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INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Representatives of the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Council. Many topics listed in this guide will change significantly before the Conference. Additional topics may be added as necessary or as the Council sees fit.

For this reason it is highly advised that representatives have a broad knowledge base regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals and online sources are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended sources include: *The New York Times*, *United Nations Chronicle*, *The Times of London*, *Al Jazeera*, *Mail & Guardian*, *Foreign Policy* and *The Economist*. The United Nations Foundation's online daily newsletter, United Nations Wire, is also an excellent resource for timely information. Whenever possible it is also recommended that representatives stay abreast of the most recent reports published by the Security Council and other relevant United Nations bodies. These can be found via the United Nations homepage under the Security Council section.

Unlike many other simulations, Security Council Members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions that will affect the course of the simulation. It will be the job of Council representatives to actively bring their State's national policies and capabilities into the simulation. While AMUN Simulations Staff will frequently consult with Council Members, representatives are welcome and encouraged to make declarative statements—including real or implied threats and deals—that do not carry operational implications outside of the United Nations. Representatives must always consult with the Simulations Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions that would have an effect outside of the United Nations. In these cases, the Simulations Staff would be equated with the actual home office or government of the involved Member States(s).

Representatives are also encouraged to seek out Simulations Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need to supplement their research on a situation. Simulations Directors wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for representatives about their countries as well as the topics at hand.

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time other States will be involved in the deliberations of the Council. Delegations representing these States, if present at AMUN, will be asked by the body to participate in deliberations by the Council. If they are not present, or choose not to participate in deliberations, a member of the AMUN Secretariat will represent them as necessary. It is customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant Member States during discussion of a topic relevant to that State's interests, however it is not required. Any State mentioned in the background research for a specific Security Council is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any State related to a topic relevant to international peace and security. For delegations that may be asked to appear before one of the Historical Security Councils (HSC) these States will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these States will not be involved in all issues, the representative(s) responsible for the HSC must be assigned to another Committee, preferably with a second representative who can cover that Committee while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. All delegations will be asked to identify their representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if needed.

A NOTE ABOUT HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCILS

AMUN's HSCs are unique not only in their topics, but also in their treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and they are flexible. Both HSC Simulations will preempt history from their start date, which are provided later in this chapter. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, what transpires will be dependent upon both Council Members' actions and Simulations Staff decisions. Council Members are encouraged to exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective roleplaying for an HSC Member State will not just be a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in that year. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations—and reevaluations—of national policies. Thus, it cannot be said that the policy course a government took in that year was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must be, by definition, in character, it is not a sure thing that—given a second opportunity to look at events—any given national government would do things exactly the same way. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for second chances.

It will be the job of Council representatives to actively bring their country's policies and capabilities into the simulation when discussing problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. In particular the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The United Nations itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues. One major factor representatives should consider when deciding whether or not to be actively involved, is the cost of involvement by the United Nations. An increase in costs often causes the Security Council to reprioritize its efforts.

While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council Members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days before the start date of the simulation and should do their research accordingly. In studying their roleplaying assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically over the years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, representatives should peruse periodicals from 3-5 years prior to the year in question to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the *New York Times* Index, should provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts, which can be useful for general information.

Both HSC simulations will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred and as modified by the representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism representatives must remember that they are roleplaying the individual assigned as their State's representative to the United Nations. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their States, or they may be relatively in the dark on their State's moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Simulations Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their State's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the United Nations could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulations Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the United Nations. In these cases, the Simulations Staff would be equated with the home office or government of the involved State.

Representatives are also encouraged to seek out Simulations Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need to supplement their research on a situation. Simulations Directors wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for representatives about their countries as well as the topics at hand.

OPEN ISSUES

A unique feature of each Security Council in simulations at AMUN is the Council's ability to set its own agenda. In addition to the situations outlined in the council-specific topic guides on the following pages, each Security Council can discuss any topic that the body wishes. For the contemporary Security Council this includes any real-world event up until the day the simulation convenes. For the Historical Security Councils, representatives should have a working knowledge of the events prior to and including the start date for their respective simulation. For the Historical Security Council of 1973, the start date is 01 May 1973. For the Historical Security Council of 1990, the start date is 10 March 1990.

For the time periods in question, open issues could include any active United Nations peacekeeping operations, the work of any United Nations body active at the time, and any social or economic issue of the day. It is *strongly recommended* that all representatives be well versed on current and historical global events relevant to their simulation.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Councils. For the contemporary Security Council these briefs are current as of spring 2016. Information for the Historical Security Councils covers information available up until the respective start dates of each simulation. It is recommended that representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of the background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1973

AUSTRALIA	**INDIA**	**SUDAN**
AUSTRIA	**INDONESIA**	**UNITED KINGDOM**
CHINA	**KENYA**	**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**
FRANCE	**PANAMA**	**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**
GUINEA	**PERU**	**YUGOSLAVIA**

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1973

In 1972, several regional crises dramatically heightened world tensions, while new cooperation between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China began to ease the Cold War conflict that had been raging since the end of World War Two.

Overall, 1972 was a difficult year for the United Nations. The permanent members of the Security Council chose to handle many of their conflicts and disagreements outside of the United Nations, leaving the other Member States feeling that internationalism was going backward and fearing for the future of the organization. In particular, relations between the United States and the United Nations significantly deteriorated in 1972, with the United States going so far as to state that it would use its veto more liberally and no longer take a soft stance on "bad" resolutions, namely those which did not actively deal with world problems from the perspective of the United States. With Communist China receiving full recognition and assuming the Chinese seat at the United Nations in 1972, world focus was turned toward the East. United States and Soviet relations improved dramatically in 1972, with the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, and the General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, signing a Strategic Arms Limitation pact in May and finalizing a United States/Soviet trade pact in October. Soviet and Chinese relations, however, deteriorated over the same time period. This was evidenced by territorial disputes, Soviet accusations that the Chinese were attempting to break apart the Communist world and Chinese support for anti-Soviet governments wherever possible. This is the atmosphere on May 1, 1973, in which representatives will begin their deliberations in the Security Council.

For each topic area, representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:
- How did this conflict begin? Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been peacefully resolved?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

After the Six-Day War of 1967, Arab and Israeli hostilities continued as before, with increased hostilities and continual small conflicts vexing the region. At the October 1967 Khartoum Conference, Arab leaders met and agreed that there would be "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it." Between 1967 and 1970, Egypt and Israel engaged in a three-year series of border engagements commonly referred to as the War of Attrition. A ceasefire between Egypt, Jordan and Israel was finally reached in 1970, but clashes along the Suez Canal continued. In addition to the border conflict with Egypt, Israel also faces disruption along its borders with Syria, as well as clashes with Palestinian guerrillas operating from Lebanon.

Military incidents between Israel and its neighbors continued throughout 1970, mainly revolving around Arab guerilla bases in Lebanon and Syria. Numerous Israeli attacks into Lebanon occurred, always in response to alleged terrorist attacks by Arabs into Israel. In September 1970, Jordan went on the offensive against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was operating from within Jordan, ousting the PLO in order to reduce retaliatory attacks from Israel. The most significant attack happened at the Olympic Games held in Munich in September 1972. In this attack, 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were murdered by Arab gunmen. There was a global outcry against the attacks, leading to large-scale retaliation by Israel against Arab bases in Lebanon and Syria. Israel's retaliatory attacks prompted admonition from Council Members, but the United States blocked strong Security Council action against Israel, supporting only resolutions that led to a non-specific cessation of hostilities and that did not include any one-sided condemnation of Israel.

The question of a Palestinian State continued as an issue for Israel through 1972. In March Jordan submitted a proposal for a semi-autonomous Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank. This proposal was quickly rejected by Israel. Arab states rejected the proposal as well, in retaliation for the aforementioned Jordanian expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from its borders.

In July 1972, in an attempt to secure better relations with Western governments, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled all Soviet military advisors from Egypt and began nationalizing all former Soviet military bases in the country. Soviet advisors peacefully departed Egypt by early August 1972. This move to counter Soviet influence was a significant step toward lessening the superpower conflict in the Middle East, yet Sadat's attempts to build a better relationship with the West were largely unsuccessful. Diplomatic talks between the United States and Egypt stalled over Egypt's insistence that talks with Israel would only take

place under the pre-conditions that Israel would have to move its borders back to the ceasefire lines of 1967. Israel's Prime Minister, Golda Meir, rejected any proposal that would have restored the 1967 borders, and refused to enter into talks that carried any pre-conditions. With both sides holding fast to these conditions, a peaceful solution seems unlikely, and recent rhetoric from Egypt suggests that President Sadat is more interested in going to war than seeking peace.

Further affecting the tenuous situation was the early April Israeli raid on PLO members in Lebanon. The operation was part of Israeli Operation Wrath of God, which targeted those suspected of being involved in the attacks at the Munich Olympics. Two weeks ago, the Security Council condemned all acts of violence, taking human life and formally condemned Israeli commando raids into Lebanon as a violation of their territorial sovereignty. Not wanting to block the resolution's positive message of unity in opposition to the cycle of violence and terrorism in the region, the United States chose to abstain rather than vote no, as had been its common action on resolutions condemning Israel.

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THE SITUATION IN UGANDA

In 1966, Ugandan President Milton Obote suspended the country's constitution and ended the power sharing agreement with King Mutesa II. The new head of the Ugandan Military and Police, Colonel Idi Amin, sent tanks to shell the King's palace; King Mutesa escaped and fled to the United Kingdom. President Obote consolidated his power by removing people in power from the Bagandas tribe and replacing them with people from his own Acholi and Langi tribes.

General Idi Amin seized political control of Uganda in 1971 through a military coup d'etat, overthrowing President Obote while Obote was at a meeting in Singapore. The leadership change was at first welcomed by Ugandans, but the country soon descended into a harsh authoritarian regime. Over the next two years, President Amin's government came under increased international scrutiny, largely because of its potential destabilizing influence on the East African region.

After the coup, President Obote sought refuge in neighboring Tanzania. Once there he began building a force of Tanzanian-backed rebels made up of Ugandan loyalists. Throughout September 1972, Obote waged a campaign of guerrilla raids, insurgent attacks and the incursion of over 1,000 troops from Tanzania into Uganda in an attempt to overthrow the Amin regime. The bulk of these troops advanced to as close as 100 miles of the Ugandan capital, Kampala, but were beaten back. Obote's plan relied heavily on mass defections by the Ugandan military to supplement their force; these defections failed to materialize, and his attempt to take back power failed.

President Amin accused the Tanzanian government of actively sponsoring and launching the attacks. Tanzanian officials have denied any involvement. President Amin's forces launched retaliatory attacks of their own into Tanzania. One air attack on the town of Bukoba killed nine and injured two hundred people. Tanzania responded by moving a battalion of roughly 1,000 troops toward the Ugandan border to prevent any incursions of the Ugandan military into the country. Hostilities ended in mid-October when Somali President Mohammed Siad Barre organized a peace conference, resulting in a formal agreement to end hostilities between Tanzania and Uganda.

During this time, President Amin formally ordered the expulsion of all Asians (mostly Gujaratis of Indian origin) from Uganda, calling them traitors and spies for the imperialist British government. This racist policy was decried by the global community, and provisions were rapidly made to deal with the large exodus of Ugandan refugees. Many went to the United Kingdom, as well as the United States and several European countries. The expulsion began a significant political conflict between Uganda and the United Kingdom, mainly focused on the treatment of the refugees and on their ability to take material goods out of the country, which was severely limited by the Amin regime.

Finally, the 18 December 1972 seizure by Amin's government of all foreign owned tea plantations and eight of the biggest commercial companies in Uganda (seven British and one American) raised anew the question of Uganda's destabilizing influence in the area. Uganda also ended ties with Israel and began a new political relationship with Libya, which only highlighted the perceived dangerous and unpredictable nature of President Amin and brought Uganda further into the international spotlight in 1973.

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The early 1960's brought independence to a number of French African colonies and gave momentum to the struggle for black nationalism in British Africa. The apartheid regime, based on white minority rule, in South Africa came under increasing scrutiny amid the changing attitudes toward such policies in Great Britain and the rest of the world.

In 1963, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. In 1964, Nyasaland achieved independence, within the British Commonwealth of Nations, as Malawi; Northern Rhodesia became independent as Zambia that same year. The aftereffects of the dissolution were still being felt when, on 11 November 1965, the minority white government of Southern Rhodesia (known informally as Rhodesia) declared itself independent from Great Britain.

After the Universal Declaration of Independence, Rhodesia received significant international attention at the United Nations, especially for its apartheid regime and policies. The Security Council adopted resolutions endorsing economic sanctions on Rhodesia, barring all trade and support; however, South Africa and Portugal continued to violate the oil and petroleum stipulations of the trade embargo, undermining the will of the Council. Talks between the British and Rhodesian governments continued on and off for several years but did not make the headway hoped for by the affected African States.

The United States' tacit support for the Rhodesian government significantly complicated the issue. Starting in 1971, the United States resumed chrome trade with Rhodesia in full violation of the 1968 UN trade embargo. In July, 1972, the United States abstained in a 14-0 Security Council vote to condemn "all acts violating" the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, considering United States actions to be outside of these sanctions. In September, the United Kingdom vetoed an African-sponsored resolution on Rhodesia, which called for stronger economic sanctions and a direct settlement of the Rhodesian issue.

By 1972 the lack of change in the government's policies regarding formal discrimination against black Africans was the focus of attention for the United Nations. Many African states and black athletes threatened to boycott the 1972 Munich Olympic Games if Rhodesia was allowed to participate. Ultimately, the International Olympic Committee conceded and barred Rhodesian athletes from participating in the games.

The economy of Zambia, which relied upon trade with Rhodesia, suffered significant disruption from the attempts to divert trade in accordance with international sanctions brought against Rhodesia. Succeeding years saw wide fluctuations in the price of copper, Zambia's major export, and a sustained drought that required heavy agricultural imports. There was also additional political stress between the two states over rebel activity. The outlawed Zimbabwe African National Union,

ZANU, were operating out of border regions in Zambia, waging a guerilla campaign against Rhodesian troop and officials. In response, on 9 January 1973, Rhodesia closed its border to traffic with Zambia, stating it would stay closed until assurances could be made that Zambia would no longer permit terrorist to operate from within its borders. The border closing threatened the economic livelihood of Zambia, which relied on railrouts through Rhodesia for much of its trade. The United Kingdom lobbied Rhodesia to reopen the border, and, on 4 February, it reopened its side. Zambia, however, decided that its side would remain closed, stating that Rhodesias closure was "rebellious" and "irrecoverable and final." President Kaunda of Zambia later stated that the border closure has been "a blessing in disguise" that allowed Zambia's economy a fresh start that did not rely on its British colonial past.

The end of 1972 also saw the escalation of guerrilla warfare from Mozambique, where ZANU also had a strong presence. Both the guerrilla activity from Zambia and Mozambique were collectively called the Rhodesian Bush War. In these early months of 1973, guerilla activity has been increasing from both fronts, further destabilizing the region.

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THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

Since World War I, South West Africa has existed as a Mandate territory under the guidance of South Africa. As manager of the Mandate, South Africa had certain obligations toward South West Africa, mainly to see that it developed its own governance and to transition it to independence. Since the early 1960s, the United Nations has expressed growing concern as to South Africa's willingness to meet these obligations. Of particular concern were the government of South Africa's policies of apartheid and racial discrimination, which the United Nations argued were contrary to the terms of South Africa's Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

On 27 October 1966, the General Assembly, through Resolution 2145, declared that South Africa had failed "to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa." In the same resolution, the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate and brought South West Africa under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. South Africa refused to cease its administration over South West Africa and continued to act as South West Africa's governmental presence. After several more years of tensions and disputes, in a move to undermine South African influence, on 12 June, 1968, the UN General Assembly attempted to force a change, proclaiming that, "in accordance with the desires of its people, South West Africa shall henceforth be known as Namibia." The situation remained unchanged into the beginning of the 1970s. Responding to a request by the UN Secretary-General on behalf of the Security Council, on 21 June 1971, the International Court of Justice confirmed that the United Nations had authority over Namibia. In direct violation of General Assembly Resolution 2145, South Africa continued its administration of Namibia, citing the League of Nations mandate which made South Africa the original administrator as justification.

Throughout 1972, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, at the request of the Security Council, was in direct contact with the South African government, seeking clarification from South Africa on its policy regarding self-determination and independence for Namibia. The dispute continued to revolve around South Africa's insistence on pressing for a "homelands" policy for Namibian natives, that is, assigning black Africans to separate development areas based on their ethnic identity, thus limiting independence and continuing South African governance. South Africa also created and favored the use of an "advisory council" of regional leaders to assist South Africa in the governance of Namibia. Both of these proposals were unacceptable to the United Nations, as the Security Council expressed concerns that these proposals would lead to the fragmentation of Namibia.

In his report, dated 30 April 1972, Secretary-General Waldheim concluded that "the position of the Government of South Africa is still far from coinciding with that established in the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Namibia." Further, "[t]he question arises whether, in the light of the results achieved so far, the contacts and efforts initiated pursuant to resolutions 309 (1972), 319 (1972) and 323 (1972) should be continued. Should the Security Council decide to continue these efforts, it should bear in mind my earlier statement to the effect that time and protracted discussion would be required if any progress is to be achieved."

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THE SITUATION IN VIET NAM

In the mid-1960s, the Republic of Viet Nam (South Viet Nam) and the United States began a more aggressive campaign to push the North Vietnamese out of South Viet Nam and to destroy North Vietnamese operations near Saigon and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, an armed organization operating out of South Viet Nam and Cambodia, fought back violently. On 31 January 1968, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong launched a series of surprise assaults on cities, towns and military installations in South Vietnam, known as the Tet Offensive.

In 1968, peace talks began in Paris between the United States and North Viet Nam; North Viet Nam refused to recognize the government of South Viet Nam, but the talks did result in an agreement to partially halt bombing. The Paris talks continued into 1969. By early 1969, the United States began secret bombing attacks on Cambodia to target North Vietnamese supply caches. After a coup deposed Cambodian head of state Prince Sihanouk in 1970, the United States launched heavy air strikes into Cambodia and Laos against North Vietnamese supply camps in January 1971.

On 10 March 1971, the Republic of China pledged its complete support to the North Vietnamese in its conflict with the United States. The Situation in Viet Nam was a well visited topic in the General Assembly in 1972. The Council, however, chose not to formally discuss the issue at the instance of the United States, which claimed that the Viet Nam War was strictly in the United States' sphere of influence.

In March 1972, North Viet Nam attacked South Viet Nam across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a line established by the 1954 Geneva Accords; this resulted in retaliatory bombing of the DMZ and North Viet Nam by the United States in April. Between March and September 1972, over 200,000 North Vietnamese soldiers waged an all-out campaign to conquer South Viet Nam known as the Easter Offensive. This offensive left several cities in North Vietnamese hands, yet was ultimately defeated by United States and South Viet Namese efforts.

The conflict peaked in December with heavy carpet bombing by the United States. Along with significant reports of bombing of civilian structures, including some foreign embassies and hospitals, considerable portions of heavily-populated civilian areas in Hanoi were devastated by the bombings. In December 1972, a ceasefire was upheld for two days over Christmas, but this was followed by the resumption of heavy bombing by the United States.

The Paris Peace talks continued throughout 1972, with US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger engaging North Vietnamese leaders. These private talks continued with limited political success, although it was rumored that some significant technical and military issues were closer to resolution as a result. On 27 January 1973, the Paris Agreement was signed by the four parties: North Viet Nam, the Viet Cong, South Viet Nam and the United States. The peace settlement enabled the United States to withdraw from the fighting inside Viet Nam.

In early February, the United States continued its bombing of North Vietnamese military bases and supply routes in Cambodia. Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger met privately with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of North Viet Nam to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. In March, the International Commission of Control of Supervision—called for in the Paris Peace Accords and established to supervise the ceasefire and report on implementation, or violation, of the Peace Agreements and Protocols—reported that the ceasefire has not been effective, with numerous violations by South Viet Nam, North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong. By the end of the month, the last American combat troops left Viet Nam. In early April, South Vietnamese President Thieu concluded a visit to the United States during which he was promised continued aid and assistance dependent upon United States approval.

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