ISSUES AT AMUN

2017 AMUN International Executive Committee

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INTRODUCTION

The *Issues at AMUN* handbook is published to assist representatives in their preparations for the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Conference. When combined with students' own research on the Member States they represent and the topics of discussion, this handbook provides representatives with all the substantive information they will require to function effectively at the simulation. Its sister handbook, *Rules and Procedures*, provides an overview of the committee rules and conference logistics with which representatives need to familiarize themselves.

Chapter One: The United Nations provides essential background information to give all representatives a common orientation to the history of the United Nations. This section begins with the origins of the United Nations and covers some important points about the organization. The chapter concludes with problems confronting the United Nations today.

Chapter Two: Conference Preparation & Position Papers outlines a recommended process for preparing for the AMUN Conference. Following these steps will place representatives well on their way to acquiring all the content knowledge necessary to be successful at AMUN. Representatives will also find general information about topic purviews and position papers.

The remaining chapters contain brief overviews of the topics to be discussed in the committees, councils, commissions and International Court of Justice at the Conference. These are intended as a guide and basis for representatives' further research. In keeping with this goal, each overview includes a bibliography to guide representatives to appropriate sources of additional information. Additionally, at the beginning of each committee's topic briefs, there is an explanation of the purview of the simulation—that is, what the body can and cannot do. The simulation purview provides context and limits for the goals and actions contained in a body's reports and resolutions.

The overviews provide background on each topic and state some areas of current United Nations and international activity on the topic. In many cases, the overviews will frame the topic in terms of a few limited aspects of a complex issue. For example, the general issue of the environment has dozens of subsidiary issues—in such a case, the overview may direct representatives to concentrate their research on ozone depletion and limiting the destruction of the rainforests, only two of the many subsidiary issues. This format allows representatives to go into greater detail in their preparations without needing to research all aspects of a multifaceted main issue, and facilitates debate by ensuring all representatives are approaching the same issues.

AMUN's philosophy in providing these topic overviews is to give representatives direction in their research but to leave the work up to them. *These overviews are not intended to be the sole source of representatives' research on the topics prior to the conference.*

Representatives participating in the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Conference should be familiar with the history of the United Nations and with the changing role the organization plays in international affairs. This section provides a brief background on the United Nations system and some of the issues it faces today.

ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations came into existence on 24 October 1945. On that day, the United Nations Charter became operative, having been ratified by the 51 original Members. The concept of all States uniting together in one organization to settle disputes peacefully was born of the desire of "civilized" countries to avoid repeating the horrors of the First and Second World Wars. The United Nations developed as a successor to the League of Nations, which represented the first modern attempt by the countries of the world to achieve this unity.

In 1942, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt coined the term "United Nations," when 47 countries signed the Declaration of the United Nations in support of the Atlantic Charter. In 1944, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China met in Washington, DC, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the first blueprint of the United Nations was prepared. In 1945, the final details for the United Nations were worked out at the Yalta Conference. Fifty-one States gathered from 24 April through 26 June 1945 in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the United Nations, which was signed on 26 June 1945.

PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The primary purposes for which the United Nations was founded are detailed in Chapter I, Article 1, of the Charter:
1. "To maintain international peace and security...
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."

HOW THE UNITED NATIONS SEEKS TO ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSE

Since 1945, the United Nations has established itself as a forum for discussing international disputes. The United Nations seeks, both through its principal organs and various subsidiary bodies, to settle disputes through peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force. Member States recognize that the United Nations has an established machinery which can be used to solve international problems. It should be recognized that the United Nations is not a world government, nor does it legislate. Rather, the actions of the United Nations, in the form

of resolutions passed by its bodies, have a strong moral persuasive effect. Member States frequently find it in their own best interests to follow United Nations recommendations.

STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has six primary bodies:

The General Assembly (GA): The General Assembly is the central deliberative organ of the United Nations. The General Assembly has been described as the nearest thing to a "parliament of mankind." All Member States are Members of the General Assembly, and each Member has one vote. The General Assembly makes recommendations on international issues, oversees all other United Nations bodies that report to the General Assembly, approves the United Nations budget and apportions United Nations funds. On the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly elects the Secretary-General and holds the authority to admit and expel Member States. Voting in the General Assembly is ordinarily by simple majority, but most of the body's work is adopted by consensus.

The Security Council (SC): The Security Council's primary responsibility is maintaining international peace and security. It has the power to employ United Nations forces and direct action against threats to the peace. Fifteen Members sit on the Security Council, including five Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 at-large Member States, which the General Assembly elects for two-year terms. A majority in the Security Council consists of nine Members voting "yes"; however, a "no" vote by any of the Permanent Members has the effect of vetoing or blocking actions.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): The Economic and Social Council is the primary body dealing with the economic, social, humanitarian and cultural work of the United Nations system. It also has a mandate to coordinate the activities of United Nations technical and specialized agencies and programs. The Economic and Social Council oversees five regional economic commissions and nine functional, or subject-matter, commissions. The Economic and Social Council is composed of 54 Member States elected by the General Assembly for three-year, renewable terms.

The Trusteeship Council (TC): In 1945 there were 11 Trust Territories, which were regions without their own governments. These 11 regions were placed under the Trusteeship Council, which helped them prepare for and achieve independence. With the admission of Palau as a United Nations Member State in 1994, the Trusteeship Council has now completed its original mandate. Today, the Trusteeship Council is inactive but is formally composed of the permanent Security Council Members.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ): The International Court of Justice, or World Court, is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations and decides international legal disputes. All United Nations Member States are automatically able to bring matters before the International Court of Justice; however, States must agree to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice before it can decide

a dispute involving that State. Fifteen judges serving nine-year terms sit on the Court.

Secretariat: The Secretariat is composed of the Secretary-General and the United Nations staff. Approximately 44,000 people are employed as the staff of the United Nations, only 5,000 of whom work at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. The vast majority work for various subsidiaries of the United Nations. The Secretary-General serves a five-year renewable term.

In addition to the six main bodies, the United Nations system includes a number of autonomous technical and specialized agencies and programs. Examples include the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). While most of these agencies and programs have independent governance structures, the Economic and Social Council coordinates their activities.

BLOC POLITICS

Historically, Member States with mutual interests have used a system of bloc politics to organize their efforts within the United Nations. These blocs tend to be made up of Member States with similar political, historical or cultural backgrounds. They are often, but not exclusively, formed on a geographical basis. By organizing themselves with other Member States that hold similar interests, bloc members hope to increase their influence above the level that they would have as a single Member State in the General Assembly.

Regional groups were formally established at the United Nations in 1957 with an endorsement by the General Assembly. As the number of Member States increased, the groups were realigned to form today's five groups: Latin America and the Caribbean group (GRULAC), the Asia-Pacific group, the Africa group, the Eastern European group and the Western Europe and Others group (WEOG). These regional groups are still used today to manage elections. Security Council seats are allocated by regional group, and the Vice Presidents of the General Assembly are chosen by regional groups, with the actual election mostly a formality. Other, smaller regional blocs, such as the Nordic countries or the JUSCANZ group (Japan, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), also exist, though they lack the formal recognition granted to the five regional groups.

Regional groups are not the only blocs active at the United Nations. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in 1967 as a group seeking a middle course between the Western and Eastern blocs of the Cold War, rapidly became an active body for the coordination of action at the United Nations for developing countries. While its importance has diminished since the end of the Cold War, it is still active on numerous issues at the United Nations. The Group of 77 (G-77) was founded in 1964 as a coordinating body to protect the economic interests of small and developing countries. With 134 members, the G-77 is the largest United Nations bloc, though coordination among members is fairly loose.

Blocs often attempt to form a consensus among members, allowing them to act as a cohesive group. The effectiveness of any given bloc in exerting its positions in the General Assembly depends upon the bloc's ability to form a consensus among its own members and then get its

members to vote accordingly. These acts of compromise form the basis of United Nations politics and often occur within the various caucusing groups. They also form the starting points for debate in the larger United Nations body.

Bloc politics have changed considerably over time. Some blocs are still coherent, like the Nordic countries, while others, like the Western European and Others Group, lack continuing cohesion. In general, their viability as a political tool is diminishing, and blocs are falling out of use as a predictable measure of votes. Often, blocs get together to draft resolutions which will begin the discussion in the larger body, but ultimately, each Member State will usually vote in its own interest, regardless of bloc memberships. States may be part of multiple blocs with diverging or competing interests, which further complicates the issue.

However, blocs are not completely irrelevant; often they are used to get an initial proposal to the floor when consensus cannot be found quickly in the larger body. Today, the most common blocs are small, temporary negotiating groups that gather around one issue to try to overcome stalemate in the larger membership bodies. Additionally, developing countries often bind together to maximize their power, especially in the face of a relative lack of economic power. Some blocs have their own secretariat staff whose job is to draft proposals and find solutions that the larger body is unable to find. Some of the more well-funded and organized blocs have a formally recognized role as permanent observers with permanent observer missions at the United Nations headquarters. Examples include the African Union, the Caribbean Community, the European Union, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. These blocs are powerful examples of Member States coming together to advance goals that may be independent of the regions they represent.

At AMUN, blocs are not be treated as official bodies. Representatives are encouraged to caucus in their bloc groups only when appropriate. Representatives should be aware that the State they represent may no longer actively participate in bloc politics or may vote outside of its traditional bloc based on the circumstances. Above all, remember that you represent your State and your State's interests, regardless of your participation in a bloc while caucusing and drafting.

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Research and preparation can be broken into six areas:

The United Nations system as a whole: It is vitally important for each representative to understand the basics of the organization which they are simulating—the United Nations. Well-prepared representatives should not only know the basic structure of the United Nations but also have a good understanding of how the committee they will be working on fits into the organization. Understanding this information will allow representatives to better understand what their committee can or cannot do within the United Nations system, what they can make recommendations on, what they can reasonably demand and what issues are beyond the purview of the body they are simulating and should be handled by another United Nations body. This handbook includes a brief description of each committee's purview. This information is provided to assist representatives in understanding the place of their work in the United Nations system, and it should be supplemented with additional research.

Current statistical information and general background of the represented State's history and policies: This is the first key to understanding what actions a State may prefer on specific issues. Research should include, but is not limited to, areas such as population, government type, natural resources and trade data. Traditional allies and adversaries should also be noted. A country's history can be crucial to understanding its contemporary actions, including the question of whether that country was previously colonized or was a colonial power, when the country gained statehood and what means were used in gaining independence (e.g., civil war, violent struggle, peaceful protests, etc.).

Specific background of the State's viewpoints on the issues to be discussed at the Conference: This is the central point of most Model UN preparation: focused research on the issues being discussed in each committee and on the Member State's position on those issues. Research can come from a variety of sources, beginning with United Nations documents and moving to articles, periodical sources, books and Internet resources beyond the United Nations website. United Nations resolutions and reports on the issues under discussion are especially helpful because they provide a quick reference to what has already been accomplished by the United Nations and what still needs to be done. These documents frequently provide voting information, which allows representatives to quickly determine their country's past positions on issues. A number of relevant sources are provided in the bibliography section of each topic brief in this handbook. Contacting the delegation's permanent mission to the United Nations can also be helpful, but the level of assistance provided varies with each country's policies and available resources.

It will be very easy for some States to find specific information to determine a position on most or all topics, while for others this information will be difficult to come by or simply not available. When clear-cut information is not available, it is incumbent on the students preparing to make the best possible inferences about what the country's policy would be, given the facts available. This might include knowing the country's background, its traditional allies, the stance of a regional group with which they tend to agree or a variety of other factors. Regardless of the facts available, knowing *exactly* what a country would do in a given situation is typically not possible. Representatives should strive in their research to know as much as they can about their country and its stance on each topic and to educate themselves enough to make reasonable policy assumptions on issues that are not totally clear.

The current world situation as it applies to the State: This is a subset of the previous two areas of research, but it is important enough to be mentioned in its own right. There is a significant difference between the policies and perspectives of the only remaining superpower and a State with very little military might. Even more significant at the United Nations are the differences on many issues between the policies of relatively rich, industrialized countries and relatively poor, developing (and especially least-developed) countries. Additionally, a country that is currently involved in a civil war or a country under United Nations sanctions may have unique responses on some issues. Knowing where the State a student represents fits in the current world geopolitical context, as a complement to his or her country-specific research, can answer many questions that may arise during the simulation.

The perspectives of States with differing viewpoints on the issues: This is one of the more difficult areas of preparation. While it is reasonable to expect that a representative will know who his or her general allies and adversaries are on a given issue, it is very difficult to have detailed information about the policies of each country in the simulation. Limitations in preparation time necessarily require that representatives focus primarily on the policies of their own country, often learning about others through references in their own research. This is an area where complete knowledge will serve participants well, but it is much more likely that each Representative will be learning the formal policies of the other countries in the Committee when they give speeches from the floor and confer behind the scenes in caucus sessions. In roleplaying, then, flexibility is key: Representatives must aggregate and assimilate new information they gain at the Conference with their pre-Conference research in order to reach consensus and compromise on complex issues.

AMUN rules of procedure: While substantive discussions of the issues form the basis of any good simulation of the United Nations, the rules of procedure are used to facilitate the substantive debate which occurs. In general, these rules are intended to provide an even playing field, allowing each State to accomplish its individual policy goals while also maximizing opportunities for the group to reach agreement, or even consensus, on the issues. Several levels of preparation are possible on the rules. For new Model United Nations participants, we recommend that each person have a working knowledge of the principal motions which can be made during the simulation, encapsulated on the Rules Short Forms on **pages 40 and the Inside Back Cover** of the *Rules & Procedures* handbook. The dais staff of each Committee will assist representatives in using these rules and assist in bringing everyone onto an even playing field. For experienced representatives, who have not attended AMUN in the past, we suggest reading AMUN's rules in depth, to note differences from other conferences they have attended. AMUN veterans should re-read the rules as a refresher. Most Model United Nations conferences use different rules of procedure, and in some cases

the contrasts are significant. In order to best facilitate everyone's experience, it is incumbent on every participant to learn and use the rules established for this conference.

PREPARING AS A GROUP

Research on the areas described above is the essential element in preparing for AMUN. We recommend that representatives use a combined effort whenever possible in doing research. Representatives can take full advantage of all the people in their delegation by assigning various topics to each individual to research and report on to the group. Some areas will naturally lend themselves to group research and discussion, while others will be more individually based.

In particular, researching the United Nations system and the background on a country can be more easily accomplished by a group effort. Each student can be assigned a specific area, such as historical background of the country, current statistics, etc. Individuals can then report back to the group on their findings, possibly including a written or oral report, to allow for greater knowledge-sharing among the delegation members.

By contrast, research on the topics discussed in each Committee will be more individualized. This does not mean, however, that the other members of the delegation will not benefit from a briefing on each topic. Topic briefings can both give the entire delegation a broader picture of country policy as well as give individual representatives valuable practice in consolidating the information they discover and in making public presentations to the group. These briefings may also assist the entire delegation in gaining a comprehensive perspective on its country's policies.

GENERAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

AMUN recommends the following general sources of information to use when researching a country and the issues for the Conference. Many of these sources are available on the Internet, either publicly or through subscriptions held by school libraries.
- United Nations Today (United Nations Department of Public Information)
- The World Factbook (CIA)
- Permanent Missions to the United Nations
- United Nations Department of Public Information
- The Europa World Yearbook (Available in most library reference sections; contains detailed background on all countries and international organizations in the world)
- United Nations Handbook (Published annually by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
- Various periodicals, including the *United Nations Chronicle*, *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Economist* (Weekly), and *Keesing's Record of World Events* (Monthly)

USING THE INTERNET

AMUN website: When using the Internet, a great starting point is AMUN's website, which includes links to these and many other United Nations-related sites. This website is updated with United Nations links as they become available and includes a great deal of background information to assist in your preparations for Conference. AMUN's website can be reached at www.amun.org. AMUN also publishes updates,

UN-related content, and tips for preparation on the conference blog, *The AMUN Accords*, available at www.amun.org/theamunaccords.

News sources: Most major newspapers and news organizations are available online and are an excellent source for country and topic information, allowing you to access a daily synopsis of worldwide news.
United Nations documents: Most United Nations resolutions, documents, speeches and other resources can be accessed through the Internet. Most United Nations agencies are represented, along with databases containing information on various regions around the world.

In particular, the main United Nations Website at www.un.org/en/ provides up-to-date information on United Nations documents passed in the General Assembly, Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, as well as historical information from these bodies, reports of the Secretary-General on various issues and other useful documents.

Most United Nations Members now have websites for their permanent missions in New York and Geneva. When a website is available, it often includes details on the State's policy and may include the text of speeches given by representatives at the United Nations. Links to these websites can be found at www.un.org/en/members/.

The United Nations also provides public access to its Official Document System (ODS), which includes nearly all documents published by the United Nations, including many that are not available on the main website of the United Nations. The ODS is available at documents.un.org. Please note that the search engine available on ODS is not always easy to use, but it is very easy to find files if you know the United Nations document number. Each UN document has a unique symbol at the top right of the document. Symbols include both letters and numbers. Some elements of the symbol have meaning, while others do not. More information about UN Document Symbols can be found at research.un.org/en/docs/symbols. The bibliography section of each topic brief in this handbook contains references to several United Nations documents and can act as a starting place for your preparations. You may want to use the UNBISNET search engine to find your document name/number and then move to ODS to find the actual document. UNBISNET also provides access to voting records and country speeches, and is found online at unbisnet.un.org.

WHY DRAFT A POSITION PAPER?

Well-crafted position papers can serve as an excellent preparatory tool for Model United Nations conference participants. A position paper can be used both as a device for internal preparation among the members of a delegation and as a public statement of your delegation's positions on the issues being discussed at the Conference. AMUN requests that all delegations submit public position papers to the Conference and strongly suggests that each delegation prepare internal position papers which more clearly and completely define their country's perspective.

AMUN believes the most important information a delegation can furnish to other delegations prior to the Conference is its basic public policy on each issue to be discussed.

INTERNAL POSITION PAPERS

This type of position paper is intended as a preparatory tool for the individuals on your delegation and for the delegation as a whole. While these are not required, AMUN strongly recommends that groups preparing for the conference use position papers as one step in their preparations. Internal position papers, often called white papers, are a broad-based statement of your country's policies on a specific issue. These might include what you publicly tell other Member States, your knowledge of any behind-the-scenes diplomacy (e.g., what deals have been made on the sidelines), information on allies and adversaries on each topic, your negotiating position on the topic and what your country hopes to accomplish on the topic. This might also include your bottom line negotiating position, the things you will press for in discussions and what (if anything) your government must see (or not see) in a draft resolution before it can provide support.

Internal position papers are very valuable tools for individual preparation, as they force representatives to think about the full complexity of the issues they are confronting from their delegation's perspective. Also, by asking representatives to put their ideas in writing, an internal position paper can force each representative to condense a large amount of research and ideas into a concise, more comprehensible argument.

Internal position papers do not need to be more than one or two pages in length and may be written either in paragraph form or with bullet points for each unique idea or issue in the topic area. The entire delegation can benefit from each individual's work if these papers are shared with each group member, thus providing a more well-rounded view of the represented country's positions on all issues.

PUBLIC POSITION PAPERS

Public position papers are intended as a public statement of a State's position on the topics being discussed at the AMUN Conference. Each paper should include brief statements about where the State stands on the topics and on what the United Nations has done to confront this issue. It should also include the State's public position on the options for the United Nations in the future, noting proposals that a delegation has (or intends to have) sponsored, supported or not supported and why. Public papers do not need to go into detail about the delegation's negotiating positions or other behind-the-scenes issues, but should be seen as something that a diplomat might say in a public speech on the topic.

ITEMS TO INCLUDE IN PUBLIC POSITION PAPERS

While the position papers sent to the conference can include any material that the delegation deems appropriate for public consumption, a number of items should be included in a well-written position paper. First, each section of the paper should specifically state the one or two key points that the country believes are the most important on each topic. While other important issues can be included, no more than two should be highlighted. The paper can then go into specific details about why these points are important and what the country believes should be done by the United Nations or its Member States to improve the situation in question. Many papers will then sum up by recapping the most important points.

There are a number of other items that you might include in a public position paper depending on the specific topic, the available information and the country's particular situation. Representatives should consider incorporating some or all of these elements in their position papers:

- References to past United Nations resolutions and international treaties, providing the specific number or name of the document and the year it passed
- References to the United Nations Charter, as appropriate for the topic
- Past statements by the Secretary-General, a senior United Nations Secretariat member or by a Representative of a United Nations agency on the topic
- Reference to the work the United Nations has already done on the topic, whether by specialized agencies, regional bodies or working with non-governmental organizations
- Past statements on the topic by representatives of your government, especially if these mention the significance of the specific issue to your country
- Specific suggestions of actions that your State will support in solving the issue in question

Finally, it is important to note that a well-written public position paper is not about a specific country, but rather about what the country would like to accomplish on the topics of discussion in each simulation. Thus public position papers should not talk about the problems facing a specific country but rather the problems facing the international community. If a country is a clear example of a successful United Nations program in action, or if the country is a member of an affected group, representatives may want to include a brief reference to that in their paper; otherwise, there is usually no need to mention specifics about the country in a position paper.

SUBMISSION OF POSITION PAPERS

AMUN requests each delegation submit a position paper to the conference, covering each committee on which it is seated, **no later than 25 October**. These papers should be no more than one-half page on each topic covered in the committee. All delegations should submit a paper covering the Concurrent General Assembly Plenary, the World Summit on the Information Society +10 (WSIS+10), and each of the three General Assembly Committees, including both topics for each committee. Delegations represented on the General Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) should also include the two topics of discussion for the Council. Delegations represented on the Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) should also include the two topics of discussion for the commission. Delegations represented on the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) should also include the two topics of discussion for the commission. Delegations represented on the Security Council or Historical Security Councils should choose up to three topics they think are the most important for their respective council to discuss and include these in their position paper. Delegations seated on the Commission of Inquiry should also include the two topics of discussion for the Commission. If a delegation chooses to place a representative on the Conference of the State Parties of the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a section for that committee should also be included.

Format of Papers: One comprehensive position paper should be submitted online for each *delegation*, combining all of the committees on which that delegation is seated. A sample position paper, along with full

submission instructions, is available at AMUN's website: www. amun.org/sample-position-papers/.

The AMUN Secretariat will not judge the position papers other than to check for completeness and general germaneness. Position papers will be collected and organized by the AMUN Secretariat and posted on the AMUN website prior to conference. As public documents, position papers must conform to the standards laid out in AMUN's policy on plagiarism (see below).

Submission Specifications: All position papers must be submitted via AMUN's online web form, available at www.amun.org. Additional submission information will be sent in the fall to all registered schools. AMUN reserves the right to reject any position paper that fails to address one of the topics as stated in the *Issues at AMUN* handbook, does not comport to basic standards of diplomatic courtesy or is determined to violate the policy on plagiarism.

Extension of Due Dates: AMUN realizes that some schools are on quarter or trimester systems and thus have a later start date. Any school with a late fall start date may request a one week extension to the official due dates listed above by e-mailing the AMUN Executive Office at mail@amun.org before **25 October**.

POSITION PAPER AWARDS

AMUN will provide a Position Paper Award for each delegation that submits an approved, completed position paper, including sections for each topic in all assigned simulations, by **11:59 p.m. Central Time on 25 October**. Note that this must include sections for the Concurrent General Assembly Plenary, all GA Committees, the major world summit and any other simulation on which the delegation has a representative seated. Submission of a position paper for the Special Committee (our optional participation simulation) is not required to qualify for a Position Paper Award. If a school is representing multiple countries, each delegation will be considered separately for Position Paper Award.

For answers to any questions about writing or submitting position papers or about Position Paper Awards, please contact the AMUN Executive Office at mail@amun.org.

PLAGIARISM

AMUN strives to create a simulation of the United Nations which is as realistic as possible while still allowing for the fulfillment of our participants' and the organization's educational goals. As such, the AMUN policy regarding plagiarism focuses on an educative rather than a punitive goal. At AMUN, plagiarism involves the substantial, verbatim or near-verbatim copying of language, without attribution, in published or unpublished texts, speeches or documents. Representatives should adhere to their country's policies at all times, but this does not give license to plagiarize existing materials. Thus, parts of speeches or position papers may be derived or paraphrased from previous speeches or papers, but should not be copied verbatim.

Similarly, AMUN expects that all representatives are familiar with past resolutions at the United Nations, but the work of the United Nations should be expanded on in representatives' work, not copied verbatim. There are some exceptions: for example, representatives are not necessarily expected to expand upon a phrase that is often or always used when a country gives a formal speech or a clause that is repeated verbatim

through several years of resolutions on a topic. Generally, it is not necessary to explicitly credit such sources, although if substantial language is quoted, it should be acknowledged and cited. Final determinations on plagiarism and its consequences are at the discretion of the AMUN Secretariat.

THE PURVIEW OF EACH SIMULATION

Each simulation's background guide contains a brief overview of that simulation's purview, which provides a general outline of the types of discussions each simulation might have on the topics in question. This is extremely important in the United Nations system, where a variety of different committees, councils and commissions may discuss different aspects of an international problem. Representatives should exercise great care in researching a topic, so their deliberations can focus on the piece of the problem considered within their simulation's purview. These purview briefs are guidelines for the discussions of each body.

An excellent example of this shifting focus among committees, councils and commissions is the issue of development. The First Committee might discuss the relationship between disarmament and development. At the same time, the Second Committee may discuss a variety of financing initiatives to assist Least Developed Countries. Similarly, the Third Committee might discuss the social and humanitarian considerations that stem from a lack of development, including gender issues, economic concerns or the impact on underrepresented populations such as the elderly or disabled. And the Fourth Committee may discuss the development issues of Non-Self-Governing Territories. The General Assembly Concurrent Plenary might discuss the problem in its entirety or address issues that cut across the mandates of the committees. By contrast, the Economic and Social Council would focus on how the United Nations specialized and technical agencies work with Member States to support economic and social development. The Security Council would address the interlinkages between peace, security and development.

Clearly, different aspects of a single problem are regularly discussed in different bodies. More importantly, at the United Nations, delegations are typically careful to only discuss those aspects relevant to their own committees, councils and commissions, leaving other aspects to others in their delegation to address in the appropriate forum.

AMUN PHILOSOPHY AND THE REALISM OF SIMULATIONS

One of the core principles of AMUN is to mirror the practice and dynamics of the United Nations as much as possible. To that end, AMUN strives to create and conduct simulations that are a realistic representation of diplomacy at the United Nations and the international system more broadly. We believe this commitment furthers AMUN's aims to create a fair and fun experience for all representatives and that it enhances the educational mission of the organization.

For any issue before the United Nations, each Member State or Observer State will have a variety of responses available to it; however, a realistic simulation will consider only those options that would have reasonably been on the table for a State at a particular moment in time. In other words, there will always be options States do not consider or dismiss out of hand because they have limited capabilities or due to historical, cultural or political constraints; in a realistic simulation, these options are not appropriate.

In conjunction with our policy on delegations that are "Out of Character" (see chapter 2 of the Rules and Procedures handbook), AMUN staffers will work with representatives to ensure the highest-quality, realistic simulation of the United Nations as possible while still allowing room for innovative and creative thinking to open up new possibilities for the United Nations and the international community.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCILS

Representatives of the Security Councils should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Unlike other Committees and Councils at AMUN, the topics listed in the Issues book do not constitute a complete list of topics the Security Councils can discuss. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Councils.

Therefore, representatives on the Contemporary Security Council must have a broad knowledge regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals and online sources are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended sources include: the *New York Times*, *United Nations Chronicle*, *The Times* of London, *Al Jazeera*, the *Mail & Guardian*, *Foreign Policy* and the *Economist*. The *UN Wire* is an excellent resource for timely information and one good way for representatives to stay abreast of the most recent reports published by the Security Council and other relevant United Nations bodies.

Historical Security Council (HSC) representatives should approach their Council's issues based on events up to the start date of the simulation and should do their research accordingly. It is strongly recommended that research be done using historical materials whenever possible. The world has changed dramatically over the years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, representatives should peruse periodicals and other primary sources from 3-5 years before the year in question that most accurately reflect the worldview at that time. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* or the *New York Times Index*, will provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts.

DECLARATIVE STATEMENTS AND OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

Security Council Members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions that will affect the course of the simulation; this ability to change reality makes these simulations different from many others. Council representatives must actively bring their State's policies and capabilities into the simulation. Representatives are welcome and encouraged to make declarative statements—including real or implied threats and deals—that do not carry operational implications outside of the United Nations; however, representatives must always consult with the Simulation Staff before making *any* operational decisions. Operational decisions include any actions that would have a real-world effect outside of the United Nations, including, for example, the announcement of movements of or actions by national military forces. In these cases, the Simulation Staff act as the home office or government of the involved Member State(s).

Simulation Staff are always available to consult with representatives as they work through their diplomatic options. Representatives are encouraged to seek out Simulation Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need to supplement their research on a situation. Simulation Staff wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for representatives about their countries and the topics at hand.

A NOTE ABOUT AMUN'S SIMULATION PHILOSOPHY

One of the core principles of AMUN is to mirror the practice and dynamics of the United Nations as much as possible. To that end, AMUN strives to create and conduct simulations that are a realistic representation of diplomacy at the United Nations and within the international system more broadly. We believe this commitment furthers AMUN's aims to create a fair and fun experience for all representatives and that it enhances the educational mission of the organization.

This commitment to realism is especially important in Security Council simulations where representatives respond to an alternate timeline and reality shifts depending on the Council's actions. Representatives are therefore asked to act within the realm of the possible.

All *actions* (as opposed to statements) proposed by Council Members must be approved by AMUN's Simulation Staff, who are charged with managing each simulation's timeline and alternate reality. As a rule, the Simulation Staff will give representatives a wide latitude in decision making. However, the Simulation Staff may deny a certain action if it falls outside of the bounds of reality or would negatively impact the realism of the simulation for all participants.

For every issue before the Council, each Member is faced with a variety of options of how to react and what policy line to take. A realistic simulation will consider only those options that would have reasonably been on the table for a State at a particular moment in time. In other words, there will always be options States do not consider or dismiss out of hand because they have limited capabilities or due to historical, cultural, or political constraints; in a realistic simulation, these options are not appropriate. These unrealistic approaches will not be permitted at AMUN.

This commitment to realism does not mean that simulations have a set trajectory they must follow. In the HSCs, there will certainly be many deviations from historical timelines, and re-thinking the way diplomacy played out in the past is encouraged. The same is encouraged in the Contemporary Council. As situations change, so do the options and attitudes of the Council Members and other countries. There are near-infinite possibilities within the bounds of realism, and our Simulation Staff will help representatives work through their options.

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

Sometimes other States will be involved in the deliberations of the Council. Delegations representing these States, if present at AMUN, will be asked to participate in deliberations by the Council. If they are not present or cannot provide a representative to address the Council, a member of the AMUN Secretariat will represent them as necessary. It is customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant Member States during discussion of a topic relevant to that State's interests, although it is not required. Any State mentioned in the background research for a specific Security Council is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any State related to a topic relevant to international peace and security. The Secretariat will notify in advance of the Conference those States likely to be asked to appear

before one of the Historical Security Councils. Those delegations should have one or more representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these States will not be involved in all issues, the representative(s) responsible for the HSC must be assigned to another Committee, preferably with a second representative who can cover that Committee while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment.

A NOTE ABOUT ROLEPLAYING IN HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCILS

AMUN's HSCs are unique not only in their topics, but also in their treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media, and they are flexible. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes; the start date for the historical simulations is provided later in this chapter. From the start date forward, what transpires will be dependent upon both Council Members' actions and Simulation Staff decisions. Council Members are encouraged to exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character, upon the capabilities of their governments and within the bounds of realistic diplomacy.

Effective roleplaying for an HSC Member State will not just be a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in that year. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations—and reevaluations—of national policies. Thus, it cannot be said that the policy course a government took in that year will necessarily be the wisest. Even were circumstances the same, it is not a sure thing that any given national government would do things exactly the same way given a second opportunity to look at events. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for second chances.

It will be the job of Council representatives to actively bring their country's policies and capabilities into the simulation when discussing problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's position on the various issues. One major factor representatives should consider when deciding whether or not to be actively involved is the cost of involvement by the United Nations. An increase in costs often causes the Security Council to re-prioritize its efforts.

While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council Members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters.

Both HSC simulations will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred and as modified by the representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism representatives must remember that they are roleplaying the individual assigned as their State's representative to the United Nations. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their States, or they may be relatively in the dark on their State's moment-to-moment actions in the world.

OPEN ISSUES

A unique feature of each Security Council in simulations at AMUN is the Council's ability to set its own agenda. The situations outlined in the council-specific topic guides on the following pages are only a few of those facing the world at the time and each Security Council can discuss any topic that the body wishes. For the contemporary Security Council this includes any real-world event up until the day the simulation convenes. For the Historical Security Councils, representatives should have a working knowledge of the events prior to and including the start date for their respective simulation. For the Historical Security Council of 1956, the start date is 1 May 1956. For the Historical Security Council of 1994, the start date is 1 January 1994.

For the time periods in question, open issues could include any active United Nations peacekeeping operations, the work of any United Nations body active at the time, and any social or economic issue of the day. It is strongly recommended that all representatives be well versed on current and historical global events relevant to their simulation.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Councils. For the contemporary Security Council these briefs are current as of spring 2017. Information for the Historical Security Councils covers information available up until the respective start dates of each simulation. AMUN recommends that representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of the background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.

THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

INTRODUCTION

The Contemporary Security Council topics below are current as of Spring 2017 and are not all-inclusive of what the Council might discuss at Conference. With the ever-changing nature of international peace and security, these four topics are a guide to help direct your research for your State's position. A more complete and updated version of likely topics for the Contemporary Security Council will be posted online this fall at www.amun.org.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin?
- Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Situation in the Middle East is dominated by two separate but interconnected topics: the Syrian Civil War and the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). International actions on either front will undoubtedly affect the other, and the geopolitical challenges that plague the region generally, and the Syrian Civil War specifically, complicate executing a more-unified effort against ISIL.

The complexities of the Syrian Civil War have been compounded and complicated by the presence of ISIL in Syria. The large number of anti-Assad factions, of which ISIL is one, has resulted in constantly-shifting tactical and strategic alliances. State-based alliances and actions in the region are also complicated—at various points, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia have all been involved in the fight against ISIL but have also supplied various sides in the Syrian Civil War as well. Generally, Sunni-dominated countries, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have supported the rebels, while Shia-controlled states, such as Iran and Iraq, have supported Assad. In short, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in a triangulated conflict and a complex proxy war for the region's and world's most powerful militaries, but one in which the alliances and goals are very murkily drawn.

THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Bashar al-Assad assumed the presidency of Syria in January 2000; his father was the president of the country from 1971-2000. Assad is also the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces and the General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath political party. Assad was once hailed as a reformer in the region, although those hopes have all but vanished since 2012.

As part of the Arab Spring movement in 2011, civilian protesters advocated for a variety of democratic and social reforms including equality for the Kurdish population, the introduction of opposition political parties and freedom of the press. Several days after the protests began, government forces opened fire on protesters in Deraa, where the movement started. The Assad regime made some small conciliatory gestures in the spring, but pressure on the Assad regime intensified and violence spread. The protest movement spread to many of Syria's major cities, including Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. In due course, members of the opposition began to arm themselves against Syrian government forces; later their aims would shift to displacing Assad's loyalist forces.

In 2012, the United Nations and the Arab League sent Kofi Annan as Special Envoy to Syria. A six-point peace plan was announced and accepted by Assad but rejected by the fractious opposition groups that lacked coordinated leadership. In April 2012, the Security Council passed Resolution 2043 to form the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor cessation of violence. Syria did not cooperate with the mission, and the mandate expired on 19 August 2012. Over time, the regime's response has been increasingly brutal and particularly devastating to Syrian civilians in besieged towns and cities.

The fighting in Syria has ebbed and flowed for more than six years, but the cumulative effects of near-constant fighting have made the humanitarian situation particularly dire. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates that more than 465,000 Syrians have died and more than 12 million have been displaced as a result of the conflict. The rising numbers of refugees and internally-displaced persons have placed pressure not only on Syria but also on neighboring countries as well as Europe. The few humanitarian aid groups and non-governmental organizations operating in Syria report catastrophic conditions related to medical care and basic sustenance needs.

Under the Obama administration, the United States held that defeating ISIL was the highest priority in the Middle East and that it would not make regime change in Syria an explicit goal. Then, in March 2017, under the new American president, Donald Trump, and following evidence that Syrian government forces had used chemical weapons against civilians, the United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles toward an airfield in Syria, the first direct attack on Assad's regime by US forces. As of May, further shifts in US policy following the Tomahawk strike were unclear.

To date, action in the Security Council has been limited under the persistent threat of Russian or Chinese veto. To date, Russia has vetoed eight resolutions on Syria; the Chinese six. Even efforts to ensure humanitarian aid in Syria have been stymied by complicated geopolitical relationships. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), and numerous United Nations aid convoys have been blocked from providing assistance to the region.

THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

The consequences of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq continue to reverberate in the Middle East. Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, a movement took hold in the region. This movement would eventually become al-Queda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Following Al-Zarqawi's death in 2006, the Sunni Awakening and the surge of American troops put added pressure on AQI. By 2008, AQI was on the brink of destruction. Nevertheless, despite the drastic pruning of the organization, it was not defeated.

Over the summer of 2010, the new leader of AQI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, worked to replenish the organization's leadership, as the US and its partners decreased their military presence and prepared to leave Iraq. After December 2011, AQI went back on the offensive. The expansion into Syria set off a series of internal power struggles between the leadership of al-Qaeda and AQI. The internal struggle gave AQI the chance to expand into Syria. Al-Baghdadi renamed AQI, calling the organization the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The organization is also known as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), IS (Islamic State), and Da'esh (an acronym of the group's Arabic name, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, but also understood as an insult). In February 2014, ISIL and al-Qaeda severed their ties, reflecting the differing goals between Baghdadi and the senior leader of Al- Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

With tensions high between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish population, ISIL moved to Mosul and began working to consolidate power and land. On 10 June 2014, ISIL seized Mosul. ISIL declared itself a caliphate on 29 June, claiming exclusive political and theological authority over the world's Muslim population. The seizures of the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tikrit assisted in connecting ISIL controlled territories thus helping pave the way for ISIL to access oil fields in both Syria and Iraq. Additionally, ISIL has worked to establish state institutions, such as a Council of Ministers, and to recruit additional forces internationally through social media and international media coverage.

The United States and its allies began airstrikes against ISIL territory in the fall of 2014, with minimal success. By early 2015, ISIL was in control of several key areas in Syria and Iraq, including oil fields. On 12 February 2015, the Security Council passed Resolution 2199 condemning both trade with terrorist groups and the paying of hostage ransom fees. Late in 2015, Russia announced it would begin airstrikes, ostensibly contributing to the fight against ISIS, but Russia targeted anti-Assad opposition groups more broadly, suggesting to the international community that Russia's primary interest was in supporting the Assad regime, rather than in defeating ISIL. In 2016 and early 2017, the anti-ISIL coalition made substantial gains in re-taking territory, both in Syria and Iraq—with the Assad regime touting even small victories to bolster the morale of Syrian troops.

Throughout 2016 and the beginning of 2017, ISIL began to take credit for a number of attacks outside of Iraq and Syria—both in the region (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Saudi Arabia), and outside (e.g., Germany, France, Belgium, the United States, Indonesia, Bangladesh). For the most part, these attacks appear to be planned by independent local or homegrown terrorists (rather than centrally-planned or financed by ISIL); it is only after an attack is carried out that ISIL leadership claims responsibility for the attacks. This chain of events represents a major departure from the methods of typical terrorist organizations, and it is of great concern to governments around the world. The fully-decentralized and uncoordinated nature of the planning and execution of attacks means traditional counter-terrorism approaches are less successful.

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THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE

Pro-Russia and pro-Western factions within Ukraine have been at odds since 2012 when Ukraine began negotiating to gain membership to the European Union. After Ukrainian independence in 1991,

Russia enjoyed a high level of influence and power in Ukraine. Ukraine's bid for membership in the European Union threatened Russia's influence. As the Ukrainian government moved to enact some of the policy changes required by the European Union, political pressure from pro-Russian groups mounted, igniting a power struggle between pro-Russian groups and those in favor of more integration into western Europe.

The political power struggle came to a head on 21 November 2013, when, in a dramatic policy reversal, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich announced that Ukraine had suspended its plans to sign the European Union agreement and would instead pursue closer ties with Russia. The announcement sparked outrage and civil unrest in many European capitals and spawned protests in Kyiv and across the Ukraine. The protest movement, named Euromaidan, called for closer ties with Europe and the removal of Yanukovich, accusing him and his government of corruption and abuses of power. Matters only worsened as many protests turned violent and clashed with the police. International concern and pressure on the Yanukovich government to respond to protesters' demands grew. On 15 December 2013, the European Union suspended negotiations with Ukraine after Yanukovich failed to address concerns about Russia's involvement in Ukraine. By February, Russian special forces extracted Yanukovich from Ukraine. Upon learning that Yanukovich had fled to Russia, the Ukrainian Parliament responded immediately by removing President Yanukovich and setting up a provisional government until elections could be held.

Following Yanukovich's removal, protesters in Crimea, an autonomous republic within Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority, made calls to rejoin Russia. The idea garnered broad support within Crimea, including within the Crimean Parliament. On 28 February 2014, Ukrainian officials accused Russia of invading Crimea and trying to incite further violence in Ukraine. Russia denied these charges and noted the troop movements were in line with the agreements with the Ukrainian government for troops stationed in the area. On 16 March, Crimea held a referendum on seceding from Ukraine and becoming part of Russia. Over 90 percent of referendum voters voted to join Russia, and Russia officially annexed Crimea two days later. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations, in A/RES/68/262, called these elections invalid and declared Russia's occupation of Crimea illegal.

Elections were held in Ukraine in May 2014, and Petro Poroshenko was elected President. Poroshenko announced that he would push for early parliamentary elections and would work to mend ties with Russia, with reconciliation contingent on Russia's recognition of Ukraine's territorial claim to Crimea. Even with this progress toward a peaceful solution, violence continued in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russia rebels. The referendum, and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, set off similar movements in two other pro-Russian oblasts (states) of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbass region of Ukraine. Both oblasts held independence referendums on 11 May 2014, which favored self-rule and eventual incorporation with Russia. Over the next few months, fighting intensified in Donbass as Ukrainian military forces clashed with separatist rebels in the region. Near the end of August, Russian forces crossed the border to secure the region for the separatists. By the end of the summer, fighting in the region left thousands of people dead or displaced.

As with Crimea, the international community called the Donetsk and Luhansk referendums invalid and condemned Russia's actions toward annexation. These conflicts have become a flashpoint, exacerbating tensions between Russia, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The tensions have resulted in a series of economic sanctions against Russia by Western countries.

In September 2014, a ceasefire between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russia rebels was reached. Rebels in Crimea refused to acknowledge actions by the Ukrainian government. In February 2015, Ukraine, Russia and other interested parties adopted the Minsk Agreement to help stem the violence in the eastern portions of Ukraine. This agreement contained provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry by both sides to create a demilitarized zone and constitutional reform in Ukraine, among other provisions. The Security Council adopted Resolution 2202 on 17 February 2015, calling on all parties to implement the Minsk Agreement.

Despite the Minsk Agreement, fighting continued and the humanitarian situation in the region continued to erode. The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights released a report in March 2016 alleging torture and abuse on both sides of the conflict. Though the United Nations has tried to investigate these claims further, the Ukrainian government has remained largely unhelpful. This past winter, Russian forces stepped up attacks on the border regions within the Ukraine, heavily shelling border towns and intensifying the humanitarian impact of the conflict.

In a more recent move to put pressure on Russia, President Poroshenko has cut trade ties with the separatist states, hoping the fragile economies will buckle because of a dependence on Russian economic support. But this move also threatens to destabilize politics within Ukraine, as Ukraine relies on the Donetsk and Luhansk oblates for coal, the country's chief power source. The decision was unpopular with many in the Ukrainian Parliament.

The political situation in Ukraine remains largely unchanged since the Minsk agreement, though new questions about the United States' stance toward Crimea have arisen since President Donald Trump took office in January 2017. Though the Trump Administration has not made any official changes to its policy regarding Ukraine, statements President Trump has made have left many in the international community wondering how committed the United States is to restoring the borders of Ukraine.

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NON-PROLIFERATION/DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

On 27 July 1953, the Korean War ended with an armistice after more than two years of negotiations between the North and the South regions. Since the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the armistice, a demilitarized zone has been in effect. Almost 50 years later, in June 2000, officials of the two countries signed a joint declaration intended to ease military tensions and promote economic cooperation. This cooperation was tested in 2002, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea admitted they were pursuing a nuclear program. This admission was in violation of both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the Agreed Framework that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held with the United States. As tensions mounted, it became increasingly clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea intended to weaponize this nuclear material. This threat led to the Six Party Talks in 2003, which included the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. The Six Party Talks resulted in formal economic assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in exchange for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not comply with a previous moratorium on testing long-range missiles, and launched several test missiles in July 2006. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1695, which condemned the launches and demanded that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program. Following Resolution 1695, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea began a series of test missile launches, nuclear weapons tests, uranium enrichment programs and weapon trials. These actions were met with increasingly severe condemnations by the United Nations Security Council and the larger international community. The Security Council adopted Resolutions 1718 in 2006 and 1874 in 2009 in an attempt to resume the Six Party Talks, strengthen the sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and have the Democratic People's Republic of Korea retract its withdrawal from the formerly ratified Treaty on the NPT.

On 17 December 2011, the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-il, suffered a fatal heart attack. His son, Kim Jong-un, formally took power in April 2012. The missile launches and nuclear tests continued under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, and, in October 2012, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it had a intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the mainland of the United States. This disclosure came two days after the Republic of Korea unveiled a missile deal with the United States. The Security Council continued to condemn the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ballistic missile program and urge compliance with Security Council resolutions.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Director General Yukiya Amano, has expressed deep concern over Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear program, and Member States within the Security Council are persistent with statements critical of Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "highly destabilizing behaviour."

On 30 November 2016, after numerous nuclear tests that were increasing in strength, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2321, which imposed the "toughest and most comprehensive sanctions regime ever" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, according to then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Since then, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted more tests, and state officials within the region have warned of the possibility of a "regional arms race." Between February and April 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted over half a dozen ballistic missile tests, with one test landing within 300 kilometers of Japan. On 28 April 2017, United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chaired a meeting of the United Nations Security Council stating that North Korea must take "concrete steps to reduce the threat that its illegal weapons programs pose" before cooperative denuclearization talks can begin.

On 9 May 2017, the Republic of Korea elected Moon Jae-in, who has pledged to work more closely with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un on addressing what he referred to as "the nuclear crisis."

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THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

After Sudan gained independence in 1956, violence and political unrest have plagued the country and its neighbors. Two north-south civil wars, with tensions dating back to 1955, have cost the lives of over two million people. The latest north-south civil war began in 1983, following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. The agreement intended to appease concerns of the southern Sudan liberation movement, establishing the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region. Despite this degree of autonomy granted to the people of the south, increased marginalization from the north generated additional unrest and sparked the Second Sudanese Civil War.

For more than two decades, the rebel movement of the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), fought the Sudanese government over resource infringement and religious determination. On 20 July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol, which restarted the peace process in Sudan and provided that the south could seek self-determination after six years.

In February 2003, intense violence broke out in the western region of Darfur between Sudanese armed forces, local militia and other armed rebel groups. The violence forced hundreds of thousands to flee to Chad, located to the west of Darfur. As the violence escalated and the refugee crisis deepened, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1547 in (blank) of 2004, which approved a special Political Mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts between the concerned parties and prepare for the introduction of an official peace support operation. As the crisis in Darfur escalated, additional tasks were delegated to UNAMIS relating specifically to Darfur.

After continued clashes over southern autonomy, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A reached a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Two months later, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1590, which officially established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The Security Council determined that the mandate of UNMIS would be to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, along with facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, providing humanitarian and development assistance, and contributing toward international efforts to protect and promote human rights in the Sudan. The mandate of UNMIS was expanded by Resolution 1706 in 2006 to include a peacekeeping force of up to 17,300 troops to protect civilians in Darfur, but the Sudanese government strongly opposed this expansion.

On 31 July 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, which augmented the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and established a joint peacekeeping operation in Darfur: the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Following South Sudan's independence in 2011, the Sudanese government terminated the presence of UNMIS. Currently, UNAMID is the largest peacekeeping mission in the world, with 19,248 total authorized personnel. The current authorization was established by Security Council Resolution 2296 in (blank) of 2016 and is set to expire on 30 June 2017.

Despite United Nations efforts in the region, ethnic cleansing and systematic rape continue in Darfur. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has alleged that the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, has been ordering the ethnic cleansing of non-Arab individuals in Darfur (ethnic groups such as the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa). The ICC issued an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir in 2009, but he continues to refute the charges. President al-Bashir won another five-year term in April 2015.

South Sudan

On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence. The United Nations Security Council welcomed South Sudan by adopting Resolution 1996 on (blank blank) 2011, which established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The Council determined that the mandate of UNMISS was to assist with the post-independence transition, as "the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region."

In December 2013, ethnically-charged attacks broke out in South Sudan's Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Upper Nile states, among others. President Salva Kiir accused his former vice-president, Riek Machar, of plotting to overthrow him, which resulted in fighting primarily between the Dinka, President Kiir's ethnic group, and the Nuer, Riek Machar's ethnic group. South Sudan, as the newest country in the world, is also the most under-developed. This means that the fighting is not only about ethnic and political differences, but also an overall lack of resources.

On 27 May 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2155, which reinforced UNMISS and prioritized its mandate toward the protection of civilians, promotion of human rights and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Resolution also supported the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, reached between the government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in January of 2014.

Despite the agreement, unrest in the country has continued. In March 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2206, which outlines sanctions in South Sudan including, but not limited to, a travel ban on South Sudanese entering other Member States and freezing South Sudanese assets in Member State territories.

More than 2.3 million people have been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began, including 1.66 million internally displaced people (IDPs), of which 53.4% are estimated to be children. Only 185,000 of these IDPs have sought refuge in United Nations Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites. Instability in neighboring countries has led 265,700 refugees from the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic to seek refuge in South Sudan.

As tensions continue to mount and the humanitarian crisis worsens, the United Nations Security Council has stressed that the situation in South Sudan does not have a "military solution." Seventy nine aid workers have been killed in South Sudan since the conflict began, the most recent of which occurred in March 2017 when six aid workers were ambushed while traveling between Juba, the capital, and the town of Pibor. The current peace process within South Sudan has been described as "not dead" but in need of "significant resuscitation."

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

The Historical Security Council (HSC) of 1956 will simulate the events of the world beginning on 1 May 1956. At the time, Dag Hammarskjold was the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolved around situations in the Middle East, the situation in South Africa, enforcement of armistice agreements, the right to self-determination, the effects of colonialism and post-colonialism, and disputes over United Nations representation for China. However, the Council may discuss any issue involving international peace and security. Representatives should have a broad knowledge of the world and world events as they stood on 1 May 1956. The Security Council can, at its discretion, involve other States or parties to the dispute on a particular topic. Possible parties to the dispute may include Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

The brief synopses presented here offer merely introductory coverage of prominent international issues that can direct representatives' continued research and preparation.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions, which should assist them in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from their country's perspective:
- How did this conflict begin?
- Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict? If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

With the assistance of UN mediation, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War officially ended when Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt signed the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Pursuant to the agreements, Israel controls over 70 percent of the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River; Jordan controls the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and Egypt controls the Gaza Strip. The City of Jerusalem was intended to be an international city, but, at the end of the conflict, the Western half of the city was controlled by Israel, and the Eastern half was controlled by Transjordan, with neither side wanting to cede control of their portion. The parties intended that the Armistice agreements were only interim agreements until they could be replaced by a permanent agreement. A Palestinian state, as was originally part of the United Nations plan creating the Israeli state, was not established, and Arab states have since refused to grant recognition of Israel.

In 1949, the Security Council passed Resolution 73, to monitor the armistice and establish the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). Despite the Armistice, armed conflict and political tensions continue in the region amid numerous violations of the agreement. Palestinian guerillas have made repeated incursions into Israel from the Gaza Strip, and Israel has responded with retaliatory attacks into Gaza. A major concern for Israel has been Jordan denying access to holy sites in East Jerusalem and Mount Scopus, in violation of the Armistice.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 1955 Israeli forces attacked and seized Syrian positions on the Northeast Corner of Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of Galilee). Israel claimed that the attack was an attempt to stop artillery attacks on Israeli fishing and police boats. On 19 January 1956, the Security Council passed Resolution 111 condemning the attack and calling for both sides to comply with their obligations under Armistice agreements with respect to the demilitarized zone.

In an effort to avert an Arab-Israeli arms race, the United States, United Kingdom and France entered the Tripartite Agreement in May 1950, committing to action both within and outside of the United Nations to prevent the violation of boundaries or armistice lines. Goals include preventing further violence, preventing stoppages of oil production and stopping the spread of Soviet communism to the region.

In response to the 750,000 Palestinian refugees that left Israel between 1946 and 1948, the United Nations General Assembly created the United Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in 1949. Currently, there are approximately 900,000 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

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THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptian military suffered from inefficiency and corruption in the higher ranks, which contributed to low morale. By January 1952 tensions between the ruling Egyptian government and the military and the civilian population led to demonstrations and riots breaking out in Cairo. Demonstrators demanded an end to the British military presence in the country, the presence of foreigners and the government of King Farouk. In response to the violence, King Farouk ousted his Prime Minister, Moustafa El-Nahas, in January 1952. Despite attempts to appease the military and demonstrators, by 23 July the military had taken power, forcing King Farouk to abdicate his throne to his infant son, Prince Ahmad Fuad.

In the aftermath, a civilian cabinet was created, political prisoners were released from jails, censorship of the press was ended, elections were called for and plans for land reform were in the works. At the heart of the new government was the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led by Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became the president of Egypt in November 1954. A new constitution was ratified in 1956, giving the Egyptian president extraordinary powers.

In 1954, the United Kingdom and Egypt signed the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954, which called for the removal of all British military personnel by June 1956. The agreement does allow the UK to base forces in Egypt in an "emergency situation," such as an attack on an Arab state or Turkey.

Complicating the relationship between the United Kingdom and Egypt is the Egyptian Government's proposed project for the High Dam at Aswan, which would provide Egypt with a cheap source of electricity and allow cultivation and irrigation of new areas for expanded agricultural production. Despite the promise of economic benefit, the Egyptian government has been unable to finance this project on its own and has turned to the United States and the United Kingdom for financial assistance. Despite an Egyptian weapons deal with the Soviet Union, denouncements by the West and continued belligerence with the Israelis, the United States and United Kingdom have agreed to help finance the dam. The United States has been discussing providing $1.3 billion to support the project that is estimated to take up to two decades to build. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has also made an offer of financing for the dam.

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THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA

On 1 November 1954 fighting broke out in the French territory of Algeria between Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), an Algerian separatist group, and the ruling French government. In response, French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes France ordered three battalions of French paratroopers into the territory to quell the violence. French newspapers immediately began suggesting that other Arab states had instigated the attacks.

By early December, the French military presence had swelled to over 70,000 personnel under the pretext of protecting the Algerian people against terrorism. By August 1955, FLN forces began conducting attacks on civilian targets. The French and their civilian para-military allies, the Pied-Noir, conducted retaliatory attacks that have left between 1,200 to 12,000 dead.

On 4 January 1955, Saudi Arabia formally asked the Security Council to consider the crisis. France considers this issue a domestic matter and any discussion of the situation in Algeria by the United Nations to be a violation of the Charter. They attempted to stop discussion of the issue in the Council by having allies such as Colombia remove the item from the agenda, but lost by one vote, and the issue was addressed in October 1955. France has indicated that they might leave the United Nations over the matter.

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THE QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

The Republic of China is one of the original members of the United Nations, having ratified the United Nations Charter on 28 September,

1945. When the Chinese civil war ended in 1949, the Communist Party of China prevailed, establishing the People's Republic of China, claiming to be the legitimate government and controlling much of the mainland territory. The Republic of China retreated to the island of Taiwan and also claimed to be the legitimate government of all of China. The Republic of China continues to represent China in the United Nations; this has raised issues about the legitimacy of the Republic of China's representation of China at the United Nations.

In 1955, the Security Council invited a representative of the People's Republic of China to participate in the Council's discussion of the issue of UN representation and address the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan. Since then, there has been continued conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of China, including shelling, air raids and anti-aircraft action, and competing claims of legitimacy.

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DECOLONIZATION

Following the Second World War, an increasing number of nations and peoples sought to exercise the right to self-determination laid out in the United Nations Charter. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, a number of former colonial territories sought and obtained independence, spurring many non-self-governing peoples to also seek independence. These trends continued into the early months of 1956. Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956, and as of May, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria are seeking independence.

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ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

In addition to its function of maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council recommends the admission of new Member States to the General Assembly. This is a critical step in the process of admitting new Member States into the United Nations. The admission of new Member States also helps the United Nations and the Security Council maintain international peace and security. As such, during both times of relative peace and those of international unrest, the Security Council may be required to review applications for potential Member States and may pass resolutions recommending admission of the applicant state to the General Assembly. As colonial territories gain independence, the Security Council's task of admitting new members to the United Nations remains a critical function of the Security Council. The recent increase in Member States has escalated regional tension over Council representation. The General Assembly experienced deadlock during non-Permanent Member Security Council elections over whether The Philippines or Yugoslavia would replace Turkey on the Council. The deadlock broke on 20 December, 1955, when Yugoslavia won the election, months after the original balloting.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

ARGENTINA	FRANCE	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BRAZIL	NEW ZEALAND	RWANDA
CHINA	NIGERIA	SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC	OMAN	UNITED KINGDOM
DJIBOUTI	PAKISTAN	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

The Historical Security Council (HSC) of 1994 will simulate the events of the world beginning on 1 January 1994. At the time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolved around the unrest in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslav Republics. However, the Council may discuss any issue involving international peace and security. Representatives should have a broad knowledge of the world and world events as they stood on 1 January 1994. The Security Council can, at its discretion, involve other States or parties to the dispute on a particular topic. Possible parties to the dispute may include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Somalia, Uganda, Georgia and Haiti.

The brief synopses presented here offer merely introductory coverage of prominent international issues that can direct representatives' continued research and preparation.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions, which should assist them in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from their country's perspective:
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THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

In 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgian colonial rule and organized as a one-party state controlled by a Hutu-dominated government. The new Rwandan government reversed colonial-era discrimination and ethnic quotas in employment and education and enforced those quotas against the minority Tutsi ethnic group. In response, Tutsi refugees in Zaire and Tanzania began attacking Hutus. The government reacted violently against Tutsi guerrilla groups. In a 1973 coup d'etat, General Juvenal Habyarimana seized control of the Hutu government, promising to restore peace, national development and unity. However, preferential treatment of Hutus aggravated the ethnic tensions throughout the following years. By the end of the 1980s, nearly 500,000 Tutsis sought refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania.

In the late 1980s, individuals from the Tutsi refugee diaspora in Uganda created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political and military organization to reform the Rwandan government and return Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. Members of the RPF blamed the government for its failure to democratize and to resolve the refugee problem. On 1 October 1990, a force of 7,000 RPF troops launched a major attack from the safe haven of Uganda onto Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) in Northern Rwanda, igniting a civil war in Rwanda. Despite their small numbers, the RPF troops' prior military experience in the Ugandan civil war allowed them to make significant gains against the Hutu forces. Their gains were short-lived, however, and the RPF was pushed back across the border by month's end. The RPF regrouped over the next three months. Under the new leadership of Paul Kagame, the RPF embarked on a more sustained campaign of guerrilla-style warfare from bases and safe havens in the Virunga Mountains. The Rwandan government sought military and financial assistance from Belgium, France and Zaire in response to the RPF attacks. The RAF launched a counteroffensive with heavy military equipment.

The civil war inflamed ethnic tensions. Tutsis inside Rwanda and moderate Hutus were labeled accomplices of the RPF and designated traitors by the government. The Hutu-run media ran a propaganda campaign aimed at promoting the superiority of Hutus and the evils of Tutsis. Ethnic tensions boiled over in the spring of 1991 when Hutu activists carried out organized killings sanctioned by local governments of roughly 1,000 Tutsis in several northern cities. Tutsis in the north were eventually allowed to relocate to safer areas, but the anti-Tutsi rhetoric only increased over the next year.

Both internal and external political pressure finally forced President Habyarimana to agree to negotiations, and lines of communication were opened between some government officials and the RPF. A ceasefire was agreed upon in July 1992, and, with the help of France, the United States and the Organisation of African Unity, peace talks were held in Arusha, Tanzania on 12 July 1992. An early agreement from these talks set a timetable for ending the fighting, promoted further peace talks between parties, addressed the repatriation of refugees and authorized the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer. The Arusha Accords concluded on 4 August 1993 with the final agreement calling for a democratically elected government and the formation of a transitional government consisting of power sharing between the current government and the RPF until elections were held and refugees repatriated. The Arusha Accords caused an open split among Hutus in power, with radical Hutu groups opposing the Habyarimana government. This led to increased anti-Tutsi propaganda, including increasingly radical radio broadcasts from Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) beginning in mid-July 1993. Activities of the Interhamwe militias, formed from internally displaced youth in 1992 by Hutu government and military leaders, also increased in late 1993.

In June 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) with the purpose of verifying that no military assistance reached Rwanda over the northern Ugandan border. In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Resolution 872 to aid in the implementation and monitoring of the Arusha Accords and to support the transitional government for an initial period of six months. UNAMIR's headquarters became operational on 1 November 1993. Shortly after arriving, UNAMIR Commander General Romeo Dallaire informed UN officials that there was the potential for large-scale, serious violence in Rwanda. However, UN officials did not respond.

On 10 December 1993, the Rwandan government, the RPF and the Special Representative of UNAMIR issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitments to the Arusha Accords and agreed to set up a broad-based transitional government before 31 December 1993. On 20 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 891 extending UNOMUR's mission for six months.

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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In 1946, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a constituent republic of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which governed numerous ethnic groups. After the death of President Josip Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia quickly plunged into political and economic turmoil. Ethnic unrest spread, and the republics of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began declaring their independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from SFRY and became an independent state on 3 March 1992. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence was opposed by Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian-controlled federal government of Yugoslavia. Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, ethnic groups previously incorporated under the SFRY began waging war with one another in an effort to gain territorial control within the former Yugoslav territory.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence was quickly recognized by the European community and the United States. In response, Serbian National Forces immediately began strikes upon Sarajevo, the newly-declared capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over the next several months, the Serbian National Forces gained control over nearly two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Serbian forces gained territory, they drove out many non-Serbians, creating a large internally displaced persons and refugee population.

As the Serbians gained ground, reports surfaced accusing them of committing ethnic violence toward ethnic Bosnians and Croats. Accordingly, the UN passed Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, which created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the purpose of promoting peace talks and maintaining peace in UN safe-zones and no-fly zones. Initially, UNPROFOR redirected observers from other parts of Yugoslavia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it later brought in additional observers. Although UNPROFOR was able to achieve some success, continued fighting led to a series of economic sanctions against all of Yugoslavia in May 1992. Through a series of resolutions, the Security Council imposed stricter sanctions prohibiting all import, export and transportation of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; the embargo excluded weapons and military equipment intended for UNPROFOR.

UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded by a series of resolutions passed in October and November 1992. These resolutions aimed to bring stability to Bosnia by deploying additional observers and limiting military flights to only those that were part of UNPROFOR's mission. By March 1993, fighting had increased in eastern Bosnia, with Serb military forces attacking civilian populations and interfering with humanitarian operations. Fighting intensified as local Muslims from surrounding areas were driven into the town of Srebrenica by Serbian military forces.

The large populations of Croats and Serbs further complicated ethnic tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, which had also been part of the Social federal republic of Yugoslavia, declared its independence in 1991 and was also fighting its own war against Serbian forces. Like the war in Bosnia, the Croatian War for Independence included ethnic violence between Serbian forces and the ethnic Croat population. These ethnic tensions spilled over into Bosnia, creating a second dimension to the conflict and complicating matters on the ground. By the late spring of 1993, Muslim and ethnic Croat forces inside of Bosnia held a tenuous alliance against the Serbs.

In May 1993 fighting erupted in central Bosnia. The fighting interrupted main supply routes to northern Bosnia and disrupted UNPROFOR operations. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that a significant lack of funding for UN missions threatened to interrupt necessary day-to-day operations in the coming months. On 4 October 1993, the Security Council extended the UNPROFOR mandate for an additional six months to 31 March 1994. In November 1993, the Security Council issued statements noting its concern that increasing military actions posed significant threats to the civilian population and

demanding that the attacks stop. Numerous peace plans and ceasefires were signed in November 1993, but they have, thus far, failed to curb fighting and stop attacks on UNPROFOR.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

In the late 1980s, civil war ravaged Somalia. A weak economy, massive foreign debt and the increasingly authoritarian policies of the Siad Barre presidency led to the formation of several resistance organizations and rebel groups. One of the most organized and effective of these groups was the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The USC eventually managed to oust Barre in early 1991, but the fighting did not end with Barre's exit. The USC and other rebel groups could not come to a political agreement, and most rebel groups chose to consolidate power within their own regions rather than share power in a formal government agreement. Internal squabbles within the USC led to Ali Mahdi Mohamed being named president and the group splitting in two, with General Aidid leading the anti-Mohamed faction. As 1991 drew to a close intense fighting plagued Mogadishu and other regions, as different groups clashed in their struggle for power.

The volatile political situation combined with a severe drought led to drastic food shortages throughout Somalia. Nearly 300,000 people died of starvation by 1992. Fighting displaced nearly two million more people, driving them into different parts of Somalia or neighboring countries.

On 3 March 1992, Aidid and Mohamed signed a ceasefire agreement. The Security Council created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM I) on 24 April 1992, to provide observers and facilitate the ceasefire. Unfortunately, conditions continued to deteriorate as factions became increasingly hostile toward the UN operation. In July 1992 the UNISOM I mandate was strengthened, and four operational zones were established. At the same time, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called for a 100-day plan to address the dire humanitarian crisis.

Concerned by the continued deterioration of the situation, the Security Council passed resolution 794 on 4 December 1992, in which the Council agreed that conditions under Article VII of the UN Charter had been met and Member States had permission to intervene and secure a safe environment for UNISOM I. The United States agreed to take control of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that was created. The presence of UNITAF in Somalia was considered a success. Humanitarian aid was reaching the people, and many of the rebel factions agreed to attend the meeting for national reconciliation convened in January of 1993 by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The reconciliation meeting eventually led to the Addis Ababa Agreement on 27 March. With a ceasefire in place and reconciliation underway, the Security Council passed resolution 814 replacing UNITAF with UNISOM II. UNISOM II was tasked with monitoring all factions' compliance with the ceasefire; preventing the resumption of violence; seizing small arms from unauthorized elements; maintaining control of heavy weapons; securing ports and means of communication necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid; protecting UN and NGO operations and their workers; demining the region; and repatriating refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

By May 1993, it became clear that not all signatories to the March Addis Ababa agreements intended to cooperate. General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of the Somali National Alliance, teamed with other factions and began engaging in armed attacks against UNISOM II, killing international troops and workers. Resolution 837 condemned these attacks and called for ground and air operations in Mogadishu to affect the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible for the attacks on peacekeepers. UNISOM II continued operations and additional ground forces from the United States were brought in for support in apprehending General Aidid and his supporters.

An increase in violence against UN and US soldiers over the summer of 1993 led to the United States sending special forces to the area specifically to neutralize General Aidid and his forces. On 3 October 1993 US Army rangers carried out a raid to capture two clan leaders. The initial mission was a success, but, on their return flight, two of the black hawk helicopters carrying the rangers were attacked and shot down by Somali militia members. The subsequent operation to rescue the downed ranger group would later be known as the Battle of Mogadishu. It extended throughout the city and lasted into the next morning when UNISOM II troops were able to carry out a rescue. The battle ended with 18 US, one Pakistani and one Malaysian fatalities in addition to more than 70 wounded. Casualty estimates from the Somalis ranged anywhere from 300 to over 2,000. Additionally, one US Army ranger was captured by the Somalis and held by General Aidid for eleven days.

As a result of the Battle, the United States abruptly changed its policy toward Somalia and General Aidid. On 6 October 1993, US President Bill Clinton ordered an end to all non- defensive US actions against General Aidid and announced that all US forces would be withdrawing from Somalia by no later than 31 March 1994. Currently, there are only a few hundred US Marines remaining. Additionally, the US sent Robert Oakley as a special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker peace.

General Aidid has agreed to stop actions against UNISOM II troops and return to the peace process. Members of the Somali factions have

been meeting to discuss peace and the future of Somalia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia since December, but progress has been slow. As the United States continues to withdraw its troops, other countries have pledged to follow suit, leaving the future of the UNISOM II and UN involvement in Somalia uncertain.

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THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

The Republic of Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, fueling separatist and nationalist concerns by citizens in the autonomous Abkhaz Republic (Abkhazia) within Georgia. The newly independent Georgia and Abkhazia were initially able to reach a power sharing agreement, but political turmoil within Georgia led to hardline Georgian nationalists taking power, which reignited the political disagreement between the two. On 23 July 1992, the Abkhaz legislature voted to return to the 1925 Soviet-era Constitution where Abkhazia was a Soviet Union republic and not part of Georgia. The State Council of the Republic of Georgia declared the act void.

Violence broke out in Abkhazia as its leadership removed Georgian officials from their offices. Separatists attacked Georgian troops who had been sent in to Abkhazia to secure main highways and railways. In August, Abkhazian separatists kidnapped 11 Georgian political negotiators, including the Interior Minister. In response, Georgia sent 3,000 troops into the capital of Sukhumi to restore order. Reports from this first offensive indicated the presence targeted violence against ethnic Abkhazians. As a result, most ethnic Abkhaz fled the capital.

Throughout the fall of 1992, several ceasefire agreements were brokered but ultimately fell apart. Both sides used the intervening months to fortify their positions and launch airstrikes on each other's positions in the towns around Sukhumi, many of which resulted in heavy civilian casualties. The heavy bombardments have left civilians cut off from basic supplies, and there have been widespread reports of both ethnic violence and looting and murder as a result of the unrest.

With the help of Russian military equipment and logistics, Abkhazian forces launched three attacks on Sukumi in January, March and early July. Each attack was ultimately unsuccessful. On 9 July 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 849, calling for plans to dispatch military observers once a ceasefire began. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire on 27 July and on 6 August, in Resolution 854, the Security Council called for an advance team of 10 military observers to be sent to Abkhazia. On 24 August, Resolution 858 established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), authorizing 88 military observers to verify compliance with the ceasefire and investigate violations. Unrelated political unrest in Georgia hampered the Georgian forces within Abkhazia from completing their agreed withdrawal, and on 16 September 1993, Abkhazian launched another attack on Sukhumi, breaking the ceasefire. Within eleven days, Abkhazian troops were able to regain control of almost all Abkhazian territory.

The Security Council passed Resolution 881 on 4 November, approving the extension of UNOMIG until 31 January 1994. On 1 December 1993, UN-sponsored negotiations began in Geneva; Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Memorandum of Understanding and promised not to use force against each other during the negotiations. The negotiations stalled when Abkhazia refused to recognize Georgia's territorial integrity. On 22 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 892 authorizing the phased deployment of 50 additional military observers.

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

On 16 December 1990, democratic elections were held in Haiti under the supervision of the United Nations. Father Jean Aristide was elected on a platform of a new economic deal for the poor and a cleansing of the civil service. Less than a year into his presidency, on 29 September 1991, Aristide was ousted by a military coup. Aristide was allowed to escape to Venezuela after diplomatic intervention by the US, French and Venezuelan ambassadors. Under the leadership of General Raoul Cedras, the military immediately began slaughtering supporters of Aristide, killing more than a thousand people in two weeks. In response, over 200,000 people fled the capital. The Organization of American States (OAS) imposed economic sanctions on Haiti, and the United States, France and Canada suspended all economic assistance. On 8 October 1991, the OAS urged all member countries to freeze Haitian assets and proposed a civilian force that would mediate disputes and monitor compliance.

The OAS and the United States pushed for Aristide's return to power. On 23 February 1992, an OAS-mediated agreement granted amnesty to the coup plotters. However, on 27 March, the Haitian Supreme Court and Senate rejected the accord. Hostilities continued in Haiti as international pressure mounted to impose a universal trade embargo on oil and weapons. On 23 April 1993, the General Assembly authorized the United Nations to take part in a UN/OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti to deploy human rights monitors in the country, after which the Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a comprehensive fuel and arms embargo in Haiti. On 3 July 1993, Cedras and Aristide signed the Governor's Island Agreement, which stated that Aristide would resume power on 30 October 1993. On 27 August 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 861 suspending the sanctions against Haiti. Four days later, Resolution 862 was adopted, which dispatched a small contingent to assess requirements for the UN Mission in Haiti.

Prior to Aristide's return to power in October, however, violence broke out in Haiti. Anti-Aristide gunmen menaced government workers and a UN team in the area, causing the Security Council to pass Resolution 867 on 23 September to immediately dispatch the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). American and Canadian troops sailed to Haiti, but, after they were were blocked from docking by anti-Aristide forces, the United States ordered the ship to return. The Security Council passed Resolution 873 on 13 October reinstating the sanctions of Resolution 841. UN envoy Dante Caputo organized talks with the Haitian military leaders to restore Aristide to power, but the talks fell apart. With the failure of the talks and continued violence, Caputo withdrew all civilian monitors from the island by the end of October.

On 22 December 1993, the United States, France, Canada and Venezuela cautioned Haiti's military leaders that the embargo would be expanded if Aristide were not allowed to return to power by 15 January 1994. Meanwhile, Aristide announced that he was organizing a conference in Miami on 15 January 1994 to help restore democracy to Haiti.

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HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

The Historical Commission of Inquiry (COI) simulates two historical commissions established by the United Nations Security Council to provide in-depth reporting on the facts and developments of a particular dispute. The Commissions may also be empowered by their mandate to serve as mediators in negotiations between the parties to the dispute. At the United Nations, each Commission is unique in membership and purpose. At AMUN, however, for the purposes of our Conference simulation, two disputes which have been the subject of past Commissions will be scrutinized by the same body of experts. These experts will also include representatives from Czechoslovakia and Argentina, nominated by India and Pakistan respectively, and Belgium and Australia, nominated by the Netherlands and Indonesia respectively.

Members of the United Nations can formally raise disputes to the Security Council through Article 35 of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council investigates those disputes through Article 34 of the Charter, historically by forming Commissions of Inquiry. The objectives of the Commission of Inquiry are to investigate the facts and allegations of the disputes, keep the Security Council informed of their findings and developments, and to tender a final report on the facts of the dispute at the conclusion of each investigation. That final report may also include recommendations for future actions that the Commission believes the Security Council should take.

The Commission of Inquiry is a historical simulation. History as it happened is considered to have happened until the start date for the simulation. Events after that date become variable and subject to change through the actions of the experts and simulation staff. This brief is a contemporary perspective of the issues before the Commission as of the start date of the simulation. Events that are ongoing as of the start date are referred to in present tenses, while events that are anticipated to happen after the start date but have not yet happened as of the start date, are referred to in future tenses. **The start date for this year's Commission is 20 January 1948.**

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The British East India Company controlled much of the Indian subcontinent after a series of military victories over local Indian powers culminated in the surrender of local forces in 1757. However, in response to the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, the British government nationalized the East India Company and began its rule of India, known as the British Raj. Over the next 90 years, India's territories were governed by a combination of direct British administration and indirect rule of approximately 400 princely states, each of which retained control over its internal affairs.

Following the upheaval of World War II and facing increasingly nationalist movements within India, the British resolved to emancipate its Indian colony. By 1947, nearly half of its territory on the subcontinent consisted of 562 self-administered princely states, dispersed all over the subcontinent. Overseen by Governor-General Lord Mountbatten,

British India was divided into two independent states: the primarily Muslim Dominion of Pakistan established on 14 August 1947, and the primarily Hindu Dominion of India established on 15 August 1947. The vast majority of principalities have been enveloped by either Pakistan or India due to geography alone.

Kashmir, located along the borders of Afghanistan and China, now straddles the territory of the newly formed states of Pakistan and India. Kashmir (also known as Jammu and Kashmir) is one of the largest principalities of British India. It has been self-administered by the maharaja Hari Singh, whose ancestors conquered and purchased territory in and around the Kashmir Valley throughout the British East India Company's control. The principality was officially recognized by the British government in 1846, and possesses unusual sovereignty in its choice over which new state to join. A second consideration, the preference of the population—or at least its ruler—weighs more heavily for Kashmir.

Kashmir's population is 77 percent Muslim and 20 percent Hindu; it trades primarily with areas now within Pakistan. The name Pakistan itself is tied to Kashmir. Derived from the acronym conceived in 1933, The "k" of Pakistan stands for Kashmir. The new leader of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and his administration, immediately began courting Singh to join the Dominion of Pakistan.

While the geography of Kashmir has been historically tied to what is now Pakistan, the rulers have come from a century-old line of Hindu maharajas. The strongest political group of Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC), though overwhelmingly Muslim, has close ties to the Indian National Congress, in particular to the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, whose family is from the Kashmir Valley. The NC, led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, has been highly critical of the hereditary and autocratic rule of Kashmir as well as the crushing poverty of its Muslim inhabitants.

While most provinces immediately acceded to either India or Pakistan, Kashmir remained open to acceding to either. Singh attempted to keep negotiations open with both states, seeking an arrangement that would preserve the autonomy Kashmir had enjoyed while continuing the powers of the hereditary maharajah. However, as negotiations stalled with India, tribal raiders began to make incursions along the Pakistan-Kashmir border.

In October 1947, after weeks of accusations from Kashmir that Pakistan was supporting raids and rebellion along their shared border, tribal forces moved en masse from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province into Kashmir. Kashmir's limited defenses were dispersed within days, and the tribal forces moved deep into Kashmiri territory, nearly to the capital city of Srinagar.

Seeing no other option, Singh wrote to Mountbatten requesting his support in approaching India for assistance. India requested the maharaja accede to the Dominion of India, so India would be acting in defense of its own territory. On 26 October 1947, Singh acceded all authority over Kashmir province to India. Sheikh Abdullah also wrote

to the government of India strongly supporting the accession to the Dominion of India. Indian forces arrived in Srinagar within 24 hours and pushed Pakistani forces out of most of Kashmir by the end of November 1947.

On 1 January 1948, the Representative of India submitted a letter to the President of the Security Council, formally issuing a complaint against Pakistan under Article 35 of the United Nations Charter. The letter detailed past incursions into the Punjab and Kashmir regions by Pakistani raiders. It further alleged that Pakistan must be materially supporting these forces and that to effectively repel them, without Pakistani or international assistance, Indian forces would need to move into Pakistani territory. The letter requested the Security Council call upon the Pakistani government to cease its alleged support of the raiders and actively discourage its nationals from participating in invasions of India's provinces.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan responded on 15 January 1948, rebutting India's claims and issuing a complaint against India under Article 35. In its letter, Pakistan alleged genocide of Muslims in Kashmir under Indian rule and claimed that the resistance India is facing in Kashmir is the true voice of Kashmir's people, who are rebelling due to the maharaja's collusion to accede to an oppressive, non-representative government. Pakistan requested that the Security Council call upon the Indian government to stop the genocide of Muslims, arrange for the cessation of fighting within Kashmir, expel all forces not from Kashmir and facilitate a plebiscite to determine the ultimate fate of the Kashmir province.

The Security Council responded on 20 January 1948 by establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Commission has two functions: "to investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter" relating to allegations of the 1 January and 15 January letters submitted by the parties to the dispute and to exercise a mediatory influence while carrying out and reporting on any directions given to the Commission by the Security Council.

Questions to consider include the following:
- To what extent are India and Pakistan contributing to current unrest within the Kashmir province? What are their goals?
- India and Pakistan have made incendiary, contradictory complaints against each other. How will the Commission conduct its investigation while still maintaining a mediatory influence?
- What steps can the Security Council take to facilitate the Commission's fact finding? What steps need to be taken to reach a peaceful resolution?

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THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

The Indonesian archipelago, commonly referred to as the Dutch East Indies, had been under the colonial control of the Netherlands since the beginning of the 19th century. This colonial control was disrupted on 10 January 1942, when the Japanese invaded the colony to seize its strategically vital natural resources, particularly oil and rubber. The Dutch military in the colony was overwhelmed in only a few months, and the Japanese occupied the islands for the remainder of the war. During their occupation, the Japanese ordered the internment and deportation of all Dutch citizens, effectively dismantling the Dutch colonial government, and built a new occupation government staffed largely with native Indonesians. The Japanese conscripted several million Indonesians into forced-labor units which were used across Japan's Pacific holdings. As the war turned against them, Japan also created Indonesian military units to police and defend the territory. The Japanese promised eventual independence for the colony as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but such promises had only gotten to the stage of the creation of a Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence by the time the US dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.

Indonesian nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, who had been leaders on the Preparatory Committee, proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, two days after Japan's surrender. Troops from the British South East Asia Command eventually arrived on the islands to liberate Europeans and other internees from Japanese prisons and work camps. During the period between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of Allied troops, the Japanese were expected to both disarm and maintain order, which resulted in the widespread transfer of weapons and policing responsibilities to native Indonesian forces. The delayed arrival of Allied troops allowed the new Republic to solidify its political control in the vacuum of the Japanese withdrawal. Scattered violence erupted between Indonesian militias and the British troops, with the largest incident being the death of British Brigadier Aubertin Mallaby and the general destruction of his command in the city of Surabaya on 30 October 1945. The British counterattacked, and fighting consumed Surabaya from 10 to 24 November 1945.

By June 1946, British troops had been replaced by Dutch soldiers and administrators. On the outer islands of the archipelago they met little resistance and re-established Dutch control. On Java and Sumatra, the

two key islands, the Dutch were able to hold the major cities but met resistance in the countryside. Both parties agreed to declare a ceasefire in October 1946 in order to begin negotiations. The result of those negotiations was the Linggadjati Agreement. The Dutch agreed to recognize Republican control over Java, Sumatra and the smaller island of Madura. Both sides agreed to a plan for a semi-autonomous, federal, United States of Indonesia, whose constituent parts would be the Republic and the governments of the Dutch-controlled portions of the archipelago. The ultimate goal of this plan was a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, ruled by the Dutch Queen and consisting of the Netherlands, the United States of Indonesia and all other Dutch colonial territories. The agreement was signed on 25 March 1947. Both sides soon accused the other of violating the ceasefire. At midnight on 20-21 July 1947 the Netherlands initiated an offensive named "Operation Product," which they described as a "police action" in response to Indonesian violations of the Linggadjati Agreement. Through this operation, the Dutch expanded the areas of Java and Sumatra they controlled considerably. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 27 on 1 August 1947, calling for a ceasefire. The Dutch announced a ceasefire at midnight on 4-5 August 1947, and the Republican government followed suit.

On 25 August 1947, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 31, establishing the Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question "to tender [the Security Council's] good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute." The Netherlands selected Belgium as its chosen representative on the Committee, and Indonesia chose Australia. On 8 December 1947, the Committee of Good Offices opened its first formal session with representatives from the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands onboard the American warship USS Renville anchored in the harbor at Batavia. Negotiations stalled, prompting the Committee to issue its "Christmas Message," laying out a proposal for a settlement of the dispute: the Dutch would withdraw within three months from the areas it had seized since 21 July and allow the Republic to re-establish civilian control; the two sides would work toward the fulfilment of the Linggadjati Agreement. Another round of negotiations produced the Renville Agreement on 17 January 1948. Under the terms of this new agreement, the Netherlands maintain sovereignty over Indonesia until it has been transferred to a federal United States of Indonesia as laid out by the Linggadjati Agreement. The areas occupied by the Dutch since 21 July 1947 are to undergo plebiscites to allow those areas to choose from three options: rejoin the Republic, join one of the Dutch-established states or form their own state within the federal United States of Indonesia.

There remain several unresolved issues hampering the peaceful resolution of the dispute. The current borders on Sumatra and Java, the so-called "Van Mook Line," which was declared by the Dutch on 29 August 1947, greatly exceed the known positions of Dutch forces when the ceasefire went into effect on 5 August 1947. The line excludes the Republic of Indonesia from all major seaports and most of the economically valuable regions of both islands. The Netherlands also continues to maintain a blockade against the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands both accuse the other of committing violations of the ceasefire. On 11 November, Dutch forces crossed the Van Mook Line and overran the other half of the island of Madura. Formations of the Indonesian army have skirmished with Dutch troops while attempting to move from Dutch-controlled areas to territory controlled by the Republic of Indonesia. Dutch troops killed a number

of civilians in the village of Rawagede on 9 December, but the Netherlands and Indonesia have made different claims regarding the number of deaths and no disciplinary action has been initiated by the Dutch government. The Dutch also claim that Indonesia has not suspended support for guerillas operating in Dutch-held territory.

Questions to consider include the following:
- Does the framework of the Linggadjati Agreement still provide a viable political solution to the conflict?
- What steps can the Security Council take to encourage adherence to its previous Resolutions and ultimately a peaceful resolution to the conflict?
- What role can the Committee of Good Offices play moving forward to mediate a resolution?

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INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly is the main deliberative policy-making body of the United Nations (UN) and is empowered to address all international issues covered by the Charter. In many ways, it acts as the central hub of the United Nations. Many United Nations bodies report to the General Assembly, but not all of these bodies are subsidiary to the General Assembly. For example, the Security Council constantly updates the General Assembly on its work, but it is an independent body; its work does not require the General Assembly's independent approval. In contrast, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and is governed by General Assembly mandates. Other subsidiary bodies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), also have direct reporting relationships with the General Assembly.

The United Nations Charter assigns each of the main committees of the General Assembly specific tasks and topics to discuss during each session. Because every Member State has a seat in every committee, it is important to note that the points of discussion do not overlap. Even if two or more committees are discussing a general topic area, each committee is responsible for discussing a very specific point or aspect of that topic. For example, the Fourth Committee may discuss the political components of the Israeli-Palestine conflict. However, issues concerning the legal, social, or economic components of the Israeli-Palestine conflict are left to other committees, such as the General Assembly Plenary or the Security Council. Therefore, Representatives in each committee should take care not to expand the discussion of any topic beyond the limitations set by their committee's mandate and into another committee's area of discussion. This is known as the committee's purview.

A note concerning funding: The Fifth Committee makes financing decisions concerning only the United Nations regular annual budget, not those decisions dealing with voluntary contributions or new outlays. Even though AMUN will not be simulating the Fifth Committee, other committees generally do not act unless sufficient funds are available for their proposals, thus financial questions should still be considered during the other committees' deliberations. Therefore, if a Committee creates a new program or initiative, that Committee should specify how the program can or will be funded. If the program falls within the United Nations regular annual budget, that resolution should defer to the Fifth Committee to establish funding.

The purpose of the Combined Plenary session on the final day is to ratify the resolutions which passed in the main General Assembly Committees and build consensus. While a small amount of additional debate is typical, it is expected that the work done by each Committee will be respected. It would thus be rare for significant changes to be made or for a resolution to fail in the Combined Plenary session after passing in committee. The Combined Plenary will also receive presentations from several other bodies.

The following are brief descriptions of each committee simulated at AMUN, along with the committee's agenda, a brief purview of each committee, a brief background and research guide for each agenda topic, and the committee's website address. Representatives should use this information as the first step in their research on the powers and limitations of their particular committee in relation to the agenda topics.

PURVIEW OF THE CONCURRENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY

The General Assembly Plenary typically considers issues that are best addressed in a comprehensive manner or that require coordinating work between many bodies of the United Nations. For example, the 60th General Assembly established a Peacebuilding Commission that oversees the United Nations peacebuilding processes and coordinates the work of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General and Member States emerging from conflict situations. Note that if the Security Council, which is given the primary task of ensuring peace and security by the Charter, is discussing a particular issue, the General Assembly Plenary will cease its own deliberations and defer to the Security Council. Additionally, only the Fifth Committee is able to set or discuss the United Nations budget. No other bodies, including the Plenary, are able to do so. The Plenary committees, both concurrent and combined, have the widest latitude of the deliberative bodies to discuss and pass resolutions on a wide variety of topics.

Website: www.un.org/ga/

A WORLD AGAINST VIOLENCE & VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The United Nations General Assembly has worked hard to combat violent extremism and unite the world against violence. Violent extremism aims to advance ideological, religious or political ends through physical and non-physical violence. Violent extremism includes the violent actions taken by individuals, actions taken to support violence committed by others and the underlying set of beliefs that justify the use of violence to advance ideological ends. While typically associated with religious beliefs of extremists, violent extremism is not limited to religion. Violent extremism is often included as part of a broader discussion of terrorism, though not all terrorism is motivated by violent extremism. The rise of global transportation and telecommunications networks have allowed many violent extremist groups to build global networks. The General Assembly's work on violent extremism focuses on addressing the root causes of extremism. The underlying argument is that by eliminating the factors that allow extremist ideologies to spread, the acts of terror and support for those actions can be reduced or eliminated.

Terrorism has been a near ever-present phenomenon since the twentieth century. A growing number of major terrorist attacks in the 1970s spurred increased global awareness and action by the United Nations. Many prominent terror groups of the 1970s aimed to advance primarily political objectives, including far-right ideologies, far-left ideologies and political independence. In 1972, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, which worked to identify the root causes of terrorism. This Committee recognized that terrorism often occurred as a reaction to oppressive regimes or other restrictive societies, and thus urged the end of colonialist and racist governments. The Ad Hoc Committee reconvened several times in

the following years, supporting the creation of the Declaration of Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in 1994. The Declaration called for greater cooperation among Member States in counter-terrorism activities and for Member States to end all support to terrorist organizations. Following this declaration, the General Assembly re-established the Committee on International Terrorism in 1996 with the goal of producing a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, however there has been little progress on this issue due to an inability to agree on an acceptable definition of terrorism.

The focus on countering terrorism greatly intensified following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. In the wake of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, discussions increasingly focused on the perceived root causes of terror and violent ideologies. There was significant disagreement about the root causes, but States and experts regularly pointed at political repression and economic hardship as two major factors. In 2006, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which sought to address the underlying conditions that lead to the spread of terrorism, improve efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, increase the capacity of States and the United Nations to respond to terrorism, and to maintain human rights and rule of law. This Global Strategy marked the first unanimous agreement on counter-terrorism efforts, and its first and fourth pillars reflect a desire to address the root causes of terrorism.

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the years following the adoption of the Global Strategy indicated that a different approach was needed to prevent the spread of violent extremism. Indeed, the international community realized that addressing the underlying condition that may foster terrorism is a goal separate from the security aspects of counter-terrorism. Further, the inability of the Ad Hoc Committee to progress on developing a comprehensive convention on international terrorism encouraged the international community to devote special focus to attaining a World against Violence and Extremism (WAVE). In 2013, the General Assembly adopted by consensus its first resolution specifically on WAVE. This resolution recognized the importance of education and community engagement in preventing the rise of violent extremism, as well as the utility of upholding freedoms of expression and of the press in fighting intolerance. Additionally, the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in 2015 brought together over 100 countries and relevant parties to develop an action agenda to prevent and counter violent extremism and raise the importance of CVE for fighting the spread of the Islamic State.

In 2016, the Secretary-General presented the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to the General Assembly, which called for incorporating both security-based processes and for preventing the underlying conditions that radicalize and foster violent extremist groups. In particular, the Secretary-General called for Member States to create national and regional plans of action to achieve WAVE, noting that existing plans to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals may fit well with the WAVE goals. Later that year, the General Assembly revisited the topic, passing a resolution which emphasized the importance of calling attention to violence against children and women, educating citizens on the importance of human rights, and promoting and practicing tolerance in life and online. Additionally, the General Assembly undertook its fifth biennial review of the Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which echoed the Secretary-General's concerns about the impact of radicalization in prisons and the impact of violent extremism on women and youth.

Looking forward, the United Nations has increased its emphasis on the importance of women and youth to preventing and countering violent extremism. Secretary-General Guterres spoke in 2017 to the Commission on the Status of Women on the importance of women's empowerment, noting that peace processes have been shown to be significantly more effective with women's involvement. The United Nations has been criticized, however, for restricting their attention to women as passive targets of extremism, when women have also actively worked in the leadership and in supportive roles of extremist groups. Increased focus has also fallen on the role of youth in preventing the spread of violent extremism, as they are especially vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment, particularly in conflict-torn regions where their future prospects are uncertain. The 2015 Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism adopted an action agenda highlighting this role, placing an emphasis on the importance of social media in the spread of violent extremism. Social media itself is an important aspect of this problem, as the Internet has become an effective tool for radicalization and recruitment. However, recent efforts have attempted to exploit the same qualities that make social media so effective in the spread of violent extremism to help counter and prevent it.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- How should the General Assembly address the relationship between women and violent extremism?
- What role do youth play in preventing and combating violent extremism?
- How can the international community combat the spread of violent extremism online?

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REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

One of the founding missions of the United Nations is to ensure international peace and security. The United Nations has used peacekeeping forces to that end since the first mission in the Middle East in 1948. These peacekeeping missions have evolved from mostly-unarmed observers and supporting personnel to an armed security force and finally to today's hybrid operations that support post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Despite these changes in structure, the prevailing reason for the missions remained the same: to defuse conflicts between Member States and support diplomatic resolution of conflicts. At the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflicts shifted. More conflicts were intrastate conflicts triggered by local unrest, and therefore, less able to be resolved through international means. These intrastate conflicts also endured much longer than the interstate conflicts of the Cold War era. This shift in the nature of conflict pushed the United Nations to adapt.

The response was to emphasize peacebuilding: rebuilding civil institutions while ensuring safety and security. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali placed peacebuilding firmly on the agenda with his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, as the United Nations looked toward a post-Cold War world and a decade marred with civil wars. The failures of the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding architecture became especially apparent later that decade, following the heavily-criticized response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Bosnian civil war in 1995. In 2000, the UN Department of Peace Operations produced the Brahimi report, which called for greater clarity in peacekeeping operations as well as institutional changes.

At the 2005 World Summit, the General Assembly and the Security Council established the three entities that compose the modern peacebuilding architecture of the United Nations: the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Peacebuilding Commission was established as an intergovernmental UN body to aid States emerging from conflicts and advise the Security Council and General Assembly. It is charged with identifying clear peacebuilding objectives and working closely with the UN operations in the field. The Peacebuilding Fund focuses on monitoring and evaluating potential conflicts while also raising funds for peacebuilding initiatives. These two arms are supported by the Support Office, which provides strategic advice and policy guidance to the Commission, helps administer the Fund, and educates the public on peacebuilding.

Over the following years, the new peacebuilding architecture saw progress, including success in supporting elections in Guinea-Bissau and establishing reintegration programs for combatants in Cote d'Ivoire. However, the peacebuilding architecture was not without flaws, and, in preparation for the General Assembly's ten-year review, the Advisory Group of Experts published a report in 2015 reviewing the effectiveness of the peacebuilding architecture. This report identified several flaws in the architecture, such as the short attention span of the international community and the instability of funding to peacebuilding operations. Its most important recommendation was to have the Commission bridge the gaps among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The Advisory Group noted that effective peacebuilding requires action spanning the purview of those three organs, but a lack of coherence resulted in a vastly unbalanced distribution of the UN's attention to different aspects of peacebuilding. In particular, the Advisory Group described the pattern as an "inverted U," with the majority of effort spent as a crisis flared, not on prevention before or rebuilding after.

In 2016, the Security Council and the General Assembly passed a joint review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, taking the Advisory Group report into strong consideration. In it, they reaffirm the necessity of levelling out the "inverted U" by adopting the Advisory Group's terminology of "sustaining peace" as the primary goal of peacebuilding. They also noted the problem of fragmentation of the UN system, and urged the Commission to connect the principal organs for peacebuilding activities, as well as to regularly meet with regional and subregional organizations to improve cooperation at those levels. The review also laid out several key priorities for the UN in their future efforts to maintain international peace and security, including increasing the Commission's emphasis on women's leadership and the integration of gender perspectives into conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies. However, the review did not address the issue of funding, instead asking for a report from the Secretary-General on potential options. As the Fund currently depends on voluntary contributions, the Advisory Group had recommended providing a moderate baseline of funding from the budget of peacekeeping operations. This recommendation raised concerns about the Fund's flexibility, largely seen as one of its greatest strengths, as it would place the Fund under the purview of the Fifth Committee. Additionally, as development and peacebuilding are mutually beneficial, the review also encouraged cooperation between

peacebuilding programs and the World Bank—particularly the World Bank's State and Peacebuilding Fund, established in 2008—however no real suggestions were made as to how this would be accomplished.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- How can the Peacebuilding Commission improve cooperation among the principal organs and with relevant peacebuilding organizations, such as the World Bank?
- Should the Peacebuilding Fund be funded through voluntary contributions from Member States, from the peacekeeping budget or through some other method?
- How can the United Nations better facilitate the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding?

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PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE

The General Assembly First Committee addresses the disarmament of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and related international security questions. The First Committee makes recommendations on the regulation of these weapons as they relate to international peace and security. The First Committee does not consider legal issues surrounding weapons possession nor does it address complex peace and security issues addressed by the Security Council. For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations General Assembly as a whole, see page 29.

Website: www.un.org/ga/first/index.shtml

WOMEN, DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

In 1979, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which states that complete disarmament "will contribute to the attainment of full equality between men and women." This declaration set a precedent for examining armed conflict as a community issue as well as a military one. Men make up the vast majority of combatants in armed conflicts, though the number of female combatants has grown. The conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has also highlighted the role that many women play in supporting armed combatants. In conflict resolutions where women are directly involved in negotiations, agreements are over 20 percent more likely to last longer than two years. Armed conflicts disproportionately affect women. Women and children compose 80 percent of refugee populations. In countries with armed conflict, maternal mortality rates are 2.5 times higher, the number of girls with primary education drops by almost 20 percent, and women's likelihood of owning property decreases by half. Female combatants are targets for sexual assault and abuse and carry the burden of domestic needs for their fellow combatants. Yet, despite these effects, women and gender are addressed in less than a third of disarmament agreements.

In 2000, the Security Council passed a resolution encouraging Member States to mainstream gender perspectives in tackling conflict resolution. A 2004 Secretary-General report acknowledged progress toward integrating women in peace and security efforts through policy measures but noted the work that remained regarding the work of women in disarmament efforts on the ground. Some recommendations from that report came to fruition through a 2006 review of women's contributions toward the implementation of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), a foundational policy document in arms control. While the original Programme of Action provided detailed policy recommendations, it did not discuss how the illicit small arms trade affects women or what their role is in addressing disarmament. The report addressed this deficiency and the broader issue of integrating women into discussions on arms control and disarmament. The report created a set of guidelines on gender mainstreaming in four areas: women's relevance in combating the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons; planning and implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; national and regional focuses

and civil society integration and public awareness initiatives. These guidelines were reviewed again in 2010 and 2016 and have served as guides for efforts moving forward.

In 2010, the General Assembly passed the first resolution focused solely on the role that women play in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. It called attention to women's contributions in practical disarmament in both regional and national spheres. Subsequent resolutions reaffirmed the General Assembly's original position, though few additional recommendations were made until the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013. The ATT serves as the primary international agreement to regulate the legal movement and transfer of arms both within and between countries. Article Seven identifies the connection between gender-based violence and international arms transfers, stating that any exporting State Party shall assess the risk of the arms being used to commit "gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children." While this formalized the need to address gender in armed conflict, it did not fully address women's participation at the negotiating table, the disproportionate effect of indirect violence and economic strife on women, or the need to confront cultural barriers to considering and incorporating women into disarmament measures, nor did it address the needs of women who are combatants.

The Security Council also passed a resolution in 2013 that notes the role of arms proliferation in gender-based violence, as well as the disproportionate effects of violence on women. The General Assembly continues to hear reports of how Member States are implementing disarmament policies as they relate to women, and recent resolutions have contained increasingly thorough recommendations for States and actors when including gender perspectives in the disarmament process, such as better understanding of the effects of violence on women and including them in the design and implementation of disarmament efforts. In its most recent resolutions, the General Assembly worked to strengthen its cooperation with local and regional organizations that help in armed conflict. These are also called disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs, these organizations focus on halting conflict and reintegrating persons and groups involved in armed conflict into society at large. The General Assembly has also asked States to increase spending on gender-based violence and armed conflict de-escalation policies and programs with a specific bent on the illicit trade of small arms and increasing women's roles in disarmament negotiations. The PoA, ATT, and other United Nations initiatives continue to meet resistance in adoption and implementation for multiple reasons, most prominently that women are still largely unseen in conflict and cultural norms that preclude women's participation in the negotiating processes.

Overall, progress on the topic remains slow, and while countries have made some progress at the State level, the United Nations continues to face both cultural and practical resistance to women's inclusion in arms control. Without women at the table, conflict areas face two distinct realities: successful disarmament is significantly less likely, and the economic and physical needs of women, both armed and civilians, will go unacknowledged. DDR programs planned without women are significantly less likely to address the decrease in education and health care or the significant violence women face, including economic vulnerability

as a result of being refugees, the increased likelihood of human trafficking and the inability to provide income. The United Nations must come together to address the needs of women in disarmament and to overcome the systemic reasons women are not included in disarmament negotiations and illicit small arms trade preventions.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can Member States alleviate the barriers that prevent women from participating in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts?
- What practices should Member States and the United Nations consider to support greater participation of women in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs? How can the United Nations ensure that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs meet the unique needs of women?
- What policies and practices can Member States adopt to ensure that women are able to participate in discussions on disarmament and the illicit trade in small arms?

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COUNTERING THE THREAT POSED BY IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have a history that spans centuries. Today, IEDs include a broad range of devices, from crude bombs made using commercially available products to highly specialized systems capable of defeating advanced military armor and countermeasures. Use of IEDs became increasingly common throughout the past two decades as a cheap, easy option for non-state actors and were responsible for over 120,000 casualties in 68 countries between 2011 and 2016. IEDs have impacted the operations of the United Nations around the world, with attacks targeting United Nations' residences, offices and vehicles, with at least 38 attacks in 2015 alone. United Nations personnel and peacekeepers face limited supplies of armor and require training and medical support. With the ongoing proliferation and evolution of IEDs, Members States have increasingly sought the assistance of the international community to stem the flow of precursor materials and disrupt technology sharing between insurgent and terrorist groups.

Non-state actors use IEDS to inflict harm upon their opponents and to execute high-profile attacks that are difficult to detect and interrupt. Even crude IEDs are capable of degrading societal stability, security and economic activity. The increasingly prolific use of IEDs in war zones and the highly-publicized use of these weapons in the past two decades has ensured broad global concern over this problem. With criminals and terrorists unwilling to abide by international law and norms, much of the focus has been on detection of, prevention of and response to attacks.

The conflict in Iraq drove IED advancement considerably in the early 2000s. An arms race between military engineers and terrorist bomb makers ensued. To overcome these countermeasures, terrorist bombers shared their increasingly hard-to-defeat designs among themselves, ensuring IEDS constantly evolved. Two key technological advancements proved especially noteworthy: the use of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and the development of non-metallic IEDs. EFPs are capable of defeating many forms of armor and inflict great harm against well-defended targets. Once this technology was adopted by insurgent groups, it quickly became one of the most devastating types of IED. Nonmetallic IEDs began appearing in 2009 and are often able to pass through metal detectors and X-rays. These bombs can be smuggled aboard planes, into government offices or buried in roads awaiting their target. In 2015, the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a detailed explanation of the construction of these weapons. This ongoing evolution of the technology and design of IEDs and the sharing of these plans is an alarming trend that the international community seeks to arrest.

The United Nations has addressed the issue of IEDs through multiple channels, leveraging several international regimes governing conflict, small arms and terrorism. It first addressed the issue in 2009 through the Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) Amended Protocol II. These discussions identified prevention, protection, detection and clearance as key areas for mitigating the threat of IEDs. The participants also affirmed the role of the Amended Protocol II in regulating IEDs, finding that the use of these weapons as booby-traps or mines by non-state actors often caused unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants and civilians. The recommendations stressed information sharing on countermeasures, ammunition stockpile management, and import and export controls. The United Nations found that IED attacks are not mere attacks of opportunity but usually involve long-term leadership, planning, financing, construction and targeting.

The United Nations has used existing bodies and regulations to curtail the use of IEDs. Supporting national and international law enforcement, particularly the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), has been a common approach. In 2015, INTERPOL hosted the inaugural International Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Leaders' Forum to encourage component controls, capacity building, public awareness and information sharing. INTERPOL also created Project Watchmaker, a data collection effort targeting IED technologies, precursor materials, and individuals and groups constructing and using IEDs. This project joins INTERPOL's Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement (CHASE) and Chemical Risk Identification and Mitigation Project (CRIMP) as international organizations and Member States target smugglers, precursor materials, and persons to combat the criminal and terrorist use of IEDs outside of warzones. Since 2010, the World Customs Organization, INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime partnered to create Programme Global Shield, designed to provide training, technical assistance, and real-time information and intelligence sharing focused on 14 precursor chemicals. The first three years of this program led to the discovery and seizure of over 60 IEDs, 194 metric tons of solid precursors and 50 arrests.

In areas of elevated or active hostilities, law enforcement and other government forces may be overwhelmed, under-resourced or even complicit in the use of IEDs against unlawful targets. Weak or complicit States are attractive for IED manufacturers and smugglers, allowing these actors to research, test, train, construct, transport and employ these weapons. How to best deal with remote havens remains a difficult question for the United Nations and is especially important when peacekeepers are present. Going forward, the General Assembly must strengthen information sharing and coordination amongst Member States, international organizations and commercial partners. The 2016 report of the Secretary-General recommends building on the success of CHASE, CRIMP and Global Shield toward a unified regulatory system for key IED components and increasing contributions by Member States to developing countries and countries recovering from conflict in managing their weapons and ammunition stockpiles.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- How can Member States work together to improve regulation of the transfer of arms, military equipment, and goods and technology that can be used in IED manufacturing?
- How can the United Nations balance the important role and mission of United Nations' peacekeepers and personnel and the threat of IEDs? What level of risk should be tolerated, and how can it be best managed?
- How can the success of CHASE, CRIMP and Global Shield translate to a global regulatory regime? What best practices in customs and law enforcement activities will have the most outsized effect in preventing the diversion of precursor materials?

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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE

The General Assembly Second Committee addresses the economic development of Member States and the stability and growth of international financial and trade networks. The Second Committee deals solely with the economic development of Member States and addresses State-to-State assistance. It does not set or discuss the budget of the United Nations, which is solely addressed by the Fifth Committee. The Second Committee also does not address social issues that affect development; such issues are considered by the Third Committee. For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations General Assembly as a whole, see page 29.

Website: www.un.org/ga/second/index.shtml

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

The increasing devastation caused by natural disasters, such as hurricanes, droughts, floods and earthquakes, has drawn new attention to disaster risk reduction (DRR) methods. According to a United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) assessment, disasters cause between 250 billion and 300 billion USD in annual losses. In addition to their immediate effects, these disasters have lasting effects on economic development. Such economic setbacks present immense challenges for sustainable development; climate change and urbanization will only increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters in the future. Urbanization, in particular, exacerbates the effects of natural disasters, even in the developed world, where dense population and high capital investment are concentrated in one location, often on the coast or in other vulnerable areas. The goals of DRR methods commonly include improving disaster preparedness, reducing exposure and vulnerability to hazards, and making Member States and their governments more aware of the consequences of land management and development.

The United Nations focused on this issue by declaring the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. In 1994, a collection of Member States and others met in Yokohama, Japan for the First World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR). At this meeting, the participants memorialized their commitment to reducing the impact of natural disasters in the ten principles of the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World. These principles emphasized key components of any DRR strategy, from ensuring environmental protection to maintaining cooperation at all levels. In 1999, the General Assembly established the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) to coordinate DRR efforts and manage the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, the United Nations' DRR strategy that ran parallel to the Yokohama Strategy.

In 2005 the international community met in Kobe, Japan, to revisit the Yokohama Strategy and prepare a strategy for the following ten years. This Second World Conference produced the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), the United Nations first multi-sector plan focused on reducing loss from disasters. Significantly, the Framework's five priorities for action place emphasis on the State having the primary responsibility to reduce disaster risk, with the expectation of cooperation between local governments and the private sector. Meeting just a month after the devastating 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the Framework advocated for implementation of the International Early Warning Programme.

Disaster risk reduction saw continued focus in the United Nations system in the years following the Second World Conference. At the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, participants recognized the importance of DRR and the link between DRR and sustainable development. In its outcome document, The Future We Want, Member States identified DRR as a crucial step for poverty-eradication and sustainable development plans. The United Nations also recognized the need for a higher-level program to address gaps in the DRR framework, addressing those in the 2013 the United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience, which identified "resilience" as the overarching goal of not only DRR, but of poverty-reduction, climate-change efforts and a host of other development goals.

In 2015, UNISDR organized a third World Conference in Sendai to update the Hyogo Framework. The Sendai Framework, the outcome of this conference, set forth the United Nations' goals for future milestones concerning disaster risk reduction with four priority areas, addressing issues from improved preparedness to ensuring effective reconstruction efforts.

In 2015 the General Assembly also concluded negotiations on and announced the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. These goals are the successor to the Millennium Development Goals. In that negotiation, Member States acknowledged that previous development efforts had not holistically considered the role that social and environmental issues, like disaster risk reduction, play in sustainable development. In the new framework, Goal 11's targets include significantly reducing global losses, both in lives and in infrastructure, due to natural disasters. With the transition to the Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations also recognized the increasing importance of private investors and other development partners, as private investments had surged past foreign aid in the previous years.

Climate change management is also a crucial factor in disaster risk reduction. While the 2015 Paris Agreement demonstrated the growing concern about climate change among the international community, Member States must remain committed to restraining the rise in global temperatures and the goal of holding the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels; in many cases current State policies are insufficient to meet this goal. This is especially important for development programs in landlocked countries or countries that otherwise are more insulated from the worst effects of global climate change.

Disaster risk reduction plays a central role in sustainable development and building resilience. Natural disasters, at a minimum, disrupt ongoing development efforts, and, at their worst, can destroy previous progress and create new challenges for a region. If the Post-2015 Development Agenda is to be achieved, substantial progress will be necessary on improving disaster risk reduction in the developing world.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can Member States work together to mitigate the impact of cross-border disasters, such as famines in neighboring countries?
- Where are there possibilities for effective regional cooperation?
- How can the United Nations support capacity building and planning efforts at the national and subnational level?
- How will increased development, increasing urbanization, and worsening climate change affect future needs for disaster risk reduction?

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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND DEVELOPMENT

The modern international finance system dates back to the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The Conference sought to create an organized global financial system following World War II, with the aim of achieving post-war prosperity through economic cooperation and learning from the mistakes made during the Great Depression. The Bretton Woods system produced by this Conference established two lending agencies to assist in global reconstruction efforts and fixed international exchange rates to the US dollar and the price of gold. In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade set standards of free trade in the post-war financial system; it would eventually be replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The core international financial institutions (IFIs) of the Bretton Woods system were the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which would later expand to become the World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank Group continues the IBRD's core function of providing loans and financing for development projects, and, additionally, holds and participates in conferences at various levels to spread knowledge about effective development. In contrast, the IMF does not directly support development projects, but rather provides loans to assist countries in meeting their financial obligations. Both the World Bank Group and the IMF also work with states to inform policies and provide technical assistance.

The role of the Bretton Woods institutions has changed over time, especially after 1971, when the United States abandoned the gold standard. In their responses to a series of economic crises in Latin America in the 1980s, the international financial institutions coalesced around a set of economic ideas for developing economies in crisis. This Washington Consensus prioritized investment in infrastructure and other pro-growth institutions and trade liberalization. In 1998, the General Assembly thanked the Bretton Woods institutions for their work in reducing volatility; the General Assembly also outlined problems in the intersection of the international financial system and development. It highlighted the instability caused by fluctuating exchange rates—which were fixed under the original Bretton Woods agreement. Additionally, it called for strengthened international cooperation to prevent future currency crises, broader access to private capital flows for developing countries and the inclusion of developing countries in the international economic decision-making process.

The Consensus guided policy advice up through the early 2000s, however, the influence of the IFIs was on the decline. The Center of Economic Policy and Research criticized the IMF's responses to the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2002 Argentine debt crisis as being overly political, charges that would be repeated again during the 2008 financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis was a major test of the Bretton Woods institutions' capabilities, as it threatened to reverse development progress in developing countries and heavily destabilized the financial systems of even highly-developed countries. The IMF undertook a variety of reforms in response to the crisis and, by 2016, had provided over 700 billion in financing.

With the recent focus on sustainable development, the international financial system and the Bretton Woods institutions see their role shifting toward promoting sustainable development, especially among least developed countries. In 2015, the General Assembly adopted the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which included in its action areas domestic and international private business and finance, and international trade as engines for development. The Action Agenda asks the Bretton Woods institutions to work together with the UN system to oversee debt obligations and watch for unsustainable financial situations as well as provide financial support to sustainable development projects in developing countries. Additionally, Sustainable Development Goal 17 calls for assistance to developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies for debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring as well as addressing the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress. To ensure effective

implementation, a group of scientists and experts selected by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon are charged with drafting a Global Sustainable Development Report by 2019.

With the declining influence of the Washington Consensus, parts of the Bretton Woods institutions have lost influence since the turn of the century. In particular, the IFIs are hampered by accusations of prioritizing Western economic and political ideals over effective assistance, an image not helped by the long streak of US bankers and politicians as presidents of the World Bank. The international financial system is continuing to undergo reforms in response to the 2008 financial crisis; the IMF in 2016 adjusted its allocation of votes to increase the voice of rising economies. The financial crisis and changing financial landscape will require additional changes to the international financial system to ensure stability and continued effectiveness, however, continued cooperation among Member States will be needed to promote coherence in financial reforms and regulations. Additionally, the success of development efforts will require cooperation between Bretton Woods and the regional development banks and financial institutions. Ensuring sustainable development when evaluating development plans is also important, as the SDGs will require an estimated 5-7 trillion USD per year in investments to achieve. Unsustainable development is still receiving substantial investment as well, with current trends expected to destroy a tenth of global natural wealth by 2030 through environmental deterioration; for example, in 2015 about 6 trillion USD was invested in high-polluting energy generation.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- How can international financial institutions balance national sovereignty and political and economic goals?
- How do regional financial institutions fit into the Bretton Woods system?
- What can be done to shield development efforts from future economic crises?
- How can financial institutions be incentivized to focus on sustainability?
- How can the General Assembly encourage the stability of domestic financial institutions and establish their role with respect to multinational institutions like the IMF?

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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE
SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN & CULTURAL

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE

While the Third Committee's work often overlaps with other United Nations organs, the Third Committee focuses its discussions on social, humanitarian and cultural concerns that arise in the General Assembly. Human rights, education and cultural preservation are typical issues for the Third Committee. The Third Committee would not discuss the legal implications of human rights matters as those are discussed by the Sixth Committee. The Committee also does not call for special studies or deploy monitors; those tasks are handled by the Human Rights Council. For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations General Assembly as a whole, see page 29.

Website: www.un.org/ga/third/index.shtml

IMPROVING THE COORDINATION OF EFFORTS AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Human trafficking is present in every country and poses a vital threat to human rights and dignity. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that, at any given point in time, 21,000 victims have reported cases across 111 countries. This does not include the vast number of victims whose cases go unreported. Estimates place the value of human trafficking at $32 billion. Forced labor and sex trafficking are the two largest reasons for human trafficking; however, the United Nations also reports on trafficking for organ harvesting, illegal adoption and child marriage. Victims of human trafficking are often malnourished, deprived of personal space and privacy, prostituted or otherwise abused and refused any payment for their work. Human trafficking disproportionately affects women—over two-thirds of reported victims are women. The vast majority of traffickers are men. Criminal impunity is a major challenge: when apprehended, traffickers are rarely prosecuted. Trafficked persons, particularly those trafficked in the sex industry and those trafficked across borders, are often imprisoned and prosecuted rather than given care and services to return home safely and recover from trauma.

While human trafficking is a long-standing problem that exploits the economically and socially vulnerable, response efforts remain largely uncoordinated. The Third Committee has pursued both horizontal coordination—coordination among similar groups—and vertical coordination—coordination among groups with differing levels of authority. Many issues related to trafficking result from this lack of coordination. In particular, the inability to accurately report its prevalence, inconsistency in punishment and the inability of organizations to work together on cases are fundamental issues preventing the international community's effectiveness. As a result, human trafficking not only remains, it has the opportunity to thrive.

In 1999, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in conjunction with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, launched the Global Programme Against Trafficking in Human Beings (GPAT). GPAT emphasized the importance of "technical cooperation" between Member States, highlighting the importance of developing the legal and operational resources necessary for identifying and prosecuting trafficking offenders. Though it has largely focused on fixing information and data collection issues, those efforts have revealed how disparate the different issues in human trafficking are between regions, countries and population demographics. The GPAT led directly to the increase of reporting, but didn't fix one of the most fundamental problems contributing to human trafficking and impunity: countries did not agree to universal definitions of human trafficking. This is a persistent problem. In many countries, indentured servitude, child marriage and other forms of trafficking are not considered to be trafficking, and national legislation is weak or nonexistent. The request for increased technical cooperation, and the capacity-building assistance that accompanied the request, helped to increase effective prosecution. However, cultural mores still prevent the effective reporting and enforcement of the issue, particularly in transnational crimes in which Member States have differing opinions.

The next decade saw incremental changes to coordinating efforts, but the UNODC called attention back to the lack of coordination in the human trafficking crisis in 2006, leading to the creation of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT). Prior to ICAT and still today, many criminal systems prosecuted trafficking victims for the acts they were forced to commit. Within ICAT, associated organizations stressed the importance for a "holistic" approach to fighting the hidden movement of people at a local and regional level. This meant increasing legislative action, prosecuting traffickers, and creating medical and judicial systems that supported rather than punished trafficking victims. Through this work, the approach of anti-trafficking actions began to develop a broader scope that encompasses the role of law enforcement officers and medical care workers in identifying and protecting victims of trafficking. ICAT was further strengthened in 2010 with the creation of a Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons.

The General Assembly has focused on improving the conditions under which United Nations committees and other international organizations can better communicate and share information while emphasizing the importance of recognizing human trafficking as an affront to international human rights. This requires all Member States cooperate and conform to some level of legislative consistency and effective enforcement. In addition to cultural differences, some Member States resist sharing criminal information, either because they fear interference or because information sharing is a politically fraught action to begin with. The United Nations has also pushed for public awareness campaigns. These are meant to help victims speak out, to give citizens the tools necessary to help victims and to increase awareness of new victim protections. This key part of the issue had been scarce in previous, less holistic approaches.

The most recent of several High-Level Meetings of the United Nations General Assembly on the Appraisal of the Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons was held in 2013. The United Nations' most recent work has focused on strategy and policy development, legislative assistance, capacity building, regional and transregional cooperation, protection and assistance to victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants, and assistance and support to children. The basis for this work is the Global Action to Prevent and Address Trafficking in Persons and

the Smuggling of Migrants (GloACT), a four-year cooperative initiative that started in 2015. There have already been several events aimed at better coordinating international efforts to address this crisis, including a Special High-Level Event in February. One of the most significant events is the World Day Against Trafficking in Persons, which increases global awareness of this problem.

Human trafficking remains one of the most difficult issues facing the international community. While the United Nations has adopted a more holistic approach that provides services rather than punishment for the victims of human trafficking and that incorporates law enforcement, medical professionals and the broader community, Member States still struggle with a lack of information. Recent efforts to view and treat trafficking victims as victims rather than perpetrators of crimes they do not choose to commit is at best indicative of shifts in mindset and at worst a moral victory for the United Nations. Intergovernmental cooperation and information sharing is still scarce and often Member States lack the resources or political will to comply with the numerous action plans and protocols put forward. The Third Committee must find ways to reinforce their holistic approach and to help Member States adopt congruent ideas of what human trafficking is, how to treat victims and when and how to best report and cooperate on human trafficking cases. Without these changes, millions of men, women and children annually will continue to be abused and exploited.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What communication barriers exist preventing information exchanges, particularly on known and suspected traffickers and trafficking cases? How can the United Nations encourage the exchange of this information?
- What steps can the international community take to ensure that traffickers are prosecuted?
- What legal and other resources do States need to better combat trafficking?

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THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION

Water is one of the most fundamental human needs, yet 884 million people lack access to safe drinking water. This poses a serious threat to human health and human dignity, as well as presenting a barrier to economic and social development. Industrial contamination, climate change and infrastructure neglect create increasingly urgent problems for millions of people. Lack of proper sanitation is one of the largest causes for drinking water contamination. Forty percent of the population worldwide lives with insufficient sanitation procedures, primarily in the form of living without bathrooms or latrines. This population is one of the poorest and most vulnerable and risks disease and death due to drinking water contamination.

As a health issue, lack of infrastructure is one of the key contributors to insufficient access to clean water and sanitation. Waste and garbage leach toxins and spread dangerous bacteria like cholera, dysentery and E. coli. They can also cause parasitic infection in populations. Existing infrastructure is often worn down, made with potentially hazardous materials like lead and often vulnerable to natural disaster. Increasing the number of sanitation facilities and the quality of infrastructure has been a long-standing goal of the United Nations. However, the costs of replacing, installing and updating infrastructure is extremely expensive and without much return on investment. This leads to prolonged use of worn systems and can place a disproportionate amount of the costs on low-income users who are at the highest risk, including cost per use or increased service costs and taxes that low-income users simply cannot afford to pay. As a result, even when facilities for clean water and sanitation are in place, many are forced to still use old systems or to make hours-long trips to wells or springs, or to use insufficient sanitation facilities. Once in place, getting people to use the infrastructure and facilities is difficult as well. Public awareness about how waste can spread illness to drinking water and how to access potable water is a key to effectively increasing access to both.

The first actionable plan to address clean water and sanitation was developed at the United Nations Water Conference in 1977. The Conference aimed to assess the status of water access and water usage, avoid a global water crisis, and monitor water use with regard to natural hazards, health and pollution control. The Conference laid the base framework for global water policy and water management, and is still used as a starting point for State policies. The Conference resolutions and final report committed Members to improving water quality and sanitation standards by 1990. This led directly to the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade of 1981-1990. The decade focused international attention on ensuring reasonable access to safe water supplies and focused on areas without adequate sanitation facilities. These policies still allowed for Member States to charge users for access to clean water and for infrastructure development.

The 1992 Dublin Statement laid out four guidelines for Member States at the local, national and international levels. These guidelines include: States should use a holistic approach to water management; development should be participatory and include members of relevant communities from the bottom up; women are integral to the safeguarding of water; and though water is a human right, it should also be recognized as an economic good. The Dublin Statement contributed to the move toward sustainable usage of water and the related actions that helped to reverse trends of over consumption, pollution, and rising threats from drought and floods. Sustainable water and sanitation systems were also included in the Agenda 21, the outcome document of the 1992 Earth Summit.

In 2003, the United Nations declared the International Year of Freshwater, increasing awareness and changing individual behaviors in water use, sanitation and hygiene; mobilized participation of communities; set national targets and plans to generate investment; and increased regulatory framework enforcement for water management that take into account both public health and ecosystem needs. In 2005, the United Nations began the International Decade for Action 'Water for Life' 2005-2015. Its goal was to promote efforts to fulfill international commitments in policies on water. The campaign helped to bridge cooperation between governments over international water disputes and for commitments made between diverse internal groups, but has only begun the steps to bridge economic interests and public need. The cooperation balanced economic interests, the needs of the ecosystem and the needs of people in poverty.

In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly declared access to safe drinking water and sanitation a human right. This was a direct result of a 2008 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights initiative that examined safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right and that called for a Special Rapporteur on the issue. Declaring access to safe drinking water and sanitation a human right ensures that States are obligated to provide clean drinking water and sanitation to their citizens. Legally, this should include providing equal access to both and preventing unreasonable barriers to access. The legal precedent for this set forth in the Dublin Statement, however, does not define affordability; the United Nations has a suggested limitation of less than three percent of household income going towards water and sanitation. Because utility companies have significantly more political power than citizens, particularly among low-income persons, policies have not caught up to this standard. While some areas have found community-led sanitation projects effective, they are not universally available or practical.

Currently there is more than enough fresh water on the planet to adequately provide for water needs but, due to unproductive economies and poor infrastructure, millions of people die from inadequate water supply, sanitation and hygiene each year. Since 1990, 2.1 billion people have gained access to improved sanitation facilities, but many are still under threat from drought and water shortages, inadequate infrastructure, environmental contamination and natural disaster. While the United Nations has focused on public awareness, the infrastructure investments, public education campaigns and open access to water all require vast amounts of money and urgently need to be completed. Some Member States, however, are reluctant to spend that money, are unable to complete these projects independently or are simply unable to focus on the issue due to geopolitical conflict. Eighty percent of human water waste is discharged into rivers or the sea without any pollution removal. This contamination and climate change create increasingly expensive projects to which many cannot afford access. Without legal systems to fix these barriers, both physical and financial, people worldwide will be denied the water they need to live.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What policies and programs can States implement to ensure the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation?
- With safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right, what responsibility do States and the private sector have to protect the natural environment and their natural water supplies?
- How can States best address issues of natural water scarcity?
- How does the privatization of water supplies and infrastructure impact the human right to safe drinking water?

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PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY +10

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) met in 2003 and in 2005. It is responsible for bridging the global digital divide and improving access to technology across the developing world. The General Assembly High-level Meeting aims to review recommendations from these two meetings and follow up on the progress of bridging digital divides and human rights in the Information Society. The body will serve as a continuation of the 2015 High-level meeting and will draft resolutions proposing future recommendations in the areas of Information Technology. As a special meeting of the General Assembly, its functional mandate is broad, and it may make comprehensive recommendations regarding Information Technology, similar to the General Assembly Plenary.

Website: https://publicadministration.un.org/wsis10/

BRIDGING DIGITAL DIVIDES

With the proliferation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), developed countries have disproportionately benefited, creating a digital divide. The digital divide is the stark disparity that exists between developed and developing countries and their access to ICT and other technological resources. The United Nations has worked to address this disparity and to ensure that developing countries can realize the benefits of that technology. The United Nations often talks about this work as providing digital opportunity or bridging the digital divide. According to a 2014 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+10) report, more than half of the world's population is still not connected to the Internet. Meanwhile, ICT have grown to play significant roles in economic growth and development. Recognizing these facts, the United Nations is fully committed to overcoming the digital divide for those at risk of being left behind and further marginalized due to a lack of access to ICT.

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) first convened in 2003 to make available the opportunities afforded by ICT and support the Millennium Development Goals. At its conclusion, the participants adopted a Declaration of Principles and set out a Plan of Action to bring 50 percent of the world's population online by 2015. More specific objectives included connecting villages with ICT and establishing community access points; connecting schools, scientific and research centers, libraries, hospitals, and government centers with ICT; and facilitating the presence and use of all world languages on the Internet. Although it did not explicitly describe how these goals might be achieved, the WSIS Plan of Action called upon governments, the private sector and civil society to promote the development of ICT around the world.

The second World Summit on the Information Society occurred in 2005 and included a substantial focus on Internet governance. This resulted in the Tunis Commitment, the Tunis Agenda and the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The Tunis Agenda reaffirmed the goals set by the Geneva Plan of Action, addressed the financial challenges of developing and implementing ICT around the world, defined Internet governance, mandated the creation of the IGF, and laid out a plan for goal execution and follow-up. The body also noted the need for various means of funding to help close the digital divide. Up until that time a large portion of the funding to help close the digital divide had come from public investment. The United Nations continued to call for increased support from the private-sector, coupled with public policy initiatives. Discussions also noted the social responsibilities all parties have to development and bridging the digital divide. A large source of future funding was expected to come from the Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF). The Fund was touted as the best means to enhance development and bridge the digital divide through voluntary public and private contributions. The Fund was largely unsuccessful and was dissolved in 2009.

Since then, the United Nations recognized the growing importance of access to the Internet through mobile devices. The 2016 WSIS Forum acknowledged the growing use of smart technologies in the areas of healthcare, urban planning and the Internet of Things and acknowledged the continued expansion of mobile broadband infrastructures that facilitate this growth. The Forum continues to note the necessity of broadband Internet connections through the developing world and advocates for expansions and upgrades to current networks and technologies to meet this need and increase connectivity in that regard.

Moreover, the WSIS+10 High Level Meeting of the General Assembly produced the Outcome Document of the High Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes. This Outcome Document represents a compilation of inputs from relevant stakeholders on the progress made by the WSIS and the steps and challenges of bridging the digital divide moving forward. It also acts in conjunction with the United Nations' commitment toward meeting and aligning with the newly-adopted Sustainable Development Goals. With swiftly evolving technologies and the ongoing issue of inclusivity, new divides have emerged regarding access to ICT and it is the General Assembly's goal to evaluate and address the new and continuing challenges.

The yearly WSIS Forum continues to meet and discuss both the challenges and opportunities presented by ICT development. The United Nations views ICT as a key tool for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and advancing economic development and human rights. One concern for the United Nations centers on closing the digital divide in education levels and opportunities. The use of digital eLearning platforms is on the rise in public and private entities and is largely viewed as a means to cut costs and provide an affordable education for all. As the field of technology develops at a rapid rate, equal access and connectivity remains another concern. Networks continue to age and public-private partnerships pose opportunities for upgrades and expanded coverage in rural areas. Private sector companies have begun considering zero-rating, in which some provider-selected content

does not count against data caps or incur additional charges, reducing cost and making access more affordable, especially on mobile networks. At risk is the idea of net-neutrality, which argues that content should be treated equally by Internet Service Providers and mobile carriers.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can the international community to ensure that developing countries have access to adequate infrastructure for ICT?
- What mechanisms are best suited to finance ICT development? What roles are appropriate for the international community, governments and the private sector?
- Should the international community support emerging strategies like zero-rating as a means of bridging the digital divide?
- How can the United Nations support increased use of ICT in developing countries?

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

The use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), including the Internet and mobile devices, has become widespread around the world and so ingrained in modern life that it has spawned the modern "Information Society." The transformational power of ICT is wide-reaching, from democratizing access to information and driving economic growth, to aiding in national revolutions. However, the ease of access that makes ICT so powerful is also a threat: ICT also facilitate espionage, domestic surveillance and organization of unlawful activities. The rise of the Information Society has forced the international community to consider how the human rights of ICT users can be protected while still ensuring State safety and the ability to protect those same users from online threats.

In 2001, the General Assembly created the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to manage the future of ICT and the role of the international community in promoting their spread. The WSIS meetings involved a multi-stakeholder approach including governments, United Nations organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector. The two original WSIS meetings took place in 2003 and 2005 and focused on developing a widespread "Information Society for All" that had universal spread of ICT and protected the human rights of its users.

During the 2003 meeting, WSIS adopted a Declaration of Principles, a guide for achieving equal accessibility to that Information Society for All, and a Plan of Action for taking the first steps toward that goal. However, the Plan of Action offered minimal guidance for how to manage the principle of simultaneously protecting human rights and combatting terrorism and criminal activity. The 2005 meeting largely focused on governance issues, defining Internet governance and establishing the Internet Governance Forum to further address issues of Internet governance, which would come to include protection of human rights.

The Tunisian Revolution of 2010-2011 and subsequent Arab Spring brought the issue of human rights online into new territory. With social media networks being used to coordinate revolutionary activity, several States restricted Internet access within their borders. Some States not threatened with rebellion have also claimed the ability to restrict Internet access in certain cases, such as copyright infringement. However, the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council reported in 2011 that removing access to the Internet is a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, regardless of the justification. The Special Rapporteur also noted that the right to privacy extends to the Internet as well, making collection of users' online activities possible human rights violations. In 2013, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "The right to privacy in the digital age," which stressed the human right to privacy, accessibility and freedom of expression online. This resolution explicitly supported the right to freedom of expression online by individuals, as well as lawful protection against invasions of privacy. This resolution also calls for Member States to refrain from unlawful surveillance on individuals and to acknowledge that online privacy is of equal importance to offline privacy.

In June 2014, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) hosted a WSIS+10 High-Level Event at its headquarters in Geneva. The High-Level Event was a special, extended version of the WSIS Forum and was intended to provide input to the General Assembly's WSIS+10 High-Level Meeting held in December 2015. At the meeting in Geneva, Member States and attending non-governmental bodies discussed progress on achieving the Information Society for All between 2005 and 2014. The Event produced two documents. The Statement on Implementation of WSIS Outcomes reaffirmed the goals decided upon in 2003 and declared that all actors, including Member States and the private sector, must ensure respect for all human rights online as well as offline. Additionally, the WSIS+10 High-Level Event also produced the WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015 to guide progress on the Information Society over the succeeding fifteen years. In December 2015, the General Assembly adopted the WSIS+10 High-Level Meeting Outcome Document, incorporating many of the principles from the High-Level Event the year prior. In this document, the General Assembly noted concerns about threats to the freedoms of expression and information, and called on Member States to protect these freedoms, as well as the right to privacy and other human rights.

As ICT becomes more and more widespread, the importance of protecting human rights in the Information Society rises as well. The rise of terrorist and criminal activities online, particularly through social media, tempt governments into violating human rights online to ensure safety offline, however the United Nations has been clear that human rights in the Information Society are no less real than the human rights the Universal Declaration first intended to protect. The effectiveness of ICT relies on public trust in its effectiveness and security, which itself requires users' rights while using ICT to be protected. The rights to privacy and to the freedoms of expression and information are fundamental to the Information Society, and yet governments and private organizations increasingly seek to violate those rights. In 2016, the UN Human Rights Council resolved that Internet access itself should be considered a human right, due to its importance to economic development and in realizing other human rights. The success of an Information Society for All, then, depends not only on the ability of the international community to protect the rights of those within the Society, but also on its ability to protect the right to participate in the Society itself.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- What steps can Member States take to protect the data of individuals while maintaining country-wide security?
- How can Member States best protect privacy in the Information Society?
- What steps should the international community take to protect the right to freedom of expression and access to impartial information?

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PURVIEW OF THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is responsible for implementing provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and monitoring compliance with the Convention. Therefore, the OPCW focuses on demilitarisation, non-proliferation, assistance to victims and protection against chemical weapons, and encourages international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry. Each delegation may place one representative on this body. For more information, please see page 8 in the AMUN *Rules and Procedures* handbook. For the purposes of this simulation, all United Nations Member States will be considered to have a seat in the special session. The body will draft resolutions to cover the issues before it.

Website: https://www.opcw.org/

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X: ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) aims to eliminate the use and production of chemical weapons. Article X of the Convention establishes mechanisms for States to provide and receive assistance to protect against chemical weapons. The Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is charged with coordinating implementation of Article X. Assistance includes technical support for dismantling chemical weapons stockpiles, provision of detection and monitoring equipment, and support to those attacked by chemical weapons. With the decline in recent years of actual weapons attacks, there has been renewed focus on the longer term issue of prevention through shared technology and protection programs. Many developing States have started their own advanced chemical production centers, which could produce chemical weapons if not monitored and regulated. Many States still have weak regulations, and expert training is vital for responding to industrial emergencies or countering the misuse of technology, especially given increased threats from non-state actors.

Following the use of poison gas during the First World War, the 1925 Geneva Protocol established a norm against chemical warfare. Efforts to eliminate all chemical weapons did not gain traction until the 1980s, when Iraq used chemical weapons in its war with Iran. The international community made a renewed commitment to creating a ban, leading to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Upon ratification, the OPCW was formed.

At the first Conference of the States Parties of the OPCW in 1997, the Conference approved a data bank for sharing information on chemical weapons protection programs. The next few years saw the creation of a series of technical training programs, ranging from field lab set-up instruction to exercises on delivering assistance in the event of a chemical emergency. The OPCW coordinates direct assistance to the requesting State. Iran was the first State to enter into an agreement for the provision of emergency medical teams, offering the use of hospitals for any casualties of weapon attacks. Switzerland entered into a similar agreement, making equipment and training available through jointly organized courses with the OPCW.

The chemical weapons protection regime continued to improve between 1997 and 2003. The number of new States Parties to the convention posed a challenge. Major CWC review conferences in 2003 and 2008 assessed the work completed in fulfilling the CWC's goals and decided on future courses of action. The conferences noted the need for further assistance despite an increase in bilateral agreements and contributions. The reviews also pushed continued development and training of the assistance response mechanism under the OPCW: the Assistance, Coordination, and Assessment Team (ACAT). The OPCW has held several international exercises, most recently in 2010, aimed at testing the immediate readiness of the OPCW in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons.

The latest CWC review in 2013 encouraged more active cooperation with regional and international groups, asking States Parties to participate in joint exercises and training programs. The most recent States Parties conference in 2016 noted that the OPCW Secretariat carried out 38 major capacity-building projects in the preceding year. It highlighted training focused on first responders and military defense personnel. These training programs continue to broaden, with assistance targeted toward the increasing number of developing countries with expanding chemical industries. Without updated training, and without updated supply line protections, Member States run the risk of chemical components and equipment falling into the hands of non-state actors. The rise of terrorism means that this form of capacity building is highly important to both domestic and international security.

In recent resolutions, the OPCW has also called for increased attention to the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons. The Network is charged with providing material, medical and financial support to the victims of chemical weapons. This has rounded out the task of prevention and assistance, although support from States Parties is still needed to fully implement the Network. The Network helped create the Practical Guide for Medical Management of Chemical Warfare Casualties, released in 2016. While many Member States speak out in support of chemical weapons victims, the support is too often rhetorical. Countries where attacks occur often receive little aid.

The actions of non-state actors also remain at the forefront of planning and preparation for chemical weapons attack responses. The ongoing Syrian Civil War illustrates many of the fears held by the international community, marking the first major poison gas attacks since the Iran-Iraq War. The weakened Syrian government has been unable to maintain control of its arsenal, with at least one documented use of mustard gas by the terrorist Islamic State in 2016. With the increasing spread of scientific information and the ease with which any person can have access to readily-available chemicals, new adaptations are needed against non-traditional threats. Responding to chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors requires coordination in, generally speaking, combat or otherwise hostile zones in areas often devastated by munitions attacks. In 2016, the OPCW hosted another training for chemical terrorism emergencies in South Korea, but much more is needed.

The OPCW has a number of areas to address to fully implement Article X. The OPCW focuses on supporting members through capacity building projects like training Member States on ways to secure chemicals and on providing for responses to chemical weapons attacks, primarily through educational initiatives and technology and tactical trainings. As non-state actors become an increased threat, States Parties will need additional assistance in both areas, especially in preventing attacks and breaches in supply chains. The Article X mandate to both prevent attacks and assist the attacked requires a well rounded approach that incorporates the widespread availability of chemicals and equipment, the inconsistencies in regulation between Member States and the emergency response capability of Member States.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- In what areas could the OPCW coordinate with other UN bodies or international organizations to improve chemical weapons protections?
- Are there more active roles or safety areas that the OPCW can explore or expand on in assisting States Parties with chemical threats from non-state actors?
- How should the OPCW balance its focus between helping States with chemical weapons protections and bolstering national regulations and industry standards?

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Implementation of Article XI: Economic and technological development

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) seeks to strike a balance between preventing the use of toxic chemicals as weapons and supporting the use of chemicals for beneficial purposes. Article XI of the Convention supports the States Parties' right to "the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technological information relating to the development and application of chemistry" for peaceful uses. In the twenty years since the CWC came into force, the international community has substantially reduced chemical weapons stockpiles. Today, an increasing focus is placed on the longer-term preventative and technological aspects of the CWC. Because chemicals and technology are necessary for industrial production, medical practice, and other peaceful uses, eradicating their use is both impractical and undesirable. Ensuring that dual-use technologies are still available for their peaceful purposes, but are also regulated to prevent weapons development and use, is key. An important part of the OPCW mission under

the Convention is improving States Parties' ability to implement the CWC and supporting the development of chemistry for non-prohibited purposes. Several barriers continue to hamper the aims of the Convention. First, fear of illicit chemical weapons programs makes many developed countries maintain strict chemical export controls, holding back technological progress in developing States. Second, the slow pace of the destruction of current chemical stocks keeps attention directed at non-proliferation.

Article XI has its origins in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) negotiations of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT declares that all parties have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful means while benefiting from international cooperation. The Conference on Disarmament, the successor to ENCD, agreed upon similar language in the Chemical Weapons Convention. This aspect of disarmament treaties was important for attracting the support of many developing countries. Before the CWC was signed, export controls and other barriers to free trade of chemicals were a point of contention between developed and developing States. The Australia Group, a 1985 export control group of industrialized States, arose in response to chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq War. Their cooperation in reviewing trade barriers and supporting Article XI helped pave the way for the passage of the CWC.

After the end of the Cold War, scientific research boomed, including chemical capacity and use in science and industry. The widespread use of chemical precursors and components in chemical weapons, namely in multinational manufacturing and business, meant the international community's ability to regulate where chemicals are located, in what amounts and in whose possession they remain is compromised. The logistics of regulating chemical components and precursors is highly complex. In addition to the increased use of chemical agents, civilian technical capacity has vastly increased.

In 2003, the OPCW reaffirmed its collaborative and coordinating efforts at its First Review Conference. The Review Conference stated again the OPCW's commitment to spreading peaceful technology and the free flow of information and to creating a widespread and accessible resource. This led the OPCW to build additional financial assistance and coordinating resources for its States Parties. In a 2005 follow-up to the Review Conference, the OPCW began its coordinating efforts in earnest. It began maintaining databases of coordinating efforts and offers, offering increased funding for capacity-building programs and providing annual reports from the Director-General on the implementation of Article XI.

In its Midterm-Plan for the Period from 2010-2012, the OPCW outlined its course of action and focused in on four main areas for the implementation of Article XI: integrated chemicals management, enhancement of chemical analytical skills, chemical-knowledge promotion and exchange, and chemical-industry outreach. In 2011, the OPCW formalized these goals in the Agreed Framework for the Full Implementation of Article XI. The Midterm-Plan focused on regulation and self-reporting. As chemical industries grow worldwide, the number of potential security gaps increases and the desire to protect intellectual property rights and to protect production secrets has prevented full reporting. The Midterm-Plan focuses on encouraging member states to implement better reporting systems and to enforce those systems across new chemical industries. Some Member States are resistant to do so if it detracts from a trade advantage.

In the past five years, the OPCW has continued to foster international cooperation to effectively implement Article XI. The need for increased awareness about the dual use of chemical weapons and the CWC's role in enforcement and fostering technological growth in particular is also necessary among practicing chemists. Unfortunately, these topics are not extensively covered at universities worldwide. The OPCW has taken steps to counter this problem. In 2015, the Secretariat continued to organize activities to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry through capacity building, knowledge sharing, and industry outreach. This has included a number of workshops and industry development events, with four more workshops worldwide in 2013. Most notably, the OPCW has created regional and individual action plans for its States Parties, including the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa.

Future implementation of Article XI will greatly depend on how Member States resolve numerous divisive issues, including information exchange and self-reporting, expanding industrial development, the potential for civilian chemicals use to compromise Article X of the CWC, and trade barriers that limit the free flow of information and technology. The OPCW will need to continue to foster cooperation between chemical industry associations, non-governmental organizations, and regional and international institutions on technological development and information exchange. The rapid pace of development of new, previously unregulated chemicals with potential weapons applications and new production processes will also need to be kept up to date by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. While its regional developmental efforts and its coordinating and educational programs have made headway, States Parties still resist information exchange on the grounds of potential threat to international security and to trade secrets and intellectual property rights.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What chemical research and development areas are seeing the most and least progress? In what ways can collaborative efforts improve or leverage this growth without harming the need for trade protections?
- What resources are necessary to improve collaboration in chemical and technological growth?
- How can the OPCW overcome information sharing resistance in the face of intellectual property and trade protections?

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CHAPTER EIGHT
GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a specialized agency and addresses issues relating to agriculture, forestry, fisheries and rural development. The FAO's mandate includes supporting sustainable agriculture and rural development, addressing food scarcity and the environmental sustainability of agricultural systems.

Website: www.fao.org/home/en

SUSTAINABLE USE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

An expanding global population increases the importance of sustainable plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA). Homogeneity among PGRFA threatens worldwide consumption patterns and agricultural practices. According to The State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture report, genetic vulnerability results "when a widely-planted crop is uniformly susceptible to a pest, pathogen or environmental hazard as a result of genetic constitution." New crops able to withstand climate change and other threats are essential for combating poverty and reducing food insecurity. Maintaining a variety of genetically diverse plants and genetic resources is key to preventing food loss and developing new crops. Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) offer opportunities to maximize efficiency in food production systems that contribute to ending hunger, but they could put delicate ecosystems at risk if improperly used. The FAO must balance these needs.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) created the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity in November 1988, which later became an independent organization. The Convention on Biological Diversity still represents the main international instrument for addressing biodiversity issues. The Conference of Parties negotiated the Nairobi Final Act, which solidified the conservation of biodiversity, including all ecosystems and living species, as a common concern of humankind. In 2000, the Conference of Parties adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The Protocol provides an international regulatory framework for protecting both the agricultural industry and its advances as well as the environment. The protocol defines a "living modified organism" as any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material that can be obtained through the use of modern biotechnology; these are more commonly known as GMOs.

The FAO has expanded on these actions. After almost a decade of debate, the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture mandate was expanded in 1995 to include biodiversity as a major issue, and, in 2001, the FAO adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The treaty ensured farmers have access to a variety of genetic strains for their crops and formalized the right of Member States to access genetic information sourced from or developed within the State's borders. This information has helped create drought-resistant crops that can be grown in food scarce areas like Africa. Protecting rights to genetic research has created a better financial incentive for countries like the United States and China to contribute to seed banks. The treaty came into effect in 2004.

Intellectual property rights are a key barriers to sharing genetic resources. Currently, States disagree about whether the genetic blueprints resulting from PGRFA and physical specimens are separate forms of legal property. In one country, a corporation may own the genetic information while an agricultural seed company pays it rights. While in other places, production companies and researchers function independently from one another, and development rights are only paid when new technology is created using research. These different systems create international trade barriers. In 2010, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization was established. The protocol guarantees that innovations in new genetic resources must be shared, while also

addressing sovereignty and information sharing issues. The protocol came into effect in 2014. The Convention on Biological Diversity has 196 States Parties. Its one subsidiary body, the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), recommends specific actions and regulations for protecting biodiversity. The protocol has helped establish some standards, but has not fully resolved the intellectual property issues.

Currently, the FAO is developing the Global Information System (GLIS) on PGRFA. Once completed the system will provide warnings of threats to genetic resources, provide access to genetic information, encourage data collection and support the main uses of genetic resources. The information technology infrastructures required in GLIS are currently being developed. Options are being explored to expand the accessibility of GLIS in developing countries. The development of GLIS still requires a solid definition of user rights and obligations. Guidelines must cover intellectual property laws, private law instruments and confidentially.

Moreover, PGRFA's failsafe, the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, opened in 2008 and designed for long-term storage of physical seed specimens, may be threatened. Its protection, a thick barrier of permafrost, is melting, and the bank flooded in May 2017. No samples were lost and the structure is sound, but the vault is the only one of its kind. The vault protects existing samples of genetically diverse plants important to crop production and development. It maintains a comprehensive set of samples from across the world's plant banks meant to help researchers and plant developers in the case of widespread sample loss, massive crop failure or natural disasters. Without it, the backup system for the world's agricultural reserves may be lost.

PGRFA has promising implications for agriculture, environmental preservation and nutrition worldwide. Sharing plant genomes has helped create drought-resistant crops and protect endangered plant species. In the event of mass plant illness or infestation, genetic differences between plants that survive and those that die can reveal ways to protect crops from widespread failure. Plant genetic resources are one of the brightest hopes we have for preventing worldwide starvation and for protecting our environment from climate change and species loss. High-risk crops like the California orange are dependent upon genetic preservation methods; without sampling and study, there is little hope they will survive our volatile climate.

The United Nations needs to decide legal limitations on information shared through GLIS, including use restrictions. Non-normative incentives for research and collaboration, such as monetary gain from genetically modified plants and trade agreements that incorporate modern intellectual property protections, will also need to be considered. The FAO has a number of frameworks to use in addressing PGRFA. To ensure that these frameworks are effective, the FAO needs to address concerns about legal mandates and information sharing and to create standards for domestic laws that will facilitate information sharing. The FAO must also consider how the organization can continue to encourage growth in research of PGRFA to ensure the technology is used to meet international development goals.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- What role do intellectual property laws, private law instruments and confidentially play PGRFA development and how must those laws change in order to support wider research and economic growth?
- How can the FAO incentivize the development of plant genetic resource systems and their use?
- What current information systems are most important to PGRFA and its growth? How can countries better use these information systems and how can they be protected?

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ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Antimicrobial resistant strains of fungi, bacteria, viruses and parasites are microorganisms that have become partially or completely resistant to treatment by antimicrobials, also referred to as "superbugs." They are a growing global threat that directly impacts public health and global economic stability. It is estimated that antimicrobial resistance contributes to 10 million human fatalities and has the potential to cause an economic collapse more extreme than the 2008 recession. While experts have long understood that antimicrobial resistance is the predictable

result of the long-term use or overuse of antimicrobial drugs in the agriculture and health industries, the ability to develop new antimicrobial drugs has not kept up with demand and has been more difficult in practice than anticipated. Antibiotics in particular have become more and more difficult to develop. Increasing human populations, urbanization and the intense use of antimicrobials in agriculture are linked to increased antimicrobial resistance. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and its Member States are working to establish best practices for combating the rise of antimicrobial resistance in both the developed and developing world.

A major cause of the emergence of new strains of antimicrobial resistant bacteria, fungi, viruses and parasites is the extensive use of antimicrobial drugs in agriculture. More than 63,000 tons of antimicrobials are used in livestock production alone, but only 42 States worldwide have systems in place to collect data on the usage of antimicrobials in livestock. Antimicrobial drugs are almost universally used in everyday livestock feed, fisheries and other agricultural production. While large agricultural facilities are responsible for the bulk of antimicrobial drug use, small-scale farmers often do so unregulated or without adhering to regulations. Large and small-scale operations alike often use antimicrobial drugs in lieu of proper hygiene practices. Large amounts of antimicrobials are leached into waste and groundwater from aquaculture; lack of reporting means that the exact amount being leached is unknown, but antimicrobial drugs have been found in the bodies of shrimp gathered miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Antimicrobial resistance has been a topic in the United Nations since the Biological Weapons Convention was established in 1972, but it stayed largely in the realm of weapons talks for the first two decades.

In 1963, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a joint group of the FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO), was formed. This marked the first significant recognition of the link between industrial agriculture and world health. Prior to 2000, international efforts to combat antimicrobial resistance were focused on drug-resistant HIV/AIDS and similar highly-adaptive viruses like malaria, tuberculosis and hepatitis with a consistent focus on drug development and outbreak management. The United Nations and WHO were focused on reactive policies rather than sourcing the problem. It wasn't until 2007 that the Codex Alimentarius Commission convened the Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance. Even then, its primary mission was to evaluate agricultural and aquacultural impacts on antimicrobial resistance and was not a prescriptive meeting.

In 2007 and 2008, the FAO hosted a number of stakeholder meetings. The first meetings outlined potential actions for the FAO, WHO and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and compiled the organizations' previous research and antimicrobial practices. This coordination allowed the FAO, WHO and OIE to identify areas where information was lacking, especially noting the overuse and underreporting of antimicrobial drugs in livestock and aquaculture, which contributes to high levels of antimicrobial drugs in water runoff, feed storage and general misuse of the drugs that can lead to the creation of superbugs.

In both 2015 and 2016 annual reports, the FAO has promoted public awareness and animal husbandry best practices. It has also created regional action plans for Member States struggling to increase compliance with those best practices and helps to fund them, in collaboration with WHO. In 2016, the FAO announced its Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR). Starting by recognizing that the health of humans, animals and the ecosystem are interdependent, the FAO identified four areas within which to focus work. Those focus areas are: raising awareness, developing monitoring capacity, strengthening governance and promoting good practices within agricultural systems. The FAO's Action Plan complements the World Health Organization's Global Action Plan on AMR, which focuses on medical and health systems.

The FAO still suffers from a lack of proper reporting, poor public awareness and noncompliance with best practices. Health organizations agree that actions taken need to be immediate, innovative and with cooperation between States. Such actions can include: governmental regulations, subsidies and aid for rural farmers, improving farm hygiene and cleanliness, focusing on preventing the spread of infections, increased veterinary oversight, accurate and affordable disease diagnostics and AMR education programs. Most importantly, filling the knowledge gap on antimicrobial drug use and environmental contamination is one of the FAO's highest priorities. Many countries still do not have concrete numbers on the amount of antimicrobials used in agriculture and lack the regulations to appropriately monitor and gather that information. The stakes are high. Without action now, antimicrobial resistance may increase rapidly, leading to a scenario where there is no effective antimicrobial treatments for malaria, tuberculosis, staphylococcus aureus and other common infections.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- What role do antimicrobials play in your country's food and agriculture production? How does antimicrobial resistance impact the public food supply and international trade?
- What level of monitoring of antimicrobial use is appropriate?
- What domestic and international regulations on antimicrobial use need to be made?
- How does AMR affect research allocations? Does the international community have the economic and regulatory tools to combat AMR and how can those tools be used most effectively?

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Chapter Nine
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

Members of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan	Maldives	Tonga
Armenia	Marshall Islands	Turkey
Australia	Micronesia	Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan	Mongolia	Tuvalu
Bangladesh	Myanmar	United Kingdom
Bhutan	Nauru	United States of America
Brunei Darussalam	Nepal	Uzbekistan
Cambodia	Netherlands	Vanuatu
China	New Zealand	Viet Nam
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Pakistan	
Fiji	Palau	**Associate Members of ESCAP:**
France	Papua New Guinea	American Samoa (United States)
Georgia	Philippines	Cook Islands (New Zealand)
India	Republic of Korea	French Polynesia (France)
Indonesia	Russian Federation	Guam (United States)
Iran, Islamic Republic of	Samoa	Hong Kong, China (China)
Japan	Singapore	Macao, China (China)
Kazakhstan	Solomon Islands	New Caledonia (New Zealand)
Kiribati	Sri Lanka	Niue (New Zealand)
Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Northern Mariana Islands (United States)
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Thailand	
Malaysia	Timor-Leste	

Purview of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) is responsible for supporting the economic and social development of Member States in the Asia-Pacific region. ESCAP focuses on poverty reduction, managing globalization and tracking emerging social issues within the region. This includes issues facing the entire region or several States within it, cross-border issues, and other emerging economic and social issues. ESCAP also provides technical assistance to its members and monitors progress of, and provides advice to, countries pursuing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The Commission is composed of 53 Member States and nine associate members. The associate members are not members of the United Nations and have no voting rights.

In 2017, AMUN will simulate the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific as a report-writing body, rather than a resolution-writing body. For more information about report-writing bodies, please see 20-21 in AMUN's *Rules and Procedures* handbook.

Website: www.unescap.org

Enhancing regional economic cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region is incredibly diverse in culture, politics, economies and natural resources. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) members include Member States from North and South America, Asia and Oceania. To function well, the region, which represents over one trillion dollars in global trade, must overcome very different beliefs in trade practices, asymmetrical infrastructure development, and an extremely varied set of cultural practices around development and trade. Despite the last few decades of progress in the region's economic development overall, poor infrastructure and inadequate practices in trade and transportation facilities have led to portions of the region lacking equal access to the world's largest and most dynamic markets. For example, South Asia has the largest concentration of the world's poor—309 million people living on less than $1.90 a day—and only composes six percent of the region's trade. As a result, a large portion of the Asia-Pacific region's 4.5 billion people lack access to the region's markets—markets that represent almost half of global trade. Increasing access to markets could pull people out of poverty and create a more long-lasting regional development. As the region increasingly develops, ESCAP must create policies of sustainable growth that benefit all countries and people.

The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific was formed in 1947 and has worked consistently to bridge the differences in the region. Regional initiatives throughout the United Nations were largely focused on promoting Member States' nationalistic goals prior to the 1990s. They provided a platform for States to assert their needs, but often did not lead to more than political posturing. The 1990s saw a boost in actionable economic cooperation following the creation of the Single European Market in 1992 and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. When the Asian economy collapsed in 1997, following a period of very quick growth, the need for regional cooperation became undeniable. The Asia-Pacific region was able to bounce back, with massive increases in membership in regional organizations, including major expansion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other organizations, until the 2008 global economic collapse. Unfortunately, studies throughout the next five years showed that

infrastructural issues like sinkholes and unmaintained roads, trade barriers like tariffs and import export requirements, and economic disparities were getting little political traction, leaving the region vulnerable to food scarcity issues and potential economic collapse.

Many of the transportation issues in the region, including poor road conditions, reliance on maritime trade and import regulations, continued into the next decade. In addition, increased production of imports and larger export markets led to disjointed manufacturing regulations and standards that prevent some countries from importing or exporting products from or to other countries in the region. In 2014, the Commission also adopted a resolution, entitled "Implementation of the Bangkok Declaration on Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration in Asia and the Pacific," which created four target area expert working groups. These groups included: moving toward the formation of an integrated market; the development of seamless connectivity in the region; financial cooperation enhancements, especially to fund the region's large infrastructure deficit; and increasing economic cooperation to address shared vulnerabilities of trade lines and economic systems, particularly to infrastructure collapse and natural disaster. ESCAP has pushed a variety of regional initiatives as part of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, such as One Belt, One Road. That initiative has created a network of trade deals meant to bridge differences between States, streamline maritime trade and increase infrastructure development. In 2014 and 2015, the sub-regional working groups created reports on their findings of regional economic cooperation. Currently, ESCAP has pushed for infrastructure development more seriously, including projects like the Asian Highway Network and the Trans-Asian Railway.

While the number of trade agreements have gone up, barriers to regional economic cooperation and integration still exist. The desire for more open trade still exists, but Member States still have prohibitive tariffs and regulations, massive infrastructure problems, and transportation issues. Even promising programs like One Belt, One Road come under fire for potentially wasting resources, increasing corruption, and potential manipulation of other Member States' governmental systems. Trade agreements may solve some of these problems, but domestic reform is also necessary; additionally, Member States rich in natural resources and with very large low-income populations are, in practice, still left out of many development projects. The creation of trade associations has not universally created common markets or fully resolved many or even most of the regulatory and policy barriers to cooperation. As a result, ESCAP must still address issues of low trade cooperation leading to impoverishment regionwide.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- How can ESCAP address the infrastructural issues, like worn roads and inadequate shipping routes, across the region?
- How can ESCAP aid in areas where infrastructure is lacking almost entirely?
- What types of regulations can be standardized or brought into alignment, what regulations must remain different and why? Can these regulations include tariffs?
- What can be done to better include Member States with large populations living on less than $1.90 a day? Do infrastructure, tariffs or market coordination best address their needs?

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Towards a sustainable, inclusive and resilient urban future for Asia and the Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region has experienced unmatched growth in the past 50 years, with many States rapidly transitioning from small, agriculturally-based economies to financial and industrial centers. It now boasts three of the world's 10 largest gross domestic products and two of the five fastest-growing economies. The United Nations estimates that urban residents will represent 66 percent of the world's population by the year 2050. Urbanization, particularly at the scale happening in the Asia-Pacific region, can have serious environmental and other long-term consequences. Consumption of goods and services tends to be higher in urban centers. Close proximity of populations allows for disease to spread more rapidly and the effects of natural disasters are greater in urban areas. According a recent ESCAP report, half of the region's urban

population lives in low-lying coastal areas, leaving many people and the environment at risk to the consequences of climate-related disasters due to poor infrastructure and lack of urban planning. These trends demonstrate the need to focus on sustainable growth and economic resilience.

The United Nations' focus on urbanization began in earnest in the mid-1970s with the first United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) Conference in Vancouver, Canada. The Conference established goals regarding human settlement policies, infrastructure and land usage. The second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 1996 produced the Habitat Agenda Goals and Principles, Commitments and the Global Plan of Action, and the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements. These documents focused on improving the quality of life in human settlements by controlling population density, reducing homelessness and addressing poverty. Habitat II also acknowledged the interdependence of urban and rural areas. In 2016, the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) yielded the New Urban Agenda initiative, which called for governments to provide basic services to all of their citizens, to root out discriminatory practices, to support clean city initiatives, to address climate change and to respect the rights of refugees. While the world has made great strides in the realm of sustainable development, Habitat III highlighted some of the substantial challenges that remain.

The Asia-Pacific region suffers from high rates of urban sprawl, which will likely increase in the coming years. With the passage of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 there has been increased attention put on sustainable, inclusive urban development. Goal Eleven aims to "make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable." The Commission identified multiple factors to meet this Goal's objectives. They include decreasing the percentage of the global population living in slums, decreasing urban sprawl, more efficiently managing solid waste and the improvement of the air conditions in urban areas.

In May 2015, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific convened the Asia-Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development. The participants agreed they would aim to better implement the three dimensions to sustainable urban development—economic, social and environmental—in the Asia-Pacific region as outlined in the 2030 Agenda. Member States agreed that there needs to be a better balance between these three factors in national policymaking, emphasized a renewed focus on education, gender equality and human rights, and highlighted the adverse effects natural disasters can have on sustainable development gains. The Forum also discussed the overall implementation of the SDGs as well as ways to monitor the progress in the region. The Commission outlined the need to close the equity gap in urban areas to reduce poverty levels and help create cities of opportunity. It also looks to enhance urban environmental quality by managing resource gaps, implementing integrated solutions and embracing green urbanism initiatives.

Moving forward, ESCAP must address numerous issues. The most significant issue in the Asia-Pacific region is how to balance the needs of megacities against the growth needs of secondary, mid-sized cities. The Commission recognizes that sustainable economic development should be spread throughout growing urban centers noting the role transport and trade play in their development. Other areas of consideration include urban environmental quality and the management and use of key resources like food and water, improving urban areas' resistance to disasters, and focusing on the status of the poor in urban areas.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- What assistance do Member States need to implement the economic, social and environmental priorities identified at the Asia Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development?
- How should the Commission best balance the needs of growing mid-sized cities versus those of larger megacities?
- What best practices can Member States implement when addressing the question of sustainable urban development?
- Through what means can Member States better allocate resources to promote sustainable urban development across all aspects?

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10 Chapter Ten
Committee of Experts on Public Administration

Purview of the Committee of Experts on Public Administration

The Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) provides expert advice to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on improving public administration and good governance. It is composed of non-governmental representatives and its recommendations are non-binding on Member States. It is expected to provide comprehensive recommendations for both governments and the United Nations system on the topics under its purview. Past work has included advice on the use of information communication technology in governance, government ethics, and the relationship between public administration and development.

In 2017, AMUN will simulate the Committee of Experts on Public Administration as a report-writing body, rather than a resolution-writing body. For more information about report-writing bodies, please see 20-21 in the AMUN *Rules and Procedures* handbook.

Website: https://publicadministration.un.org/en/cepa

Promoting accountable institutions, ethical leadership and integrity to enhance confidence in efforts to deliver sustainable development

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 is "the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels." Sustainable development requires accountable and ethical government, as it is precisely that government that holds the primary responsibility for ensuring development. Additionally, corruption impedes economic growth. The World Economic Forum estimates that corruption causes on average a 10 percent increase in the cost of doing business. Recalling the United Nations founding principle of national sovereignty, it is crucial that governments be situated to most efficiently lead the development agenda for their state. However, as recognized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, public service and public trust are interlocked.

CEPA noted in 2015 that the interrelated concepts of transparency, accountability, ethical leadership and integrity form the basis for effective public administration. Integrity, as the opposite of corruption, is necessary to set and follow the rules that prevent corruption from taking hold. Ethical leadership is the commitment of public servants to

adhere to that integrity. Transparency and access to information allow the public; other internal institutions, such as the private sector or other layers of government; and outside observers to identify breaches of ethics when they occur. Finally, accountability is the ability to react to ethical breaches and correct them, however this requires integrity to ensure that the measures taken are in the public interest. CEPA identified four main factors that promote accountable institutions, ethical leadership and integrity: procedural methods, institutional arrangements, social accountability and public control, and cultural norms.

The four aforementioned factors differ not only in their contexts, but also in their ease of adoption. Procedural methods, such as freedom of information legislation, tend to be the simplest to put into place and, while they can result in immediate changes, they lack in long-term durability. These methods generally increase access to information or regulate the behavior of public officials; both of which assist in increased citizen engagement and improve trust in government. The drawback, however, is that procedures that are implemented by the government can easily be repealed by the government. It is therefore important to build a supporting infrastructure to promote good governance while these methods still provide momentum. In particular, the institutional makeup of the government should be organized to promote transparency and accountability, even within itself through a system of checks and balances.

Accountability is the step connecting empowered citizens and transparency to reliable governance. In addition to requiring institutions on the governmental side that can audit activities and enforce reforms, accountability requires the citizens to organize and participate in the political process. The United Nations describes civil society organizations (CSOs) as the "third sector" of society, cooperating with both the public and private sectors. Regarding accountability, CSOs need to be able to work closely with public institutions to act as a bridge between citizen demands and the government. Establishing the necessary protections to allow CSOs to function, such as freedoms of information and association, also set traditions of good governance that reinforce these efforts. The promotion of an accountability culture needs time to take root, but it can provide some of the force needed to maintain anti-corruption and good governance measures.

The first global and legally-binding action against corruption was the 2003 Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The Convention approached the issue of corruption in five areas: preventative measures, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. The

details of this implementation were left to the newly created Conference of States Parties (Conference), which would also engage in periodic reviews. However, the details of the Convention have come under criticism, as the UNCAC Coalition, representing over 350 civil society organizations, argued that the Convention suffered from a lack of involvement of CSOs, particularly with respect to the review process. Within States, lack of legal protections—particularly freedoms of expression and of the press—have allowed for increased persecution of CSOs, hampering anti-corruption efforts.

As CEPA discussed in 2015, progress in promoting accountable institutions, ethical leadership and integrity is slow, so any effective plans will need to balance short, medium and long-term goals. The Arab Spring and the spread of information and communications technology have shown a change in how people expect to interact with their government, a phenomenon dubbed by CEPA as "2.0 culture." In 2.0 culture, people place a priority on open government, transparency and broad civic engagement. This change in culture will require a shift in how the public sector presents itself, both in its structure and in the expectations levied upon its civil servants.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- What can the United Nations do to support greater transparency among State governments, including through the use of information and communication technology?
- What policies or practices keep state institutions accountable? How can leaders best ensure accountability and ethical leadership by government officials?
- How can civil society and the public best keep governments accountable? What resources do they need to do so?

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REDEFINING RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO SUPPORT PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND RESPONSIVE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY, INCLUDING THROUGH E-SOLUTIONS

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the right of all people to engage with their governments on a fair basis, which requires effective communication in both directions. Citizens should be able to petition and otherwise direct the actions taken by their government, while the government needs to deliver its services effectively to its citizens. These processes rely on citizens' trust in the system to be effective. However, despite wide agreement on the importance of good governance, case studies have shown that there is no uniform strategy to achieve it. Instead, a diverse body of approaches have been developed at varying levels and differing amounts of governmental ("top-down") and grassroots ("bottom-up") involvement. Additionally, democratization movements have resulted in more decentralized governments, which help position governments closer to the people and facilitate general access to the political process. Good governance also plays an important role in stimulating development, as noted by Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17, which call for Member States to build inclusive institutions at all levels and to improve partnerships within and among the various players in the development sector.

Responsive public service delivery plays an important role in participatory governance as well, as it is important for public services to be responsive to the changing needs at the local level. This makes public service delivery a two-way street: the government needs to effectively provide public services to its citizens and requisition the help of the citizens to survey its own effectiveness. The wording of this is important; as remarked by CEPA in 2015, it is the function of public administration to be there for its citizens, but it is not the function of citizens to be there for the public administration. Instead, the public institutions should reduce the barriers for citizen interaction. One method that has seen success in several countries is the adoption of freedom of information legislation, as increasing public knowledge of citizens' rights and the actions of public institutions allows for community organizers to lobby for effective changes.

Given the beneficial relationship between good governance and development, the World Bank has promoted efforts to reduce corruption and improve governance. The 2007 Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy focused the Bank's efforts on Demand For Good Governance (DFGG), which encompasses projects that increase the ability of citizens and organizations to hold the state accountable. Rather than affect the structure of the government, which effects the "supply" of good governance, these projects range from public expenditure tracking of Ugandan education funding in 2001, to providing grants to organizations working to address known weaknesses in government programs in Cambodia in 2008. The World Bank noted that, despite anecdotal

evidence that demand-side governance programs are more effective than supply-side ones, the key is to focus on the interface between supply and demand as well, namely improving interactions between the state and the citizenry.

Urbanization has a significant impact on public service delivery and participation. Urban populations have higher service needs, and rapid urbanization, particularly in the developing world, puts tremendous pressure on local governments to provide adequate services. While improving participatory governance and responsive public service delivery is not isolated to developing countries, developing countries see the vast majority of effects of urbanization and thus are especially impacted by its effects on public administration. The International Growth Centre remarked that in developing countries in Asia and Africa, municipal governments often were not empowered enough to deliver adequate public services. It further noted that political shortcomings, not technological ones, are largely responsible for the inability for cities to meet their responsibilities. In 2014, UN-Habitat held the seventh World Urban Forum, which recognized that cities have seen rising inequality and declared the need to promote urban agendas that, among other goals, encourage participatory and inclusive local governance.

On the larger scale, the World Bank agreed that availability of technology is not the limiting factor to its usefulness. Existing Informations and Communications Technology (ICT) can be of great use toward improving participatory governance and responsive public service delivery. Over recent decades, governments have integrated ICT into government programs to increase transparency and responsiveness, such as through "open data" websites or websites where citizens can petition their government. In particular, ICT reduces the cost and difficulty of large-scale communications, enabling governments to interact with their citizens in ways that would otherwise simply be unfeasible. However, as ICT's effectiveness relies upon its usage, it is important that governments support citizens' trust in ICT. CEPA ranked cybersecurity concerns, especially regarding data security, as of equal importance for this issue as encouraging use of ICT. Given the global nature of most ICT, these concerns necessarily require international cooperation to address.

The issues of participatory governance and responsive public service delivery can be approached on several fronts. At their core, efforts to increase democratization and decentralization will assist in these goals, however, care must also be taken to ensure coherence among the different levels of government, especially with increased decentralization. Urban areas will need special attention to reverse the decline in public service availability and the rise of urban slums as urbanization continues to rise across all states. ICT has proven to be a useful asset to improve communications between the government and its citizens, although it cannot overcome political shortcomings or declining trust in ICT. Cybersecurity concerns reduce the effectiveness of ICT through diminished usage and will need to be addressed through cooperation at the international level.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:
- How can Member States best use ICT to increase responsiveness to their citizens?
- What steps can the United Nations take through its programs to support participatory and responsive governance by Member States?
- What participatory governance techniques might address the current erosion of trust and growing dissatisfaction with governments?

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PURVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal international judicial body of the United Nations. The Court has two primary functions: developing advisory opinions on matters of international law referred to it by United Nations bodies and specialized agencies and presiding over legal disputes submitted to it by Member States. Only Member States may submit cases to the Court. The Court is only considered competent to preside over a case if both States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court over the dispute. The International Court of Justice does not preside over legal disputes between private organizations, the public or individuals.

Website: www.icj-cij.org

ADVISORY OPINION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on July 8, 1996. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case.

The International Court of Justice received an initial request for an advisory opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons from the World Health Organization (WHO) on 3 September 1993. However, the ICJ declined this request because the WHO request was *ultra vires*, or acting outside of its legal capacity. Consequently, the UN General Assembly requested an advisory opinion in December of 1994, which was accepted by the ICJ in January of 1995. The GA requested that the ICJ answer the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?"

The first issue the Court must consider is whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to address this issue. An advisory opinion differs from a contentious case in that it does not arise directly out of a dispute between Member States. Instead, the General Assembly or the Security Council must formally request that the ICJ give its official opinion on some matter of international law. The United Nations Charter provides that the General Assembly may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on "any legal question."

However, the ICJ need not necessarily render an advisory opinion whenever asked. The Member States who oppose jurisdiction in the present case argue that the General Assembly is not authorized to ask the ICJ for an opinion on a matter unrelated to its work. Since the General Assembly cannot, for example, create an outright ban on nuclear weapons, opponents of jurisdiction claim that rendering an advisory opinion would be inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. Additionally, they argue that the politically charged nature of the issue puts it outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ, and that an ICJ opinion on the matter could undercut progress being made on this issue both in other bodies of the United Nations and among Member States privately. This opinion was requested during a time in which many Member States were either looking to acquire nuclear weapons of their own or disclaiming them and seeking disarmament of the world powers who did possess such weapons.

Proponents of jurisdiction argue that the United Nations Charter gives the General Assembly broad authority to ask "any legal question" and is not limited as other, more specialized bodies are. The General Assembly has also frequently addressed questions of nuclear disarmament in many different forums. They argue that the court must also decide that, as phrased, the General Assembly's request is indeed a "legal question" under the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the ICJ. Opponents of jurisdiction characterize the question as vague and abstract, while proponents claim that even if the question is abstract, that is no bar to the authority of the ICJ to render an advisory opinion.

The legal issue is highlighted by two conflicting provisions of the United Nations charter. Article 2 (4), states all Members' commitment to refrain from using force or the threat of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." However, Article 51 provides that Member States retain the right to self defense.

Nuclear weapons are consistently an issue at the forefront of international relations. While many limitations were put in place during the Cold War in the 1960s and 1970s, the threat of nuclear war persists, and is continuously re-evaluated. The threat of nuclear weapons can be used to deter other states from using nuclear weapons but may also be used as a threat of violence against other states. Although nuclear weapon capabilities have been available for decades, they have been put to use in just two instances, both in 1945 near the end of World War II, by the United States. Nuclear weapons have since been detonated several thousand times, to the international community's knowledge, for non-violent purposes of demonstration and testing by the countries that acknowledge possessing them.

The use of nuclear weapons and the possible impact that nuclear weapons have on the international community has resulted in a variety of actions by the United Nations. With wide-ranging support from United Nations Member States, many actions have passed regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Examples include the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Outer Space Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was ratified in 1963 by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, essentially banning nuclear testing. As the treaty was passed during the Cold War, this was a milestone for the States struggling for power in the international community. However, this treaty emphasizes environmental issues rather than disarmament, so nuclear testing was not completely eliminated.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty treaty prohibits parties to the treaty from putting any object carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into orbit around the earth. Additionally, it prohibits military actions, nuclear tests, and installing weapons systems or military bases on celestial bodies.

The NPT entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. It is essentially a bargain between those States Parties that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. Those who do not already possess nuclear weapons agree to never acquire such weapons, while

those already possessing them agree to peacefully share civilian nuclear technology with other States Parties and to embark on programs of complete nuclear disarmament. Presently, nearly all United Nations Member States have joined the treaty, with a few exceptions. North Korea acceded to the treaty in 1985 but never complied, and announced withdrawal in 2003. Additionally, India, Israel and Pakistan have not accepted the NPT; although none of the three have acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, the international community widely accepts that all do. South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, has yet to join. The NPT establishes a system to oversee Member States' actions through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as conferences to be held every five years.

In considering its decision, the Court must take into account customary and conventional international law as well as the United Nations Charter. The question posed by the General Assembly can be further broken down to consider both distinct varieties of international law and distinct scenarios in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons may occur. First, there is the question of whether international law has any type of authorization or prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court must also consider whether the United Nations Charter ever authorizes the threat or use of nuclear weapons in matters of self-defense. International humanitarian law and the laws applicable to armed conflict also play a role, as the Court must consider if the threat or use of nuclear weapons is compatible with instruments such as the Geneva Conventions under differing circumstances, such as a pre-emptive strike versus self-defense. Finally, the Court may choose to consider the issue of whether any international obligation toward disarmament exists.

Questions to Consider
- Does the Court have jurisdiction to render an opinion in this case? On what grounds would that jurisdiction rest? Even if the Court does have jurisdiction, should it exercise its discretion to not render the opinion?
- Currently, what effect could the use of nuclear weapons have on international agreements regarding use of force?
- What are the circumstances, if any, in which the use of nuclear weapons can be deemed legal?
- What aspects of international humanitarian law govern the threat or use of nuclear weapons?
- What effect would use of a nuclear weapon as a weapon of war have on the international community?

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LIECHTENSTEIN V. GERMANY: DISPUTE OVER THE RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY AFTER WORLD WAR II AND THE VAN LAER PAINTING

This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 18 June 2004. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case,

On June 1, 2001, Liechtenstein initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Germany to recover certain property that was seized from nationals of Liechtenstein and used to fund war reparations during the Second World War. The crux of the dispute is a painting that Liechtenstein claims belongs to the Prince of Liechtenstein. During World War II, Czechoslovakia was a belligerent against Germany; Liechtenstein remained officially neutral. Throughout the war, the Czechoslovakian government passed a series of laws, collectively known as the Beneš Decrees. These Decrees nationalized the personal property of German and Hungarian nationals and people allegedly of German or Hungarian descent to fund reparations for damages caused during the war. The Decrees applied to Liechtensteinians, whom the Czechoslovakian government considered to be of German descent. The property of Liechtenstein nationals seized under these decrees has never been returned to its owners, nor has compensation been offered or paid. The validity of the Beneš Decrees and the associated confiscations is an unresolved issue between Liechtenstein, the Czech Republic and Germany.

In 1945, Czechoslovakia confiscated the property of Franz Joseph II, Prince of Liechtenstein, located within Czechoslovakian borders, under the Decrees. Among other things, the seizure included land, a castle and all of the contents of that castle, including a painting by the seventeenth century Dutch artist Pieter van Laer called *A Roman Lime Quarry*. Following its seizure, the painting was held by the Historic Monuments Office in Brno, Czechoslovakia. In 1991 the van Laer painting was on loan to the Wallraf-Richartz Museum in Cologne, Germany. While the painting was in Germany, Prince Hans Adam II filed suit in the German courts to regain custody of the painting. On 28 January 1998, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany decided against Prince Hans-Adam II, finding that Article 3 of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (the Settlement Convention) precluded the court from hearing the merits of the case. The German court system did not allow for an appeal of this ruling, and, for the next two years, Liechtenstein brought its protest directly to the German government but was denied compensation. Germany released the painting, and it was returned to what had become the Czech Republic.

Liechtenstein believes that this Court has jurisdiction under the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, which entered into force on 18 February 1980. States Parties to this Convention submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for any disputes that arose before the Convention entered into force. Germany believes that the Court lacks jurisdiction *ratione temporis* on the basis of Article 27(a) of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. If the Court is to find that there exists a dispute, it would relate to the Settlement Convention and the Beneš Decrees, which predate the entry into force date of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes as between Liechtenstein and Germany, which is 18 February 1980.

Germany contends that there is no dispute between the Parties. Germany has never accepted the validity of the Benes confiscations and German courts have consistently held that the Settlement Convention bars the German court from ruling on the lawfulness of confiscation measures resulting from the Second World War. The German government and courts have consistently contended that the only dispute in this matter is between Liechtenstein and the successor States of Czechoslovakia.

Liechtenstein contends that, prior to this dispute, Liechtenstein and Germany were in agreement that the disputed property was not subject to any of the treaties or accords that proceeded from World War II for the reparation of war debts or crimes committed by the German Reich. Liechtenstein claims Germany allowed, for the first time in 1995, Liechtenstein's assets to be treated as German external assets for purposes of the Settlement Convention. Germany has placed all such property under this umbrella and, in so doing, has violated Liechtenstein's sovereignty and international law by refusing to pay any sort of compensation for the lost property to Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein asserts that this is a separate dispute between Liechtenstein and Germany, which, according to Liechtenstein, Germany has itself acknowledged.

There is no common understanding between Liechtenstein and Germany that the Settlement Convention did not apply to Liechtenstein property, and no common understanding on the existence of a dispute. Germany additionally objects to jurisdiction on the theory that the rights and obligations of the Czech Republic are at issue in this case; without their participation in the matter the Court cannot proceed. Following ICJ precedent, any rulings regarding the determination of the rights and obligations of a third party must include the consent and representation of that State. This is known as the "necessary third party rule." In this case, the third party is the Czech Republic, which is absent from these proceedings. To prevail, Germany would have to show that any ruling by the Court would, in fact, involve the determination of rights and obligations of the Czech Republic. Liechtenstein asserts that this matter only addresses Germany's actions after 1995, and, therefore, the Czech Republic is not a required party.

Liechtenstein asserts that, as an established neutral party during the Second World War, it is a violation of customary international law to subject the property of Liechtensteinian nationals to confiscation for German debt. Liechtenstein claims Germany has violated its rights as a neutral party by applying the Settlement Convention to the confiscation of the Pieter van Laer painting. Germany argues that it did not interfere with Liechtenstein's rights and that Settlement Convention barred the German courts from considering the merits of the Liechetenstein's case.

Questions to Consider
- Does the Court have jurisdiction to decide this case and if so, on what issue?
- How should the Court apply the Beneš Decrees to their legal discussion?
- How does the "necessary third party rule" affect the analysis?
- How does the status of the parties as neutral, Allied or Axis during WWII affect the ruling?
- Is the primary issue in this case sovereignty, reparations or property rights?

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MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (SOMALIA V REPUBLIC OF KENYA)

Maritime delimitation throws boundary-making, sensitive questions of State sovereignty, jurisdiction and title to valuable natural resources into question. As the world continues to develop maritime resources, the potential political and security risks of boundary disputes are high, and unresolved maritime boundaries between States may easily affect bilateral relations or international peace and security.

An area of roughly 62,000 square miles in the Indian Ocean has become the center of a dispute between Somalia and Kenya. This triangular area may contain significant gas and oil deposits, which has sparked conflict between these two generally friendly States. Experts have determined the disputed area has unclear ownership. Kenya believes that the area is within its boundaries, claiming that the maritime boundary should extend due east along the line of latitude established by where their land border meets on the coast. Kenya also argues that this border demarcation reflects the de facto arrangement over the last 100 years. Somalia argues that the maritime boundary should be an extension of the land boundary, which would extend the maritime boundary to the southeast. This conflict is further complicated by the Kenyan sale of mineral rights to a portion of the disputed area.

This case arises as a result of the structure outlined in Article 76, paragraph 8, of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force on 16 November, 1994. Kenya ratified UNCLOS on 2 March 1989; Somalia followed on 24 July 1989. UNCLOS directs States Parties to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and to submit this information to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which makes recommendations regarding these borders. UNCLOS requires three delimitation areas: the Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf. These definitions are outlined in UNCLOS. Unresolved maritime boundaries may also cause disputes when oil and gas discoveries are made in overlapping claimed areas. Delimitation is commonly necessary between adjoining states, as a boundary must be drawn to divide the waters from the point where the land boundary meets the sea to a distance of 200 nautical miles from shore.

The main discussions regarding maritime delimitation occurred during the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf discussions and those regarding the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, on grounds of their similarity, were conducted together throughout the sessions of the Conference. Negotiations during the Conference on the Law of the Sea revealed the existence of two virtually irreconcilable approaches: (1) delimitation should be effected by the application of the median line or equidistance line coupled with an exception for special circumstances; and, (2) delimitation should involve a more emphatic assertion of equitable principles. Kenya and Somalia were both among the group of States supporting the equitable principle as the criterion in delimitation. During the Conference, many draft proposals were presented by the differing sides, the proponents of the equidistant line favor the equidistance/median line as a standard of delimitation, while supporters of the equitable approach object to the very mention of the equidistance/median line as standard for delimitation and reject the elevation of that standard to the status of a basic principle.

A compromise was reached in 1982, with the text, "The delimitation of the EEZ/continental Shelf zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the international Court of Justice, in order to achieve equitable solution," being incorporated in UNCLOS. Unfortunately, this has not decided the issue. Because of the ambiguity in the rules, it has been left for the international courts and tribunals to interpret and apply the common expression of the delimitation to "achieve an equitable solution" in cases where the Parties cannot settle their dispute by mutual agreement. When evaluating an "equitable solution," courts have looked at historical title, geographical considerations, the use of reefs, islands and elevations, the proportionality of the area to be delimited, and other circumstances.

In 2009, Kenya submitted proposed borders for maritime delineation to the CLCS. Somalia responded to the proposed borders, stating that it rescinded its agreement to the borders and, instead, relied upon a prior memorandum of understanding with Kenya to settle the dispute by negotiation and that settlement would occur after obtaining the recommendations of the CLCS. This argument became the basis for jurisdictional questions–did the prior memorandum preclude the ICJ from taking on the border dispute for mediation and was the CLCS recommendation necessary prior to negotiation or only for finalization? In 2014, Kenya and Somalia submitted to two technical level meetings for recommendations on maritime delimitation in the disputed region. Both the memorandum and the technical level meetings concluded that Somalia and Kenya needed to come to an agreement on a single border for delimitation. Somalia has responded that the memorandum was followed by negotiations at the 2014 technical level meetings, consequently giving the ICJ precedent for stepping in.

In regards to the border delimitation itself, Kenya believes that the area is within its boundaries, claiming that the maritime boundary should extend due east along the line of latitude established by where their land border meets on the coast. Kenya also argues that it historically has had jurisdiction. It argues that Kenyan control of the area was formalized

when Kenya defined its EEZ in 1979. The 1979 declaration cemented the traditional colonial use of the sea. Kenya claims that their actions thus far in the disputed area have been transitory and comply with ICJ precedent set in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976. Somalia contests this claim, stating that Kenya only asserted this use in 2005, and that their objection was noted relatively quickly in 2009. Somalia also argues that the maritime boundary should be an extension of the land boundary, which would extend the maritime boundary to the southeast.

While the question of jurisdiction is an important one in every case, this simulation will not address this question because the Court has already addressed many of these concerns in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 2 February 2017.

Questions to consider
- How do previous agreements impact the decision made and what may this mean for future cases?
- How should the CLOS be applied?
- Does Kenya's sale of mineral rights affect the boundary dispute?
- What geographic considerations are there for the court to consider?

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