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AMERICAN MODEL UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

ISSUES AT AMUN



2014 AMUN International Executive Committee

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INTRODUCTION

The *Issues at AMUN Handbook* is published to assist Representatives in their preparations for the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Conference. When combined with students' own research on the Member States they represent and the topics of discussion, this handbook provides Representatives with all the substantive information they will require to function effectively at the simulation. Its sister handbook, *Rules and Procedures*, provides an overview of the Committee rules and Conference logistics with which Representatives need to familiarize themselves for the simulation.

“Chapter One – The United Nations” provides essential background information to give all Representatives a common orientation to the history of the United Nations. This section begins with the origins of the United Nations and covers some important points about the organization. Finally, the chapter focuses on problems confronting the United Nations today.

“Chapter Two – Conference Preparation & Position Papers” outlines a recommended process for preparing for the AMUN Conference. Following these steps will lead you well on your way to acquiring all the content knowledge to be a successful Representative at AMUN. You will also find general information about topic purviews and position papers here.

Chapters Three through Nine then contain brief overviews of the topics to be discussed in the Committees, Councils, Commissions and International Court of Justice at the 2014 Conference. These are intended as a guideline and basis for Representatives' further research of the issues involved. In keeping with this goal, each overview includes a bibliography to guide Representatives to appropriate sources of additional information.

The overviews provide background on each topic and state some areas of current United Nations and international activity on the topic. In many cases, the overviews will frame the topic in terms of a few limited aspects of a complex issue. For example, the general issue of “the environment” has dozens of sub-issues—in such a case, the overview may direct Representatives to concentrate their research on “Ozone Depletion” and “Limiting the Destruction of the Rain Forests,” only two of the many subsidiary issues. This format allows Representatives to go into greater detail in their preparations without needing to research all aspects of a multifaceted main issue.

AMUN's philosophy in providing these topic overviews is to give Representatives direction in their research but to leave the work up to them. *These overviews are not intended to be the sole source of Representatives' research on the topics prior to the Conference.*



CHAPTER ONE

THE UNITED NATIONS

Representatives participating in the American Model United Nations Conference should be familiar with the history of the United Nations, and with the changing role the organization plays in international affairs. This section provides a brief background on the United Nations system and some of the issues it faces today.

ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations came into existence on 24 October 1945. On that day, the United Nations Charter became operative, having been ratified by the fifty-one original Members. The concept of all States uniting together in one organization designed to settle disputes peacefully was born of the desire of civilized countries to avoid the horrors of the First and Second World Wars. The United Nations developed as a successor to the League of Nations, which represented the first modern attempt by States to achieve this unity.

In 1942, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt first coined the term “United Nations,” when forty-seven countries signed the Declaration of the United Nations in support of the Atlantic Charter. In 1944, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China met in Washington, DC at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the first blueprint of the United Nations was prepared. In 1945, the final details for the United Nations were worked out at the Yalta Conference. Fifty-one States gathered from 24 April through 26 June in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the United Nations, which was signed on 26 June 1945.

PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The primary purposes for which the United Nations was founded are detailed in Chapter I, Article 1 of the Charter:

1. “To maintain international peace and security;”
2. “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;”
3. “To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion;” and
4. “To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”

HOW THE UNITED NATIONS SEEKS TO ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSE

Since 1945, the United Nations has established itself as a forum for discussing international disputes. The United Nations seeks, both through its principal organs and various subsidiary bodies, to settle disputes through peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force. Member States recognize that the United Nations has an established machinery which can be utilized to solve international problems. It should be recognized that the United Nations is not a world government, nor does it legislate. Rather, the actions of the United Nations, in

the form of resolutions passed by its bodies, have a strong moral persuasive effect. Member States frequently find it in their own best interests to follow United Nations recommendations.

STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has six primary bodies:

The General Assembly (GA): The GA is the central deliberative organ of the United Nations. The GA has been described as the nearest thing to a “parliament of mankind.” All Member States are Members of the GA, and each Member has one vote. The GA makes recommendations on international issues, oversees all other United Nations bodies which must report to the GA annually, approves the United Nations budget and apportions United Nations expenses. On the recommendation of the Security Council, the GA elects the Secretary-General and holds the authority to admit and expel Member States. Voting in the GA is ordinarily by simple majority, but a majority of the body’s work is adopted by consensus.

The Security Council (SC): The Security Council is charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It has the power to employ United Nations forces and direct action against threats to the peace. Fifteen Members sit on the Security Council, including five Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten at-large Member States, which the General Assembly elects for two-year terms. A majority in the Security Council consists of nine Members voting “yes”; however, a “no” vote by any of the Permanent Members has the effect of vetoing or blocking actions.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): ECOSOC is the primary body dealing with the economic, social, humanitarian and cultural work of the United Nations system. It also has a mandate to coordinate the activities of United Nations technical and specialized agencies and programs. ECOSOC oversees five regional economic Commissions and nine functional, or “subject-matter,” Commissions. ECOSOC is composed of fifty-four Member States elected by the GA for three-year renewable terms.

The Trusteeship Council (TC): In 1945 there were eleven Trust Territories, which were regions without their own governments. These eleven regions were placed under the TC, which helped them prepare for and achieve independence. With the admission of Palau as a United Nations Member State in 1994, the TC has now completed its original mandate. Today, the TC is inactive but is formally composed of the permanent Security Council Members.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ): The International Court of Justice, or World Court, is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations and decides international legal disputes. All United Nations Member States are automatically able to bring matters before the ICJ; however, States must agree to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ before it can decide a dispute involving that State. Fifteen judges serving nine-year terms sit on the Court.



Secretariat: The Secretariat is composed of the Secretary-General and the United Nations staff. Approximately 16,000 people are employed as the staff of the United Nations, one-third of whom work at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. The other two-thirds work for various subsidiary bodies of the United Nations. The Secretary-General serves a five-year renewable term.

In addition to the six main bodies, the United Nations system includes a number of autonomous technical and specialized agencies and programs. Examples include the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). While most of these agencies and programs have independent governance structures, ECOSOC coordinates their activities.

BLOC POLITICS

Historically, Member States with mutual interests have used a system of bloc politics to organize their efforts within the United Nations. These blocs tend to be made up of Member States with similar political, historical or cultural backgrounds. They were often, but not exclusively, formed on a geographical basis. By organizing themselves with other Member States that hold similar interests, bloc members hope to increase their influence above the level that they would have as a single Member State in the General Assembly.

Regional groups were formally established at the United Nations in 1957 with an endorsement by the General Assembly. As the number of Member States increased, the groups were realigned to form today's five groups: Latin America and the Caribbean group (known as GRULAC), the Asia-Pacific group, the Africa group, the Eastern European group and the Western Europe and Others group (WEOG). These regional groups are still used today to manage elections. Security Council seats are allocated by regional group, and the Vice Presidents of the General Assembly are chosen by regional groups, with the actual election mostly a formality. Other, smaller regional blocs, such as the Nordic countries or the JUSCANZ group (Japan, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), also exist, though they lack the formal recognition granted to the five regional groups.

Regional groups are not the only blocs active at the United Nations. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in 1961 as a group seeking a middle course between the Western and Eastern blocs of the Cold War, rapidly became an active body for the coordination of action at the United Nations for developing countries. While its importance has diminished since the end of the Cold War, it is still active on numerous issues at the United Nations. The Group of 77 (G-77) was founded in 1964 as a coordinating body to protect the economic interests of small and developing countries. With 132 members, it is the largest United Nations bloc, though coordination among members is fairly loose.

Blocs usually attempt to form a consensus among members, allowing them to act as a cohesive group. The effectiveness of any given bloc in exerting its positions in the General Assembly depends upon its ability to form a consensus among its own members and then get its members to vote accordingly. These acts of compromise form the basis of United Nations politics and often occur within the various caucusing groups and form the starting points for debate in the larger United Nations body.

Bloc politics have changed considerably over time. Some regional blocs are still coherent, like the Nordic countries, while others, like the Western European and Others group, lack continuing cohesion. In general, their viability as a political tool is diminishing, and blocs are falling out of use as a predictable measure of votes. Often, blocs get together to draft resolutions which will begin the discussion in the larger body, but ultimately, each Member State will usually vote in its own interest, regardless of its bloc memberships. Further complicating the issue of bloc politics is that states may be part of multiple blocs with diverging or competing interests.

However, blocs are not completely irrelevant; often they are used to get an initial proposal to the floor when consensus cannot be found quickly in the larger body. Today, the most common blocs are small, temporary negotiating groups that gather around one issue to try to overcome stalemate in the larger membership bodies. Additionally, developing countries often bind together to maximize their power, especially in the face of a relative lack of economic power. Some blocs have their own secretariat staff whose job it is to draft proposals and find solutions that the larger body is unable to find. Some of the more well-funded and organized blocs have a formally recognized role as permanent observers with permanent observer missions at the United Nations headquarters. Examples include the African Union, the Caribbean Community, the European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. These blocs are a powerful example of Member States coming together to advance goals that may be independent of the regions they represent.

At AMUN, blocs will not be treated as official bodies. Representatives are encouraged to caucus in their bloc groups only when appropriate. Representatives should be aware that the state they represent may no longer actively participate in bloc politics, or may vote outside of its traditional bloc based on the circumstances. Above all, remember that you represent your country and your country's interests, regardless of your participation in a bloc while caucusing and drafting.



CHAPTER TWO

CONFERENCE PREPARATION & POSITION PAPERS

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Research and preparation can be broken into six areas:

The United Nations system as a whole: It is vitally important for each Representative to understand the basics of the organization which they are simulating—the United Nations. Well-prepared students not only should know the basics of the United Nations' structure, but also should have a good understanding of how the Committee they will be working on fits into the organization. Understanding this information will allow Representatives to better understand what their Committee can or cannot do within the United Nations system, what they can make recommendations on, what they can reasonably demand and what issues are beyond the purview of the body they are simulating and should be handled by another United Nations body. The *Issues at AMUN* handbook includes a brief description of each Committee's purview. This information is provided to assist students in understanding the place of their work in the United Nations system, and it should be supplemented with additional research.

Current statistical information and general background of the represented state's history and policies: This is the first key to understanding what actions a State may prefer on specific issues. Research should include, but certainly not be limited to, areas such as population, government type, natural resources, and trade data. Traditional allies and adversaries should also be noted. Additionally, a country's history can be crucial to its contemporary actions, including the question of whether that country was previously colonized or was a colonial power, when the country gained statehood and what means were used in gaining independence (i.e., civil war, violent struggle, peaceful movement, etc.).

Specific background of the State's viewpoints on the issues to be discussed at the Conference: This is the central point of most Model United Nations preparation: focused research on the issues being discussed in each Committee and on the Member State's position on those issues. Research can come from a variety of sources, beginning with United Nations documents and moving to articles, periodical sources, books and Internet resources beyond the United Nations website. United Nations resolutions and reports on the issues under discussion are especially helpful because they provide a quick reference to what has already been accomplished by the United Nations and what still needs to be done. These documents also frequently provide voting information, which allows Representatives to quickly determine their country's past positions on issues. A number of relevant sources are provided in the bibliography section of each topic brief in the *Issues at AMUN* handbook. Contacting the represented country's permanent mission to the United Nations can also be helpful, but the level of assistance provided varies with each country's policies and the resources they have available.

For some countries, it will be very easy to find specific information to determine a position on most or all topics, and for others this information will be difficult to come by or simply not available. When clear-cut information is not available, it is incumbent on the students preparing to make the best possible inferences of what the country's policy would be, given the facts available.

This might include knowing the country's background, its traditional allies, the stance of a regional group with which they tend to agree or a variety of other factors. Regardless of the facts available, knowing *exactly* what a country would do in a given situation is typically not possible. Representatives should strive in their research to know as much as they can about their country and its stance on each topic, and to educate themselves enough to make reasonable policy assumptions on issues that are not totally clear.

The current world situation as it applies to the State: This is a subset of the previous two areas of research, but it is important enough to be mentioned in its own right. There is a significant difference between the policies and perspectives of the only remaining superpower and a State with very little military might. Even more significant at the United Nations are the differences on many issues between the policies of relatively rich, industrialized countries and relatively poor, developing (and especially least-developed) countries. Additionally, a country which is currently involved in a civil war or a State which is under United Nations sanctions may have unique responses on some issues which are very different from the rest of the international community. Knowing where the State a student represents fits in the current world geopolitical context, as a complement to his or her country-specific research, can answer many questions which may arise during the simulation.

The perspectives of States with differing viewpoints on the issues: This is one of the more difficult areas of preparation. While it is reasonable to expect that a Representative will know who their general allies and adversaries are on a given issue, it is very difficult to have detailed information about the policies of each country in the simulation. Limitations in preparation time by definition require that students focus primarily on the policies of their own country, often learning about others through references in their own research. This is an area where complete knowledge will serve participants well, but it is much more likely that each Representative will be learning the formal policies of the other countries in the Committee when they give speeches from the floor and confer behind the scenes in caucus sessions. In roleplaying, then, flexibility is key: Representatives must aggregate and assimilate new information they gain at the Conference with their pre-Conference research in order to reach consensus and compromise on complex issues.

AMUN Rules of Procedure: While substantive discussions of the issues form the basis of any good simulation of the United Nations, the rules of procedure are used to facilitate the substantive debate which occurs. In general, these rules are intended to provide an even playing field, allowing each country to accomplish its individual goals in advocating its policies while also maximizing opportunities for the group to reach agreement, or even consensus, on the issues. Several levels of preparation are possible on the rules. For new Model United Nations participants, it is recommended that each person have a working knowledge of the principal motions which can be made during the simulation, encapsulated on the Rules Short Forms on **pages 35–36** of the *AMUN Rules & Procedures* Handbook. The staff of each Committee will assist Representatives in using these rules



on the first day of the Conference and assist in bringing everyone onto an even playing field. For experienced Representatives, especially those who have not attended AMUN in the past, we suggest reading AMUN's rules in-depth, both as a refresher on these rules of procedure and to note differences from other conferences a school might attend. Most Model United Nations conferences use slightly different rules of procedure, and in some cases the contrasts are significant. In order to best facilitate everyone's experience, it is incumbent upon every participant to learn and use the rules established for this Conference.

PREPARING AS A GROUP

Research on the areas described above is the essential element in preparing for AMUN. It is strongly recommended that Representatives use a combined effort whenever possible in doing research. Representatives can fully take advantage of all the people representing their country by assigning various topics to each individual to research and report on to the group. Some areas will naturally lend themselves to group research and discussion, while others will be more individually-based.

In particular, researching the United Nations system and the specific background on a nation can be more easily accomplished by a group effort. Each student can be assigned a specific area, such as historical background of the country, current statistics, etc. Individuals can then report back to the group on their findings, possibly including a written or oral report, and allow for greater knowledge-sharing among the delegation members.

By contrast, research on the topics discussed in each Committee will, by its nature, be more individualistic. This does not mean, however, that the other members of the delegation will not benefit from a briefing on each topic. Topic briefings can both give the entire delegation a broader picture of country policy as well as give individual Representatives valuable practice in consolidating the information they discover and in making a public presentation to the group. These briefings may also assist the entire delegation in gaining a comprehensive perspective on its country's policies.

GENERAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

AMUN recommends the following general sources of information to use when researching your country and the issues of the Conference. Note that many of these sources are available on the Internet, either publicly or through subscriptions that are often held by your school library.

- United Nations Today (United Nations Department of Public Information)
- The World Almanac or The Universal Almanac
- Permanent Missions to the United Nations (e-mail for information on your nation and the specific issues under consideration)
- United Nations Department of Public Information (e-mail for a publications list)
- The Europa World Yearbook (Available in most library reference sections; contains detailed background on all countries and international organizations in the world)
- United Nations Handbook (Published annually by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
- Various periodicals, including the *United Nations Chronicle*, *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Economist* (Weekly), and *Keesing's Record of World Events* (Monthly).

USING THE INTERNET

AMUN website: When using the Internet, a great starting point is AMUN's website, which includes links to these and many other United Nations-related sites. This website is updated with United Nations links as they become available and includes a great deal of background information to assist in your preparations for Conference. AMUN's website can be reached at www.amun.org.

News sources: Most major newspapers and news organizations are available online and are an excellent source for country and topic information, allowing you to access a daily synopsis of worldwide news.

United Nations documents: Most United Nations resolutions, documents, speeches and other resources can be accessed through the Internet. Most United Nations agencies are represented, along with databases containing information on various regions around the world.

In particular, the main United Nations Website at www.un.org/en/ provides up-to-date information on United Nations Documents passed in the General Assembly, Security Council and ECOSOC, as well as historical information from these bodies, reports of the Secretary-General on various issues and other useful documents.

Most United Nations members now have websites for their permanent missions in New York and Geneva. When a website is available, it often includes details on the country's policy and may include the text of speeches given by Representatives at the United Nations. These addresses can be found at www.un.org/members.

The United Nations also provides public access to its Official Documents System (ODS), which includes nearly all of the documents published by the United Nations, including many that are not available on the United Nations's main website. The ODS system is available at documents.un.org. Please note that the search engine available on ODS is not always easy to use, but it is very easy to find files if you know the United Nations document number. The bibliography section of each topic brief in the Issues at AMUN handbook contains references to several United Nations documents and can act as a starting place for your preparations. You may want to utilize the UNBISNET search engine to find your document name/number and then move to ODS to find the actual document. UNBISNET also provides access to voting records and country speeches, and is found online at unbisnet.un.org.

WHY DRAFT A POSITION PAPER?

Well-crafted position papers can serve as an excellent preparatory tool for Model United Nations conference participants. A position paper can be used both as a device for internal preparation among the members of a delegation and as a public statement of your delegation's positions on the issues being discussed at the Conference. AMUN requests that all delegations submit public position papers to the Conference but also strongly suggests that each delegation prepare internal position papers which more clearly and completely define their country's perspective.

AMUN believes the most important information a delegation can furnish to other delegations prior to the Conference is its basic public policy on each issue to be discussed.



INTERNAL POSITION PAPERS

This type of position paper is intended as a preparatory tool for the individuals on your delegation and for the delegation as a whole. While these are not required, AMUN strongly recommends that groups preparing for the Conference use position papers as one step in their preparations. Internal position papers, which are often called white papers in the international community, are a broad-based statement of your country's policies on a specific issue. These might include what you publicly tell other Member States, your knowledge of any behind-the-scenes diplomacy (e.g., what deals have been made on the sidelines), information on allies and adversaries on each topic, your negotiating position on the topic and what your country hopes to accomplish on the topic. This might also include your bottom line negotiating position, the things you will press for in discussions and what (if anything) your government must see (or not see) in a draft resolution before it can provide support.

Internal position papers are very valuable tools for individual preparation, as they force students to think about the full complexity of the issues they are confronting from your delegation's perspective. Also, by asking students to put their ideas in writing, an internal position paper can force each student to condense a large amount of research and ideas into a small, more comprehensible argument from your State's perspective.

These types of position papers do not need to be more than one or two pages in length and may be written either in paragraph form or with bullet points for each unique idea/issue in the topic area. Also, the entire delegation can benefit from each individual's work if these papers are shared with each group member, thus providing a more well-rounded view of the represented country's positions on all issues.

PUBLIC POSITION PAPERS

Public position papers are intended as a public statement of your country's positions on the topics being discussed at the AMUN Conference. Each paper should include brief statements about where your country stands on the issue in question and on what the United Nations has done to confront this issue. It should also include your country's public position on the options for the United Nations in the future, noting proposals which your group has (or intends to have) sponsored, supported or not supported and why. Public papers do not need to go into detail about your negotiating positions or other behind-the-scenes issues but should rather be seen as something that a diplomat might say in a public speech on the topic.

ITEMS TO INCLUDE IN PUBLIC POSITION PAPERS

While the position papers sent to the Conference can include any material that your delegation deems appropriate for public consumption, a number of items should be included in a well-written position paper. First, each section of the paper should specifically state the one or two key points that your country believes are the most important on each topic. While other important issues can be included, no more than two should be highlighted. The paper can then go into specific details about why these points are important and what your country believes should be done by the United Nations or its Member States to improve the situation in question. Many papers will then sum up by recapping the most important points.

There are a number of other items that you might include in a public position paper depending on the specific topic, the available information and your country's particular situation. You should consider incorporating some or all of these elements in your position papers:

- References to past United Nations resolutions and international treaties, providing the specific number or name of that document and the year it passed
- References to the United Nations Charter, as appropriate for the topic
- Past statements by the Secretary-General, a senior United Nations Secretariat member or by a Representative of a United Nations agency on the topic
- Reference to the work the United Nations has already done on the topic, whether by specialized agencies, regional bodies or working with non-governmental organizations
- Past statements on the topic by Representatives of your government, especially if these mention the significance of the specific issue to your country
- Specific suggestions of actions that your country will support in solving the issue in question

Finally, it is important to note that a well-written public position paper is not about your country, but rather about what your country would like to accomplish on the topics of discussion in each simulation. Thus your public position papers should not talk about the problems facing your country, but rather the problems facing the international community. If your country is a clear example of a successful United Nations program in action, or if your country is a member of an affected group, you may want to include a brief reference to that in your paper; otherwise, there is usually no need to even mention specifics about your country in a position paper.

SUBMISSION OF POSITION PAPERS

AMUN requests each delegation submit a position paper to the Conference, covering each Committee on which it is seated, **no later than 25 October**. These papers should be no more than one-half page on each topic that is covered in the Committee. Thus, all delegations should submit a paper covering the Concurrent GA Plenary and each of the four General Assembly Committees, including both topics for each Committee. Delegations represented on ECOSOC should also include the two main topics of discussion for that Council. Delegations represented on the Commission on Social Development (CSocD) should also include the two topics of discussion for the Commission. Delegations represented on the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) should also include the two topics of discussion for the Commission. Delegations represented on the Security Council or Historical Security Councils should choose the two or three topics which they think are the most important for their respective Council to discuss and include these in their position paper. If a delegation chooses to place a Representative on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a section for that Committee should also be included.

Format of Papers: One comprehensive position paper should be submitted online for each *delegation*, combining all of the Committees on which that delegation is seated. A sample position paper, along with full submission instructions, is available at AMUN's website: www.amun.org/sample-position-papers/.



The AMUN Secretariat will not judge the position papers other than to check for completeness and general germaneness. Position papers will be collected and organized by the AMUN Secretariat, posted on the AMUN website prior to Conference and then made available in the Home Government office for public perusal during the Conference. As public documents, position papers must conform to the standards laid out in AMUN's policy on plagiarism (see below).

Submission Specifications: All position papers must be submitted via AMUN's online web form, available at www.amun.org. Additional submission information will be sent in the fall to all registered schools. AMUN reserves the right to reject any position paper that fails to address one of the topics as stated in the *Issues at AMUN* handbook, does not comport to basic standards of diplomatic courtesy or is determined to violate the policy on plagiarism.

Extension of Due Dates: AMUN realizes that some schools are on quarter or trimester systems and thus have a later start date. Any school with a late fall start date may request a one week extension to the official due dates listed above by e-mailing the AMUN Executive Office at mail@amun.org before 25 October.

POSITION PAPER AWARD CERTIFICATES

AMUN will provide a Position Paper Award Certificate for each delegation that submits an approved, completed position paper, including sections for each topic in all assigned simulations, by 11:59 p.m. Central Time on 25 October. Note that this must include sections for the Concurrent General Assembly Plenary, all GA Committees, and any other simulation on which the delegation has a Representative seated. If a school is representing multiple countries, each country will be considered separately for Position Paper Award.

For answers to any questions about writing or submitting position papers or about Position Paper Awards, please contact the AMUN Executive Office at mail@amun.org.

PLAGIARISM

AMUN strives to create a simulation of the United Nations which is as realistic as possible while still allowing for the fulfillment of our participants' and the organization's educational goals. As such, the AMUN policy regarding plagiarism focuses on an educative rather than a punitive goal. At AMUN, plagiarism involves the substantial, verbatim or near-verbatim copying of language, without attribution, in published or unpublished texts, speeches or documents. Representatives should adhere to their country's policies at all times, but this does not give license to plagiarize existing materials. Thus, parts of speeches or position papers may be derived or paraphrased from previous speeches or papers, but should not be copied verbatim.

Similarly, it is expected that all Representatives are familiar with past resolutions at the United Nations, but the work of the United Nations should be expanded on in Representatives' work, not copied verbatim. There are some exceptions: for example, Representatives are not necessarily expected to expand upon a phrase that is often or always used when a country gives a formal speech or a clause that is repeated verbatim through several years of resolutions on a topic. Generally, it is not necessary to explicitly credit such sources, although if substantial

language is quoted, it should be acknowledged and cited. Final determinations on plagiarism and its consequences are at the discretion of the AMUN Secretariat.

THE PURVIEW OF EACH SIMULATION

Each simulation's background guide contains a brief overview of that simulation's purview, which provides a general outline of the types of discussions each simulation might have on the topics in question. This is extremely important in the United Nations system, where a variety of different Committees, Councils and Commissions may discuss different aspects of an international problem. Representatives should exercise great care in researching a topic, so their deliberations can focus on the piece of the problem considered within their simulation's purview. These purview briefs are guidelines for the discussions of each body.

An excellent example of this shifting focus among Committees, Councils and Commissions is the issue of development. The First Committee might discuss the relationship between disarmament and development. At the same time, the Second Committee may discuss a variety of financing initiatives to assist Least Developed Countries. Similarly, the Third Committee might discuss the social and humanitarian considerations that stem from a lack of development, including gender issues, economic concerns or the impact on underrepresented populations such as the elderly or disabled. And the Fourth Committee may discuss the development issues of Non-Self-Governing Territories. The GA Plenary might discuss the problem in its entirety or address issues that cut across the mandates of the Committees. By contrast, the Economic and Social Council would focus on how the United Nations specialized and technical agencies work with Member States to support economic and social development. The Security Council would address the interlinkages between peace, security and development.

Clearly, different aspects of a single problem are regularly discussed in different bodies. More importantly, at the United Nations, delegations are typically careful to only discuss those aspects relevant to their own Committees, Councils and Commissions, leaving other aspects to others in their delegation to address in the appropriate forum.



CHAPTER THREE

THE SECURITY COUNCILS

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Representatives of the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Council. Many topics listed in this guide will change significantly before the Conference. Additional topics may be added as necessary or as the Council sees fit.

For this reason it is highly advised that Representatives have a broad knowledge base regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals and online sources are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended sources include: *The New York Times*, *United Nations Chronicle*, *The Times of London*, *Al Jazeera*, *Mail & Guardian*, *Foreign Policy* and *The Economist*. The United Nations Foundation's online daily newsletter, *United Nations Wire*, is also an excellent resource for timely information.

Whenever possible it is also recommended that Representatives stay abreast of the most recent reports published by the Security Council and other relevant United Nations bodies. These can be found via the United Nations homepage under the [Security Council section](#). Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on United Nations sources with some news sources provided for background on certain aspects of topics.

Unlike many other simulations, Security Council members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions that will affect the course of the simulation. It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems throughout the simulation. While AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with Council members, Representatives are welcome and encouraged to make whatever declarative statements—including real or implied threats and deals—that do not carry operational implications outside of the United Nations. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulations Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions that would have an effect outside of the United Nations. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the actual home office or government of the involved Member States(s).

Representatives are also encouraged to seek out Simulation Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need extra information on a situation. Simulation Directors wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for Representatives about their countries as well as the topics at hand.

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the Council. Delegations representing these countries, if present at AMUN, will be asked to participate in deliberations by the body. If they are not present or choose not to participate in deliberations a member of the AMUN Secretariat will represent them as necessary. It is

customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant Member States during discussion of topics, however it is not required. Any State mentioned in the background research for a specific Security Council is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any State related to a topic relevant to international peace and security. For delegations that may be asked to appear before one of the Historical Security Councils these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. All delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if and when needed.

A NOTE ABOUT HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCILS

AMUN's HSCs are unique not only in their topics, but also in their treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and they are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from its start date, which is provided later in this chapter. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, what transpires will be dependent upon both Council members' actions and Simulation Staff decisions. Council Members are encouraged to exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective roleplaying for an HSC Member State will be not just a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in that year. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations—and reevaluations—of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government took in that year was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must be, by definition, in character, it is not a sure thing that - given a second opportunity to look at events - any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musing of foreign ministers and heads of state pinning for second chances.

It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's policies and capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The United Nations itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues. One major factor Representatives should consider when deciding whether to be actively involved or to be a bystander which Representatives must consider, is the cost of involvement by the United Nations. An increase in costs often causes the Security Council to reprioritize its efforts.



While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of the previous year and should do their research accordingly. In studying their roleplaying assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically over the years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should peruse periodicals from 3-5 years prior to the year in question to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the *New York Times* Index, should provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts, which can be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are roleplaying the individual assigned as their State's Representative to the United Nations. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their countries, or they may be relatively in the dark on their countries' moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their country's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the United Nations could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulations Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the United Nations. In these cases, the Simulations Staff would be equated with the home office or government of the involved State.

Representatives are also encouraged to seek out Simulations Staff to act in the home office capacity when they need extra information on a situation. Simulation Directors wear many hats, including acting as an in-house resource for Representatives about their countries as well as the topics at hand.

OPEN ISSUES

A unique feature of each Security Council in simulations at AMUN is the Council's ability to set its own agenda. This allows that, in addition to the situations outlined in the council specific topic guides on the following pages, the Security Councils can discuss any topic that the body wishes. For the contemporary Security Council this includes any real-world event up until the day the simulation convenes. For

the Historical Security Councils, Representatives should have a working knowledge of the events prior to and including the start date for their respective simulation. For the Historical Security Council of 1961, the start date is 01 January 1961. For the Historical Security Council of 1993, the start date is 23 May 1993.

For the time periods in question, open issues could include any active United Nations peacekeeping operations, the work of any United Nations body active at the time, and any social or economic issue of the day. It is *strongly recommended* that all Representatives be well versed on current and historical global events relevant to their simulation.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Councils. For the contemporary Security Council these briefs are current as of spring 2014. Information for the Historical Security Councils covers information available up until the respective start dates of each simulation. It is recommended that Representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of the background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.



THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMBERS OF THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

ARGENTINA
AUSTRALIA
CHAD
CHILE
CHINA

FRANCE
JORDAN
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
NIGERIA

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RWANDA
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin? Is this a new conflict or a reignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been solved peacefully?
- What State and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

The end of the Sudanese civil war did not mean an end to hostilities in the region. Three peacekeeping missions in Sudan are currently addressing unresolved issues from the conflict and unrest caused by the independence of South Sudan: the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

Recent events in Darfur have increased security concerns for civilians and UNAMID forces. Four rebel movements have combined to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), adopting a political platform for a national approach to the many conflicts in Sudan, with economic stagnation topping the list of concerns. Nearly two million people are internally displaced from this ongoing conflict and the increase in overall violence in Darfur has caused further deterioration of the humanitarian situation.

The resolution of competing territorial claims to Abyei remains unresolved, yet the security situation there has largely improved since the deployment of UNISFA. Failed referendums in both 2012 and 2013 add to growing concerns over the border region's long-term stability. Further, both Sudan and South Sudan retain armed forces in Abyei and are in direct violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area.

Approaching its third year of independence, Africa's youngest State, South Sudan, faces multiple challenges. Planning for the 2015 elections remains behind schedule, with President Salva Kiir blaming timing and funding issues. While the relationship with Sudan shows glimpses of progress, internally President Kiir has faced mass upheaval. Intercommunal conflict in 2013 brought the attention of the Security Council, which passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendation for UNMISS to increase its presence and humanitarian efforts. A February 2014 UNMISS report highlighted human rights violations

and estimated the death toll to be in the thousands. Others report findings include allegations of rebel forces engaging in ethnically targeted killings.

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THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Following the Second Congo War (1998-2003), rebel groups sought refuge in the east with tacit support from neighboring countries, leading to increased instability in the region. During the war, the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to monitor ceasefire agreements between the warring factions. As foreign armies pulled out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence increased. Militant factions merged, split and evolved over time, creating significant instability in the eastern provinces of Orientale, North Kivu and South Kivu. In July 2010, the United Nations Organization and Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) replaced MONUC. The change emphasized the political aspects of the



mandate and reinforced the Mission's mandate to support the Congolese government, political stabilization and peace efforts in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In late 2012, M23, a group that had splintered from the rebel group National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), launched an offensive that led to the brief occupation of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, near the border with Rwanda. The shifting security situation required greater peacekeeping forces, necessitating a change in the MONUSCO mandate. The Security Council shifted the mandate to encompass protecting civilians and monitoring human rights abuses, including active pursuit of armed groups operating within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In November 2013, United Nations and Congolese forces defeated M23 and signed a peace deal. MONUSCO and Congolese forces began working in eastern Congo to quell violence. United Nations Special Representative for Congo, Martin Kobler, stated that his peacekeepers were working diligently to root out the rest of the rebel forces, but he noted they were unlikely to be eliminated by military means alone. The government has continued to work with MONUSCO to restore state authority to retrieved areas and begin dialogues with neighboring counties to promote stability. However, while the security situation has greatly improved, the humanitarian situation has remained precarious.

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THE SITUATION IN THE UKRAINE

Unrest in Ukraine began as an internal political conflict in late 2013. Ukrainian President Yanukovich's rejection of a trade deal with the European Union in November 2013 set off anti-government protests in the capital of Kyiv. Peaceful protest turned violent when government forces attacked protesters on 30 November, leading to dozens of injuries. Opposition forces called for the resignation of President Yanukovich. Instead, he brokered a \$15 billion aid deal with Russia in hopes of quelling the uprising. The conflict reached a critical point in late February when Yanukovich fled the country, leaving opposition forces in control of Kyiv. The Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove him from office, but Yanukovich rejected this decision from exile in Russia. Ukrainian nationalists mobilized their own forces in opposition to Yanukovich's insistence that he was still in charge of the country.

The crisis took on an international focus over the region of Crimea. Armed and uniformed gunman began seizing government buildings in Crimea while rallies erupted calling for Crimea to secede from Ukraine and rejoin the Russian Federation. The Russian Parliament granted President Vladimir Putin the authority to use military force to restore order in the region. On 1 March 2014, the new Ukrainian government mobilized reserve troops, threatening war if Russia intervened. Russian nationalists in Crimea hastily scheduled a referendum for 16 March. The Security Council discussed a draft resolution to declare the elections invalid, but the Russian Federation vetoed the resolution. The referendum was held as scheduled with voters overwhelmingly choosing to join Russia. Since the referendum, the government of Russia has recognized Crimea as Russian territory.

Working in Geneva, the European Union, Russia and the United States agreed on a pact to end the crisis. However, violence intensified in Eastern Ukraine as pro-Russian gunmen refused to relinquish command over government buildings. Rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the creation of the independent State of Novorossiia in May 2014. Ukrainian forces attempted to quell the unrest, but pressure by pro-Russian rebels succeeded in driving them from the region by the end of April. Russia has called for an emergency session of the Security Council over the continued fighting in the region. As of early May, no meeting had taken place.

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THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Late 2012 saw the destruction of nearly a decade of stability in the Central African Republic when a loose coalition of rebels, calling itself Séléka, began an offensive against the government of President François Bozizé. In January 2013, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) held peace talks, resulting in the Libreville Agreements



which formalized a power-sharing arrangement and established a national unity government. This government was composed of members of Séléka and supporters of President Bozizé. The new government lasted a few short months before fighting resumed. President Bozizé was ousted on 24 March 2013 and fled the nation. Michel Djotodia, First Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense and a prominent leader of Séléka, declared himself President, suspended the constitution and dissolved the unity government. The African Union's Peace and Security Council condemned the seizure of power, and the United Nations Security Council released a statement calling for the Libreville Agreements to continue to be the framework for a peaceful solution.

Fighting continued throughout 2013 despite President Djotodia announcing the disbanding of Séléka in September 2013. In October 2013, the Security Council updated the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (BINUCA) to support the transition process and stabilize the security situation. Resolution 2121 also authorized BINUCA to increase its field presence as security conditions allowed. With increased violence, militia groups re-emerged and increased their attacks against local communities, including Muslim communities. In his 15 November report, the Secretary-General noted concern about the religious and ethnic violence in the country and the severe humanitarian situation that displaced more than 400,000 persons internally and an additional 66,000 refugees.

In December the Security Council authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission (MISCA) for one year and authorized the 1,600 French forces, launched in Operation Sangaris, to take all necessary measures to support MISCA. Additionally, the resolution called for a one year arms embargo, except for arms that would help MISCA fulfill its mandate. In January 2014, the Security Council extended the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2015 and authorized the European Union to deploy troops to the country. The deployment took place after the international community encouraged Djotodia and Prime Minister Tiangaye to step down for failing to establish authority in the country.

Despite strong international involvement, revenge attacks continue. Talks of sanctions on individuals have failed due to Chinese and Russian reluctance. The Security Council passed Resolution 2149 in April establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which will incorporate BINUCA and MISCA by the end of September. The United Nations Director of Humanitarian Operations has commented that the short timeframe and lack of troops has allowed the situation to deteriorate, and that peacekeeping troops need to be mobilized more quickly to protect civilians in the future.

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THE SITUATION IN MALI

The current unrest in Mali began in early 2012 when a group of Tuaregs led a rebellion and declared an independent State of Azawad, an area that comprises nearly sixty percent of Mali. At nearly the same time, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré was overthrown in a coup d'état by the Malian military a month before elections were scheduled. The conflict became more complicated as rebel groups fractured and Islamist forces joined the fighting, seizing areas of the desert. In December 2012, the Security Council passed resolution 2085 authorizing the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The mission was to be composed of neighboring nations and members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Resolution 2100 switched AFISMA from an African operation to the United Nations-led United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA took over on 1 July 2013 and France began to withdraw its troops.

Following a peaceful presidential election in August 2013, President Boubacar Keita was sworn in on 4 September. The ceremony was accompanied by a French announcement that the war against Islamic extremists in the country had been won but that France would maintain forces in the country as long as the threat continued. The Secretary-General called on the new government to focus on the troubling humanitarian crisis in the country as MINUSMA and French troops worked to improve the security situation in the state against Islamic extremists who were still fighting. Peaceful and transparent elections were held in November and December, marking a positive turn. However, a Security Council mission in February 2014 noted that the stalled dialogue for a peace settlement was likely to threaten the progress already achieved. Battles against Islamists have continued, with French troops taking the lead. In April, the entire government resigned in a letter to President Keita with the hope that the government would make good on its word to revive long-delayed peace talks. Nine were killed in separatist battles at the end of April, making the success of the peace talks imperative to a future long-term settlement.

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THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

Civilian protests began in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011 and were met with harsh repression by the Syrian government under long-reigning President Bashar al-Assad. Civilians began taking up arms against the government beginning a civil war in which over 160,000 Syrians have died as of May 2014. Despite occasional signs of consolidation, the opposition has been fragmented even though most are Sunni Muslim, the majority religion in Syria. Kurdish rebel groups are also engaged in the conflict, seizing the opportunity to fight for an independent Kurdish State.

On 23 February 2013 former Secretary-General and Joint Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and League of Arab States Kofi Annan introduced a six-point plan that required the government and rebels to actively work toward peace. The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by the passage of Security Council Resolution 2043 in April, ushering in a brief ceasefire. By the second month of UNSMIS deployment, fighting had expanded beyond pre-ceasefire levels. UNSMIS saw its activities constantly hampered by government and opposition forces. As the initial 90-day UNSMIS mandate drew close to expiring, the Security Council passed Resolution 2059, allowing UNSMIS 30 days to wind down its operations. Shortly thereafter Mr. Annan resigned from his position, and Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed to replace him. Fighting continued to escalate with heavy weapons such as cluster bombs, rockets and gunships; international concerns centered on the potential and rumored use of sarin gas and other chemical and biological weapons. After an August attack in Damascus by Syrian forces, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that he had evidence that chemical weapons had been used, but that it was inconclusive as to which side had used them. In September 2013, Resolution 2118 passed, ordering the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons after a decision by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By November, all but one of Syria's declared chemical weapons sites had been verified.

Talks between rebel groups and the Syrian government on how to end the Syrian Civil War were held in January and February, but ended without achieving more than a ceasefire in the city of Homs. In February 2014, the Security Council passed Resolution 2139, demanding that government and opposition forces allow humanitarian aid to

reach beleaguered citizens. Since then, two reports from Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos indicate that neither side has accommodated aid deliveries and that fighting has continued, making the humanitarian situation worse. Amos urged the Security Council to take stronger action. In response, France stated that stronger measures would be tough and would likely invite a Russian veto.

Violence continued in early May with bombings in the cities of Aleppo and Hama. The brutality of the bombings that killed dozens of people, including a large number of children, has jeopardized the ceasefire agreement in Homs, which was not announced as scheduled. The agreement was expected to be a victory for President Assad ahead of the scheduled 3 June elections in which Assad is expected to win another term.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

CEYLON

CHILE

CHINA

ECUADOR

FRANCE

LIBERIA

TURKEY

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

As 1961 began, Dwight D. Eisenhower prepared to pass the United States of America's Presidency to John F. Kennedy, marking a potential shift in Cold War relations between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Cold War tensions were extremely high and played out on all levels of foreign policy and diplomacy for both States and their allies. Colonialism was collapsing while changing political and social climates forced governments to make drastic changes to deal with new pressures. Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld continued his efforts to energetically use the Secretariat to fulfill the roles of the United Nations Charter as he saw fit, pursuing peace actively, sometimes at odds with the Security Council's Member States.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions are designed to assist in developing a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- Should the United Nations be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the United Nations play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the region?

THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

In the early 1950s, Belgium faced increasing pressure to grant independence to its colonial territory of Belgian Congo. On 30 June 1960, the Republic of Congo was granted independence in an effort to avoid years of bloodshed and prolonged insurgency encountered by other colonial powers that sought to maintain their colonial holdings. Despite this intention, granting Congo independence failed to prevent bloodshed or conflict. The severity of the ensuing turmoil drew the attention of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who actively campaigned for United Nations involvement in establishing peace in the region.

As the agreed-upon date for independence approached, Congo found itself ill-prepared for self-governance. Its great size, coveted natural resources, fractured political leadership, tribal loyalties and dependence on the 10,000-strong Belgian colonial civil service contributed to an extremely precarious situation. Although a Treaty of Friendship, Assistance, and Cooperation with Belgium was signed by the first government on the eve of independence, it was never ratified and was quickly disregarded.

The first government of the newly independent Congo was a coalition formed between the leaders of two opposing political factions with great tribal support, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. The provisional constitution called for a unitary system, joining the Congo's provinces together in one government. However, the President of the Katanga Province, Moïse Tshombe, member of a third political faction, believed in a federated system, and his disagreement quickly led to Katanga's secession.

Problems in the Congo became much worse just five days after independence. A series of mutinies swept through the Congolese army, as Congolese troops removed the European officer commanders and installed native Congolese between 5-9 July 1960. Mutineers roamed the capital city of Leopoldville and attacked Europeans. The new, all-Congolese military created a terrifying environment for the Europeans living and working in the Congo, causing thousands of Belgians to flee to Congo (Brazzaville), Rhodesia and Belgium. On 10 July 1960, the Belgian military unilaterally intervened, sending 1,200 troops to aid the force of 2,500 already in Congo under the Treaty of Friendship. On 11 July 1960, Moïse Tshombe, backed by Belgian support, declared Katanga independent from Congo. By 12 July 1960, the Belgian troops had reestablished order in Leopoldville as well as other cities.

Ralph Bunche, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, kept Hammarskjöld apprised of the evolving situation. On 10 July 1960, the Congolese Cabinet formally requested United Nations help in the form of "technical assistance in the military field." The Congolese were unfamiliar with the United Nations system, and, while the wording of the request was suggested to them, it became the cause of many of the United Nations' later problems in the region.

On 13 July 1960, Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the Charter, requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation. The Security Council passed Resolution 143 (with abstentions by China, France and the United Kingdom) which called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the establishment of a United Nations force providing "military assistance as necessary," per the Congolese request. On 18 July, the first 3,500 United Nations troops, composed mainly of African regiments, entered the Congo.

The first months of the Congo crisis saw many difficulties for United Nations forces. Resolution 143 had several problems: (1) it only made clear that the Secretary-General was to do something about the situation, not what specifically; (2) there was no timetable provided; (3) there was no description given of the military assistance; (4) there was no mention of territorial integrity (with regard to the Katanga situation); and (5) United Nations troops were only to use weapons in self-defense and were not to become a party to any internal conflicts.



This period saw intense arguments, within both the Congo and the United Nations, over the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga. These were only resolved by a personal visit from Hammarskjöld to Katanga on 12 August. Further, Prime Minister Lumumba grew extremely critical and distrustful of United Nations aid, issuing several ultimatums for the United Nations to conform to his policies and provide United Nations military force against Tshombe in Katanga or withdraw.

Hammarskjöld was deeply personally involved in the handling of the Congo crisis, repeatedly appearing before the Council seeking endorsement of his actions. On 8 August, the Council passed Resolution 146, backing Hammarskjöld's plan and actions, clarifying the territorial integrity issue by calling upon all States to refrain from any action that might undermine the territorial integrity of the Republic of Congo, and again demanding the departure of Belgian troops. Although the first United Nations troops entered Katanga in mid-August, the Belgians did not fully withdraw until mid-October.

In early September, Kasa-Vubu dismissed Lumumba and declared a new government, with the support of the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Joseph Mobutu. Lumumba, in turn, announced that President Kasa-Vubu was no longer Head of State and called upon the people, workers and the army to rise. The Council of Ministers published a communiqué depriving Kasa-Vubu of his powers, nullifying his ordinance, revoking the Government and accusing him of high treason. In votes by both houses of the Congolese parliament, Lumumba's claim to legitimacy was supported. With the opening of the General Assembly that fall, both factions vied for the Congo's seat. The Kasa-Vubu delegate was seated after a long, drawn out political battle.

The interplay of Cold War politics was an underlying factor in the Congo crisis. While the West mildly supported Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu, the Soviets and their allies supported the legitimacy of the Lumumba government and the Congolese Parliament by providing military aid to Lumumba and several factions. The Soviets also used the crisis as an opportunity to attack Hammarskjöld's leadership. Khrushchev went so far as to attack Hammarskjöld specifically in his address at the opening of the General Assembly in 1960.

The final major group of players in the Congo crisis were the other African States. Seventeen African States were admitted to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall 1960 session, immediately becoming a bloc influencing negotiations and actions. While they joined the West in isolating the Soviet bloc, they were not united, and often disagreed with the West on specifics in the Congo. Three major African groups arose: those which backed Lumumba, those which backed the actions of the United Nations to date, and those which backed Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu.

Near the end of 1960, events again moved toward an imminent crisis. On 28 November, Lumumba was arrested by forces loyal to Mobutu and jailed. He remained a captive at the end of the year. Katanga was still independent, with a strong Belgian infrastructure still in place. Finally, both the Belgians and the Soviets were supplying various factions in bids to establish new independent territories.

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THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Many Latin American and Caribbean countries were dealing with severe and mounting problems entering the 1960s. The countries in this region faced the incredible tasks of industrializing their economies, enacting land reform and establishing civilian control over the military all at the same time. The end results of the rapidly changing political and economic climate were political and social instability throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. After a short period of military rule, Argentina's newly elected government had to deal with general strikes and massive inflation in 1959. Brazil, which was attempting 50 years of economic improvement in five, was facing an imminent reckoning with foreign creditors and growing unrest in the military. Meanwhile, civil unrest was prevalent in El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Guatemala.



The deepening mistrust between the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro, who took power in Cuba on 1 January 1959, and several other Latin American States, most notably the United States, set the stage for heightened Cold War tensions. While Castro had not officially declared himself a Marxist, his populist policies, increasing reliance on the Communist Party for organizational support and crack-down on anti-communist factions were more than enough to convince the United States of Castro's intention to establish a Marxist regime in Cuba. Moves by Cuba and the Soviet Union to form stronger political, economic and military ties raised the possibility of a Communist military presence in the heart of the Americas, which would undermine the entire inter-American system of alliances, treaties, international organization and tacit understandings. Even without the establishment of bases by Communist powers, activities of the Soviet bloc in supplying arms and military advice to a State in Latin America presented problems of hemispheric defense for the United States, and thus international politics. Cuba's growing political, military and economic relationship with the Soviet Union was discouraged by several American states, which called for Cuba to remain in the framework of the inter-American principles.

In turn, Cuba accused the United States of promoting plans for intervention in Cuba, protecting Cuban war criminals, providing training facilities for counter-revolutionary elements and multiple violations of Cuban air space throughout 1960. In July 1960, the Cuban government requested an opportunity to be heard before the Security Council to discuss what it termed "repeated threats, reprisals and aggressive acts" by the United States against Cuba. The Security Council responded with Resolution 144 (19 July 1960), which deferred the issue until a report was received from the Organization of American States, and called on all parties to reduce tensions in the region.

Current issues facing the Council include the possibility of increased tension between Cuba and other States in the region and the likelihood of new political instability caused by political and economic development crises in the region.

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SECURITY COUNCIL / SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

During its early years, the United Nations was generally allowed only those duties the great powers were willing to cede to it. In that context, the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General and his Secretariat was rarely acrimonious. Furthermore, the United Nations was rarely an active power broker in a crisis situation. The relative lack of real international responsibility within the Secretariat quickly began to evaporate when Dag Hammarskjöld succeeded Trygve Lie as Secretary-General in 1953. Hammarskjöld's perception of the ideals of the United Nations may not have been more expansive than those of his predecessor, but he was significantly more willing to take action. As Secretary-General, he greatly extended the influence of the United Nations with his peacekeeping efforts, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.

Hammarskjöld used his good offices in a variety of situations to attempt to prevent war and further the purpose of the United Nations Charter. Though rebuffed, he attempted to intercede during the Suez Crisis, and he was constantly working to engage various players in the Middle East. Hammarskjöld was most active, however, in the many African disputes of the era, especially as decolonization peaked in the late 1950s. Hammarskjöld regularly did more than just offer the good offices of the Secretary-General; he was an active believer in the role of United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Under Hammarskjöld, United Nations peacekeeping forces were deployed to more areas of dispute and in greater numbers than at any time before or since. Hammarskjöld's activist approach to the office of Secretary-General and the Secretariat often led to tensions, both within the United Nations bureaucracy, and between the Secretariat and Member States. Hammarskjöld was willing to take action without having first gained what others considered to be full approval for those actions. The use of peacekeeping forces, without specific Security Council resolutions allowing engagement of those forces, is one such example. Hammarskjöld often defended his actions on the principles of working toward the maintenance of international peace and stability or on expansive views of General Assembly actions and authority.

Regardless of where the authority for his action derived, the activist nature in which the office of Secretary-General was viewed (both by Hammarskjöld and by his Secretariat support staff) led to many disagreements. Several Member States publicly expressed disapproval with what they viewed as the Secretary-General's meddling in what were otherwise sovereign affairs or policies. It was, in fact, just this attitude that led to the Soviet's attempt to have Hammarskjöld removed from the post of Secretary-General.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS

Cold War tensions colored the entire spectrum of international relations throughout the middle of the 20th Century. Most viewed the era as a zero-sum game for virtually every decision made by the United States, Soviet Union and their allies. In 1960, tensions were reaching their highest levels yet. While many minor events occurred during the year, the most significant incident occurred 1 May 1960 when Soviet missiles were able to bring down a United States U-2 spy plane in Soviet airspace. The incident took place just prior to the East-West Summit in Paris, significantly increasing the tense setting for the meeting. The Security Council took up the discussion under the heading "The Question of Relations Between the Great Powers," and discussions were held in several meetings from May through July 1960. A draft resolution concerning the violation of Soviet airspace failed to garner a majority on 26 May; this was followed by a more neutrally phrased resolution on 27 May. This resolution recommended the peaceful resolution of problems between States, appealed to United Nations Members to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, called for continued disarmament talks between the major powers, especially on nuclear issues, and urged the Four Powers (France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States) to continue discussions in order to reduce tensions. The Soviet Union again complained to the Council of continuing aggressive acts by the U.S. Air Force, and was met with repeated denials from the United States. This led to three additional draft resolutions in July, but each failed due to vetoes by Permanent Members of the Council. It is in the context of these relationships that the Security Council must again take up the crises of the 1961 time period. The Council's ability to act, and the efficacy of such action, could be predicated on overall United Nations activity and on the actions of its Member States.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

BRAZIL

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CHINA

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JAPAN

MOROCCO

NEW ZEALAND

PAKISTAN

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SPAIN

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VENEZUELA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

As 1993 began, the United Nations was faced with the challenge of promoting three interlocking and mutually reinforcing goals: peace, development and democracy. The United Nations peace keeping operations in the field were evolving to include political, social, humanitarian and environmental dimensions. Political, social and cultural nation-building were requirements for development to take root across the world. States also came to realize that the democratization of national institutions and the protection of the fundamental human rights of all citizens were a necessary prerequisite to development, as development was to peace. The Security Council of 1993 required new approaches to information gathering and dissemination in order to obtain the confidence of the international community on an ever-globalizing world stage.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions are designed to assist in developing a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- Should the United Nations be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the United Nations play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the issue?

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 left ethnic groups waging war with each other, rehashing centuries of ethnic and religious grievances. The epicenter of the ethnic conflict was the newly independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Immediately after independence in 1992, Serb National Forces barricaded themselves around the city of Sarajevo and launched artillery attacks on the city. Serb forces and ethnic Serbian militias, both working for a larger Serbian homeland, began a systematic invasion and takeover of much of the rural land within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian militias forced all non-Serbs out of the territory under Serbian control, creating thousands of refugees. In addition, reports of violence against non-Serbs, particularly Muslims, began surfacing, and, by the end of 1992, Serbian forces controlled 70 percent of Bosnia, creating a political and humanitarian emergency of increasing urgency.

In response to the growing unrest, the United Nations authorized the creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992. UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure conditions for peace talks and to help maintain peace in several designated "safe zones." United Nations peacekeepers were successful

in enabling humanitarian aid, but little was accomplished in the way of securing peace. The Security Council imposed a series of economic sanctions against what remained of Yugoslavia starting in May of 1992. All import, export and transport to and from Yugoslavia was forbidden; monetary transactions of any sort were strictly curtailed; all social and cultural contacts were broken off; and diplomatic representation was drastically reduced.

The United Nations and European Economic Community (EEC) sent a negotiating team to Bosnia, led by United Nations Special Envoy David Owen and EEC Representative Cyrus Vance. The lead negotiators unveiled the Vance-Owen peace plan in late 1992, with debate continuing into the spring of 1993. Muslim and Croat factions agreed to the plan after further negotiation, but the plan ran into problems while seeking Serbian support. The United States became highly critical of the plan and claimed that its provisions rewarded the Serbs for their aggression. The United States instead lobbied for a "lift and strike" plan which involved editing the terms of the arms embargo to provide weapons support for the Muslim and Croat soldiers as well as using United States and NATO air forces to conduct air raids on Serbian forces. The United States' plan failed to gain any support within the Council. With the threat of force from the United States off the table, the Serbs saw no need to agree to the Vance-Owen plan.

With the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan, new levels of violence erupted within Bosnia. Muslim and Croat forces that had been united in an uneasy alliance against the Serbs have begun fighting each other. Despite calls by the Security Council and UNPROFOR, hostilities continued, and the fighting is blocking the main humanitarian assistance supply routes into northern Bosnia and restricting the movements of UNPROFOR and UNHCR.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Since decolonization, Somalia experienced persistent internal warfare accompanied by poor social and economic conditions. In January 1991, internal conflict between various factions resulted in a lack of a recognized central government and a collapse of state institutions. Intra-clan conflict, poor economic conditions and a wide-spread drought destroyed the agricultural system in Somalia which resulted in a massive famine and the deaths of at least three hundred thousand Somalis since 1991. Control of food supplies has led to divided loyalties and is used as currency for armaments.

On 3 March 1992, representatives of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid, the United Somali Congress factional leaders, signed a ceasefire agreement and allowed for the United Nations to deploy a monitoring mission into Somalia to oversee arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance to the region. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council approved Resolution 751, which created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); in July, fifty military observers were sent to Mogadishu to monitor ceasefire agreement conditions. On 15 August 1992 the United Nations humanitarian "Operation Provide Relief" commenced. However, due to insufficient security the United Nations' humanitarian effort was largely ineffective; flights were looted, food convoys hijacked, and aid workers assaulted. UNOSOM I was regarded as a failure, and with Resolution 794 the Security Council called upon Member States to contribute military forces to help establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

In December, U.S. President George Bush proposed to have the United States lead an international force to Somalia to provide a secure environment. The United States would then turn the operation over to United Nations peacekeeping forces once the situation on the ground stabilized. On 5 December, the United Nations approved the plan and 25,000 U.S. troops with an additional 17,000 from more than twenty additional countries deployed as part of a United Task Force (UNITAF) named "Operation Restore Hope."

UNITAF forces landed without opposition on the coast of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, took control of two airfields and proceeded to secure other key installations. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali organized a national reconciliation conference for Somalia in January 1993; representatives from 14 Somali political movements attended. By the end of the conference, three agreements had been reached: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993; the Agreement On Implementing The Cease-fire And On Modalities Of Disarmament; and the Agreement On The Establishment Of An Ad Hoc Committee.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted his recommendation to the Security Council that the United Nations-led UNOSOM II replace UNITAF as the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, and officially succeeded UNITAF on 4 May 1993. UNOSOM II would seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF: the mandate of UNOSOM II extended beyond humanitarian relief to include nation-building through disarmament of the Somali people, restoring law and order and support of infrastructure and a representative government.

On 27 March 1993, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia; the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants. The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament



and security; rehabilitation and reconstruction; restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Presently, implementation of the agreement has stalled and militias are again maneuvering for positions of power and fighting has renewed.

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THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu began with Belgian colonial rule. The Belgians chose to govern Rwanda through the preferential treatment and empowerment of the Tutsis; later, when the Tutsi elite began to agitate for independence, this favored status switched to Hutus and further complicated relations. In 1962, Rwanda was granted independence, elections installed a radical Hutu government

and popular violence against Tutsis drove many into exile (particularly into Uganda). In 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power and pledged to restore order; however, the establishment of a one-party state, ethnic quotas and preferential treatment of Hutus did little to bridge the ethnic divide. To further exacerbate poor social conditions, Rwanda's economy experienced a harsh shock in 1989 when coffee prices fell dramatically. Rwanda's primary export products are coffee and tea, and falling prices of these commodities caused severe economic hardship throughout the country.

In 1990, the Habyarimana government came under pressure from the Tutsi refugee diaspora living in Uganda, who wished to return to their homeland. The recently-formed Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was at the forefront of this movement. The Habyarimana government and the RPF disagreed fundamentally on the solution to the repatriation problem, and tensions came to a head on 1 October 1990, when RPF forces invaded from Uganda. The RPF had more experience and training. Despite a disadvantage in numbers, the RPF made significant progress against the Rwandan Armed Forces. Before the RPF advance reached Kigali, the Rwandan government called upon Belgium, France and Zaire for military and financial assistance. The Belgian and French troops provided security and organizational assistance in Kigali while the Zairean reinforcements engaged the RPF alongside the Rwandan Armed Forces at the front lines. The RPF was repelled back to a national park near the Ugandan border by the end of October.

The Belgian and Zairean troops withdrew after the RPF offensive was stopped, but the French remained in the country, organizing, training and equipping the Rwandan Armed Forces. Within Rwanda, the RPF was denounced by the government. Armed mobs of Hutu civilians began pursuing RPF "collaborators," who often happened to be Tutsi, killing them and driving them from their homes.

The war continued for almost two years until a cease-fire agreement was signed on 12 July 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania. This agreement set a timetable for the cessation of hostilities, promoted political talks with the goal of arranging a peace accord with power-sharing, and authorized the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer.

On 9 January 1993, a power-sharing agreement was signed in Arusha, calling for a new government to divide power between President Habyarimana's party, RPF representatives and several other Rwandan political parties. Violence surged inside the country when Habyarimana's party declared their rejection of the agreement on 21 January. On 8 February, RPF violated the cease-fire, reached the outskirts of Kigali, and drove Rwandan troops south. Hutu civilian residents of the RPF-controlled areas fled. French forces were called upon to come to the Rwandan government's aid. Meanwhile, Rwandan soldiers took vengeance on Tutsi civilians and opponents of the regime, killing over 147 people. Many more were beaten, tortured and raped as hundreds of homes and businesses were looted and burned.

The return to unrest and ethnic violence further strained the humanitarian situation. In early February, the number of internally displaced persons reached nearly one million. The International Committee of the Red Cross warned of a major catastrophe and increased its budget for Rwanda eightfold. Through these efforts, the relief organizations hoped to ease the plight of the displaced persons until the fundamental issues of violence within the country and in the border areas near Uganda were resolved.



On 22 February, Uganda and Rwanda sent separate letters to the President of the United Nations Security Council asking for the deployment of military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, specifically arms transportation. In response, the Secretary-General sent a goodwill mission from 4 to 18 March. Concurrently, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania brokered a meeting between the warring factions from 5 to 7 March. The two sides agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and resume peace talks in Arusha. Following the Security Council's Resolution 812 of 12 March, a technical mission was dispatched to the Uganda-Rwanda border, and reported that it would be possible to deploy military observers on the Rwandan side to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it.

The Arusha talks reconvened on 16 March, and the United Nations launched an interagency appeal on 15 April for international assistance to Rwanda to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people. Rwanda and the RPF have requested an international force to monitor a demilitarized zone to be established along the lines of the previous cease-fire agreement. On 20 May, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Haiti's recent political problems stem from a 30 September 1991 coup d'état, led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, which deposed the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Reaction to the coup was violent and Haiti plunged into disorder and violence. The civil unrest has resulted in the massive displacement of an estimated 300,000 Haitians, sending tens of thousands of refugees to neighboring countries.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations have been working to bring stability and peace back to Haiti and have made efforts to reinstate the presidency of Aristide. On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which it again demanded the restoration of President Aristide, the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights. It also requested the Secretary-General to take the "necessary measures" in order to assist the OAS to solve the Haitian crisis.

The Secretary-General appointed Dante Caputo as his special envoy for Haiti in December 1992, and Caputo immediately held preliminary consultations with the various parties. By mid-January 1993, he received verbal support for an international civilian mission and dialogue to resolve the political crisis.

In his 18 January letter to President Aristide the Secretary-General agreed to United Nations participation in an international civilian mission subject to the approval of the General Assembly and agreement by the OAS. Following the Special Envoy's consultations, the idea and mandate of an International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement were incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Mr. Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.

With MICIVIH instituted, Caputo turned his attention to seeking a political solution. The immediate objective was agreement on three issues: the return of President Aristide; the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for reconstruction of the country and the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti. So far the negotiations have failed. In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of the United Nations component of MICIVIH.

The General Assembly authorized United Nations participation with the OAS in MICIVIH on 20 April, reiterating the need to have the Aristide government restored to power and continuing dialogue with Caputo. The General Assembly rejected the partial Parliamentary elections that Haiti organized in January 1993. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have centered on the deployment of 500 foreign police officers. However, Aristide supporters are against any armed international presence in the country.

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THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

At the onset of 1993, three peacekeeping operations were present in the region: two peacekeeping forces—the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—and an observer mission: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). On 13 January 1993, the United States, United Kingdom and France conducted air raids on Iraqi anti-missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq following a series of incidents on the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait involving Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone and unauthorized retrieval of Iraqi property from Kuwaiti



territory. Following the implementation of the air raids the Security Council passed resolution 806 authorizing the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) to take direct physical action in response to any future violation of the demilitarized zone.

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OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS: PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

On 14 May 1992, the United Nations announced that peacekeeping costs were expected to rise by more than a third to \$3.7 billion. The failure of Member States to pay their share of peacekeeping costs is a major problem. By the end of April, unpaid peacekeeping dues totalled \$1.5 billion. These unpaid dues create serious doubts about the United Nations' ability to finance future peacekeeping operations at a critical moment. The current United Nations mission in Somalia, UNOSOM II, is expected to cost \$1.2 billion a year. If the Serbs in Bosnia can be persuaded to accept an international peace plan, the United Nations plans to deploy some 70,000 troops to the area, which could cost \$2 billion a year.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly is the main deliberative policy-making body of the United Nations (UN) and is empowered to address all international issues covered by the Charter. In many ways, it acts as the central hub of the United Nations. Many United Nations bodies report to the General Assembly, but not all of these bodies are subsidiary to the GA. For example, the Security Council constantly updates the General Assembly on its work, but it is an independent body; its work does not require the General Assembly's independent approval. In contrast, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and is governed by General Assembly mandates. Other subsidiary bodies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), also have direct reporting relationships with the General Assembly.

The United Nations Charter assigns each of the main Committees of the General Assembly specific tasks and topics to discuss during each session. Because every Member State has a seat in every Committee, it is important to note that the points of discussion do not overlap; even if two or more Committees are discussing a general topic area, each Committee is responsible for discussing a very specific point or aspect of that topic. For example, the Fourth Committee may discuss the Israeli-Palestine conflict with regard to its political components. However, issues concerning the legal, social, or economic components of the Israeli-Palestine conflict are left to other Committees, the General Assembly Plenary, or the Security Council. Therefore, Representatives in each Committee should take care not to expand the discussion of any topic beyond the limitations set by their Committee's mandate and into another Committee's area of discussion. This is known as the Committee's purview.

A note concerning funding: The Fifth Committee makes financing decisions concerning only the United Nations's regular, annual budget, not those decisions dealing with voluntary contributions or new outlays. Even though AMUN will not be simulating the Fifth Committee, other Committees generally do not act unless sufficient funds are available for their proposals, thus financial questions should still be considered during the other Committees' deliberations. Therefore, if a Committee creates a new program or initiative, that Committee should specify how the program can or will be funded, and if the program falls within the United Nations's regular annual budget, that resolution should defer to the Fifth Committee to establish funding.

The purpose of the Combined Plenary session on the final day is to ratify the resolutions which passed in the four Main GA Committees and build consensus. While a small amount of additional debate is typical, it is expected that the work done by each Committee over the first three days of the Conference will be respected. It would thus be rare for significant changes to be made, or for a resolution to fail in the Plenary session after passing in Committee.

The following are brief descriptions of each Committee simulated at AMUN, along with the Committee's agenda, a brief purview of each committee, a brief background and research guide for each agenda topic, and the Committee's website address. Representatives should use this

information as the first step in their research on the powers and limitations of their particular Committee in relation to the agenda topics.

PURVIEW OF THE CONCURRENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY

The General Assembly Plenary typically considers issues that several Committees would have the power to discuss, but which would best be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Likewise, the General Assembly Plenary is also responsible for coordinating work between the many different bodies of the United Nations. For example, the 60th General Assembly recently established a Peacebuilding Commission that oversees the United Nations' peacebuilding processes and coordinates the work of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General, and Member States emerging from conflict situations. Note that if the Security Council, which is given the primary task of ensuring peace and security by the Charter, is discussing a particular issue, the General Assembly Plenary will cease its own deliberations and defer to the Security Council.

Website: www.un.org/ga/

EXTERNAL DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The 2007 financial crisis highlighted and exacerbated global economic imbalances. As the international community reeled from the destruction, a number of sovereign debt crises followed in the wake of the financial crisis. The recent Eurozone crisis and the current high debt loads of many developing states were just the latest round of global emergencies kicked off by sovereign debt. Total external debt of developing countries reached an estimated \$4.8 trillion in 2011; long-term debt represents nearly 70 percent of the total and is mainly held by private creditors. Debt sustainability and effective debt management are essential in helping countries meet their national development objectives and the Millennium Development Goals.

When countries are overly burdened by debt and debt payments, they face tough choices on how to allocate their yearly budgets. All countries need to make significant capital infrastructure investments—such as electricity generation and distribution, roads, airports and ports. Significant debt loads limit the resources available for these capital investments, frequently pushing governments to issue new debt to make infrastructure investments. This further limits resources in the future, especially Least Developed Countries (LDCs), who begin with more limited revenue. In the past, credit relief programs were also often creditor driven, taking into account the needs of the creditors over the needs of the borrowers. These policies frequently led to poor financial decisions that further hurt developing economies while doing little to address the long-term debt problems.

The first round of modern international debt crises came to a head in the 1990s when dozens of primarily developing countries faced unsustainable debt levels. In response, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other international financial institutions worked together to offer solutions. In 1996, the



IMF and the World Bank formed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which offered eligible countries debt reduction in exchange for meeting certain benchmarks in setting sound financial policies and poverty reduction strategies. Since 1996, the HIPC Initiative has helped 36 countries reduce the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) devoted to servicing debt by an average of 1.5 percent. Additionally, in the 35 countries that have met all terms of the program, spending on public health and welfare has increased to five times that of debt spending. The IMF, World Bank and the African Development Bank have further agreed to the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which grants full debt cancellation for countries that have met HIPC Initiatives. The HIPC initiative is estimated to provide a total of \$71 billion USD to 41 eligible countries, while MDRI is expected to provide an additional \$28 billion.

The General Assembly is an important forum for the international community to reflect collectively on the benefits, costs and strategies for managing external debt and its impact on development. Through the 1980s the United Nations reported on the increasing difficulty developing States had paying creditors and begun raising concerns about the adverse affects on development. In the early 1990s, the United Nations became worried by the continued growth in debt, the inability of some States to pay and the failure of previous debt reforms—especially as macroeconomic shocks in the 1990s and early 2000s led some heavily indebted States to default on their debts. The General Assembly was a crucial force urging the creation of the HIPC Initiative. The IMF and World Bank have also collaborated with the United Nations to help measure and track progress on several of the Millennium Development Goals. The technical expertise of the IMF and World Bank provide the United Nations valuable partners in efforts to address this topic.

In addition to the initiatives aimed at poorer countries, there are also positive developments for middle-income countries, most notably the Paris Club and the Evian Approach. The Paris Club is a group of creditor States who coordinate to find sustainable solutions for countries facing debt repayment difficulties. Traditionally, assistance has come in the form of shorter-term debt solutions such as rescheduling payments or granting forbearance. Since the adoption of the Evian Approach in 2003, the focus has shifted to first analyzing debt conditions and implementing changes based on the underlying issues, including options that focus on long-term debt sustainability.

There are still critical issues that need to be addressed. One major issue is that the programs described above only address debts owed to the creditors that are involved in the programs. Since 2000, the composition of external debt and debtors has shifted, and the share of long-term external debt owed to private creditors has increased. A number of countries are now facing aggressive litigation stemming from debt collection by commercial creditors and so-called “vulture funds.” These efforts have the potential to undermine poverty reduction benefits in developing countries. There is also concern over available funding for debt relief. Currently three countries—Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea—are positioning themselves to enter into the HIPC Initiative; however, the inclusion of any one of these has the potential to bankrupt the system.

Debt relief does not guarantee a financial recovery. Many HIPC countries still have fragile economies that can be devastated by conflict, natural disaster or global economic events. Much of the progress made in the early 2000s was threatened by the global economic recession of the past six years. The global recession has had a lasting impact on many of

the indebted countries in the developing world. The economic downturn has also renewed concerns over poor economic choices. One such concern is over sustainable development practices. As many countries try to stabilize their economies, they often gravitate to policies that generate quick revenue at the expense of the environment, health and welfare of citizens and other indicators.

Looking ahead, the General Assembly should consider several issues. First, the international community must consider how it can encourage and support domestic financing. Policymakers need to think creatively about how to provide investors with appropriate incentives to invest in sustainable development. Second, the General Assembly should consider how traditional development cooperation, and official development assistance in particular, can support economic growth and debt relief. Technical assistance to manage debt and address debt problems can be crucial for many countries, in particular the most vulnerable. Finally, the General Assembly might consider how it can address the challenges stemming from the marked increase in privately-held sovereign debt; integrating their concerns into debt relief negotiations, convincing them of the benefit of these programs, will be vital as their proportion of funding increases.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include the following:

- What should the international community’s response be to the growing role of private creditors in the external debt crisis?
- How can the General Assembly support and encourage Member States’ efforts to address external debt?
- How could future debt relief initiatives be integrated with other forms of development aid and financial assistance?

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PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT

In 2001, the Ambassador of China to the United Nations stated, “In some sense, the United Nations itself has been a product of the prevention of armed conflict.” Founded in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations was conceived with the clear goals of promoting peace as well as preventing and ending armed conflict. While it pursues these goals through many means—social and economic development, economic integration and trade, and disarmament—one of the central pillars of the United Nations’ work has been to mediate or stop armed conflicts.

Many elements of the United Nations are involved in preventing and responding to conflicts. The Security Council is the central international body for addressing armed aggression and dealing with specific threats to the international peace. It may also authorize peacekeeping operations, which are managed by the Secretariat. The General Assembly focuses on addressing the systemic and institutional causes of armed conflict. The General Assembly Plenary has historically used its broad purview to take a comprehensive look at the causes of armed conflict, to include resource and geopolitical competition, ideology, poverty and political disenfranchisement, among many others.

Throughout most of its history, the United Nations has focused on reacting to conflicts through mediation efforts, interventions and declarations by the Security Council and the deployment of peacekeepers. Following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations increasingly faced complex conflicts: intrastate conflicts, civil wars and crimes against humanity. In many of these circumstances, the United Nations’ reactive toolkit was not well-suited to creating enduring solutions.

In 2000, the Security Council asked Secretary-General Kofi Annan to prepare a study and recommendations on the future of the prevention of armed conflict by the United Nations. Released in 2001, the report focused on shifting the United Nations from a reactive approach to conflict to a proactive or preventative approach. The Secretary-General made a number of recommendations, including recommended actions for States, the private sector, regional organizations and civil society. Moreover, he called upon the entire United Nations system to develop a culture of prevention.

Responding to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly passed a resolution on the prevention of armed conflict in 2003.

This resolution aimed to implement some of the Secretary-General’s recommendations. The resolution also sought to clarify the roles of the Member States, General Assembly, the Security Council and various private entities in the solution to and prevention of armed conflict. The hope was that these actions would help Member States achieve greater cooperation and finding solutions diplomatically before the conflict escalates to one of violence.

The General Assembly continually examines the underlying causes of armed conflicts. The goal is to develop solutions that achieve more than just the absence of conflict but the ability to have tools in place to solve problems prior to the escalation to violence. Prevention efforts are ideally focusing on ways to eliminate the need for aggression in the first place as opposed to controlling the used of arms during conflicts.

Since 2003, the United Nations has sought to implement the recommendations from the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. In many instances, these have met with great success, such as the creation of the Kimberly Process and other efforts at preventing the trafficking of conflict minerals and the formation of the United Nations’ Mediation Support Unit and Peacebuilding Commission. In 2006, the Secretary-General published a follow-up report, reviewing progress made since 2001. His report highlighted a growing culture of prevention, efforts to maximize the costs of wars to make them more unattractive, and key policy changes enabled by the international community’s activism on the issue. Throughout his report, the Secretary-General extolled progress in the understanding of the causes of armed conflict, acknowledging that any successful effort at conflict avoidance or mitigation must start with a firm understanding of the motivators of conflict.

The United Nations has increasingly made use of training and stabilization operations to prevent situations from decaying/devolving into violence. More specialized and technical agencies are including conflict prevention as a core element of their work, using their technical assistance and training mandates to address drivers of conflict. Member States are, in many cases, collaborating to address conflict. Yet these changes have not always worked. Despite extensive mediation efforts by the United Nations, the civil war in Syria is ongoing. The 2012 rebellion and coup d’état in Mali caught the international community off-guard and under-prepared. The situation was only stabilized following mediation efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and by a military intervention by the French armed forces on behalf of the interim government. Both ECOWAS and France continue their involvement in stabilizing the country. And in Asia, competing territorial claims in the South China Sea have become a major source of regional tension, drawing a number of States into a cycle of military and political maneuvering.

Following the numerous crises and conflicts over the last decade, the General Assembly now has an opportunity to assess how far the United Nations has come and how effective the recommendations from 2001 and 2003 have been. Since the Secretary-General’s report, the nature of conflict itself has changed. Many of the greatest conflicts of the last decade have been asymmetric, pitting States against non-state actors. Conflict between States increasingly makes use of unmanned aerial vehicles and cyberwarfare. The former pose a particular challenge because they reduce a primary deterrent of conflict: the loss of life on both sides. Over the last decade, many regional organizations have matured significantly—from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to



the League of Arab States and the African Union (AU). These organizations are increasingly playing a role in preventing armed conflict, particularly through mediation, though their full potential has yet to be realized. As the General Assembly looks ahead, it will need to consider what tools are necessary for Member States, civil society and other partners as they look to prevent armed conflicts in this time of great change.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How well have the United Nations' efforts to prevent conflict worked? How can the United Nations, Member States and other actors work to better prevent future conflicts?
- What is the role of regional bodies and organizations in preventing armed conflict?
- How can the United Nations contribute to the prevention of new forms of conflict, such as cyberwarfare and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles?

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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE

DISARMAMENT & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE

The General Assembly First Committee addresses the disarmament of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and related international security questions. The First Committee makes recommendations on the regulations of these weapons as they relate to international peace and security. The First Committee does not address legal issues surrounding weapons possession or control complex peace and security issues addressed by the Security Council. For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations's General Assembly as a whole, see page 24.

Website: www.un.org/ga/first/index.shtml

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

From the United Nations' very beginning, the international community has struggled with balancing the danger of nuclear weapons with access to the technology and the energy that nuclear fission can provide. In the aftermath of the second World War, the international community, fearing what the uncontrolled expansion of nuclear weapons could herald, promoted nuclear non-proliferation as a central element of international peace and stability. Restricting nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions is considered an effective constraint on the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and advanced nuclear weaponry.

As nuclear testing continued and more powerful weapons were developed, concerns about the radioactive fallout and the technologies mounted. In 1954, an experimental thermonuclear device tested by the United States at Bikini Atoll produced an explosion nearly twice the yield expected, resulting in far greater nuclear fallout than original estimates. A Soviet test soon after resulted in radioactive rain over Japan. Concerned by the health, safety, and environmental implications of these nuclear tests, the United Nations began negotiations on a nuclear testing ban in the 1950s. These discussions occurred between the nuclear powers privately and within the United Nations' Disarmament Commission with much international interest. While originally coupled with an attempt to achieve total nuclear disarmament, the latter concept was dropped for lack of progress.

A persistent problem was the question of verification; how could the parties ensure that the agreed upon restraints were being followed? As the talks continued through the late 1950s, the nuclear powers outlined the characteristics of a control system to monitor the ban, but nuclear testing continued. Several moratoriums were unilaterally declared by the Soviet Union and the Western powers during this time. After much back and forth, the nuclear powers agreed upon a text which became the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. As suggested by its name, the 1963 Treaty greatly restricted options for the testing of nuclear weapons, but it did not create an outright ban on the practice. Importantly, the parties had successfully defined a system for monitoring the Treaty. This system includes on-site inspections, monitoring sites and a network of seismic sensors.

In the interest of the broader auspices of nuclear non-proliferation, the international community continued to address the topic over the following decades. Key milestones included the creation of several Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT is intended to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology while protecting States' right to nuclear technology for peaceful use. The NPT also created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to oversee safeguards and confidence-building measures and implement verification measures. In 1994, the United Nations began discussions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to strengthen the 1963 Treaty and end underground nuclear testing. The CTBT itself was drafted and approved for signature by the General Assembly in September 1996. The CTBT seeks to end the testing of nuclear weapons and effectively cease the advancement of new weapons technologies within the field. The CTBT obligates signatories to prohibit any person or organization under its authority from testing such devices, contribute to an international monitoring system consisting of radiological and seismic observation stations, and implement confidence building measures regarding their compliance. It is designed with a specific cohort of parties to the treaty; before the CTBT can enter into force, forty-four nuclear-technology-holding States must sign and ratify it. As of June 2014, the CTBT still requires signatures from three of the forty-four Member States, and ratification by an additional five signatories.

Achieving full ratification of the CTBT has been a key goal for much of the international community. Beyond the symbolic meaning of sweeping ratification, the aforementioned 44 Member States, identified in Annex 2 of the CTBT, must ratify the treaty before it can actually enter into force. It is easy to imagine the CTBT as a bulwark of the international non-proliferation regime, yet in its current state it lacks the full weight of international law. In light of its importance, the United Nations has revisited the CTBT eight times in recent years with Conferences on Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conferences have focused on implementation of the treaty and moving those States identified by Annex 2 into a ratified status. Since 2007 both Colombia and Indonesia have ratified the treaty, and Israel and the People's Republic of China show signs of movement toward ratification. Meanwhile, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan remain non-signatories to the CTBT.

In the past decade the only nation to test nuclear weapons has been the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While these announced tests have been universally condemned by the 183 signatories to the CTBT, they have provided valuable confirmation that the established monitoring systems are capable of detecting clandestine nuclear blasts. In fact, the infrastructure developed to detect a nuclear test and monitor compliance with the CTBT has yielded unexpected benefits. Seismological monitoring systems can provide rapid, detailed data in the event of an impending tsunami, and atmospheric radiological detection methods were used to track nuclear contamination stemming from the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

Despite the high number of signatories to the CTBT, the treaty is a contentious topic, with debate over the CTBT providing a microcosm



of the challenges that face international diplomacy. Domestic politics add complexity to expanded ratification of the treaty. Some parties argue that Member States already in possession of nuclear weapons enjoy a privileged position as rule-makers, and the infringement on national sovereignty remains a concern. These challenges will not subside of their own accord, but with careful diplomacy they can be overcome. The CTBT's provision requiring all Annex 2 States to ratify the treaty before it enters force means that the international community must seek a consensus outcome in order to truly secure the treaty's legacy.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- In the case of non-ratifiers, what are the obstacles to ratification?
- How can the international community assist in encouraging other members to ratify the CTBT?
- Are there any potential modifications or addendums to the CTBT that could encourage ratification?
- How can the international community influence non-signatories to cease nuclear testing and encourage the eventual ratification and compliance with the CTBT?

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THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

While the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons occurs in all parts of the world, it is concentrated in areas plagued by armed conflict, organized crime and violence. Several factors allow the arms trade to flourish. Weak central authorities and porous borders permit easy flows of weapons and profits, while instability and violence generate the demand for weapons that fuels significant profits.

The illicit weapons trade feeds civil wars, provides terrorists with means to achieve their violent goals and stocks the arsenals of drug cartels. Even on a smaller scale, these weapons can expand the lethality of criminal gangs and enable many acts of violence. The pervasive availability of light arms has made massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law far easier than it would be under more tightly controlled circumstances.

In 1991, United Nations established the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The Register aimed to track legal, legitimate arms sales between Member States. In theory, tracking makes diverting arms to the black market more difficult and allows the international community to monitor potentially destabilizing build-ups of light weaponry. In practice, however, the results have been more mixed. All reports of arms exports and imports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms are purely voluntary, and compliance has been a challenge. In 1997 and 1999, the Secretary-General created two expert groups



to delve into the challenges associated with tackling the illegal arms trade. These groups prepared the agenda for the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The conference was a significant step forward in terms of cooperation within the international community on this growing problem. During this conference, United Nations Member States adopted the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects. The Programme of Action forms a procedural cornerstone for addressing light arms trafficking, although the recommendations it makes are non-binding. The Programme of Action asserts that meaningful steps must be taken at the national, regional and international levels if a durable solution is to be found. It encourages Member States to aggressively police unlicensed producers of arms within their borders and ensure that all legitimate manufacturers place serial numbers, as well as marks indicating country of origin, on all weapons produced. By implementing these policies, a large proportion of the light arms throughout the world would be traceable to their origins. Combining this traceability with the Programme of Action's other facet of regional and international information sharing networks creates protections against the illicit sale of arms. United Nations Member States reviewed the Programme of Action in 2012, and the published report highlighted several areas for continued focus. Member States are supposed to designate a National Coordination Agency tasked with overseeing the Programme of Action's implementation and small arms issues more broadly, but this has not been universally implemented. Ensuring the marking and tracing of weapons both manufactured domestically and imported from abroad has also fallen short of expectations. When record keeping is done, a vast number of Member States fail to maintain those records for the 30 year duration required by the International Tracing Instrument. A third review conference is scheduled for 2018.

In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the aforementioned International Tracing Instrument. The initiative encourages Member States to establish mechanisms to note the last legal owner of a small arm, both via manufacturer marks on the weapons themselves as well as diligent record keeping to document transfers of said weapons. The 2013 General Assembly resolution on this topic calls for Member States to submit reports on their implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, including the name and contact information of the national points of contact and information on national marking practices used to indicate country of manufacture and country of import.

Yet while efforts to increase the traceability is a major step forward for arms control, there are significant challenges to arms control efforts. Major weapons producers are cautious about efforts that significantly curtail their ability to produce and sell arms to legitimate buyers – and numerous importers of small arms have expressed their concern about efforts to restrict or invasively track small arms. Countless United Nations resolutions, statements and other documents affirm the rights of Member States to produce, export and stockpile such weapons for a variety of legitimate purposes. And while major producers may sell to legitimate organizations and individuals, there are many ways – including the use of shell organizations, theft, and others – that small arms make their way into the hands of criminals and terrorists.

Areas of weak governance – like the Trans-Sahel region – often create opportunities for wide distribution of weapons beyond the direct control of any State authority. Regional instabilities, like the revolution in Libya, can result in the transfer of legitimately acquired weapons to bad

actors. This can have severe negative ramifications on a civilian population. Recovering and accounting for these weapons is no easy task, but it is central to creating stability for these populations.

Several key developments on this issue have occurred quite recently. The General Assembly in 2013 made major progress toward greater accountability in the production and sale of small arms with the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by the General Assembly. With 118 signatories and 41 States Parties, the ATT is well on its way to the 50 ratifications necessary to enter into force. Much of the earlier work by United Nations bodies, such as clear marking of arms by manufacturers and import/export records, was incorporated into the document. Member States party to the treaty must also in good faith consider the impact on peace and security of the arms they export. In addition, exporters must evaluate if the weapons they are providing could facilitate serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law. Notably, many major exporters of light arms have not signed or ratified the convention. Without these States as parties to the Treaty, it will have a limited impact. Addressing the concerns of these States will be crucial to the viability of a stronger regime for preventing illicit small arms.

With this reality in mind, one of the greatest tools the international community can use to stem the tide of the illicit weapons trade is information. This information comes in a multitude of forms: from distinct manufacturing markings, to transfer records, to shared import/export data. The more tightly the web of international arms trade is woven, the more difficult it becomes to unravel into the black market.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can States further improve tracking and marking of small arms?
- Has your State ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, and if not what are the objections?
- How can the international community encourage voluntary disclosure of arms exports and imports?
- What are the main challenges in removing excess arms from regions recovering from armed conflict, and what tools does the United Nations possess to assist with that transition?

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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE

ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE

The Second Committee makes recommendations on means to improve the economic development of Member States and maintain the stability of the international financial and trade network. The economic issues considered by the Second Committee are distinguished from those considered by the Fifth Committee in that this Committee deals solely with financing the economic assistance to Member States, whereas the Fifth Committee addresses the budgetary issues within the United Nations System. The Second Committee does not address social issues that affect development; such issues are considered by the Third Committee. For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations's General Assembly as a whole, see page 24.

Website: www.un.org/ga/second/index.shtml

ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT

In 2012, the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development urged Member States to pursue new methods to eradicate poverty. Noting the staggering disparities between developing and developed countries, the Conference reported that current policies were insufficient to address poverty in a sustainable manner. Today, least-developed and landlocked countries, and those affected by conflict, currently face severe challenges in providing economic mobility for their socially vulnerable, especially women and youth. Increasing the ability for individuals in these countries to create and sustain small and medium enterprises is a crucial element for promoting economic growth. Whereas previous resolutions advocated technology sharing, expansionary monetary policy, or debt consolidation, current discussions emphasize supporting the capacity of small and medium sized business owners to sustain economic growth.

Entrepreneurs strive to develop and market innovative products and services. Entrepreneurs who seek to develop businesses that make a profit but also address local social, health and environmental concerns are widely referred to as social entrepreneurs. While some entrepreneurs in the developed world are able to access venture capital, entrepreneurs in the developing world frequently work within resource-scarce environments. Moreover, many entrepreneurs face bureaucratic permitting processes that stymie market entry for months or years, government entities that require bribes to function, litigious environments and lack of access to capital and traditional banking services. These conditions tend to discourage entrepreneurial ventures. According to a 2013 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, access to financial capital assets, education and supportive attitudes toward failure are the three main indicators for the success of entrepreneurs. The United Nations must act now to help entrepreneurs and solve key issues surrounding their success or failure.

In December 2012, the General Assembly Second Committee adopted the first resolution on “Entrepreneurship for Development.” The resolution recognized that entrepreneurs possess a unique capability to address issues within their own community, including water scarcity, food insecurity and health threats. To capitalize on entrepreneurial potential,

the resolution called upon Member States to create habitats conducive for individuals to start their own businesses. The General Assembly also invited technology transfers, supported entrepreneurial education and advocated for reducing barriers that discourage new ventures. In addition, the resolution called for a High Level Thematic Debate that would include members from the scientific, academic and business communities to discuss with policymakers key new methods for increasing economic growth in the developing world.

The High Level Thematic Debate hosted on 26 June 2013 addressed how entrepreneurship can support the post-2015 development agenda. Although the developing world faces various challenges, members from non-governmental organizations, venture capitalists and scholars agreed with the President of the 67th session of the General Assembly that “the post-2015 agenda will largely stand or fall on whether governments will be able to work together with individuals who embody the spirit of socially-responsible entrepreneurship.”

The High Level Thematic Debate highlighted various successful programs such as the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) programs, Women’s Entrepreneurship Development and Youth Entrepreneurship programs, which train women and youth to commercialize their ideas into enterprises. In addition, the debate called for continued support of partnerships between academia and business to promote youth entrepreneurs; for example, programs similar to the United Nations Information Center’s partnership with the Modern University of Business and Science in Beirut, which promotes entrepreneurship to Lebanese high-school students. Recognizing that all Member States possess different levels of expertise in supporting entrepreneurship, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development produced a policy framework to assist policymakers in developing governmental institutions that provide an enabling environment for entrepreneurs.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the President of the General Assembly have frequently called upon Member States to increase the ability and opportunity for entrepreneurs to thrive. Specifically, they listed current actions the United Nations is taking such as the Global Compact initiative and cooperation between the World Bank, United Nations Commission Trades and Development, ILO and the United Nations Capital Development fund, which is working with the MasterCard Foundation to give access to financial services to the poor in Sub-Saharan Africa. United Nations actors involved in this area also include the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, which recognizes that Africa would be especially benefited by positive entrepreneurship programs and is seeking to work with the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa and the African Union. But the United Nations has limited capabilities and many of the actions that would help to foster entrepreneurship must be taken within individual Member States.

Crowdsourcing—which refers to the practice of gathering creative or financial resources from a large group of people—is one potential area of growth for entrepreneurial development. Similar to microfinance and microloans, crowdsourcing is strongly supported by the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth. Its relatively new features makes it difficult to grasp its future impact of the program and how it will be regulated or supported



by Member States. Some contentious issues in this area include how to best support entrepreneurs through governments and whether subsidies, loan guarantees and other methods could possibly infringe upon international trade obligations.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can entrepreneurship support development objectives?
- What role does financing of entrepreneurs, including microfinance, microcredit, crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, etc. have in the feasibility of promoting entrepreneurship in development? What role promoting these policies is available to the United Nations? Member States? Regional bodies? Private industry and non-governmental organizations?
- What education policies could best boost entrepreneurship in the context of developing countries?

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PROMOTION OF NEW AND RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY

An estimated 1.2 billion people lack access to basic electricity and 2.8 billion people still depend on nonrenewable sources or traditional biomass for cooking, heat and light. As more people escape poverty and the global middle class continues to grow, global demand for all forms of energy is rapidly increasing. This demand causes significant problems. The widespread use of wood and other biomass contributes to pollution and deforestation. There are also development implications: communities that use biomass must dedicate significant resources to gathering biomass, reducing the time they have available to perform other productive work. The large-scale use of carbon-based energy sources—coal, oil and natural gas—are causing global climate change and contributing to unprecedented levels of pollution in some regions. Climate change has the prospect of causing rising sea levels and unstable weather patterns. Simultaneously, nonrenewable sources of energy are being depleted and becoming more expensive. Member States recognize that identifying new and renewable sources of energy will be critical to both the eradication of poverty and sustainable development for the future.

Over the last 30 years, new and alternative forms of energy have become increasingly common and affordable. Wind turbines have become more widely deployed, and new technology may allow “kite” turbines to be placed up in the high-speed winds of jet streams. For decades, the efficiency of solar panels has been increasing and dropping in cost-per-watt. In many regions, solar panels are reaching grid parity—the point at which the cost-per-watt of an energy source are more economically effective to install than traditional non-renewable power plants. Other, low-tech options—such as cheap, foldable solar stoves—also meet the cooking and heat needs of those with the least economic means. However, mass adoption of these technologies face several roadblocks. Large wind turbine farms and solar plants require extensive supporting infrastructure to carry the energy to markets. Wind and solar are also both non-continuous sources of energy; wind turbines, for example, only spin about a third of the time. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, when four nuclear reactors underwent a series of failures in the aftermath of an earthquake and tsunami in 2011, has discouraged investment in nuclear energy. As these sources struggle, the controversial practice of hydraulic fracturing has unlocked massive reserves of natural gas. As a result, natural gas has become an alternative energy of choice for many new projects because of its low cost and comparably low environmental impact.

During the 1970s, with the rise in and volatility of costs for petroleum, more attention was focused on new and renewable sources of energy. This led the General Assembly to convene the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy in Nairobi in 1981. The conference examined alternative forms of energy, including wind, solar, bio-mass, geothermal and hydropower. It adopted the Nairobi Program of Action for the Development and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of Energy as a blueprint for national and international action. The Nairobi Program identified five broad areas for concentrated action: energy assessment and planning; research, development, and demonstration; transfer, adaptation, and application of mature technologies; information flows; and education and training. Endorsing the Nairobi



Program later that year, the General Assembly set up an interim committee to launch immediate implementation and, in 1992, established the Committee on the Development and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of Energy, open to the participation of all States as full members.

In 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Committee that in 1990 new and renewable energy sources accounted for 17.7 percent of the total energy consumption. The drop in oil prices during the 1980's had led to a decline in investment in renewable energy resources. But growing concern for the environment lent urgency to efforts to find alternatives to fuels that contributed to global warming.

Since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, new and renewable energy sources have received a great deal of attention. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation called for substantially increasing the global share of energy derived from new and renewable sources of energy. In the Secretary-General's 2007 report on the promotion of new and renewable sources of energy, it was highlighted how achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and of more equitable socio-economic development will depend on providing the poor with increased access to modern energy services to enable them to meet their basic needs and for income-generation. With strong international support, many Member States undertook initiatives to expand the proportion of energy generated by these alternative and new sources.

United Nations and the World Bank launched the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4ALL) in late 2011. This new multi-stakeholder initiative sets three main goals for 2030: providing universal access to electricity and modern fuels for cooking, doubling the rate of improvement in energy efficiency, and doubling the share of renewable energy. The initiative attempts to lower the barrier of high up-front costs that are associated with renewable energy by supporting new business models, investments and partnerships that increase access to renewable energy. The partnership also finances a variety of renewable energy sources. SE4ALL promotes financing from Member States, African Development Bank, Sustainable Endowment Institute, World Institute of Renewable Energy and CleanStart, among others.

Building on this energy, the United Nations General Assembly in 2012 declared 2014-2024 the United Nations Decade of Sustainable Energy for All. Looking forward, the General Assembly will need to consider how to translate the high interest in this issue into tangible results. Several issues merit consideration from the body. First, Member States need to consider the barriers to shifting toward renewable and sources of energy. There are still technological barriers to the widespread use of renewable energy forms in some applications, like motor vehicles, that have not been fully addressed. Scaling the use of these technologies is particularly challenging. Many forms of renewable energy continue to suffer from high start-up costs and high maintenance costs. Finding additional ways to reduce the costs of renewable technologies to parity with existing sources of energy is crucial. Member States should consider how to scale the growth of small-scale, renewable energy technologies into the developing world. In many States, poor electricity infrastructure, large distances and difficult terrain mean that reaching rural communities with traditional infrastructure may be cost prohibitive. New, small-scale technologies could provide a good solution—but there remain significant economic and regulatory barriers. The widespread growth of mobile phone access in the developing world demonstrates

that networked and distributed models can be effective, as long as the incentives are right for providers.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What actions can the United Nations take to help reduce barriers to the use of renewable energy, particularly in developing countries?
- What actions can Member States take to support the development of new renewable energy technologies?
- How can the United Nations support the deployment of small-scale, renewable energy options in rural areas and developing countries?

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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE

SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN & CULTURAL

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE

While the Committee's areas of concern and its work often overlaps with other United Nations organs, the Third Committee focuses its discussions on social, humanitarian and cultural concerns that arise in the General Assembly. The Third Committee discusses issues with, recognizes reports of, and submits recommendations to the General Assembly in coordination with other United Nations organs, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations's General Assembly as a whole, see page 24.

Website: www.un.org/ga/third/index.shtml

INTENSIFICATION OF EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The United Nations, in its Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, defined violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life." Violence against women remains a significant problem, particularly violence by intimate partners. According to the World Health Organization, almost one third (30 percent) of all women who have been in a relationship have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner; in some regions this rate is much higher. These forms of violence affect women physically, but they also have severe negative psychological effects, including post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep difficulties, eating disorders and emotional distress. The social and economic costs are also enormous. Women may suffer isolation, inability to work, loss of wages, lack of participation in regular activities and limited ability to care for themselves and their children.

In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized the rights of women as an issue that merits special attention. Much of the United Nations' early work on the topic was focused on establishing legal rights for women and encouraging gender equality under the law. One of the first major international agreements specifically focused on women's rights was the 1976 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The General Assembly approved the Convention in 1979, and it entered into force in 1981. Today it has been ratified by 188 Member States – making it one of the most universally ratified human rights treaties within the United Nations system. The Convention addresses the civil rights and the legal status of women in great detail. The Convention established the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, a body of twenty-three women's rights experts from around the world, mandated to collect reports of Parties' compliance with the convention and initiate inquiries into grave or systemic abuses. Despite this substantial progress on women's legal status, women are disproportionately the targets of violence, intimidation and other crimes. In many cases, violence is a response to women trying to exercise their established legal rights. Thus the attention of the United Nations eventually shifted to preventing, with the hope of eradicating, violence against women. In the 1980s, when violence against women first became a major issue

for women's movements in every region, the focus was on acts of overt physical and sexual violence. This included, for example, female infanticide, female feticide, incest, battery, burning, mutilation, marital rape and "honour killings" in the private sphere, and sexual harassment, stoning and rape in public arenas. By the 1990s, the definition had been expanded to include more structural forms of gender-based violence. Certain cultural practices, like son-preference, dowry customs, and virginity tests, for example, were highlighted as demeaning to women and fostering conditions that normalize and tolerate abuses of women's rights. In this way, violence against women increasingly has been understood as encompassing all forms of discrimination that create an environment in which such abuses can be perpetrated with impunity and, sometimes, even with social sanction. In 1993, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, a broad outline of the underlying principles and recommended actions in support of eliminating violence against women. Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly established the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of Actions to Eliminate Violence against Women. This fund supports national, regional and international actions taken by non-governmental organizations and governments to eliminate violence against women. In 2006, the General Assembly stressed the need to treat all forms of violence against women and girls as a criminal offense punishable by law and highlighted the obligation of Member States to exercise due diligence in preventing, investigating and punishing perpetrators of violence against women and girls.

Other United Nations bodies and organizations have also addressed violence against women. In 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution encouraging Member States to prosecute perpetrators of violence against women, ensure equal access to justice for women, and adequately address the needs of victims of sexual violence. Additionally, several United Nations organizations have strengthened their collaboration under the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality. In 2007, a report by the Secretary-General outlined some additional goals in this topic area. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is spearheading a multi-year, system-wide campaign to eliminate violence against women and girls through 2015. While organizations and countries have made progress, there have been difficulties with tracking and accountability. The General Assembly has also recently called for more data and investigations on the issue to support efforts both in prevention and prosecution.

Despite these efforts, violence against women is a tenacious challenge. Many Member States have laws and regulations on local and national levels that discourage and criminalize violence against women. However, many of these laws have been rendered ineffective due to inadequate enforcement, legal loopholes, and social or cultural stigmas that prevent victims from reporting. Fully ending violence against women requires the involvement of the United Nations system, Member States, communities, individuals, and shifting cultural norms. The last few years have seen particularly heinous acts of violence against women, such as the 2012 Delhi rape case. Increasingly civil society organizations are rallying to address societal taboos around reporting cases of violence against women. They are also putting increasing pressure on governments to address the legal and law enforcement challenges. Social media



has been an important tool for advocating on behalf of victims. At the same time, not all victims want the publicity, and too much attention can result in further harm or violence being targeted against victims. Balancing the promise of mobilization and information inherent in social media with the risk poised to victims and campaigners will be vital as individuals and organizations adopt it as a tool. Ultimately, ending the culture of immunity will be vital to stopping violence against women.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can the United Nations support judicial systems prosecuting perpetrators of violence against women, and how can this be improved?
- How can Member States work with civil society to change social norms around reporting and prosecuting violence against women? What about social norms that encourage violence against women?
- What positive role could social media play in addressing violence against women? How can it complement or enhance existing reporting regimes?

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PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM

Countering terrorism is one of the most complex and multi-faceted issues facing the international community, which continues to struggle with the best way to address the issue. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; the era of modern terrorism began with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II of Russia in 1881. Yet the last several decades have seen new complexities. First and foremost, the ease of global communication enabled by the Internet and other communication technologies makes it increasingly simple for terrorists to reach larger audiences, communicate with associates around the world and recruit more easily. Second, the globalized trade and transportation systems have enabled terrorists to more easily move and acquire resources. Third, the number and diversity of terrorist attacks have increased significantly. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism estimates that there were around 650 terrorist incidents in 1970 and approximately 5,000 in 2011. The reasons have also changed: while nationalism was the primary motivator in the 19th century, political ideology, religion and independence movements all emerged as motivating factors in the 20th century. The methodologies employed by terrorists are equally diverse: ranging from fear and coercion through major violent attacks to drug and human trafficking. Individual governments are increasingly struggling with counter-terrorism efforts and are turning to the international community for support and cooperation. The United Nations plays an important role as a key platform for multilateral, systemic approaches to addressing these threats.

Preventing international terrorism has been on the United Nations General Assembly's agenda since 1972. The General Assembly adopted its earliest counter-terrorism conventions in 1973 and 1979: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. These conventions were spurred by the growing trend of terrorists to seize or attack embassies, or hijack planes and other vehicles. The Conventions were designed to create effective measures to prevent, address and punish the taking of hostages and targeting of diplomats and government employees. Further work was done on condemning and suppressing terrorists' access to bomb-making materials, financing and access to nuclear weapons, with conventions passed on each topic through the late 90s.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States brought the topic of combating terrorism to the forefront of the international agenda. After considerable discussion and debate, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006. It was the first time the international community agreed to a comprehensive and strategic approach to combating terrorism and was the clearest condemnation yet of terrorism as a legitimate tactic. The Strategy centered on four pillars: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. This strategy is designed to enhance national, regional and international



efforts to counter terrorism. Though the Strategy was agreed to and adopted, Member States struggled in its formulation on how to approach the issue, with ongoing debate on whether prevention of radicalization or suppression of terrorism is the more effective approach. This debate is further compounded because there is no agreement over what motivates or causes individuals to turn to terrorism. Limited economic opportunity, poverty, weak governance and conflict are some of the conditions that can motivate individuals to become terrorists, issues that will be unaffected by security measures taken by domestic security measures taken by an individual state to prevent terrorist attacks.

Unfortunately, actions taken in the name of countering terrorism can have a negative impact on human rights. In order to prevent terrorism, governments may create direct restrictions on the exercise of individual human rights, including life, liberty, security and self-determination, many of the rights threatened by the actions of terrorists themselves. Operational activities to find and dismantle terrorist operations may also have a range of collateral effects, unintentionally violating the human rights of bystanders.

Human rights are universal and must be protected during the conduct of counter-terrorist activities. Some conventions, like the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, explicitly note that war and national emergency are not valid reasons for the derogation of human rights obligations. The United Nations Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2001, with a goal of monitoring implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 on combating terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate advises the Committee, including on ensuring that human rights are protected while Member States implement counter-terrorism policies. In addition, the United Nations has passed numerous resolutions that describe principles of how to protect human rights while countering terrorism, including in the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism serves as a monitoring mechanism under the United Nations Human Rights Council. He makes monitoring visits to countries, including to the United States after the terrorist attacks in 2001, and offers recommendations. Through these actions this issue has received closer attention from all over the world.

Several recent high-profile issues have highlighted the conflict between human rights and activities intended to counter terrorist activities. Persons suspected of being terrorists have been captured, deported and detained without charge and allegedly subjected to torture. Non-governmental organizations and some States have expressed concern that cyber-espionage and data collection on civilians carried out in furtherance of counter-terrorism activities conflicts with the right to privacy described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A serious debate about interpreting this right to privacy in the digital age, complicated by States' determination to protect themselves and their people, is ongoing. A January 2014 report from the Special Rapporteur outlines an inquiry into the lethal use of drones in counter-terrorism operations and its effects on civilians, noting that the use of drones may violate the right to life of civilians and may also violate the right to trial of the accused terrorists. The report also recommends States conduct their own independent and impartial investigations when civilian casualties occur. Even with these recommendations, the Special Rapporteur cautions that issues of accountability and transparency may be raised in regard to

drone strikes even if there is no violation of international law. In every case, all issues must be examined while keeping in mind the framework laid out in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in which States must ensure that any means of combating terrorism needs to adhere to international law.

A key difficulty faced by activists on all sides of the issue is defining what laws are applicable in countering terrorism. The laws of war, specifically the Geneva Convention, offer very limited protections for unlawful combatants, a category applied to terrorists by some States. Resolving this debate is essential for an international understanding of alleged terrorists' rights to trial, free speech and other issues. Unfortunately, the debate is compounded by the practice of labeling opposition or minority parties in some States as terrorists to justify their harsh treatment. Finally, Member States must deal with cultural, linguistic and religious diversity while countering acts of terror. The Kurdish, Uighur, and Chechen movements for independence or autonomy have all witnessed spates of violence and repression, a cycle fueled by the failure of integration. If this diversity is not taken into account, the inadvertent discriminatory actions taken may lead to further marginalization and radicalization of communities affected by these policies.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What are the implications of data collection as it becomes more significant in efforts to counter terrorism?
- What safeguards are in place to allow for investigation into allegations of the violations of human rights, especially those of civilians harmed by State-sponsored violence, during efforts at countering terrorism?
- Does the question of the applicability of international law need to be resolved for an effective reporting regime to exist?
- What opportunities are available while countering terrorism to improve the mediation and management of sectarian conflict, and how could they be leveraged to improve the underlying human rights situation?

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THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTH COMMITTEE

LEGAL

PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTH COMMITTEE

The General Assembly Sixth Committee addresses issues relating to international law. The Committee not only drafts new international law, but also offers interpretations of existing international law as well as recommendations for Members to implement international regulations through national law. The Committee also considers legal issues which affect the United Nations Secretariat and operations. The Sixth Committee does not resolve legal disputes; that is the responsibility of the International Court of Justice. For more information concerning the purview of the United Nations's General Assembly as a whole, see page 24.

Please note: When considering the reports of sub-committees that may change the United Nations Charter or other legal documents, the Sixth Committee may act on provisions within that report and write resolutions appropriate to carry out any recommendations from such reports. When a topic results in a recommendation to change the United Nations Charter, the provisions laid out in Chapter XVIII and elsewhere in the Charter must be followed in the GA Plenary session, followed by submission of any approved portion to the Member States before ratification. Similarly, if this Committee recommends the formation of a new treaty or comparable legal agreement, a treaty conference would be called for during the GA Plenary session, to be held at a later date.

Website: <http://www.un.org/ga/sixth/index.shtml>

THE RULE OF LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS

The rule of law refers to a set of legal concepts that the international community has accepted as key to both the fair administration of justice within a sovereign country and the fair administration of justice between sovereign countries. The notion of the rule of law long predates the establishment of the United Nations and, in its earliest iterations (dating as far back as 1760 BC in the form of laws promulgated by the King of Babylon), it simply meant the codification and presentation of law to the public. The concept has evolved, over time and across the globe, to encompass the principles of supremacy of law, accountability of government to the wishes of the public and the importance of an independent judiciary.

At the United Nations, rule of law at the international level addresses elements relevant to the ways in which Member States relate to and interact with each other, including the right to self-determination of all peoples and sovereign equality before the law, respect for and fulfillment of international obligations in good faith, non-use or threat of use of force, and peaceful dispute resolution between States. At the national level, rule of law as defined by the United Nations takes the form of a Constitutional system as the supreme law of the land supported by a clear and consistent legal framework and strong institutions of justice, governance, security, and human rights that are well structured, financed, trained and equipped, as well as contributions from public and civil society that strengthen the legitimacy of those institutions and hold them and public officials accountable.

Some Member States may not view the implementation of rule of law principles to be in their best interest because the rule of law could detract from their own power and ability to control government resources—or they may have publicly supported the rule of law but not executed any actual improvements within their own borders. However, individual Member States have much to gain from better implementation of rule-of-law principles, especially in transitional periods. During times in which the government of a Member State is in flux, such as during the recent transitions of the Arab Spring, there is a window of opportunity for the incoming government to better implement the rule of law. The United Nations can assist in this regard by providing experts and resources to assist with nation-building. Additionally, when national governments fail due to various crises such as natural disasters and wars, international rule of law principles and resources can help to fill the gap until a functioning government can be reinstated.

Although the concept is not expressly mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, maintaining and promoting rule of law is inextricably linked to its primary purposes. The principles of rule of law also pervade the Charter. It charges the United Nations with promoting respect for international legal obligations by providing mechanisms for the codification and wide-spread acceptance of international law in the form of treaties and agreements initiated by the General Assembly. The Charter established the International Court of Justice, which is responsible for independent adjudication of disputes between States at the international level. Finally, it establishes the right of self-determination and equality before the international legal order for all States and peoples, regardless of size and strength.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” It has only been in the past two decades that the issue has gotten regular and specific attention at the United Nations. In 1993, the Vienna World Conference recommended that the United Nations establish a comprehensive program to help States build up infrastructure to help maintain adequate rule of law. Since that time, the United Nations has undertaken a number of initiatives and activities to promote and maintain rule of law at the international level and to assist States with establishing it at the national level.

The Millennium Declaration in 2000 declared that rule of law is critical to the accomplishment of the Millennium Development Goals. In 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies that set forth a comprehensive definition of the rule of law. The report defined the rule of law as a principle of governance encompassing equality before the law, independence of the judiciary, consistency with international human rights law, and separation of powers. The Security Council, which has adopted a number of resolutions on the importance of the rule of law, regularly uses the definition from the Secretary-General's report as a guide to focus on the scope of the topic and it has widely been accepted as the official United Nations definition of the concept.

Current efforts at the United Nations are focused on strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities, particularly regarding the interrelationship between rule of law and areas such as peace and security, development and the protection and promotion of human rights.



The 2005 World Summit outcome and a number of reports from the Secretary-General contributed to a renewed interest in rule of law by the General Assembly in 2006. This interest led to the establishment in 2007 of the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General and supported by the Rule of Law Unit, which coordinates United Nations efforts to support and promote the rule of law at international and national levels.

During the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of the Law held by the General Assembly on 24 September 2012, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. It stresses the interrelationship between the rule of law and the three pillars of the United Nations: peace and security, development, and human rights. Follow-up and implementation remain concerns.

In June 2013, the Secretary-General issued a report titled “Measuring the Effectiveness of the Support Provided by the United Nations System for the Promotion of the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations,” which heavily discusses the High Level Meeting on the issue of the rule of law, and also looks into ways in which the effectiveness of the rule of law is being carried out by the United Nations. The Report indicated that special attention with respect to this particular aspect of the rule of law is needed in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, the Secretariat has launched reforms to the system of peacekeeping operations to aid in the maintenance of the rule of law. The reforms aim to create a global focal point for the police, justice and corrections fields to aid in the maintenance of the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict zones.

Looking ahead, there are several issues that the United Nations should consider addressing, including capacity-building, asset recovery, peace-building, conflict prevention and the logistical and policy concerns surrounding the management of crisis and conflict situations and the aftermath of those situations. At the national level, technical capacity and political reforms will be key in creating effective strategies between Member States while focusing on justice, peace and democracy. Many Member States have also expressed a desire to ratify and implement effective international instruments pertaining to the rule of law at the national level.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can States work with associations and civil society organizations to improve the rule of law through international and national cooperation?
- What policy barriers remain to the development of robust national and international rule of law?
- How must the rule of law adapt to accommodate regional cultures and traditions while maintaining core principles, such as equality, before the law?

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CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS ON MISSION

Under international law, wrongdoers should be held accountable for their crimes, subject to due process of law. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case for United Nations officials and experts on mission. Accountability of United Nations officials has been a problem for years. In the early 1990s, peacekeepers in the Balkans and Southeast Asia were accused of numerous illegal activities, including the operation of prostitution rings. The issue has returned to the spotlight because of recent allegations of misconduct by United Nations peacekeepers and other officials. Allegations include criminal sexual abuse and exploitation committed by United Nations officials in developing countries, specifically in Mali, Haiti, Sierra Leona, Guinea and Liberia.

While the work of United Nations officials and experts on mission is undoubtedly important, the General Assembly has recognized the extremely detrimental and negative effects that the criminal acts of these officials can have on the image, credibility, impartiality and integrity of the United Nations as a whole. This is particularly true for serious crimes such as sexual exploitation and abuse. These allegations ultimately damage the United Nations’ ability to operate as a neutral, objective and credible actor, particularly in conflict zones. Moreover, they represent an affront to the ideals of human dignity that form the core of the United Nations’ mandate.

While issues of criminal accountability affect both civilian personnel and peacekeepers, allegations of misconduct arise mostly from United Nations Peacekeeping missions. The lack of an internal United Nations system for individual criminal accountability and justice, combined with the fact that Peacekeepers are typically not citizens of the Member States in which their missions are located, often causes the criminal acts of these officials to fall into a jurisdictional gap. The Member State in which the



crime occurred and the Member State of which the offending official is a citizen may both claim rights to prosecute, and each may have valid concerns about the other's ability and willingness to prosecute. For example, the Member State where the crime occurred may not have a functioning criminal justice system, while the Member State of citizenship may choose not to prosecute or may be seen as too lenient on the accused.

One of the first United Nations discussions on this issue occurred in 1996, when the study *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* revealed that the arrival of peacekeepers was correlated with a significant increase in child prostitution in six countries under examination. In 2000, the United Nations released the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly known as the Brahimi Report. The Brahimi Report took on the issue seriously and made a number of recommendations to isolate flaws and increase accountability for peacekeeping personnel. The Secretariat accepted the recommendations, but full implementation remains a challenge.

In 2005, the Secretary-General's Special Advisor, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Husseini, published a report entitled "A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations." In response, the Secretary-General released new rules and regulations for peacekeeping missions. These codes of conduct are outlined in two publications: *Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets (Ten Rules)* and *We Are United Nations Peacekeepers*. These publications sought to deal with an additional issue identified over the course of a decade: the inconsistent training provided to peacekeepers, in particular. Unlike civilian employees of the Secretariat, peacekeepers are employed by their home government—and those governments are responsible for both paying and initially training peacekeepers from their home country. Insufficient training in their obligations and responsibilities is a major issue for peacekeepers.

In 2005, the General Assembly also moved quickly to create the Ad Hoc Committee on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission. Additionally, the Sixth Committee convened a group of legal experts in 2005 to examine how best to consider this issue in light of the original principles contained in the United Nations Charter. The group has since expressed support for strict adherence to the zero-tolerance policy in order to close jurisdictional gaps. This is a complicated issue due to the many varying ways in which Member States extend their domestic laws internationally or to nationals acting on foreign soil.

This debate continues today, and Member States will need to consider what additional steps can be taken in this regard. Striking the proper balance on criminal accountability has been difficult for the United Nations. While it is important to close jurisdictional gaps and hold perpetrators of crimes accountable, this interest must also be balanced against ensuring due process of law for the accused. Processes that strip the accused of due process rights are also inconsistent with the spirit of the United Nations. The Sixth Committee does need to examine where jurisdictional gaps exist and how Member States and the Secretariat can work together to ensure accountability. Closing jurisdictional gaps for peacekeepers is especially important, given the volume of allegations arising from peacekeeping operations. Finally, the Sixth Committee might consider how adequate training of United Nations personnel might complement the existing rules and enforcement mechanisms. Both civilian personnel and peacekeepers may not have a sufficient understanding of their legal obligations while on missions, especially given differing legal environments and cultural norms between countries.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can the United Nations reduce misconduct through training, rule-setting and enforcement?
- What is the right balance between holding perpetrators accountable and ensuring that adequate due process is provided for the accused?
- Where do jurisdictional holes exist that allow allegations to go uninvestigated or unprosecuted?

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CHAPTER FIVE

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

PURVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established as part of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1950. The agency's mandate is to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. The UNHCR strives to ensure that all refugees can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state and to return home voluntarily. Its actions are guided by the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as by other instruments of international refugee law. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR meets annually in Geneva to approve the programs and budget of the UNHCR and to give advice on issues within the agency's mandate.

Website: <http://www.unhcr.org/>

REFUGEE PROTECTION AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a refugee as someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” Generally considered one of the groups most vulnerable to human rights abuses, refugees are of great concern to the United Nations and the international community. The total number of people forcibly displaced in the world today has reached 45.2 million, 15.4 million of whom are classified as refugees; this is the highest level of displaced persons in nearly two decades.

While rates of basic human rights abuses are much higher among refugee populations, one of the most prevalent is in the form of sexual violence, including assault and rape. Primarily but not exclusively affecting women and girls, this violence occurs both during flight and while in exile. The many challenges facing refugees—especially the lack of legal documents, proof of identity and a disputed legal status in the host State—can limit refugees' ability to access legal recourse and protection. Without access to legal institutions and the protections normally available in communities, many victims live in shame, fearful of social stigma or retaliation. Though there are marked decreases in rape and sexual exploitation in post-conflict situations, refugees remain vulnerable to victimization. Even worse, the vulnerability accompanies the displaced person through their whole displacement, leaving them at risk through their flight, temporary housing and eventual repatriation.

Until the twentieth century, rape and sexual violence were considered aspects of war. As the laws of war evolved during the early twentieth century, so too did the community's view on the need to provide protection for civilians. The League of Nations coordinated international aid for refugees in Russia in 1921, and the United Nations formed the UNHCR in 1950 to assist European refugees following World War II. In 1951, the international community drafted the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which established the first definition of

who is considered a refugee and required States to cooperate with the UNHCR. This initial document was expanded in 1967 by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Together, these documents outline not only the social rights of refugees but also their obligations to host governments. With a number of basic rights and protections agreed upon, the international community moved to address the prevalence of sexual violence against refugees with the Guidelines on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Violence Against Refugees in 1995. This handbook addresses the conditions that affect the rate of sexual violence, the emotional and psychological effects of that violence and outlines strategies for aid workers to address the issue.

Regional efforts to address the problem have also progressed in parallel, such as the Organization of African Unity's 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and Latin America's 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. In the 1969 Convention, the African Union was able to come to a consensus on the definition of a refugee, the basic human rights pertaining therein and made the commitment to work closely with UNHCR on refugee issues. In the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, States recommitted themselves to the 1951 Convention and to upholding and cooperating with the work of the UNHCR. These regional agreements showcase States taking accountability for their neighbors; the resistance of States to the work of the UNHCR is one of the largest roadblocks to affecting change. In the international arena, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict in 1974, emphasizing the particular danger that women and children face. This also elevated the issue in the public consciousness and shined a light on the plight of refugees, particularly women and children.

In spite of the evolution in international law protecting refugees from sexual violence, implementation and enforcement of these provisions remains difficult, especially in conflicts with non-State actors. Sexual violence continues to be a tool of oppression in modern conflicts. Ongoing conflict in the Central Africa Republic, Syria, Nigeria and other regions highlight that the obligations and efforts of the UNHCR continue to grow in importance and urgency. While the Central African Republic supports provisions of international law as well as integrating refugee populations into local populations, an escalation of violence in early 2013 weakened the government and led to a decrease in the governmental monitoring of refugee populations and enforcement of protections. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict visited in early 2014 and documented cases of inter-religious and inter-communal attacks with recurring instances of rape and gang rape, forced marriage, sexual mutilation, abduction and sexual slavery. This is simply one example of how increased violence and conflict continue to bring the threat of sexual violence, especially against women and children, to refugee populations across the globe. While the UNHCR works tirelessly to document and prevent sexual violence against refugees, there are clear capacity limitations.

The core challenges going forward include a shortage of aid, limited access to official forms of identification and the hesitancy of victims themselves to report cases of sexual violence. The UNHCR continues



to advocate education for both refugees and those who assist them, underscoring the importance of providing care to those who have already experienced sexual violence. States themselves could improve methods of prevention, could increase police protection among refugee camps and could work with the UNHCR and non-governmental organizations to better recognize the conditions and circumstances that leave refugees more vulnerable to sexual violence. Convincing States to actively adhere to both the 1951 Convention and the 1995 Guidelines will be crucial. Equally important is ensuring that the UNHCR is able to monitor the situations of sexual violence against refugees around the world.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can the question of sexual violence be tackled in conflict areas, and how must sexual violence be handled differently when State institutions are non-existent?
- What protections could be strengthened in order to protect refugees from sexual violence?
- What can be done to encourage victims to report their abuse?

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INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Since 1998, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been assisting and protecting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). IDPs are people displaced by armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations and natural disasters within their home country. IDPs legally remain under the protection of their own government, even though that government might be the cause of their flight. They are distinct from refugees, who have been displaced across an international border. Because IDPs are not covered under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, most were unrecognized by international law until the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The international response to internal displacement has been selective, uneven and, in many cases, inadequate. Large numbers of IDPs receive no humanitarian assistance or protection whatsoever. Sovereignty and the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states present significant challenges to the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), which began monitoring IDPs in 1998, conflict and violence have created 28.8 million IDPs globally, with over 6.8 million people displaced in Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone. Additionally, natural disasters displaced 143.9 million between 2008 and 2012. Many of the countries affected by recent natural disasters also continue to experience violent conflicts. While the UNHCR manages to assist over half of all IDPs globally, it is clear that more remains to be done.

Historically, there has been little recognition of de facto refugees within their own national borders. Because they do not cross an international border, internal displacement was long considered a domestic issue. This began to change as States created regional refugee agreements referencing IDPs, such as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, which called for the same standards of recognition and treatment to apply for internally displaced persons as refugees. Due to continued pressure, the Secretary-General appointed a representative to monitor the status of IDPs in 1992. The Special Representative conducted new research into the causes and consequences of internal displacement and implications



with international law, while working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Member States and United Nations partners to come up with a plan to combat the problem. This led to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the first comprehensive review of current laws and gaps in the law on IDPs. In 1998, the Interagency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Assistance created the Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre, tasked to monitor IDPs and provide important information and training to NGOs and States.

The current response model for IDPs took shape following the 2005 Humanitarian Reform Agenda. This reform defined several specific areas of assistance provided in response to humanitarian crises, including health, education and logistics, and defined clusters of humanitarian organizations responsible for coordinating all of the response efforts within those areas. The UNHCR is the cluster lead for protection and shares responsibility for shelter and camp coordination and management. Under this system, when States are unable or unwilling to meet the needs of IDPs, the international humanitarian response efforts can deploy to work in parallel of the State's efforts, with that State's permission. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plays a key role in the coordination in crisis situations. OCHA also promotes efficient interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian operations, bridges gaps in environmental emergency management, and maps global emergency relief stockpiles on behalf of the whole humanitarian community. OCHA is responsible for coordinating the United Nations agencies, NGOs and civil society whose services help internally displaced men, women and children in need. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is another important partner; IOM works to help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, including refugees and internally displaced people. Though focused on migration, IOM often becomes involved in efforts to assist IDPs because many States frame the issue as one of internal migration.

Recent natural disasters and the ongoing effects of the Arab Spring emphasize the continuing need for a consolidated approach to aiding the internally displaced. In January 2010 the earthquake in Haiti displaced 2.3 million people; as of June 2013, 280,000 remain displaced. Despite some progress, many IDPs do not feel safe. In March 2014, cholera victims in Haiti filed a class action lawsuit against the United Nations, citing United Nations Peacekeepers as the source of the disease. The lack of a response or investigation from the United Nations, along with a continued failure to halt the spread of disease, underscores the neglect that many IDPs face daily.

The Syrian Civil War continues to perpetuate one of the worst current refugee crises. In a July 2013 report, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons described the plight and mass displacement of over six million Syrians. The report recommends action be taken to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to IDPs and the end of forced displacement in accordance with international law. However, the situation in Syria continues to deteriorate and illustrates that the lack of a political solution is the greatest impediment to humanitarian aid.

Finding a solution to effectively assist and protect IDPs is complex and difficult. One of the successes of the last five years is the 2009 Kampala Convention, the first regional agreement to specifically set out the

rights of internally displaced peoples and the obligations of governments to provide legal protections. Brokered by the African Union, it not only addresses conflict-based crises but also displacement due to environmental disasters, including those attributed to climate change. Although the effects of the agreement are still in their infancy, this could serve as a model for a more widespread and comprehensive legal convention.

Looking ahead, the greatest challenge facing the UNHCR is convincing Member States to recognize the plight of IDPs and work toward addressing the root political causes of internal refugee crises. Displacement is often worse in conflicts where Member States refuse to acknowledge the problem and local actors and organizations do not become fully engaged with NGOs and international aid groups. As it continues to be a gray area of human rights law, the UNHCR will need to put pressure on all States to bring IDP issues to the same level of awareness that refugees receive. Until Member States are willing to reconsider the scope of sovereignty and allow organizations like the UNHCR to work within their borders, an insecure environment and uncooperative host governments will be the largest impediments to creating a lasting solution to serve IDPs.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can the United Nations work with Member States who may not recognize or be sympathetic to the situation of their internally displaced persons?
- What lessons can be learned from a more regional approach, like the 2009 Kampala Convention?
- How has the current multi-agency 'cluster' approach worked thus far in improving assistance to IDPs? Are there options for improvement?

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CHAPTER SIX

THE ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL

MEMBERS OF THE ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL

ALBANIA	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	MAURITIUS
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	EL SALVADOR	NEPAL
AUSTRIA	ETHIOPIA	NEW ZEALAND
BANGLADESH	FRANCE	NIGERIA
BELARUS	GEORGIA	PANAMA
BENIN	GERMANY	PORTUGAL
BOLIVIA	GREECE	REPUBLIC OF KOREA
BOTSWANA	GUATEMALA	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BRAZIL	HAITI	SAN MARINO
BURKINA FASO	INDIA	SERBIA
CANADA	INDONESIA	SOUTH AFRICA
CHINA	ITALY	SUDAN
COLOMBIA	JAPAN	SWEDEN
CONGO	KAZAKHSTAN	TOGO
CROATIA	KUWAIT	TUNISIA
CUBA	KYRGYZSTAN	TURKMENISTAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	LESOTHO	UNITED KINGDOM
DENMARK	LIBYA	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PURVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

The Economic and Social Council is the principal United Nations organ responsible for coordinating economic, social and related works of 14 specialized agencies, 10 functional commissions and five regional commissions. ECOSOC accepts reports and recommendations from other United Nations bodies, including the Commission for Social Development (CSocD) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Along with its coordinating role, ECOSOC gathers information and advises Member States on economic, social, humanitarian and human rights programs. ECOSOC also coordinates and collaborates with autonomous specialized agencies that work closely with the United Nations. These organizations include multilateral financial and trade institutions, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

Website: www.un.org/en/ecosoc/

STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Humanitarian crises are events that cause significant threats to the health, safety or welfare of large groups of people. Causes of humanitarian crises vary widely but include natural disasters, man-made disasters and armed conflict. The impacts of humanitarian crises range in form: from famines and epidemics to the displacement of large populations as refugees and internally displaced persons. Humanitarian crises are often triggered by events that also weaken governmental institutions, like major natural disasters and civil wars. States are frequently unable to effectively respond on their own and meet the needs of their population. Crisis response can also be hampered by limited resources, inexperience and indifference—particularly to the plight of political, ethnic and religious minorities.

Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations, its subsidiary bodies and the specialized and technical agencies have provided humanitarian

assistance. Generally, the specialized and technical agencies—such as the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—provide direct assistance, while the deliberative bodies (ECOSOC and the General Assembly) provide a forum for Member States to agree on their approaches and to direct the coordination of efforts among agencies. Improving coordination of response by the United Nations agencies and by Member States has grown increasingly important as the United Nations has played a role in an increasing number of humanitarian crises and as the complexity of these operations has grown.

Managing and coordinating the United Nations' and the international community's responses to humanitarian disasters is vital in preventing delays, waste and conflict. In 1971 the General Assembly authorized the creation of a Disaster Relief Coordinator. In response to the growth of international humanitarian action and awareness as well as lessons learned from two decades of implementation of the Disaster Relief Coordinator position, the General Assembly requested in 1991 that the Coordinator and related functions be merged into a new Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The United Nations in 1998 further consolidated its humanitarian functions by merging the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and other elements of the Secretariat into the new Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

To this day, OCHA is the primary United Nations entity responsible for coordinating humanitarian assistance. OCHA's mandate is threefold: the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development, and humanitarian advocacy. OCHA also coordinates appeals to Member States and civil society for funding for specific humanitarian events through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and receives and manages donations through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Both CAP and CERF serve these functions across the United Nations system.



In 2005, the Humanitarian Response Review, commissioned by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, recommended several actions to improve coordination. Recommendations include increased preparedness and surge capacity, both on the international and national level; greater transparency and accountability to those in affected areas; and increased and more flexible funding from supporting States. Many of the recommendations found in the Review have been topics of discussion at ECOSOC in the past several years, and they continue to be relevant as new and varying disasters arise.

One of the most notable changes in recent years has been the development of the cluster approach to response efforts. Deployed for the first time following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action as designated by OCHA, including food, water and shelter, among others. Through this designation, each cluster is given clear responsibilities for coordination. With these clusters in place, the Humanitarian Coordinator, put in place by OCHA, can manage a large-scale response with more precision. Each cluster has a focal point or lead agency that operates at the global and country level. In the last nine years, the cluster approach has been deployed in 30 countries. The United Nations has evaluated the approach twice, in 2007 and 2010. Both evaluations have found the approach to provide tangible results, but both also recommended areas of improvement.

After particularly challenging efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance during the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2011 Japanese earthquakes and tsunami, OCHA and its inter-agency organizations acknowledged more needed to be done in terms of coordination development and strategic planning. In 2011, the United Nations adopted a new Transformative Agenda in response to growing acknowledgment of the weaknesses in multilateral humanitarian response, including unclear or unequal accountability, a lack of adequate leaders being deployed and a lack of appropriate coordination in place at various levels. The Transformative Agenda focuses on changes in all of these areas, including the simplification of the cluster approach, an inter-agency rapid response mechanism and expanded accountability to affected people.

Following 2010 Haiti earthquake, the United Nations system has become increasingly focused on the concept of disaster risk reduction. This approach focuses on building resilient communities, particularly as climate change increases the likelihood of more and larger climate-related humanitarian disasters. While resilience is important, it is frequently difficult to rally support and funding for these efforts. Additionally, building resilience requires engaging an even larger range of stakeholders, as communities reassess building standards, develop emergency response services and create community organizations to aid in the event of disasters. In most States, these efforts are only beginning.

Looking ahead, there are a number of issues related to humanitarian assistance that the international community must consider. First, there continue to be instances where Member States are unwilling or unable to work with the United Nations and OCHA, particularly when crises affect disadvantaged minorities or opposition groups. Without this cooperation, it is extremely difficult to implement any sort of assistance. This is seen most clearly in Syria, with 9.3 million people still within the country who have extremely limited access to humanitarian assistance. Because of the government's unwillingness to cooperate coupled with an extreme lack of infrastructure and security, it is nearly impossible for the international community to provide assistance to those caught in the conflict.

Second, funding and donor fatigue are on-going concerns. Most humanitarian crises are funded through the appeals process that reacts to crises as they occur. OCHA has stated many times that it is difficult to receive funding in a timely manner when a natural disaster occurs. In 2014, OCHA's appeal for funding was \$12.9 billion, an annual increase of over four billion dollars. In Syria alone, an estimated \$6.5 billion is required to provide for both internally displaced persons and refugees. This is compounded because funding can be tied to specific causes or areas; the inflexibility of the donor makes it difficult to use the funds as OCHA would see most fit.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can or should the United Nations provide humanitarian assistance when it is opposed by the host government?
- What have been the major successes and failures of recent humanitarian assistance operations?
- How well have the 2005 recommendations addressed these issues?
- How can the United Nations build more resilient communities that reduce the impact of natural and man-made crises?

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STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

More than 10 million individuals are held in penal institutions around the world, many facing unsupported sentences or inhumane conditions. With this number increasing daily, it is important for a minimum set of guidelines to steer the treatment of prisoners throughout their incarceration in order to prepare them for release back into society with minimal effects, as well as to protect the inherent human rights of individuals. The increase of global conflict, including things like the spike in murder rates in Latin America in the first decade of this century, show that penal institutions and the treatment of prisoners is pivotal as we move forward into the future.

The degree of protection afforded to prisoners has increased significantly since the creation of the United Nations Charter in 1945. Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” and established a broad array of human rights that apply to all people—including prisoners. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 established the first international legal protections for prisoners of war. Both documents set the stage for the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which were adopted by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1957. These rules are often regarded by States as the primary—if not only—source of standards relating to treatment in detention, and are the key framework used by monitoring and inspection mechanisms in assessing the treatment of prisoners. These Standard Minimum Rules were meant to outline generally accepted norms for the treatment of prisoners, not to codify an international penal system.

The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners reflected the generally accepted ideas on detention of the 1950s. At the time, Member States acknowledged that the rules were part of a constantly changing field and were thus subject to change. Additionally, they acknowledge that geographic and cultural restrictions could hinder the treatment of prisoners in various countries but encouraged Member States to strive for congruency. Specific issues addressed in the Standard Minimum Rules span the separation of men and women, the separation of untried and convicted prisoners, and the state of habitable living provided to each prisoner. Drawing on the experience of Member States, their legal institutions, and freshly codified universal human rights, the Standard Minimum Rules reflect protections against torture and arbitrary detention, legal recognition and equal treatment before the law.

Between 1955 and 1990, the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders met every five years. These meetings allowed Member States to discuss international standards outside of the General Assembly and the resolution-writing process. It was in these meetings that Member States recognized a need for regional expert groups to discuss regionally-relevant issues. Regional groups were added to the agenda and the discussion at the Fifth United Nations Congress in 1975.

These discussions culminated in 1990, when the General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners. The Basic Principles reinforce the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and outlined the basic human rights owed to prisoners, particularly with regard to cultural and religious allowances. The General Assembly also adopted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures, otherwise known as the Tokyo Rules in 1990, which aimed to define clear international standards on alternatives to imprisonment. These rules were a direct response to the overcrowding and outdated prison facilities faced by Member States. This is an important evolution, as it allows offenders to be punished accordingly while putting less pressure on over-burdened prison systems.

Noting that women are oftentimes needing different or specific guiding principles when it comes to prisoner treatment, the United Nations has recently focused on the status of imprisoned women. The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) were adopted by the General Assembly in 2010. These rules are a series of guidelines for States regarding the specific needs of female prisoners. The guidelines address long-standing problems when it came to the imprisonment of women, including the use of strip searches and the protocol of children entering prison with their mother. The Bangkok Rules establish alternative methods to strip or invasive searches, specifically state that pregnant and nursing women may not be punished by close confinement and allow for those children who have remained in prison with their mothers to be provided with healthcare services, among other things.

While States have made strides in improving the treatment of prisoners, progress is uneven. The Standard Minimum Rules establish minimum international standards of treatment, but are not binding. This is particularly evident in Latin America, with recent cases in Venezuela and Bolivia making headlines and highlighting the lack of adherence to the Rules. However, there remains little to be done in countries that lack infrastructure or the resources to adequately provide for the large number of prisoners they detain every year. Still, there are successes. The rules have spurred regional action, including the European Prison Rules in 2006 and the creation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Special Rapporteur on Prisons and other places of Detention. The Rules are also a standard by which non-governmental organizations compare and contrast penal systems across the globe; police brutality alongside prison riots and massacres bring a media spotlight to the issues of overcrowding, inhumane treatment and a failure of a government or system in its treatment of prisoners.

Particularly in States with a high volume of prisoners that strain the system, governments must explore other avenues. The open-ended groups established by the General Assembly in 2010 have met a number of times on ways to continue to bring the rules in line with twenty-first century guidelines and practices. Through three meetings thus far, the most recent in 2014, the open-ended groups have proposed several changes to the existing rules. The United Nations will begin considering these proposals, outlined in the three working groups’ final reports, later in 2014. Balancing this shift to a new set of Standard Minimal Rules is the lack of universal attainment of the existing standards: how much further should the minimum expectation be raised when some States remain unable, or unwilling, to meeting existing targets?



Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What are the barriers to improving the treatment of prisoners, particularly in countries with limited resources?
- How can the United Nations and international community address these barriers?
- How can Member States and the United Nations improve treatment of imprisoned women?
- How should the Standards be updated to reflect human rights norms of the twenty-first century?

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CHAPTER SEVEN

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

MEMBERS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

ALGERIA	ETHIOPIA	NIGER
ANGOLA	GABON	NIGERIA
BENIN	GAMBIA	RWANDA
BOTSWANA	GHANA	SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
BURKINA FASO	GUINEA	SENEGAL
BURUNDI	GUINEA-BISSAU	SEYCHELLES
CABO VERDE	KENYA	SIERRA LEONE
CAMEROON	LESOTHO	SOMALIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	LIBERIA	SOUTH AFRICA
CHAD	LIBYA	SOUTH SUDAN
COMOROS	MADAGASCAR	SUDAN
CONGO	MALAWI	SWAZILAND
COTE D'IVOIRE	MALI	TOGO
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	MAURITANIA	TUNISIA
DJIBOUTI	MAURITIUS	UGANDA
EGYPT	MOROCCO	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	MOZAMBIQUE	ZAMBIA
ERITREA	NAMIBIA	ZIMBABWE

PURVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is one of five regional commissions of the Economic and Social Commission and represents countries in Africa. ECA supports the economic development of its member states by reinforcing economic relationships among its members and other countries of the world. It does so by promoting developmental cooperative activities and projects of regional and subregional scope, bringing a regional perspective to global problems and translating global concerns at the regional and subregional levels. ECA also has as one of its primary objectives the promotion of the region's social development.

Website: <http://www.uneca.org/>

POST-2015 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

With the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to the purpose and principles of the United Nations' Charter. The MDGs were designed around eight areas for focused efforts in development, reflecting the principles and ideals outlined in the Millennium Declaration. These goals have galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest. Ninety percent of children in developing regions now enjoy access to primary education, remarkable gains have been made against malaria and tuberculosis, and child mortality has been cut nearly in half. While the lives of millions have improved, some goals remain unfulfilled. To both reinvigorate existing efforts and to continue the momentum of progress, the United Nations has undertaken a serious round of negotiations on defining the post-2015 development agenda. These efforts at defining the next generation of development targets must tackle not only setting those goals but must also include hard decisions about how progress toward those goals is measured and defined.

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), established in 1958 as a regional commission by the Economic and Social Council, has closely monitored progress toward achievement of the MDGs in its 54 Member States. Despite the many positive contributions, the MDGs have had challenges, including the misinterpretation of their purpose as specific goals, a lack of national-level influence, an omission of key issues and an overemphasis on donor-recipient relationships. The ECA has published annual progress reports on the implementation of the initiatives to end suffering from disease, destitution and hunger; their 2013 MDG report acknowledged that Africa was on-track for achieving only three of the eight goals. Although the Member States have made strides in universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, and combating HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and other diseases, the challenge of food security remains a key issue for the continent.

In addition to monitoring and reporting on the progress of the MDGs, the Economic Commission for Africa has been active in discussions of the post-2015 development agenda, including a series of consultations in 2012 and 2013 aimed at identifying post-2015 development goals. These consultations elicited interest in emphasizing economic growth and structural transformation, re-orienting goals toward domestic initiatives, prioritizing social inclusion and incorporating the Rio+20 outcomes in the post-2015 development agenda. In addition, consultation participants suggested taking into account a country's starting point and recognizing progress toward development goals rather than simply measuring a set target, as had been done by the existing MDGs.

The African Union (AU) has also been active in shaping the regional discussion of the post-2015 development agenda. In May 2013, the AU appointed a High Level Committee under the leadership of Liberian President Johnson Sirleaf to develop a Common African Position on the post-2015 development agenda. The six pillars for post-2015 development emphasis in the draft AU common position are: structural economic transformation and inclusive growth; science, technology and innovation; people-centered development; environmental sustainability, national resources management and disaster risk management; peace and security; and finance and partnership.



Broader United Nations discussion of this topic includes the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The Panel's May 2013 report recommended five major shifts in post-2015 development goals, which include: leaving no one behind; putting sustainable development at the core; transforming economies for jobs and inclusive growth; building peace and effective, open, and accountable institutions; and forging a new global partnership. The post-2015 agenda discussions have largely examined three major options for the MDGs: retention and reconfiguration, reformulation or development of an alternative framework. The African Member States, in response to a joint Economic Commission for Africa, African Union and United Nations Regional Groups survey, have indicated interest in reformulation of the MDGs, which would enable the addition of new goals, alteration of existing goals and a more rigorous discussion around the international communities' commitments to success.

Africa is one of the core regions of global focus for the Millennium Development Goals. The people of Africa continue to need access to better education, healthcare, job opportunities, and more transparent, responsible and helpful governance around the world. To help policy makers and the delivery of aid, more complete data from numerous African States is needed. A civil registry system, recording basic demographic data like births and deaths, remains nonexistent in most sub-Saharan African States. Reporting on malaria and other health issues is incomplete or inconsistent in forty-one States around the world, many of which are in Africa; these forty-one States contain about eighty-five percent of all malaria cases. Even today, forty-eight percent of people in Africa remain in extreme poverty, the largest proportion remaining in the world. The ECA must consider how the MDGs have enabled major successes elsewhere, why Africa's progress has lagged on certain standards, and how the post-2015 development agenda can invigorate the region's and the international community's efforts.

Drafting the post-2015 development agenda effectively began at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012. At Rio+20, Member States began discussions on a set of sustainable development goals, with the intention that this would be integrated into a larger post-2015 process. While the conference did not define specific sustainable development goals, it did outline several considerations. In January 2013, the General Assembly established an Open Working Group to prepare a discussion draft. In June 2014, the working group put forward the first draft of the proposed goals and targets. The draft includes sixteen focus areas and numerous targets, spanning poverty eradication, sustainable agriculture, gender equality, and sustainable cities.

Moving forward, the Commission should consider several questions. First and foremost, the body should be prepared to recommend goals and indicators for the post-2015 development process that meet the needs of Africa. One issue particularly relevant to the Commission is how goals should be set: whether they should be uniform global targets or relative targets that account for local conditions. Additionally, the body might consider what the most appropriate role for the international community is in supporting the post-2015 development goals. Good governance, official development assistance and political will all play a role in achieving development targets. Finally, the body might consider the role that public-private partnerships or foreign direct investment (FDI) might play. FDI in Africa increased to over \$50 billion—close to double the official development assistance to the

continent. With partnerships also on the rise, the private sector is an increasingly important actor in the continent's economic and social development.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What goals and targets should be included in the post-2015 development goals? Are there existing goals that should be retained?
- What role should the international community play in supporting the post-2015 development agenda in Africa?
- How can the private sector support economic and social development in Africa?

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THE STATE OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE DIMENSION OF ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS AS A GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE

When money is moved secretly and illegally from one jurisdiction to another, this constitutes an illegal financial flow. Such funds may be proceeds from organized crime, smuggling, corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, or international trade manipulations. Illicit financial flows are the result of many factors, such as poor (or poorly enforced) financial regulatory frameworks; weak and non-harmonized taxing regimes; international trade mispricing; opaque public procurement and contracting; and an increasingly organized and sophisticated web of multinational criminal networks. Typically this money leaves Africa to end up in developed countries and in tax havens throughout the world.

While illegal financial flows are concentrated in West Africa and primarily stem from extractive and mining industries, they are a burden for almost every State. Three percent of illicit financial flows are derived from government corruption, while 33 percent comes from organized criminal activity and 64 percent from trade manipulations. In recent years, researchers estimate that approximately \$50 billion USD was lost per year due to illicit outflows on the African continent, totaling an estimated \$1.2 trillion to \$1.4 trillion between 1980 and 2009. Every dollar that leaves the continent is a dollar lost to investment opportunities in critical sectors such as agriculture, food security, health and education services, and infrastructure. This problem is compounded by the drain on hard currency reserves, the stimulation of inflation, and a widening of income disparity. The channels through which these funds flow are both a symptom and a cause of the endemic corruption in the region. Their presence undermines the foundations of developing economies and governments, which impacts future equitable and sustainable development prospects for millions.

The international community has struggled with illicit financial flows for decades. The United Nations first examined the issue through a number of topic areas in the 1980s and 1990s. These early efforts were focused on addressing the sources of illicit financial flows, especially transnational organized crime and corruption. In 2000, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It addresses illicit financial flows by encouraging adoption of legislation to criminalise money laundering and corruption, creation of regulatory systems to monitor movements of cash and promoting international cooperation for both the monitoring and recovery of the proceeds of crime. In 2005, the United Nations adopted the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The Convention Against Corruption addresses gaps in the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime by promoting transparency in the hiring of officials and in acquisition, the establishment of domestic and regional anti-corruption monitoring bodies, and the criminalization of trading in influence and embezzlement. In 2011, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) established the High-Level Panel on

Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, a new panel to more holistically seek solutions by addressing illicit financial flows directly.

The Panel was mandated to educate and facilitate policy discourse, mobilize the African people, examine the main drivers of illicit financial flows, identify challenges and the vested interests involved in and benefiting from them, and offer policy options and recommendations. The Panel, in its 2013 report on the topic, found that the mispricing of trade exports and imports is facilitated by some 60 international tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions, enabling the creation and operation of millions of disguised corporations, oil companies, anonymous trust accounts and fake charitable foundations. Their reporting adds to the body of research that clearly articulates the need for action in combating illicit financial flows from Africa.

There are many interrelated reasons why the rate of illicit financial flows on the continent is not decreasing, including lack of oversight, the sheer complexity in tracking the money, and the limited resources by African institutions. Poor governance leads to public corruption and encourages corporate misbehavior. Anticorruption agencies in Africa—government institutions designed to tackle corruption in the public and private spheres—face many challenges, from their independence and autonomy to their mandates, which sometimes do not give them the powers to prosecute or follow through on specific cases.

Looking ahead, the Commission should consider several issues. First, the body should consider how Member States and United Nations entities could cooperate. The solutions are complex, but collaboration among regional and international bodies (such as the African Union and International Monetary Fund), government members (including whistle-blowers, civil servants and judicial actors), civil society and the banking sector is essential to success. Areas in need of increased cooperation include strengthening tax administration and enforcement through better regionally-integrated systems; facilitating tax information exchange between governments from developed and developing countries; moving toward a consistent and globalized regulatory system on transfer pricing, including the use of advance transfer pricing systems; and, increasing global asset recovery capacity. Cooperation in these areas would provide a major step towards curtailing financial flows by corporations and other parties seeking to avoid or minimize their tax liabilities. Second, Member States might consider how to improve data collection. Data is essential to more accurately gauging and studying the problem. Finally, Member States should consider how to follow-up on and implement the recommendations of the 2013 report produced by the High-Level Panel. Successfully addressing the issues it raises could significantly improve financial and development outcomes for the continent as a whole.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What steps should the United Nations and Member States take to implement the High-Level Panel's recommendations?
- How can Member States and the United Nations cooperate to improve available data on illicit financial flows in Africa?
- How does the international trade regime currently enable illicit financial flows? How can the African Union, the United Nations and Member States cooperate to address this problem?



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CHAPTER EIGHT

COMMISSION FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

ANDORRA	EGYPT	PAKISTAN
ARGENTINA	EL SALVADOR	PERU
AUSTRIA	FINLAND	POLAND
BANGLADESH	GERMANY	REPUBLIC OF KOREA
BELARUS	JAPAN	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BRAZIL	KUWAIT	SPAIN
BURKINA FASO	LIBERIA	SUDAN
CAMEROON	MADAGASCAR	UGANDA
CHILE	MALAWI	UKRAINE
CHINA	MAURITANIA	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CUBA	MEXICO	VIET NAM
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	MONGOLIA	ZIMBABWE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	NEPAL	
ECUADOR	NIGERIA	

PURVIEW OF THE COMMISSION FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The United Nations Committee for Social Development (CSocD) is an ancillary body of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It is charged to advise ECOSOC on issues of social development and other social areas not covered by technical and specialized agencies of the United Nations. It covers issues ranging from protections for families and youth development to the rights of the disabled and the rights of indigenous peoples. It also examines issues of social cohesion and support for civil society. The Commission meets on an annual basis.

Website: <http://undesadspd.org/commissionforsocialdevelopment.aspx>

STATUS OF THE WORLD PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR YOUTH

The United Nations generally defines youth as people between the ages of 15 and 24. Youth is a critical time for individual development, as individuals complete school, create new households, form families and find their first adult employment. Young people also play a critical role in their societies. When the needs of youth are met, they can serve as drivers of economic growth, developers of new ideas and engaged, active citizens in their communities. When the needs of youth are not met, it can create unrest, stagnate economies and tear the fabric of societies.

While the United Nations has long recognized the importance of young people, the issue has come into clearer focus in recent years. Youth unemployment was a major challenge for the European economies both before and after the 2008 financial crisis, and the high rates of youth unemployment continue to be a challenge. Youth were widely viewed as the drivers of the revolutions of the Arab Spring, which toppled governments across the Middle East and North Africa. Youth protests against economic and education policies in Latin America have created challenges for governments across the region. And in Asia, youth are driving the economic transformations of China, India and others. Today, there are approximately 1 billion youth ages 15 to 24 globally, and more than 3 billion are under the age of 30. The youth population in most countries will peak in the decades ahead, creating a narrow

demographic window for States to “lock in” policies that create good livelihoods for their youth populations. Failing to do so will be a drag on the economy and hurt social cohesion for years to come—especially as many countries experience challenges related to aging populations in the next thirty years.

The General Assembly first acknowledged the role of youth in 1965 when they drafted the Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples. The modern focus on youth began when the General Assembly declared 1985 the International Youth Year. It drew international attention to the important role young people play in the world, and, in particular, their potential contribution to development. A decade later in 1995, the General Assembly adopted the World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond, which aimed to guide the policies and programs of Member States aimed at empowering and supporting youth in ten priority areas.

Between 2005 and 2007, Member States completed a ten-year review of the World Programme and ultimately agreed to add five priorities and to expand upon these areas in the Supplement to the World Programme of Action for Youth. The fifteen areas of focus are education; employment; hunger and poverty; health; environment; substance abuse; juvenile justice; leisure-time activities; girls and young women; the full and effective participation of youth in the life of society and in decision-making; as well as globalization; information and communication technologies; HIV/AIDS; armed conflict; and inter-generational issues.

While Member States have agreed upon the importance of supporting youth in principle, the issue is still highly political. Because the needs of youth are intrinsically linked to national economic and social development policies, Member States are frequently wary of outside interference with national policies regarding youth. In some instances, the needs and demands of youth collide uncomfortably with social norms and laws. Young women and girls frequently seek education and employment opportunities that are prohibited by custom or law. This can have severe repercussions, as the Malala Yousafzai case demonstrated. In other instances, the inclusion of youth voices in the political process may introduce instability and dissent. Increased youth voices in policy deliberations may advance ideas that current governments oppose. At



the 2010 World Youth Congress, the youth recommendations called for decreased military spending and dramatic increases in education and social welfare spending.

In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2010 the International Year of Youth. This generated a renewed focus on youth issues, with major summits held in Turkey and Mexico. In December 2011, the United Nations Secretariat Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) convened experts and developed quantitative indicators for the World Programme of Action. These are crucial tools for Member States to assess progress in supporting youth development. The group also determined that the 15 priority areas could be grouped into three priority clusters: youth and the global economy; youth and civil society; and youth and their well-being. In January 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that youth engagement would be a major priority in his five-year plan for the United Nations Secretariat. He subsequently appointed a new Envoy on Youth, whose mandate includes raising the profile of youth issues, advocating on behalf of youth and supporting youth development at the United Nations.

Today, the United Nations technical and specialized agencies play a critical role in addressing many of the problems facing youth: the International Labour Organization works substantially on youth unemployment; the World Health Organization works to improve youth health outcomes and prevent HIV/AIDS; and the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, and the United Nations Children's Fund both work to support access to education. Yet the primary responsibility for meeting the needs of youth falls on the Member States. Frequently, support from the United Nations comes in evaluation, policy planning and occasionally in the execution of programs.

Despite the increase in attention and a renewed focus on supporting youth by Member States, the challenges facing young people continue. Youth unemployment remains high, particularly in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, despite efforts by Member States, the United Nations and its technical and specialized agencies. So far, Member States have not found sufficient solutions to this challenge. In many instances, Member States may need to consider new economic policies that create opportunities for young people, though these policies may have other, more negative impacts on other parts of the economy. In a recent global assessment by the Secretariat, young people have identified education as their most pressing need. The number of illiterate and innumerate continues to grow around the world, largely driven by conflicts that prevent youth from attending school and getting an education. Finally, dissatisfaction among youth continues to rise in many areas around the world, and young people are seeking a stronger role in governance at the local, national and international level. The strong youth interest at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) demonstrates how youth are lobbying for a greater voice in deciding the future of the world at every level.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- What are the major concerns facing young people in your country? How have you worked to meet them?
- How has the United Nations supported youth development efforts around the world, and are there ways to adapt its programming to meet present concerns?
- How can the United Nations address the youth unemployment crisis?

- How should the United Nations include youth voices, and what recommendations would assist Member States in integrating youth into governance structures?

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD PROGRAMME OF ACTION CONCERNING DISABLED PERSONS

Defined as “the consequence of an impairment that may be physical, cognitive, mental, sensory, emotional, developmental, or some combination of these,” disabilities affect over a billion people across the globe. The disabled are entitled to the same rights as all other human beings and to equal opportunities. Too often their lives are handicapped by physical and social barriers in society, which hamper their full participation. The World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons was adopted in 1982 as a global strategy for protecting persons with disabilities in a social and national context. The United Nations continues to implement the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons to better provide this large and growing population demographic with the opportunities and human rights they deserve.



The call for an international standard of rights concerning disabled persons emerged out of the existing United Nations Charter. While documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applied to the disabled, it did not explicitly cite their needs within its text. Because of this, work on the rights of disabled persons focus on social support and on preventative health issues. This shift began with the adoption in 1971 of the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons. At the forefront of this document was the guarantee that the mentally disabled were to be afforded all of the same rights and freedoms possible given their respective condition. Also included in the document were protections for access to health care and treatment. Throughout the Declaration was a message of protection and empowerment: the mentally disabled were to be treated as any other member of society so far as they could participate. Importantly, the Declaration specified that any rights of the mentally disabled curtailed by States could only be done after a legal review; the decision of the State must also be regularly reviewed and subject to appeal.

Building on its earlier work, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons in 1975. The Declaration set out to define the term “disabled person,” affirming the rights of persons with disabilities and strengthening the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons. As with other international documents on this issue, the focus remains on preventing disabilities; providing rehabilitation for those affected; and ensuring a more free and equal society in which to live. The General Assembly further proclaimed 1981 as the International Year for Disabled Persons, with the theme “full participation.” The goals of the International Year were to encourage research on disability issues including transportation systems and infrastructure, encourage full integration into society and educate and inform the public as to the rights of disabled persons.

The International Year of Disabled Persons, 1981, was followed by the adoption of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons (WPA) in 1982. The WPA encourages all States, no matter their level of development, to work with a strong sense of urgency to prevent disability, provide rehabilitation and eliminate obstacles to the full participation of disabled persons in social life. Some of the most important measures for prevention of impairment in the WPA include avoidance of war; improvement of the educational, economic and social status of the least privileged groups; and identification of types of common impairment. It also encourages States to take steps to detect symptoms and signs of impairment as early as possible and to follow immediately with the necessary curative or remedial action, which can prevent disability or at least lead to significant reductions in the severity of disability. In all rehabilitation efforts, emphasis should be placed on the abilities of the individual, whose integrity and dignity must be respected. Prevention is not a panacea, however. Despite preventive efforts, there will always be a number of people with impairments and disabilities, and societies have to identify and remove obstacles to their full participation. The General Assembly adopted two more key documents in the following decades. The first was the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Standard Rules), adopted in 1993. These twenty-two rules summarize the message of the WPA and serve as the basis for policy-making and technical cooperation. And in 2006, the international community formally agreed on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Countries that join in the Convention commit themselves to develop and carry out policies, laws and administrative measures for securing the rights recognized in the Convention and abolish laws, regulations, customs

and practices that constitute discrimination. As of July 2014, it has been signed or ratified by 158 Member States.

The Standard Rules mandate the Commission for Social Development (CSocD) supervise their implementation. CSocD has named three Special Rapporteurs on disability since 1994, and their reports continue the recent discussion of this topic as a human rights issue, with more recent reports encouraging States to sign the Convention and integrate respect for the rights of the disabled in development programs, domestic and international. CSocD is especially concerned about the lack of reporting and data collection on the issue.

While it is encouraging that steps have been taken by the international community to promote the well-being of persons with disabilities in their own nations and internationally, there remain many challenges. There is strong correlation between poverty and impairment; the birth of a disabled child often forces a family further into destitution. In those States where there is already great pressure on their social welfare system, or where there is a lack of adequate medical care, this often means that children with disabilities are abandoned by their families. Even today, the birth of a disabled child can be perceived as a curse or a punishment, depending on various social customs and belief systems.

Looking ahead, the Commission should consider some of the following issues. First, the Commission might consider how effectively the Convention is being implemented by States Parties and what steps might encourage non-States Parties to ratify the Convention. Enshrining the principles of equality in national law and in national policies is crucial to the success of the Convention. Second, there is a significant gap in data concerning disabled persons. Data collection is vital to ensuring an accurate global understanding of the scope of the issue and to better understand how the international community can better work on the national and local levels to speak specifically to their needs. A global monitoring mechanism and the ability for information-sharing would be critical in this; the United Nations has encouraged non-governmental organizations to partner with Member States in this to achieve this goal. Third, the Commission should consider how to encourage equitable access to education. Education can both empower the disabled as well as improve their treatment and opportunities. Fears and stigmas about the disabled remain; efforts at educating populations about prevention, rehabilitation, and empowerment as envisioned in the WPA must extend to rural areas to combat these attitudes. Finally, the body should consider how these goals could be integrated with the upcoming debate and design of the post-2015 development goals.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include the following:

- How effectively is the Convention being implemented, and how can the Commission improve implementation?
- How can Member States support equitable access to education for disabled persons?
- What specific data could improve the global understanding of the situation faced by the disabled?
- How might the rights of the disabled be integrated within the post-2015 development goals?

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CHAPTER NINE

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

PURVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal international judicial body of the United Nations. The two major roles of the ICJ are developing advisory opinions on matters of international law referred to it by specialized agencies and presiding over legal disputes submitted to the Court by Member States. Only Member States may submit cases to the Court, and the Court is only considered competent to preside over a case if both States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court over the dispute. The ICJ does not preside over legal disputes between individuals, the public, or private organizations.

Website: www.icj-cij.org

AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (REPUBLIC OF GUINEA V. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO)

This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 26 November 2006. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case.

This case involves proceedings between the Republic of Guinea on behalf of Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, a Guinean citizen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaire. The case concerns Guinea's assertion that Diallo, who lived in Zaire for 32 years, was unlawfully imprisoned by Zairean authorities, divested of his property, and expelled from the country after he attempted to collect a debt owed to him by Zaire. While residing in Zaire, Diallo founded two major companies: the trading company Africom-Zaire and the container transport company Africacontainers. Both companies had contracts with major oil and mineral companies within Zaire and with the government itself.

The proceedings came about after Diallo attempted to recover substantial debt owed to him by Zaire Shell, an oil company of which Zaire was a shareholder. In 1995, after direct negotiation with the company and the state failed, Diallo filed suit through the Zaire court system to collect the debts. Diallo was successful and the court ordered Zaire Shell to pay Africacontainers, \$13 million. The court also issued a seizure order against Zaire Shell's bank accounts and property. The decision was upheld through several appeals and was initially honored by the Prime Minister. The Minister of Justice was to oversee negotiations between Diallo and Africacontainers and Zaire Shell to develop a payment schedule.

However, the Prime Minister of Zaire issued an expulsion order against Diallo on 31 October 1995. The order claimed Diallo's "presence and conduct have breached public order in Zaire, especially in the economic, financial, and monetary areas, and continue to do so." On 5 November, Diallo was secretly arrested and imprisoned and the Prime Minister revoked the seizure against Zaire Shell's accounts and property. Diallo's plight generated significant attention from the media and international organizations, and despite petitions from groups, he was held for 74 days. After his release, the Prime Minister issued a new expulsion

order and Diallo was forced to leave the country on 31 January 1996. The paperwork involved in the deportation was formalized as a refusal of entry notice and an account of illegal residence.

On behalf of Diallo, the Republic of Guinea requested in 1998 that the International Court of Justice order Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to pay reparations of over \$30 billion and make a public apology to Diallo. Guinea asserts that Diallo's arrest, detention and expulsion were a result of a Democratic Republic of the Congo policy to prevent him from collecting the debts owed. Guinea is arguing on behalf of Diallo by exercising its diplomatic protection, noting that Diallo is a Guinea national and his rights were violated in the following three categories: his individual rights, his direct rights as the acting partner in Africom-Zaire and Africacontainers-Zaire, and the rights of those companies by substitution.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo argues that Mr. Diallo is a dual citizen of both Guinea and the DRC. Since he resided in the country for 32 years, he acquired Congolese citizenship through the doctrine of *jus soli*. As a consequence of this legal status, the Democratic Republic of the Congo contests Guinea's ability to afford diplomatic protection for Diallo. Additionally, the Democratic Republic of the Congo asserts that Diallo engaged in improprieties with an administration that was historically corrupt and exploitative. By knowingly doing business with such a government, Mr. Diallo fails to meet the requirement of having "clean hands" to claim diplomatic protection determined in past international cases. Nevertheless, the current government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo views itself as a successor state to Zaire. As such, it took over the international identity of Zaire, but it holds that it cannot be held responsible for the obligations made by its corrupt predecessor state. Even if the Court should find that the current government is responsible, the Democratic Republic of the Congo claims that the amount of damages Guinea has asserted is far too high. As a country that holds Highly Indebted Poor Country status with the Paris Club of international creditors, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in no shape to pay such an amount and would be irrevocably harmed by such a judgment.

In successfully adjudicating this case, the Court must first decide on the citizenship status of Mr. Diallo. His status as either a Guinea national or a dual national will have a cascading effect on the rest of the arguments made by both sides. Secondly, the Court must decide what rights and responsibilities both Mr. Diallo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have to each other based on his citizenship status and his dealings with the past government of Zaire. Lastly, the Court must determine if the current government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is responsible for the potentially corrupt business agreements made by the past government of Zaire.

Questions to consider on this issue include:

- What recourse does a State or individual have in the International Court of Justice when wronged as a result of internal politics in another state?
- What effect should the Court give to the decision of the Zairian court in favor of Diallo?



- How do international law and treaties influence the obligations that a state has to allow foreign businesses to collect debt upon a judgment?
- Does a State have the right to pursue justice on behalf of one of its nationals through the International Court of Justice?

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LAGRAND (GERMANY V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 28 March 2000. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case.

This case concerns two German nationals, Karl and Walter LaGrand. On 7 January 1982, the brothers attempted a bank robbery in Arizona, killing the bank’s manager in the attempt. Two years later, an Arizona court convicted the brothers of first-degree murder and sentenced them to death. Germany claims the sentence was invalid because Arizona officials did not comply with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), a multilateral treaty to which Germany and the United States of America are both parties. Jurisdiction is claimed under Article I of the Optional Protocol, which states that any disputes arising from the Vienna Convention are to be settled under the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

The Vienna Convention provides that when a national of one country is arrested or otherwise detained by competent authorities in another country, those authorities are required to do two things. First, they must notify the prisoner of his or her right to contact and be represented by counsel from his or her own country. Second, if the prisoner so requests, the authority must notify the consular post (point of communication for a State’s official legal authorities) for the national’s country of origin.

In this case, the relevant “competent authorities” of the detaining state were Arizona law enforcement and judicial officials. Germany claims, and the United States of America admits, that the Arizona officials failed to comply with the notification requirements of the Vienna Convention. Germany only learned of the brothers’ detention and pending death sentences in 1992, when the brothers themselves notified the German consular post in Los Angeles after learning of their rights from other sources. Germany contends that if the brothers had been represented by German counsel they would have fared better at trial, while the United States of America contends that this is too speculative of a harm to justify interference with Arizona’s criminal justice system.

Karl LaGrand was executed on 24 February 1999. On 2 March 1999, the day before Walter LaGrand’s scheduled execution, Germany petitioned the International Court of Justice for “provisional measures of protection” against the United States that would create an injunction to stay the execution until the Court could reach a decision on the merits. The International Court of Justice granted Germany’s request, stating that until final decision in the case was made, the United States of America “should take all measures at its disposal” to stay the execution. Germany then sought to enforce the provisional measures in the United States Supreme Court; the Supreme Court denied Germany’s request. Despite Germany’s diplomatic and legal efforts, the Governor of Arizona refused to stay the execution, and Walter LaGrand was put to death on 3 March 1999.

One of the major conflicts in this case is between the Vienna Convention and the United States of America’s domestic doctrine of procedural default, which prevents parties to a trial from raising defenses on appeal if they failed to raise them at the initial trial. This doctrine became important to the case when German counsel were not allowed to raise the Vienna Convention violation issue in later federal court proceedings involving the LaGrands. Germany argues that the Vienna Convention should take precedence, especially since the reason the brothers did not claim their rights at trial was a result of Arizona’s failure to notify them of this right.

After Walter LaGrand’s execution, Germany changed its claim for remedies since a new trial was no longer possible. Germany demands a declaration from the International Court of Justice that the United States of America violated the Vienna Convention. Additionally, Germany demands that the United States of America both pay reparations and put in place protocols to ensure that a similar situation would be prevented in the future. In legal support of its argument, Germany claims the Vienna Convention confers rights on individuals such as the LaGrand brothers, rights which are enforceable in both domestic and international courts. The United States claims the Vienna Convention confers enforceable rights on States Parties only, not individuals.

Germany also argues in support of the binding power of provisional International Court of Justice rulings, claiming that the United States of America violated the Vienna Convention’s VCCR’s Optional Protocol by not complying with the Court’s provisional measures and staying the execution. The United States of America counters with the claim that its domestic doctrine of procedural default takes precedence over the Vienna Convention and that the Court does not have the authority to rule on Arizona’s sovereign right to manage its own criminal justice system. These questions go to the foundation of the Court’s powers and purpose. In preparing your research, pay special attention to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.



Questions to consider on this issue include:

- What judicially enforceable rights, if any, do treaties confer upon individuals?
- When the International Court of Justice was created, along with the United Nations Charter, to what extent did the founding Member States intend for provisional International Court of Justice rulings to be binding?
- How can countries strike the appropriate balance between effective International Court of Justice rulings and state sovereignty?
- To what extent should customary international law and other treaties affect interpretation of a treaty provision?
- To what extent should international legal obligations undertaken by a Member State affect the implementation of its domestic laws? What about the actions of its sub-state political entities, such as the State of Arizona under the United States of America's federal system?

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OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN (BOLIVIA V. CHILE)

On 24 April 2013, the government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia filed an application to institute proceedings against the Republic of Chile. Bolivia cites more than one hundred years of treaties, agreements, government communications and public statements to support their assertion that Chile has an unfulfilled obligation to negotiate with Bolivia a path for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

Bolivia cites the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, also known as the Pact of Bogotá, in support of the Court's jurisdiction in this matter. Article 31 recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court in matters between American States involving, among other disputes, matters of interpreting treaties and questions of international law. Both Bolivia and Chile have signed and ratified the Pact.

Chile and Bolivia achieved independence from Spain in 1810 and 1825, respectively. At the time, Bolivia's territory reached the Pacific

Ocean, although both Chile and Bolivia declared sovereignty over the area that represented Bolivia's link to the ocean, referred to in Bolivia as the department of Litoral. The Treaty of 10 August 1866 settled this dispute, marking the border between the two nations at the 24th parallel. This resolution was further solidified by the Treaty of 6 August 1874. This agreement was short lived, with Chile annexing the Litoral during the War of the Pacific, (also known as the Guano or Nitrate War). This war, between Chile, Bolivia and Peru, began in 1879 and ended with the Truce of Valparaíso, signed in 1884, sealing Chile's victory; the Truce granted Chile control over the disputed territory and declared the border treaties of 1866 and 1874 null and void. This treaty, however, did not officially end the conflict nor give Chile permanent annexation of the disputed territory—only control. In 1895, the parties executed the Special Treaty on the Transfer of Territories, which included provisions for Bolivia to regain natural and sovereign access to the sea, dependent on Chile's acquisition of specific areas.

In 1904 the parties signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, officially ending the War of the Pacific and establishing Chilean rule over the previously conquered Bolivian territories, including the department of Litoral. The Treaty did grant Bolivia the right to import and export goods through two ports, Arica and Antofagasta. The loss of the Litoral converted Bolivia into a landlocked country, with all the special difficulties in the export and import of goods that entails. Bolivia is rich in natural resources, which are difficult to export without a sea port. In addition to the direct access it provides to the ocean, the contested department of Litoral is rich in natural resources.

Over the subsequent years, there have been a number of communications between the two countries concerning the status of Bolivia's former land link to the Pacific Ocean. In 1950 and 1961, official communications from Chile to Bolivia discussed the possibility of entering into formal negotiations to grant Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

On 8 February 1975, the President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, signed a Declaration with Bolivian President Hugo Banzer, in which both assumed a compromise “to find formulas to solve the vital issues which both countries faced, such as one relating to the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia.” With this compromise, both governments started a negotiation in which Chile, through an official note on 19 December 1975, expressed: “it would consider, as manifested by President Banzer, the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign seacoast linked to the Bolivian territory by an equally sovereign territorial strip.”

This problem was further discussed in bilateral agreements between Bolivia and Chile, such as the Ayacucho Statement of 1974. In 1979 the Organization of American States adopted resolution 426, formally asking the countries to engage in negotiation to provide Bolivia with sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Further resolutions adopted by OAS in 1980, 1981 and 1983 reiterated this request.

In 2006, the Chilean government agreed to start negotiations about the maritime theme as part of a 13-point Agenda which, after four years of conversations without result, led to an another formal Chilean pledge, this time “to present and to achieve concrete, feasible and useful solutions” for the maritime issue, as written in the Act signed in La Paz on 14 July 2010. A few months later however, the meetings disintegrated. After this point, Chile declared through multiple state organs that there was no issue needing to be discussed, and that there is no legal basis for Bolivia's claim. Bolivia asserts that Chile has affirmed through its public officials and



past discussions an agreement to negotiate an agreement granting sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, they claim that this obligation has not been met.

Chile has asserted that there exists no agreement or obligation to negotiate access. They state that there is no legal basis for the dispute, that there are no ongoing maritime discussions between the two countries and that the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship established the border between the two countries.

Questions to consider include the following:

- Does the Pact of Bogotá provide the Court jurisdiction over this matter?
- Do statements of the Chilean government prove or create an obligation to negotiate both sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia and the territories which Chile will cede to Bolivia?
- What, if any, mechanism, does the Court have to mandate and review negotiations between two Member States?

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