considers this issue a domestic matter and any discussion of the situation in Algeria by the United Nations to be a violation of the Charter. They attempted to stop discussion of the issue in the Council by having allies such as Colombia remove the item from the agenda, but lost by one vote, and the issue was addressed in October 1955. France has indicated that they might leave the United Nations over the matter.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, David. (1955). Algerian Debate Voted by the UN; French Quit Hall. *New York Times*. 10 October.
- Clark, Michael. (1955). Shifts in Algeria Favored by Paris. *New York Times*. 16 June.
- Colombia Urges U.N. Drop Algerian Item. (1955). *New York Times*. 16 November.
- Move in U.N. on Algeria Due. (1955). *New York Times*. 5 January.
- Terrorist Bands Kill 7 in Algeria; French Send Aid. (1954). *New York Times*. 2 November.

THE QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

The Republic of China is one of the original members of the United Nations, having ratified the United Nations Charter on 28 September,



1945. When the Chinese civil war ended in 1949, the Communist Party of China prevailed, establishing the People's Republic of China, claiming to be the legitimate government and controlling much of the mainland territory. The Republic of China retreated to the island of Taiwan and also claimed to be the legitimate government of all of China. The Republic of China continues to represent China in the United Nations; this has raised issues about the legitimacy of the Republic of China's representation of China at the United Nations.

In 1955, the Security Council invited a representative of the People's Republic of China to participate in the Council's discussion of the issue of UN representation and address the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan. Since then, there has been continued conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of China, including shelling, air raids and anti-aircraft action, and competing claims of legitimacy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Formosa Still Adamant." (1955). *New York Times*. 10 December.

UN DOCUMENTS

United Nations, Security Council (1950). Complaint of Armed Invasion of Formosa (Taiwan) 29 September. S/1950/87.

DECOLONIZATION

Following the Second World War, an increasing number of nations and peoples sought to exercise the right to self-determination laid out in the United Nations Charter. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, a number of former colonial territories sought and obtained independence, spurring many non-self-governing peoples to also seek independence. These trends continued into the early months of 1956. Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956, and as of May, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria are seeking independence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Colonialism in 1955. (1955). *New York Times*. 30 December.

United Nations (1956). Yearbook of the United Nations. 1956. United Nations. p. 121-123.

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

In addition to its function of maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council recommends the admission of new Member States to the General Assembly. This is a critical step in the process of admitting new Member States into the United Nations. The admission of new Member States also helps the United Nations and the Security Council maintain international peace and security. As such, during both times of relative peace and those of international unrest, the Security Council may be required to review applications for potential Member States and may pass resolutions recommending admission of the applicant state to the General Assembly. As colonial territories gain independence, the Security Council's task of admitting new members to the United Nations remains a critical function of the Security Council. The recent increase in Member States has escalated regional tension over Council representation. The General Assembly experienced deadlock during non-Permanent Member Security Council elections over

whether The Philippines or Yugoslavia would replace Turkey on the Council. The deadlock broke on 20 December, 1955, when Yugoslavia won the election, months after the original balloting.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Parrot, Lindsay. (1955). Explosive Issues Still Facing U.N. *New York Times*. 30 October.

Sketches of 16 New Members Admitted to the U.N. (1955). *New York Times*. 15 December.

Hamilton, Thomas. (1955). New Members for U.N. to Mean Many Changes. *New York Times*. 11 December.

UN DOCUMENTS

United Nations, Security Council (1956). Admission of New Members to the United Nations. 6 February. S/Res/112 (3546).



THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

ARGENTINA

BRAZIL

CHINA

CZECH REPUBLIC

DJIBOUTI

FRANCE

NEW ZEALAND

NIGERIA

OMAN

PAKISTAN

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

RWANDA

SPAIN

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

The Historical Security Council (HSC) of 1994 will simulate the events of the world beginning on 1 January 1994. At the time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolved around the unrest in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslav Republics. However, the Council may discuss any issue involving international peace and security. Representatives should have a broad knowledge of the world and world events as they stood on 1 January 1994. The Security Council can, at its discretion, involve other States or parties to the dispute on a particular topic. Possible parties to the dispute may include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Somalia, Uganda, Georgia and Haiti.

The brief synopses presented here offer merely introductory coverage of prominent international issues that can direct representatives' continued research and preparation.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions, which should assist them in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from their country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin?
- Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

In 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgian colonial rule and organized as a one-party state controlled by a Hutu-dominated government. The new Rwandan government reversed colonial-era discrimination and ethnic quotas in employment and education and enforced those quotas against the minority Tutsi ethnic group. In response, Tutsi refugees in Zaire and Tanzania began attacking Hutus. The government reacted violently against Tutsi guerrilla groups. In a 1973 coup d'état, General Juvenal Habyarimana seized control of the Hutu government, promising to restore peace, national development and unity. However, preferential treatment of Hutus aggravated the ethnic tensions throughout the following years. By the end of the 1980s, nearly 500,000 Tutsis sought refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania.

In the late 1980s, individuals from the Tutsi refugee diaspora in Uganda created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political and military organization to reform the Rwandan government and return Tutsi

refugees to Rwanda. Members of the RPF blamed the government for its failure to democratize and to resolve the refugee problem. On 1 October 1990, a force of 7,000 RPF troops launched a major attack from the safe haven of Uganda onto Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) in Northern Rwanda, igniting a civil war in Rwanda. Despite their small numbers, the RPF troops' prior military experience in the Ugandan civil war allowed them to make significant gains against the Hutu forces. Their gains were short-lived, however, and the RPF was pushed back across the border by month's end. The RPF regrouped over the next three months. Under the new leadership of Paul Kagame, the RPF embarked on a more sustained campaign of guerrilla-style warfare from bases and safe havens in the Virunga Mountains. The Rwandan government sought military and financial assistance from Belgium, France and Zaire in response to the RPF attacks. The RAF launched a counteroffensive with heavy military equipment.

The civil war inflamed ethnic tensions. Tutsis inside Rwanda and moderate Hutus were labeled accomplices of the RPF and designated traitors by the government. The Hutu-run media ran a propaganda campaign aimed at promoting the superiority of Hutus and the evils of Tutsis. Ethnic tensions boiled over in the spring of 1991 when Hutu activists carried out organized killings sanctioned by local governments of roughly 1,000 Tutsis in several northern cities. Tutsis in the north were eventually allowed to relocate to safer areas, but the anti-Tutsi rhetoric only increased over the next year.

Both internal and external political pressure finally forced President Habyarimana to agree to negotiations, and lines of communication were opened between some government officials and the RPF. A ceasefire was agreed upon in July 1992, and, with the help of France, the United States and the Organisation of African Unity, peace talks were held in Arusha, Tanzania on 12 July 1992. An early agreement from these talks set a timetable for ending the fighting, promoted further peace talks between parties, addressed the repatriation of refugees and authorized the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer. The Arusha Accords concluded on 4 August 1993 with the final agreement calling for a democratically elected government and the formation of a transitional government consisting of power sharing between the current government and the RPF until elections were held and refugees repatriated. The Arusha Accords caused an open split among Hutus in power, with radical Hutu groups opposing the Habyarimana government. This led to increased anti-Tutsi propaganda, including increasingly radical radio broadcasts from Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) beginning in mid-July 1993. Activities of the Interhamwe militias, formed from internally displaced youth in 1992 by Hutu government and military leaders, also increased in late 1993.



In June 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) with the purpose of verifying that no military assistance reached Rwanda over the northern Ugandan border. In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Resolution 872 to aid in the implementation and monitoring of the Arusha Accords and to support the transitional government for an initial period of six months. UNAMIR's headquarters became operational on 1 November 1993. Shortly after arriving, UNAMIR Commander General Romeo Dallaire informed UN officials that there was the potential for large-scale, serious violence in Rwanda. However, UN officials did not respond.

On 10 December 1993, the Rwandan government, the RPF and the Special Representative of UNAMIR issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitments to the Arusha Accords and agreed to set up a broad-based transitional government before 31 December 1993. On 20 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 891 extending UNOMUR's mission for six months.

BIOGRAPHY

- Accord Ends 3-Year Civil War in Rwanda. (1993). *New York Times*. 4 August.
- Burundi Seals Border as 30,000 Flee Coup. (1993). *New York Times*. 22 October.
- Rwanda- A Historical Chronology. *Frontline* (2014). Public Broadcasting System.
- Kuperma, Alan (2001). The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. Brookings Institution Press.
- Leader of Burundi Reportedly Killed in Coup by Ethnic Rival. (1993). *New York Times*. 21 October.
- Prunier, Gérard. (1999). The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. (2nd ed.). Kampala: Fountain Publishers Limited.
- United Nations, Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations. Home.
- Wagh, Colin (2004). Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. McFarland.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council (1993). Rwanda. 20 December. S/RES/891.
- United Nations, Security Council (1993). Rwanda. 5 October. S/RES/872.
- United Nations, Security Council (1993). Rwanda. 22 June. S/RES/846.
- United Nations, Security Council (1993). Rwanda. 12 March. S/RES/812.

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In 1946, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a constituent republic of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which governed numerous ethnic groups. After the death of President Josip Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia quickly plunged into political and economic turmoil. Ethnic unrest spread, and the republics of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began declaring their independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from SFRY and became an independent state on 3 March 1992. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina's

declaration of independence was opposed by Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian-controlled federal government of Yugoslavia. Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, ethnic groups previously incorporated under the SFRY began waging war with one another in an effort to gain territorial control within the former Yugoslav territory.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence was quickly recognized by the European community and the United States. In response, Serbian National Forces immediately began strikes upon Sarajevo, the newly-declared capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over the next several months, the Serbian National Forces gained control over nearly two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Serbian forces gained territory, they drove out many non-Serbs, creating a large internally displaced persons and refugee population.

As the Serbs gained ground, reports surfaced accusing them of committing ethnic violence toward ethnic Bosnians and Croats. Accordingly, the UN passed Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, which created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the purpose of promoting peace talks and maintaining peace in UN safe-zones and no-fly zones. Initially, UNPROFOR redirected observers from other parts of Yugoslavia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it later brought in additional observers. Although UNPROFOR was able to achieve some success, continued fighting led to a series of economic sanctions against all of Yugoslavia in May 1992. Through a series of resolutions, the Security Council imposed stricter sanctions prohibiting all import, export and transportation of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; the embargo excluded weapons and military equipment intended for UNPROFOR.

UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded by a series of resolutions passed in October and November 1992. These resolutions aimed to bring stability to Bosnia by deploying additional observers and limiting military flights to only those that were part of UNPROFOR's mission. By March 1993, fighting had increased in eastern Bosnia, with Serb military forces attacking civilian populations and interfering with humanitarian operations. Fighting intensified as local Muslims from surrounding areas were driven into the town of Srebrenica by Serbian military forces.

The large populations of Croats and Serbs further complicated ethnic tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, which had also been part of the Social federal republic of Yugoslavia, declared its independence in 1991 and was also fighting its own war against Serbian forces. Like the war in Bosnia, the Croatian War for Independence included ethnic violence between Serbian forces and the ethnic Croat population. These ethnic tensions spilled over into Bosnia, creating a second dimension to the conflict and complicating matters on the ground. By the late spring of 1993, Muslim and ethnic Croat forces inside of Bosnia held a tenuous alliance against the Serbs.

In May 1993 fighting erupted in central Bosnia. The fighting interrupted main supply routes to northern Bosnia and disrupted UNPROFOR operations. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that a significant lack of funding for UN missions threatened to interrupt necessary day-to-day operations in the coming months. On 4 October 1993, the Security Council extended the UNPROFOR mandate for an additional six months to 31 March 1994. In November 1993, the Security Council issued statements noting its concern that increasing military actions posed significant threats to the civilian population and



demanding that the attacks stop. Numerous peace plans and ceasefires were signed in November 1993, but they have, thus far, failed to curb fighting and stop attacks on UNPROFOR.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Burns, John F (1993). *Bosnia Serbs Drive to Take Sarajevo; U.N. is Kept Back*. *New York Times*. 22 July.
- Finlin, Alastair (2004). *The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-1999*. Osprey Publishing.
- O'Ballance, Edgar (1995). *Civil War in Bosnia, 1992-94*. Macmillan.
- Rief, David (1995). *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*. Simon and Schuster.
- Thomas, Nigel and K. Mikulan (2006). *The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 1992-2001*. Osprey Publishing.
- U.N. *Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions*. (1993). *New York Times*. 30 December.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council (1993). Former Yugoslavia. 4 October. [S/RES/871](#).
- United Nations, Security Council (1993). Croatia. 25 January. [S/RES/802](#).
- United Nations, Security Council (1992). Bosnia and Herzegovina. 18 December. [S/RES/798](#).
- United Nations, Security Council (1992) Bosnia and Herzegovina. 16 November. [S/RES/787](#).
- United Nations, Security Council (1991). Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 15 December. [S/RES/721](#).

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

In the late 1980s, civil war ravaged Somalia. A weak economy, massive foreign debt and the increasingly authoritarian policies of the Siad Barre presidency led to the formation of several resistance organizations and rebel groups. One of the most organized and effective of these groups was the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The USC eventually managed to oust Barre in early 1991, but the fighting did not end with Barre's exit. The USC and other rebel groups could not come to a political agreement, and most rebel groups chose to consolidate power within their own regions rather than share power in a formal government agreement. Internal squabbles within the USC led to Ali Mahdi Mohamed being named president and the group splitting in two, with General Aidid leading the anti-Mohamed faction. As 1991 drew to a close intense fighting plagued Mogadishu and other regions, as different groups clashed in their struggle for power.

The volatile political situation combined with a severe drought led to drastic food shortages throughout Somalia. Nearly 300,000 people died of starvation by 1992. Fighting displaced nearly two million more people, driving them into different parts of Somalia or neighboring countries.

On 3 March 1992, Aidid and Mohamed signed a ceasefire agreement. The Security Council created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM I) on 24 April 1992, to provide observers and facilitate the ceasefire. Unfortunately, conditions continued to deteriorate as factions became increasingly hostile toward the UN operation. In July 1992 the UNISOM I mandate was strengthened, and four operational zones were

established. At the same time, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called for a 100-day plan to address the dire humanitarian crisis.

Concerned by the continued deterioration of the situation, the Security Council passed resolution 794 on 4 December 1992, in which the Council agreed that conditions under Article VII of the UN Charter had been met and Member States had permission to intervene and secure a safe environment for UNISOM I. The United States agreed to take control of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that was created. The presence of UNITAF in Somalia was considered a success. Humanitarian aid was reaching the people, and many of the rebel factions agreed to attend the meeting for national reconciliation convened in January of 1993 by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The reconciliation meeting eventually led to the Addis Ababa Agreement on 27 March. With a ceasefire in place and reconciliation underway, the Security Council passed resolution 814 replacing UNITAF with UNISOM II. UNISOM II was tasked with monitoring all factions' compliance with the ceasefire; preventing the resumption of violence; seizing small arms from unauthorized elements; maintaining control of heavy weapons; securing ports and means of communication necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid; protecting UN and NGO operations and their workers; demining the region; and repatriating refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

By May 1993, it became clear that not all signatories to the March Addis Ababa agreements intended to cooperate. General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of the Somali National Alliance, teamed with other factions and began engaging in armed attacks against UNISOM II, killing international troops and workers. Resolution 837 condemned these attacks and called for ground and air operations in Mogadishu to affect the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible for the attacks on peacekeepers. UNISOM II continued operations and additional ground forces from the United States were brought in for support in apprehending General Aidid and his supporters.

An increase in violence against UN and US soldiers over the summer of 1993 led to the United States sending special forces to the area specifically to neutralize General Aidid and his forces. On 3 October 1993 US Army rangers carried out a raid to capture two clan leaders. The initial mission was a success, but, on their return flight, two of the black hawk helicopters carrying the rangers were attacked and shot down by Somali militia members. The subsequent operation to rescue the downed ranger group would later be known as the Battle of Mogadishu. It extended throughout the city and lasted into the next morning when UNISOM II troops were able to carry out a rescue. The battle ended with 18 US, one Pakistani and one Malaysian fatalities in addition to more than 70 wounded. Casualty estimates from the Somalis ranged anywhere from 300 to over 2,000. Additionally, one US Army ranger was captured by the Somalis and held by General Aidid for eleven days.

As a result of the Battle, the United States abruptly changed its policy toward Somalia and General Aidid. On 6 October 1993, US President Bill Clinton ordered an end to all non-defensive US actions against General Aidid and announced that all US forces would be withdrawing from Somalia by no later than 31 March 1994. Currently, there are only a few hundred US Marines remaining. Additionally, the US sent Robert Oakley as a special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker peace.

General Aidid has agreed to stop actions against UNISOM II troops and return to the peace process. Members of the Somali factions have



been meeting to discuss peace and the future of Somalia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia since December, but progress has been slow. As the United States continues to withdraw its troops, other countries have pledged to follow suit, leaving the future of the UNISOM II and UN involvement in Somalia uncertain.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Crocker, Chester A. (1995). *The Lessons of Somalia - Not Everything Went Wrong*. *Foreign Affairs*. May/June Issue.
- Gordon, Michael L. and Thomas L. Friedman (1993). *Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep*. *New York Times*. 25 October.
- Lewis, Paul (1993). *Reluctant Peacekeepers: Many U.N. Members Reconsider Role in Conflicts*. *New York Times*. 12 December.
- Lewis, Paul (1993). *U.N. Gives Timetable for Somalia Democracy*. *New York Times*. 16 September.
- Lorch, Donatella (1993). *At The Peace talks, Somalis Mostly Shout*. *New York Times*. 6 December.
- Nhema, Alfred and Paul Zeleza (2008). *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs*. Ohio University Press.
- Menkhaus, Ken (2004). *Somalia: State Collapse and Threat of Terrorism*. Oxford University Press.
- Prunier, Gérard (1996). *Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal (1990–1995)*. *Refugee Quarterly* 15.1, p. 35–85.
- Somali Militia Hits U.N. Post* (1993). *New York Times*. 14 December.
- The Somalia Mission; U.N. Opposes a G.I. Pullout from Somalia* (1993). *New York Times*. 7 October.
- U.N. Will Take Over in Somalia Next Week* (1993). *New York Times*. 25 April.

UN DOCUMENTS

- United Nations, Security Council. (1993). *Somalia*. 22 September. *S/RES/865*.
- United Nations, Security Council. (1993). *Somalia*. 26 March. *S/RES/814*.
- United Nations, Security Council. (1992). *Somalia*. 3 December. *S/RES/794*.
- United Nations, Security Council. (1992). *Somalia*. 30 November. *S/24868*.
- United Nations, Security Council. (1992). *Somalia*. 28 August. *S/RES/775*.
- United Nations, Security Council. (1992). *Somalia*. 24 April. *S/RES/751*.

THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

The Republic of Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, fueling separatist and nationalist concerns by citizens in the autonomous Abkhaz Republic (Abkhazia) within Georgia. The newly independent Georgia and Abkhazia were initially able to reach a power sharing agreement, but political turmoil within Georgia led to hardline Georgian nationalists taking power, which reignited the political disagreement between the two. On 23 July 1992, the Abkhaz legislature voted to return to the 1925 Soviet-era Constitution where Abkhazia was a Soviet Union republic and not part of Georgia. The State Council of the Republic of Georgia declared the act void.

Violence broke out in Abkhazia as its leadership removed Georgian officials from their offices. Separatists attacked Georgian troops who had been sent in to Abkhazia to secure main highways and railways. In August, Abkhazian separatists kidnapped 11 Georgian political negotiators, including the Interior Minister. In response, Georgia sent 3,000 troops into the capital of Sukhumi to restore order. Reports from this first offensive indicated the presence targeted violence against ethnic Abkhazians. As a result, most ethnic Abkhaz fled the capital.

Throughout the fall of 1992, several ceasefire agreements were brokered but ultimately fell apart. Both sides used the intervening months to fortify their positions and launch airstrikes on each other's positions in the towns around Sukhumi, many of which resulted in heavy civilian casualties. The heavy bombardments have left civilians cut off from basic supplies, and there have been widespread reports of both ethnic violence and looting and murder as a result of the unrest.

With the help of Russian military equipment and logistics, Abkhazian forces launched three attacks on Sukhumi in January, March and early July. Each attack was ultimately unsuccessful. On 9 July 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 849, calling for plans to dispatch military observers once a ceasefire began. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire on 27 July and on 6 August, in Resolution 854, the Security Council called for an advance team of 10 military observers to be sent to Abkhazia. On 24 August, Resolution 858 established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), authorizing 88 military observers to verify compliance with the ceasefire and investigate violations. Unrelated political unrest in Georgia hampered the Georgian forces within Abkhazia from completing their agreed withdrawal, and on 16 September 1993, Abkhazian launched another attack on Sukhumi, breaking the ceasefire. Within eleven days, Abkhazian troops were able to regain control of almost all Abkhazian territory.

The Security Council passed Resolution 881 on 4 November, approving the extension of UNOMIG until 31 January 1994. On 1 December 1993, UN-sponsored negotiations began in Geneva; Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Memorandum of Understanding and promised not to use force against each other during the negotiations. The negotiations stalled when Abkhazia refused to recognize Georgia's territorial integrity. On 22 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 892 authorizing the phased deployment of 50 additional military observers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abkhaz World. *A Short Chronicle of Events of the 1992-93 Georgian-Abkhazian War*.
- Archer, Clive and Lena Johnson (1996). *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia*. Westview Press. pp. 121-138, 189-212.
- Chervonnaya, Svetlana (1994). *Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow*. Gothic Image Publications.
- Human Rights Watch (1995). *Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict*. *Human Rights Watch Arms Project*. Vol. 7, No. 7. March.
- Francis, Celine (2011). *Conflict Resolution and Status: The Case of Georgia and Abkhazia (1989-2008)*. Brussels: VUBPress.
- Lynch, Dov (2000). *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*. pp.127-149. London: MacMillan Press LTD.



Mackinlay, John and Peter Cross (2003). *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*. pp.63-110. New York: United Nations University Press.
UNOMIG.

UN DOCUMENTS

United Nations, Security Council (1993). Abkhazia, Georgia. 22 December. S/RES/892.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Abkhazia, Georgia. 4 November. S/RES/881.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Abkhazia, Georgia. 24 August. S/RES/858.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Abkhazia, Georgia. 6 August. S/RES/854.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Abkhazia, Georgia. 9 July. S/RES/849.

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

On 16 December 1990, democratic elections were held in Haiti under the supervision of the United Nations. Father Jean Aristide was elected on a platform of a new economic deal for the poor and a cleansing of the civil service. Less than a year into his presidency, on 29 September 1991, Aristide was ousted by a military coup. Aristide was allowed to escape to Venezuela after diplomatic intervention by the US, French and Venezuelan ambassadors. Under the leadership of General Raoul Cedras, the military immediately began slaughtering supporters of Aristide, killing more than a thousand people in two weeks. In response, over 200,000 people fled the capital. The Organization of American States (OAS) imposed economic sanctions on Haiti, and the United States, France and Canada suspended all economic assistance. On 8 October 1991, the OAS urged all member countries to freeze Haitian assets and proposed a civilian force that would mediate disputes and monitor compliance.

The OAS and the United States pushed for Aristide's return to power. On 23 February 1992, an OAS-mediated agreement granted amnesty to the coup plotters. However, on 27 March, the Haitian Supreme Court and Senate rejected the accord. Hostilities continued in Haiti as international pressure mounted to impose a universal trade embargo on oil and weapons. On 23 April 1993, the General Assembly authorized the United Nations to take part in a UN/OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti to deploy human rights monitors in the country, after which the Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a comprehensive fuel and arms embargo in Haiti. On 3 July 1993, Cedras and Aristide signed the Governor's Island Agreement, which stated that Aristide would resume power on 30 October 1993. On 27 August 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 861 suspending the sanctions against Haiti. Four days later, Resolution 862 was adopted, which dispatched a small contingent to assess requirements for the UN Mission in Haiti.

Prior to Aristide's return to power in October, however, violence broke out in Haiti. Anti-Aristide gunmen menaced government workers and a UN team in the area, causing the Security Council to pass Resolution 867 on 23 September to immediately dispatch the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). American and Canadian troops sailed to Haiti, but, after they were blocked from docking by anti-Aristide forces, the United States ordered the ship to return. The Security Council passed Resolution 873 on 13 October reinstating the sanctions

of Resolution 841. UN envoy Dante Caputo organized talks with the Haitian military leaders to restore Aristide to power, but the talks fell apart. With the failure of the talks and continued violence, Caputo withdrew all civilian monitors from the island by the end of October.

On 22 December 1993, the United States, France, Canada and Venezuela cautioned Haiti's military leaders that the embargo would be expanded if Aristide were not allowed to return to power by 15 January 1994. Meanwhile, Aristide announced that he was organizing a conference in Miami on 15 January 1994 to help restore democracy to Haiti.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Girard, Dr. Philippe R. (2004). *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
 Greenhouse, Steven (1993). Aristide Organizes Haiti Conference. *New York Times*. 24 December.
 Greenhouse, Steven (1993). U.S. Gives Haiti's Military Rulers a New Deadline. *New York Times*. 23 December.
 Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry (2009). *Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia*. London: Zed Books.
 Kumar, Chetan (1998). *Building Peace in Haiti*. London: Lynne Rienner.
 Malone, David (1998). *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 Soderlund, Walter C., Donald Briggs, Kai Hildebrandt, and Abdel Salam Sidahmed (2008). *Humanitarian Crises and Intervention: Re-assessing the Impact of Mass Media*. pp.123-154. Sterling, Virginia: Kumarian Press.
 Whitfield, Teresa (2007). *Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict*. pp.105-134. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

UN DOCUMENTS

United Nations, General Assembly (1993). The situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti. 23 April. A/RES/47/20B.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Haiti. 13 October. S/RES/873.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Haiti. 23 September. S/RES/867.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Haiti. 31 August. S/RES/862.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Haiti. 27 August. S/RES/861.
 United Nations, Security Council (1993). Haiti. 16 June. S/RES/841.