



CHAPTER THREE

THE SECURITY COUNCILS

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Representatives of the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Council. Many topics listed in this guide will change significantly before the Conference. Additional topics may be added as necessary or as the Council sees fit.

For this reason it is highly advised that Representatives have a broad knowledge base regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals and online sources are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended sources include: *The New York Times*, *United Nations Chronicle*, *The Times of London*, *Al Jazeera*, *Mail & Guardian*, *Foreign Policy* and *The Economist*. The United Nations Foundation's online daily newsletter, *United Nations Wire*, is also an excellent resource for timely information.

Whenever possible it is also recommended that Representatives stay abreast of the most recent reports published by the Security Council and other relevant United Nations bodies. These can be found via the United Nations homepage under the [Security Council section](#). Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on United Nations sources with some news sources provided for background on certain aspects of topics.

Unlike many other simulations, Security Council members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions that will affect the course of the simulation. It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems throughout the simulation. While AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with Council members, Representatives are welcome and encouraged to make whatever declarative statements—including real or implied threats and deals—that do not carry operational implications outside of the United Nations. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulations Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions that would have an effect outside of the United Nations. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the actual home office or government of the involved Member States(s).

Representatives are also encouraged to seek out Simulation Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need extra information on a situation. Simulation Directors wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for Representatives about their countries as well as the topics at hand.

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the Council. Delegations representing these countries, if present at AMUN, will be asked to participate in deliberations by the body. If they are not present or choose not to participate in deliberations a member of the AMUN Secretariat will represent them as necessary. It is

customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant Member States during discussion of topics, however it is not required. Any State mentioned in the background research for a specific Security Council is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any State related to a topic relevant to international peace and security. For delegations that may be asked to appear before one of the Historical Security Councils these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. All delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if and when needed.

A NOTE ABOUT HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCILS

AMUN's HSCs are unique not only in their topics, but also in their treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and they are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from its start date, which is provided later in this chapter. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, what transpires will be dependent upon both Council members' actions and Simulation Staff decisions. Council Members are encouraged to exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective roleplaying for an HSC Member State will be not just a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in that year. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations—and reevaluations—of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government took in that year was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must be, by definition, in character, it is not a sure thing that - given a second opportunity to look at events - any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musing of foreign ministers and heads of state pinning for second chances.

It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's policies and capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The United Nations itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues. One major factor Representatives should consider when deciding whether to be actively involved or to be a bystander which Representatives must consider, is the cost of involvement by the United Nations. An increase in costs often causes the Security Council to reprioritize its efforts.



While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of the previous year and should do their research accordingly. In studying their roleplaying assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically over the years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should peruse periodicals from 3-5 years prior to the year in question to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the *New York Times* Index, should provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts, which can be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are roleplaying the individual assigned as their State's Representative to the United Nations. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their countries, or they may be relatively in the dark on their countries' moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their country's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the United Nations could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulations Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the United Nations. In these cases, the Simulations Staff would be equated with the home office or government of the involved State.

Representatives are also encouraged to seek out Simulations Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need extra information on a situation. Simulation Directors wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for Representatives about their countries as well as the topics at hand.

OPEN ISSUES

A unique feature of each Security Council in simulations at AMUN is the Council's ability to set its own agenda. This allows that, in addition to the situations outlined in the council specific topic guides on the following pages, the Security Councils can discuss any topic that the body wishes. For the contemporary Security Council this includes any real-world event up until the day the simulation convenes. For

the Historical Security Councils, Representatives should have a working knowledge of the events prior to and including the start date for their respective simulation. For the Historical Security Council of 1961, the start date is 01 January 1961. For the Historical Security Council of 1993, the start date is 23 May 1993.

For the time periods in question, open issues could include any active United Nations peacekeeping operations, the work of any United Nations body active at the time, and any social or economic issue of the day. It is *strongly recommended* that all Representatives be well versed on current and historical global events relevant to their simulation.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Councils. For the contemporary Security Council these briefs are current as of spring 2014. Information for the Historical Security Councils covers information available up until the respective start dates of each simulation. It is recommended that Representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of the background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.



THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMBERS OF THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIA

CHAD

CHILE

CHINA

FRANCE

JORDAN

LITHUANIA

LUXEMBOURG

NIGERIA

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

RWANDA

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin? Is this a new conflict or a reignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been solved peacefully?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

The end of the Sudanese civil war did not mean an end to hostilities in the region. Three peacekeeping missions in Sudan are currently addressing unresolved issues from the conflict and unrest caused by the independence of South Sudan: the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

Recent events in Darfur have increased security concerns for civilians and UNAMID forces. Four rebel movements have combined to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), adopting a political platform for a national approach to the many conflicts in Sudan, with economic stagnation topping the list of concerns. Nearly two million people are internally displaced from this ongoing conflict and the increase in overall violence in Darfur has caused further deterioration of the humanitarian situation.

The resolution of competing territorial claims to Abyei remains unresolved, yet the security situation there has largely improved since the deployment of UNISFA. Failed referendums in both 2012 and 2013 add to growing concerns over the border region's long-term stability. Further, both Sudan and South Sudan retain armed forces in Abyei and are in direct violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area.

Approaching its third year of independence, Africa's youngest State, South Sudan, faces multiple challenges. Planning for the 2015 elections remains behind schedule, with President Salva Kiir blaming timing and funding issues. While the relationship with Sudan shows glimpses of progress, internally President Kiir has faced mass upheaval. Intercommunal conflict in 2013 brought the attention of the Security Council, which passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendation for UNMISS to increase its presence and humanitarian efforts. A February 2014 UNMISS report highlighted human rights violations

and estimated the death toll to be in the thousands. Others report findings include allegations of rebel forces engaging in ethnically targeted killings.

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THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Following the Second Congo War (1998-2003), rebel groups sought refuge in the east with tacit support from neighboring countries, leading to increased instability in the region. During the war, the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to monitor ceasefire agreements between the warring factions. As foreign armies pulled out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence increased. Militant factions merged, split and evolved over time, creating significant instability in the eastern provinces of Orientale, North Kivu and South Kivu. In July 2010, the United Nations Organization and Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) replaced MONUC. The change emphasized the political aspects of the



mandate and reinforced the Mission's mandate to support the Congolese government, political stabilization and peace efforts in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In late 2012, M23, a group that had splintered from the rebel group National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), launched an offensive that led to the brief occupation of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, near the border with Rwanda. The shifting security situation required greater peacekeeping forces, necessitating a change in the MONUSCO mandate. The Security Council shifted the mandate to encompass protecting civilians and monitoring human rights abuses, including active pursuit of armed groups operating within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In November 2013, United Nations and Congolese forces defeated M23 and signed a peace deal. MONUSCO and Congolese forces began working in eastern Congo to quell violence. United Nations Special Representative for Congo, Martin Kobler, stated that his peacekeepers were working diligently to root out the rest of the rebel forces, but he noted they were unlikely to be eliminated by military means alone. The government has continued to work with MONUSCO to restore state authority to retrieved areas and begin dialogues with neighboring counties to promote stability. However, while the security situation has greatly improved, the humanitarian situation has remained precarious.

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THE SITUATION IN THE UKRAINE

Unrest in Ukraine began as an internal political conflict in late 2013. Ukrainian President Yanukovich's rejection of a trade deal with the European Union in November 2013 set off anti-government protests in the capital of Kyiv. Peaceful protest turned violent when government forces attacked protesters on 30 November, leading to dozens of injuries. Opposition forces called for the resignation of President Yanukovich. Instead, he brokered a \$15 billion aid deal with Russia in hopes of quelling the uprising. The conflict reached a critical point in late February when Yanukovich fled the country, leaving opposition forces in control of Kyiv. The Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove him from office, but Yanukovich rejected this decision from exile in Russia. Ukrainian nationalists mobilized their own forces in opposition to Yanukovich's insistence that he was still in charge of the country.

The crisis took on an international focus over the region of Crimea. Armed and uniformed gunman began seizing government buildings in Crimea while rallies erupted calling for Crimea to secede from Ukraine and rejoin the Russian Federation. The Russian Parliament granted President Vladimir Putin the authority to use military force to restore order in the region. On 1 March 2014, the new Ukrainian government mobilized reserve troops, threatening war if Russia intervened. Russian nationalists in Crimea hastily scheduled a referendum for 16 March. The Security Council discussed a draft resolution to declare the elections invalid, but the Russian Federation vetoed the resolution. The referendum was held as scheduled with voters overwhelmingly choosing to join Russia. Since the referendum, the government of Russia has recognized Crimea as Russian territory.

Working in Geneva, the European Union, Russia and the United States agreed on a pact to end the crisis. However, violence intensified in Eastern Ukraine as pro-Russian gunmen refused to relinquish command over government buildings. Rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the creation of the independent State of Novorossiya in May 2014. Ukrainian forces attempted to quell the unrest, but pressure by pro-Russian rebels succeeded in driving them from the region by the end of April. Russia has called for an emergency session of the Security Council over the continued fighting in the region. As of early May, no meeting had taken place.

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THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Late 2012 saw the destruction of nearly a decade of stability in the Central African Republic when a loose coalition of rebels, calling itself Séléka, began an offensive against the government of President François Bozizé. In January 2013, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) held peace talks, resulting in the Libreville Agreements



which formalized a power-sharing arrangement and established a national unity government. This government was composed of members of Séléka and supporters of President Bozizé. The new government lasted a few short months before fighting resumed. President Bozizé was ousted on 24 March 2013 and fled the nation. Michel Djotodia, First Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense and a prominent leader of Séléka, declared himself President, suspended the constitution and dissolved the unity government. The African Union's Peace and Security Council condemned the seizure of power, and the United Nations Security Council released a statement calling for the Libreville Agreements to continue to be the framework for a peaceful solution.

Fighting continued throughout 2013 despite President Djotodia announcing the disbanding of Séléka in September 2013. In October 2013, the Security Council updated the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (BINUCA) to support the transition process and stabilize the security situation. Resolution 2121 also authorized BINUCA to increase its field presence as security conditions allowed. With increased violence, militia groups re-emerged and increased their attacks against local communities, including Muslim communities. In his 15 November report, the Secretary-General noted concern about the religious and ethnic violence in the country and the severe humanitarian situation that displaced more than 400,000 persons internally and an additional 66,000 refugees.

In December the Security Council authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission (MISCA) for one year and authorized the 1,600 French forces, launched in Operation Sangaris, to take all necessary measures to support MISCA. Additionally, the resolution called for a one year arms embargo, except for arms that would help MISCA fulfill its mandate. In January 2014, the Security Council extended the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2015 and authorized the European Union to deploy troops to the country. The deployment took place after the international community encouraged Djotodia and Prime Minister Tiangaye to step down for failing to establish authority in the country.

Despite strong international involvement, revenge attacks continue. Talks of sanctions on individuals have failed due to Chinese and Russian reluctance. The Security Council passed Resolution 2149 in April establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which will incorporate BINUCA and MISCA by the end of September. The United Nations Director of Humanitarian Operations has commented that the short timeframe and lack of troops has allowed the situation to deteriorate, and that peacekeeping troops need to be mobilized more quickly to protect civilians in the future.

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THE SITUATION IN MALI

The current unrest in Mali began in early 2012 when a group of Tuaregs led a rebellion and declared an independent State of Azawad, an area that comprises nearly sixty percent of Mali. At nearly the same time, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré was overthrown in a coup d'état by the Malian military a month before elections were scheduled. The conflict became more complicated as rebel groups fractured and Islamist forces joined the fighting, seizing areas of the desert. In December 2012, the Security Council passed resolution 2085 authorizing the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The mission was to be composed of neighboring nations and members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Resolution 2100 switched AFISMA from an African operation to the United Nations-led United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA took over on 1 July 2013 and France began to withdraw its troops.

Following a peaceful presidential election in August 2013, President Boubacar Keita was sworn in on 4 September. The ceremony was accompanied by a French announcement that the war against Islamic extremists in the country had been won but that France would maintain forces in the country as long as the threat continued. The Secretary-General called on the new government to focus on the troubling humanitarian crisis in the country as MINUSMA and French troops worked to improve the security situation in the state against Islamic extremists who were still fighting. Peaceful and transparent elections were held in November and December, marking a positive turn. However, a Security Council mission in February 2014 noted that the stalled dialogue for a peace settlement was likely to threaten the progress already achieved. Battles against Islamists have continued, with French troops taking the lead. In April, the entire government resigned in a letter to President Keita with the hope that the government would make good on its word to revive long-delayed peace talks. Nine were killed in separatist battles at the end of April, making the success of the peace talks imperative to a future long-term settlement.

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THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

Civilian protests began in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011 and were met with harsh repression by the Syrian government under long-reigning President Bashar al-Assad. Civilians began taking up arms against the government beginning a civil war in which over 160,000 Syrians have died as of May 2014. Despite occasional signs of consolidation, the opposition has been fragmented even though most are Sunni Muslim, the majority religion in Syria. Kurdish rebel groups are also engaged in the conflict, seizing the opportunity to fight for an independent Kurdish State.

On 23 February 2013 former Secretary-General and Joint Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and League of Arab States Kofi Annan introduced a six-point plan that required the government and rebels to actively work toward peace. The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by the passage of Security Council Resolution 2043 in April, ushering in a brief ceasefire. By the second month of UNSMIS deployment, fighting had expanded beyond pre-ceasefire levels. UNSMIS saw its activities constantly hampered by government and opposition forces. As the initial 90-day UNSMIS mandate drew close to expiring, the Security Council passed Resolution 2059, allowing UNSMIS 30 days to wind down its operations. Shortly thereafter Mr. Annan resigned from his position, and Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed to replace him. Fighting continued to escalate with heavy weapons such as cluster bombs, rockets and gunships; international concerns centered on the potential and rumored use of sarin gas and other chemical and biological weapons. After an August attack in Damascus by Syrian forces, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that he had evidence that chemical weapons had been used, but that it was inconclusive as to which side had used them. In September 2013, Resolution 2118 passed, ordering the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons after a decision by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By November, all but one of Syria's declared chemical weapons sites had been verified.

Talks between rebel groups and the Syrian government on how to end the Syrian Civil War were held in January and February, but ended without achieving more than a ceasefire in the city of Homs. In February 2014, the Security Council passed Resolution 2139, demanding that government and opposition forces allow humanitarian aid to

reach beleaguered citizens. Since then, two reports from Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos indicate that neither side has accommodated aid deliveries and that fighting has continued, making the humanitarian situation worse. Amos urged the Security Council to take stronger action. In response, France stated that stronger measures would be tough and would likely invite a Russian veto.

Violence continued in early May with bombings in the cities of Aleppo and Hama. The brutality of the bombings that killed dozens of people, including a large number of children, has jeopardized the ceasefire agreement in Homs, which was not announced as scheduled. The agreement was expected to be a victory for President Assad ahead of the scheduled 3 June elections in which Assad is expected to win another term.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

CEYLON

CHILE

CHINA

ECUADOR

FRANCE

LIBERIA

TURKEY

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

As 1961 began, Dwight D. Eisenhower prepared to pass the United States of America's Presidency to John F. Kennedy, marking a potential shift in Cold War relations between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Cold War tensions were extremely high and played out on all levels of foreign policy and diplomacy for both States and their allies. Colonialism was collapsing while changing political and social climates forced governments to make drastic changes to deal with new pressures. Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld continued his efforts to energetically use the Secretariat to fulfill the roles of the United Nations Charter as he saw fit, pursuing peace actively, sometimes at odds with the Security Council's Member States.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions are designed to assist in developing a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- Should the United Nations be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the United Nations play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the region?

THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

In the early 1950s, Belgium faced increasing pressure to grant independence to its colonial territory of Belgian Congo. On 30 June 1960, the Republic of Congo was granted independence in an effort to avoid years of bloodshed and prolonged insurgency encountered by other colonial powers that sought to maintain their colonial holdings. Despite this intention, granting Congo independence failed to prevent bloodshed or conflict. The severity of the ensuing turmoil drew the attention of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who actively campaigned for United Nations involvement in establishing peace in the region.

As the agreed-upon date for independence approached, Congo found itself ill-prepared for self-governance. Its great size, coveted natural resources, fractured political leadership, tribal loyalties and dependence on the 10,000-strong Belgian colonial civil service contributed to an extremely precarious situation. Although a Treaty of Friendship, Assistance, and Cooperation with Belgium was signed by the first government on the eve of independence, it was never ratified and was quickly disregarded.

The first government of the newly independent Congo was a coalition formed between the leaders of two opposing political factions with great tribal support, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. The provisional constitution called for a unitary system, joining the Congo's provinces together in one government. However, the President of the Katanga Province, Moïse Tshombe, member of a third political faction, believed in a federated system, and his disagreement quickly led to Katanga's secession.

Problems in the Congo became much worse just five days after independence. A series of mutinies swept through the Congolese army, as Congolese troops removed the European officer commanders and installed native Congolese between 5-9 July 1960. Mutineers roamed the capital city of Leopoldville and attacked Europeans. The new, all-Congolese military created a terrifying environment for the Europeans living and working in the Congo, causing thousands of Belgians to flee to Congo (Brazzaville), Rhodesia and Belgium. On 10 July 1960, the Belgian military unilaterally intervened, sending 1,200 troops to aid the force of 2,500 already in Congo under the Treaty of Friendship. On 11 July 1960, Moïse Tshombe, backed by Belgian support, declared Katanga independent from Congo. By 12 July 1960, the Belgian troops had reestablished order in Leopoldville as well as other cities.

Ralph Bunche, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, kept Hammarskjöld apprised of the evolving situation. On 10 July 1960, the Congolese Cabinet formally requested United Nations help in the form of "technical assistance in the military field." The Congolese were unfamiliar with the United Nations system, and, while the wording of the request was suggested to them, it became the cause of many of the United Nations' later problems in the region.

On 13 July 1960, Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the Charter, requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation. The Security Council passed Resolution 143 (with abstentions by China, France and the United Kingdom) which called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the establishment of a United Nations force providing "military assistance as necessary," per the Congolese request. On 18 July, the first 3,500 United Nations troops, composed mainly of African regiments, entered the Congo.

The first months of the Congo crisis saw many difficulties for United Nations forces. Resolution 143 had several problems: (1) it only made clear that the Secretary-General was to do something about the situation, not what specifically; (2) there was no timetable provided; (3) there was no description given of the military assistance; (4) there was no mention of territorial integrity (with regard to the Katanga situation); and (5) United Nations troops were only to use weapons in self-defense and were not to become a party to any internal conflicts.



This period saw intense arguments, within both the Congo and the United Nations, over the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga. These were only resolved by a personal visit from Hammarskjöld to Katanga on 12 August. Further, Prime Minister Lumumba grew extremely critical and distrustful of United Nations aid, issuing several ultimatums for the United Nations to conform to his policies and provide United Nations military force against Tshombe in Katanga or withdraw.

Hammarskjöld was deeply personally involved in the handling of the Congo crisis, repeatedly appearing before the Council seeking endorsement of his actions. On 8 August, the Council passed Resolution 146, backing Hammarskjöld's plan and actions, clarifying the territorial integrity issue by calling upon all States to refrain from any action that might undermine the territorial integrity of the Republic of Congo, and again demanding the departure of Belgian troops. Although the first United Nations troops entered Katanga in mid-August, the Belgians did not fully withdraw until mid-October.

In early September, Kasa-Vubu dismissed Lumumba and declared a new government, with the support of the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Joseph Mobutu. Lumumba, in turn, announced that President Kasa-Vubu was no longer Head of State and called upon the people, workers and the army to rise. The Council of Ministers published a communiqué depriving Kasa-Vubu of his powers, nullifying his ordinance, revoking the Government and accusing him of high treason. In votes by both houses of the Congolese parliament, Lumumba's claim to legitimacy was supported. With the opening of the General Assembly that fall, both factions vied for the Congo's seat. The Kasa-Vubu delegate was seated after a long, drawn out political battle.

The interplay of Cold War politics was an underlying factor in the Congo crisis. While the West mildly supported Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu, the Soviets and their allies supported the legitimacy of the Lumumba government and the Congolese Parliament by providing military aid to Lumumba and several factions. The Soviets also used the crisis as an opportunity to attack Hammarskjöld's leadership. Khrushchev went so far as to attack Hammarskjöld specifically in his address at the opening of the General Assembly in 1960.

The final major group of players in the Congo crisis were the other African States. Seventeen African States were admitted to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall 1960 session, immediately becoming a bloc influencing negotiations and actions. While they joined the West in isolating the Soviet bloc, they were not united, and often disagreed with the West on specifics in the Congo. Three major African groups arose: those which backed Lumumba, those which backed the actions of the United Nations to date, and those which backed Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu.

Near the end of 1960, events again moved toward an imminent crisis. On 28 November, Lumumba was arrested by forces loyal to Mobutu and jailed. He remained a captive at the end of the year. Katanga was still independent, with a strong Belgian infrastructure still in place. Finally, both the Belgians and the Soviets were supplying various factions in bids to establish new independent territories.

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THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Many Latin American and Caribbean countries were dealing with severe and mounting problems entering the 1960s. The countries in this region faced the incredible tasks of industrializing their economies, enacting land reform and establishing civilian control over the military all at the same time. The end results of the rapidly changing political and economic climate were political and social instability throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. After a short period of military rule, Argentina's newly elected government had to deal with general strikes and massive inflation in 1959. Brazil, which was attempting 50 years of economic improvement in five, was facing an imminent reckoning with foreign creditors and growing unrest in the military. Meanwhile, civil unrest was prevalent in El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Guatemala.



The deepening mistrust between the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro, who took power in Cuba on 1 January 1959, and several other Latin American States, most notably the United States, set the stage for heightened Cold War tensions. While Castro had not officially declared himself a Marxist, his populist policies, increasing reliance on the Communist Party for organizational support and crack-down on anti-communist factions were more than enough to convince the United States of Castro's intention to establish a Marxist regime in Cuba. Moves by Cuba and the Soviet Union to form stronger political, economic and military ties raised the possibility of a Communist military presence in the heart of the Americas, which would undermine the entire inter-American system of alliances, treaties, international organization and tacit understandings. Even without the establishment of bases by Communist powers, activities of the Soviet bloc in supplying arms and military advice to a State in Latin America presented problems of hemispheric defense for the United States, and thus international politics. Cuba's growing political, military and economic relationship with the Soviet Union was discouraged by several American states, which called for Cuba to remain in the framework of the inter-American principles.

In turn, Cuba accused the United States of promoting plans for intervention in Cuba, protecting Cuban war criminals, providing training facilities for counter-revolutionary elements and multiple violations of Cuban air space throughout 1960. In July 1960, the Cuban government requested an opportunity to be heard before the Security Council to discuss what it termed "repeated threats, reprisals and aggressive acts" by the United States against Cuba. The Security Council responded with Resolution 144 (19 July 1960), which deferred the issue until a report was received from the Organization of American States, and called on all parties to reduce tensions in the region.

Current issues facing the Council include the possibility of increased tension between Cuba and other States in the region and the likelihood of new political instability caused by political and economic development crises in the region.

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SECURITY COUNCIL / SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

During its early years, the United Nations was generally allowed only those duties the great powers were willing to cede to it. In that context, the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General and his Secretariat was rarely acrimonious. Furthermore, the United Nations was rarely an active power broker in a crisis situation. The relative lack of real international responsibility within the Secretariat quickly began to evaporate when Dag Hammarskjöld succeeded Trygve Lie as Secretary-General in 1953. Hammarskjöld's perception of the ideals of the United Nations may not have been more expansive than those of his predecessor, but he was significantly more willing to take action. As Secretary-General, he greatly extended the influence of the United Nations with his peacekeeping efforts, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.

Hammarskjöld used his good offices in a variety of situations to attempt to prevent war and further the purpose of the United Nations Charter. Though rebuffed, he attempted to intercede during the Suez Crisis, and he was constantly working to engage various players in the Middle East. Hammarskjöld was most active, however, in the many African disputes of the era, especially as decolonization peaked in the late 1950s. Hammarskjöld regularly did more than just offer the good offices of the Secretary-General; he was an active believer in the role of United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Under Hammarskjöld, United Nations peacekeeping forces were deployed to more areas of dispute and in greater numbers than at any time before or since. Hammarskjöld's activist approach to the office of Secretary-General and the Secretariat often led to tensions, both within the United Nations bureaucracy, and between the Secretariat and Member States. Hammarskjöld was willing to take action without having first gained what others considered to be full approval for those actions. The use of peacekeeping forces, without specific Security Council resolutions allowing engagement of those forces, is one such example. Hammarskjöld often defended his actions on the principles of working toward the maintenance of international peace and stability or on expansive views of General Assembly actions and authority.

Regardless of where the authority for his action derived, the activist nature in which the office of Secretary-General was viewed (both by Hammarskjöld and by his Secretariat support staff) led to many disagreements. Several Member States publicly expressed disapproval with what they viewed as the Secretary-General's meddling in what were otherwise sovereign affairs or policies. It was, in fact, just this attitude that led to the Soviet's attempt to have Hammarskjöld removed from the post of Secretary-General.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS

Cold War tensions colored the entire spectrum of international relations throughout the middle of the 20th Century. Most viewed the era as a zero-sum game for virtually every decision made by the United States, Soviet Union and their allies. In 1960, tensions were reaching their highest levels yet. While many minor events occurred during the year, the most significant incident occurred 1 May 1960 when Soviet missiles were able to bring down a United States U-2 spy plane in Soviet airspace. The incident took place just prior to the East-West Summit in Paris, significantly increasing the tense setting for the meeting. The Security Council took up the discussion under the heading "The Question of Relations Between the Great Powers," and discussions were held in several meetings from May through July 1960. A draft resolution concerning the violation of Soviet airspace failed to garner a majority on 26 May; this was followed by a more neutrally phrased resolution on 27 May. This resolution recommended the peaceful resolution of problems between States, appealed to United Nations Members to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, called for continued disarmament talks between the major powers, especially on nuclear issues, and urged the Four Powers (France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States) to continue discussions in order to reduce tensions. The Soviet Union again complained to the Council of continuing aggressive acts by the U.S. Air Force, and was met with repeated denials from the United States. This led to three additional draft resolutions in July, but each failed due to vetoes by Permanent Members of the Council. It is in the context of these relationships that the Security Council must again take up the crises of the 1961 time period. The Council's ability to act, and the efficacy of such action, could be predicated on overall United Nations activity and on the actions of its Member States.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VENEZUELA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

As 1993 began, the United Nations was faced with the challenge of promoting three interlocking and mutually reinforcing goals: peace, development and democracy. The United Nations peace keeping operations in the field were evolving to include political, social, humanitarian and environmental dimensions. Political, social and cultural nation-building were requirements for development to take root across the world. States also came to realize that the democratization of national institutions and the protection of the fundamental human rights of all citizens were a necessary prerequisite to development, as development was to peace. The Security Council of 1993 required new approaches to information gathering and dissemination in order to obtain the confidence of the international community on an ever-globalizing world stage.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions are designed to assist in developing a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- Should the United Nations be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the United Nations play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the issue?

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 left ethnic groups waging war with each other, rehashing centuries of ethnic and religious grievances. The epicenter of the ethnic conflict was the newly independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Immediately after independence in 1992, Serb National Forces barricaded themselves around the city of Sarajevo and launched artillery attacks on the city. Serb forces and ethnic Serbian militias, both working for a larger Serbian homeland, began a systematic invasion and takeover of much of the rural land within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian militias forced all non-Serbs out of the territory under Serbian control, creating thousands of refugees. In addition, reports of violence against non-Serbs, particularly Muslims, began surfacing, and, by the end of 1992, Serbian forces controlled 70 percent of Bosnia, creating a political and humanitarian emergency of increasing urgency.

In response to the growing unrest, the United Nations authorized the creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992. UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure conditions for peace talks and to help maintain peace in several designated "safe zones." United Nations peacekeepers were successful

in enabling humanitarian aid, but little was accomplished in the way of securing peace. The Security Council imposed a series of economic sanctions against what remained of Yugoslavia starting in May of 1992. All import, export and transport to and from Yugoslavia was forbidden; monetary transactions of any sort were strictly curtailed; all social and cultural contacts were broken off; and diplomatic representation was drastically reduced.

The United Nations and European Economic Community (EEC) sent a negotiating team to Bosnia, led by United Nations Special Envoy David Owen and EEC Representative Cyrus Vance. The lead negotiators unveiled the Vance-Owen peace plan in late 1992, with debate continuing into the spring of 1993. Muslim and Croat factions agreed to the plan after further negotiation, but the plan ran into problems while seeking Serbian support. The United States became highly critical of the plan and claimed that its provisions rewarded the Serbs for their aggression. The United States instead lobbied for a "lift and strike" plan which involved editing the terms of the arms embargo to provide weapons support for the Muslim and Croat soldiers as well as using United States and NATO air forces to conduct air raids on Serbian forces. The United States' plan failed to gain any support within the Council. With the threat of force from the United States off the table, the Serbs saw no need to agree to the Vance-Owen plan.

With the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan, new levels of violence erupted within Bosnia. Muslim and Croat forces that had been united in an uneasy alliance against the Serbs have begun fighting each other. Despite calls by the Security Council and UNPROFOR, hostilities continued, and the fighting is blocking the main humanitarian assistance supply routes into northern Bosnia and restricting the movements of UNPROFOR and UNHCR.

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Since decolonization, Somalia experienced persistent internal warfare accompanied by poor social and economic conditions. In January 1991, internal conflict between various factions resulted in a lack of a recognized central government and a collapse of state institutions. Intra-clan conflict, poor economic conditions and a wide-spread drought destroyed the agricultural system in Somalia which resulted in a massive famine and the deaths of at least three hundred thousand Somalis since 1991. Control of food supplies has led to divided loyalties and is used as currency for armaments.

On 3 March 1992, representatives of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid, the United Somali Congress factional leaders, signed a ceasefire agreement and allowed for the United Nations to deploy a monitoring mission into Somalia to oversee arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance to the region. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council approved Resolution 751, which created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); in July, fifty military observers were sent to Mogadishu to monitor ceasefire agreement conditions. On 15 August 1992 the United Nations humanitarian "Operation Provide Relief" commenced. However, due to insufficient security the United Nations' humanitarian effort was largely ineffective; flights were looted, food convoys hijacked, and aid workers assaulted. UNOSOM I was regarded as a failure, and with Resolution 794 the Security Council called upon Member States to contribute military forces to help establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

In December, U.S. President George Bush proposed to have the United States lead an international force to Somalia to provide a secure environment. The United States would then turn the operation over to United Nations peacekeeping forces once the situation on the ground stabilized. On 5 December, the United Nations approved the plan and 25,000 U.S. troops with an additional 17,000 from more than twenty additional countries deployed as part of a United Task Force (UNITAF) named "Operation Restore Hope."

UNITAF forces landed without opposition on the coast of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, took control of two airfields and proceeded to secure other key installations. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali organized a national reconciliation conference for Somalia in January 1993; representatives from 14 Somali political movements attended. By the end of the conference, three agreements had been reached: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993; the Agreement On Implementing The Cease-fire And On Modalities Of Disarmament; and the Agreement On The Establishment Of An Ad Hoc Committee.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted his recommendation to the Security Council that the United Nations-led UNOSOM II replace UNITAF as the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, and officially succeeded UNITAF on 4 May 1993. UNOSOM II would seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF: the mandate of UNOSOM II extended beyond humanitarian relief to include nation-building through disarmament of the Somali people, restoring law and order and support of infrastructure and a representative government.

On 27 March 1993, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia; the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants. The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament



and security; rehabilitation and reconstruction; restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Presently, implementation of the agreement has stalled and militias are again maneuvering for positions of power and fighting has renewed.

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THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu began with Belgian colonial rule. The Belgians chose to govern Rwanda through the preferential treatment and empowerment of the Tutsis; later, when the Tutsi elite began to agitate for independence, this favored status switched to Hutus and further complicated relations. In 1962, Rwanda was granted independence, elections installed a radical Hutu government

and popular violence against Tutsis drove many into exile (particularly into Uganda). In 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power and pledged to restore order; however, the establishment of a one-party state, ethnic quotas and preferential treatment of Hutus did little to bridge the ethnic divide. To further exacerbate poor social conditions, Rwanda's economy experienced a harsh shock in 1989 when coffee prices fell dramatically. Rwanda's primary export products are coffee and tea, and falling prices of these commodities caused severe economic hardship throughout the country.

In 1990, the Habyarimana government came under pressure from the Tutsi refugee diaspora living in Uganda, who wished to return to their homeland. The recently-formed Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was at the forefront of this movement. The Habyarimana government and the RPF disagreed fundamentally on the solution to the repatriation problem, and tensions came to a head on 1 October 1990, when RPF forces invaded from Uganda. The RPF had more experience and training. Despite a disadvantage in numbers, the RPF made significant progress against the Rwandan Armed Forces. Before the RPF advance reached Kigali, the Rwandan government called upon Belgium, France and Zaire for military and financial assistance. The Belgian and French troops provided security and organizational assistance in Kigali while the Zairean reinforcements engaged the RPF alongside the Rwandan Armed Forces at the front lines. The RPF was repelled back to a national park near the Ugandan border by the end of October.

The Belgian and Zairean troops withdrew after the RPF offensive was stopped, but the French remained in the country, organizing, training and equipping the Rwandan Armed Forces. Within Rwanda, the RPF was denounced by the government. Armed mobs of Hutu civilians began pursuing RPF "collaborators," who often happened to be Tutsi, killing them and driving them from their homes.

The war continued for almost two years until a cease-fire agreement was signed on 12 July 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania. This agreement set a timetable for the cessation of hostilities, promoted political talks with the goal of arranging a peace accord with power-sharing, and authorized the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer.

On 9 January 1993, a power-sharing agreement was signed in Arusha, calling for a new government to divide power between President Habyarimana's party, RPF representatives and several other Rwandan political parties. Violence surged inside the country when Habyarimana's party declared their rejection of the agreement on 21 January. On 8 February, RPF violated the cease-fire, reached the outskirts of Kigali, and drove Rwandan troops south. Hutu civilian residents of the RPF-controlled areas fled. French forces were called upon to come to the Rwandan government's aid. Meanwhile, Rwandan soldiers took vengeance on Tutsi civilians and opponents of the regime, killing over 147 people. Many more were beaten, tortured and raped as hundreds of homes and businesses were looted and burned.

The return to unrest and ethnic violence further strained the humanitarian situation. In early February, the number of internally displaced persons reached nearly one million. The International Committee of the Red Cross warned of a major catastrophe and increased its budget for Rwanda eightfold. Through these efforts, the relief organizations hoped to ease the plight of the displaced persons until the fundamental issues of violence within the country and in the border areas near Uganda were resolved.



On 22 February, Uganda and Rwanda sent separate letters to the President of the United Nations Security Council asking for the deployment of military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, specifically arms transportation. In response, the Secretary-General sent a goodwill mission from 4 to 18 March. Concurrently, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania brokered a meeting between the warring factions from 5 to 7 March. The two sides agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and resume peace talks in Arusha. Following the Security Council's Resolution 812 of 12 March, a technical mission was dispatched to the Uganda-Rwanda border, and reported that it would be possible to deploy military observers on the Rwandan side to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it.

The Arusha talks reconvened on 16 March, and the United Nations launched an interagency appeal on 15 April for international assistance to Rwanda to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people. Rwanda and the RPF have requested an international force to monitor a demilitarized zone to be established along the lines of the previous cease-fire agreement. On 20 May, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Haiti's recent political problems stem from a 30 September 1991 coup d'état, led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, which deposed the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Reaction to the coup was violent and Haiti plunged into disorder and violence. The civil unrest has resulted in the massive displacement of an estimated 300,000 Haitians, sending tens of thousands of refugees to neighboring countries.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations have been working to bring stability and peace back to Haiti and have made efforts to reinstate the presidency of Aristide. On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which it again demanded the restoration of President Aristide, the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights. It also requested the Secretary-General to take the "necessary measures" in order to assist the OAS to solve the Haitian crisis.

The Secretary-General appointed Dante Caputo as his special envoy for Haiti in December 1992, and Caputo immediately held preliminary consultations with the various parties. By mid-January 1993, he received verbal support for an international civilian mission and dialogue to resolve the political crisis.

In his 18 January letter to President Aristide the Secretary-General agreed to United Nations participation in an international civilian mission subject to the approval of the General Assembly and agreement by the OAS. Following the Special Envoy's consultations, the idea and mandate of an International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement were incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Mr. Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.

With MICIVIH instituted, Caputo turned his attention to seeking a political solution. The immediate objective was agreement on three issues: the return of President Aristide; the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for reconstruction of the country and the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti. So far the negotiations have failed. In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of the United Nations component of MICIVIH.

The General Assembly authorized United Nations participation with the OAS in MICIVIH on 20 April, reiterating the need to have the Aristide government restored to power and continuing dialogue with Caputo. The General Assembly rejected the partial Parliamentary elections that Haiti organized in January 1993. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have centered on the deployment of 500 foreign police officers. However, Aristide supporters are against any armed international presence in the country.

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THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

At the onset of 1993, three peacekeeping operations were present in the region: two peacekeeping forces—the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—and an observer mission: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). On 13 January 1993, the United States, United Kingdom and France conducted air raids on Iraqi anti-missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq following a series of incidents on the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait involving Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone and unauthorized retrieval of Iraqi property from Kuwaiti



territory. Following the implementation of the air raids the Security Council passed resolution 806 authorizing the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) to take direct physical action in response to any future violation of the demilitarized zone.

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OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS: PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

On 14 May 1992, the United Nations announced that peacekeeping costs were expected to rise by more than a third to \$3.7 billion. The failure of Member States to pay their share of peacekeeping costs is a major problem. By the end of April, unpaid peacekeeping dues totalled \$1.5 billion. These unpaid dues create serious doubts about the United Nations' ability to finance future peacekeeping operations at a critical moment. The current United Nations mission in Somalia, UNOSOM II, is expected to cost \$1.2 billion a year. If the Serbs in Bosnia can be persuaded to accept an international peace plan, the United Nations plans to deploy some 70,000 troops to the area, which could cost \$2 billion a year.

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