



THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

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As 1993 began, the United Nations was faced with the challenge of promoting three interlocking and mutually reinforcing goals: peace, development and democracy. The United Nations peace keeping operations in the field were evolving to include political, social, humanitarian and environmental dimensions. Political, social and cultural nation-building were requirements for development to take root across the world. States also came to realize that the democratization of national institutions and the protection of the fundamental human rights of all citizens were a necessary prerequisite to development, as development was to peace. The Security Council of 1993 required new approaches to information gathering and dissemination in order to obtain the confidence of the international community on an ever-globalizing world stage.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions are designed to assist in developing a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- Should the United Nations be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the United Nations play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the issue?

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 left ethnic groups waging war with each other, rehashing centuries of ethnic and religious grievances. The epicenter of the ethnic conflict was the newly independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Immediately after independence in 1992, Serb National Forces barricaded themselves around the city of Sarajevo and launched artillery attacks on the city. Serb forces and ethnic Serbian militias, both working for a larger Serbian homeland, began a systematic invasion and takeover of much of the rural land within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian militias forced all non-Serbs out of the territory under Serbian control, creating thousands of refugees. In addition, reports of violence against non-Serbs, particularly Muslims, began surfacing, and, by the end of 1992, Serbian forces controlled 70 percent of Bosnia, creating a political and humanitarian emergency of increasing urgency.

In response to the growing unrest, the United Nations authorized the creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992. UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure conditions for peace talks and to help maintain peace in several designated "safe zones." United Nations peacekeepers were successful

in enabling humanitarian aid, but little was accomplished in the way of securing peace. The Security Council imposed a series of economic sanctions against what remained of Yugoslavia starting in May of 1992. All import, export and transport to and from Yugoslavia was forbidden; monetary transactions of any sort were strictly curtailed; all social and cultural contacts were broken off; and diplomatic representation was drastically reduced.

The United Nations and European Economic Community (EEC) sent a negotiating team to Bosnia, led by United Nations Special Envoy David Owen and EEC Representative Cyrus Vance. The lead negotiators unveiled the Vance-Owen peace plan in late 1992, with debate continuing into the spring of 1993. Muslim and Croat factions agreed to the plan after further negotiation, but the plan ran into problems while seeking Serbian support. The United States became highly critical of the plan and claimed that its provisions rewarded the Serbs for their aggression. The United States instead lobbied for a "lift and strike" plan which involved editing the terms of the arms embargo to provide weapons support for the Muslim and Croat soldiers as well as using United States and NATO air forces to conduct air raids on Serbian forces. The United States' plan failed to gain any support within the Council. With the threat of force from the United States off the table, the Serbs saw no need to agree to the Vance-Owen plan.

With the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan, new levels of violence erupted within Bosnia. Muslim and Croat forces that had been united in an uneasy alliance against the Serbs have begun fighting each other. Despite calls by the Security Council and UNPROFOR, hostilities continued, and the fighting is blocking the main humanitarian assistance supply routes into northern Bosnia and restricting the movements of UNPROFOR and UNHCR.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Since decolonization, Somalia experienced persistent internal warfare accompanied by poor social and economic conditions. In January 1991, internal conflict between various factions resulted in a lack of a recognized central government and a collapse of state institutions. Intra-clan conflict, poor economic conditions and a wide-spread drought destroyed the agricultural system in Somalia which resulted in a massive famine and the deaths of at least three hundred thousand Somalis since 1991. Control of food supplies has led to divided loyalties and is used as currency for armaments.

On 3 March 1992, representatives of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid, the United Somali Congress factional leaders, signed a ceasefire agreement and allowed for the United Nations to deploy a monitoring mission into Somalia to oversee arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance to the region. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council approved Resolution 751, which created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); in July, fifty military observers were sent to Mogadishu to monitor ceasefire agreement conditions. On 15 August 1992 the United Nations humanitarian "Operation Provide Relief" commenced. However, due to insufficient security the United Nations' humanitarian effort was largely ineffective; flights were looted, food convoys hijacked, and aid workers assaulted. UNOSOM I was regarded as a failure, and with Resolution 794 the Security Council called upon Member States to contribute military forces to help establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

In December, U.S. President George Bush proposed to have the United States lead an international force to Somalia to provide a secure environment. The United States would then turn the operation over to United Nations peacekeeping forces once the situation on the ground stabilized. On 5 December, the United Nations approved the plan and 25,000 U.S. troops with an additional 17,000 from more than twenty additional countries deployed as part of a United Task Force (UNITAF) named "Operation Restore Hope."

UNITAF forces landed without opposition on the coast of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, took control of two airfields and proceeded to secure other key installations. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali organized a national reconciliation conference for Somalia in January 1993; representatives from 14 Somali political movements attended. By the end of the conference, three agreements had been reached: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993; the Agreement On Implementing The Cease-fire And On Modalities Of Disarmament; and the Agreement On The Establishment Of An Ad Hoc Committee.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted his recommendation to the Security Council that the United Nations-led UNOSOM II replace UNITAF as the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, and officially succeeded UNITAF on 4 May 1993. UNOSOM II would seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF: the mandate of UNOSOM II extended beyond humanitarian relief to include nation-building through disarmament of the Somali people, restoring law and order and support of infrastructure and a representative government.

On 27 March 1993, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia; the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants. The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament



and security; rehabilitation and reconstruction; restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Presently, implementation of the agreement has stalled and militias are again maneuvering for positions of power and fighting has renewed.

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THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu began with Belgian colonial rule. The Belgians chose to govern Rwanda through the preferential treatment and empowerment of the Tutsis; later, when the Tutsi elite began to agitate for independence, this favored status switched to Hutus and further complicated relations. In 1962, Rwanda was granted independence, elections installed a radical Hutu government

and popular violence against Tutsis drove many into exile (particularly into Uganda). In 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power and pledged to restore order; however, the establishment of a one-party state, ethnic quotas and preferential treatment of Hutus did little to bridge the ethnic divide. To further exacerbate poor social conditions, Rwanda's economy experienced a harsh shock in 1989 when coffee prices fell dramatically. Rwanda's primary export products are coffee and tea, and falling prices of these commodities caused severe economic hardship throughout the country.

In 1990, the Habyarimana government came under pressure from the Tutsi refugee diaspora living in Uganda, who wished to return to their homeland. The recently-formed Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was at the forefront of this movement. The Habyarimana government and the RPF disagreed fundamentally on the solution to the repatriation problem, and tensions came to a head on 1 October 1990, when RPF forces invaded from Uganda. The RPF had more experience and training. Despite a disadvantage in numbers, the RPF made significant progress against the Rwandan Armed Forces. Before the RPF advance reached Kigali, the Rwandan government called upon Belgium, France and Zaire for military and financial assistance. The Belgian and French troops provided security and organizational assistance in Kigali while the Zairean reinforcements engaged the RPF alongside the Rwandan Armed Forces at the front lines. The RPF was repelled back to a national park near the Ugandan border by the end of October.

The Belgian and Zairean troops withdrew after the RPF offensive was stopped, but the French remained in the country, organizing, training and equipping the Rwandan Armed Forces. Within Rwanda, the RPF was denounced by the government. Armed mobs of Hutu civilians began pursuing RPF "collaborators," who often happened to be Tutsi, killing them and driving them from their homes.

The war continued for almost two years until a cease-fire agreement was signed on 12 July 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania. This agreement set a timetable for the cessation of hostilities, promoted political talks with the goal of arranging a peace accord with power-sharing, and authorized the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer.

On 9 January 1993, a power-sharing agreement was signed in Arusha, calling for a new government to divide power between President Habyarimana's party, RPF representatives and several other Rwandan political parties. Violence surged inside the country when Habyarimana's party declared their rejection of the agreement on 21 January. On 8 February, RPF violated the cease-fire, reached the outskirts of Kigali, and drove Rwandan troops south. Hutu civilian residents of the RPF-controlled areas fled. French forces were called upon to come to the Rwandan government's aid. Meanwhile, Rwandan soldiers took vengeance on Tutsi civilians and opponents of the regime, killing over 147 people. Many more were beaten, tortured and raped as hundreds of homes and businesses were looted and burned.

The return to unrest and ethnic violence further strained the humanitarian situation. In early February, the number of internally displaced persons reached nearly one million. The International Committee of the Red Cross warned of a major catastrophe and increased its budget for Rwanda eightfold. Through these efforts, the relief organizations hoped to ease the plight of the displaced persons until the fundamental issues of violence within the country and in the border areas near Uganda were resolved.



On 22 February, Uganda and Rwanda sent separate letters to the President of the United Nations Security Council asking for the deployment of military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, specifically arms transportation. In response, the Secretary-General sent a goodwill mission from 4 to 18 March. Concurrently, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania brokered a meeting between the warring factions from 5 to 7 March. The two sides agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and resume peace talks in Arusha. Following the Security Council's Resolution 812 of 12 March, a technical mission was dispatched to the Uganda-Rwanda border, and reported that it would be possible to deploy military observers on the Rwandan side to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it.

The Arusha talks reconvened on 16 March, and the United Nations launched an interagency appeal on 15 April for international assistance to Rwanda to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people. Rwanda and the RPF have requested an international force to monitor a demilitarized zone to be established along the lines of the previous cease-fire agreement. On 20 May, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Haiti's recent political problems stem from a 30 September 1991 coup d'état, led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, which deposed the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Reaction to the coup was violent and Haiti plunged into disorder and violence. The civil unrest has resulted in the massive displacement of an estimated 300,000 Haitians, sending tens of thousands of refugees to neighboring countries.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations have been working to bring stability and peace back to Haiti and have made efforts to reinstate the presidency of Aristide. On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which it again demanded the restoration of President Aristide, the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights. It also requested the Secretary-General to take the "necessary measures" in order to assist the OAS to solve the Haitian crisis.

The Secretary-General appointed Dante Caputo as his special envoy for Haiti in December 1992, and Caputo immediately held preliminary consultations with the various parties. By mid-January 1993, he received verbal support for an international civilian mission and dialogue to resolve the political crisis.

In his 18 January letter to President Aristide the Secretary-General agreed to United Nations participation in an international civilian mission subject to the approval of the General Assembly and agreement by the OAS. Following the Special Envoy's consultations, the idea and mandate of an International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement were incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Mr. Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.

With MICIVIH instituted, Caputo turned his attention to seeking a political solution. The immediate objective was agreement on three issues: the return of President Aristide; the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for reconstruction of the country and the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti. So far the negotiations have failed. In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of the United Nations component of MICIVIH.

The General Assembly authorized United Nations participation with the OAS in MICIVIH on 20 April, reiterating the need to have the Aristide government restored to power and continuing dialogue with Caputo. The General Assembly rejected the partial Parliamentary elections that Haiti organized in January 1993. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have centered on the deployment of 500 foreign police officers. However, Aristide supporters are against any armed international presence in the country.

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THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

At the onset of 1993, three peacekeeping operations were present in the region: two peacekeeping forces—the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—and an observer mission: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). On 13 January 1993, the United States, United Kingdom and France conducted air raids on Iraqi anti-missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq following a series of incidents on the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait involving Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone and unauthorized retrieval of Iraqi property from Kuwaiti



territory. Following the implementation of the air raids the Security Council passed resolution 806 authorizing the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) to take direct physical action in response to any future violation of the demilitarized zone.

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OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS: PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

On 14 May 1992, the United Nations announced that peacekeeping costs were expected to rise by more than a third to \$3.7 billion. The failure of Member States to pay their share of peacekeeping costs is a major problem. By the end of April, unpaid peacekeeping dues totalled \$1.5 billion. These unpaid dues create serious doubts about the United Nations' ability to finance future peacekeeping operations at a critical moment. The current United Nations mission in Somalia, UNOSOM II, is expected to cost \$1.2 billion a year. If the Serbs in Bosnia can be persuaded to accept an international peace plan, the United Nations plans to deploy some 70,000 troops to the area, which could cost \$2 billion a year.

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