CHAPTER THREE
THE SECURITY COUNCILS

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Representatives of the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Council. Many topics listed in this guide will change significantly before the conference. Additional topics may be added as necessary or as the Council sees fit.

For this reason it is highly advised that representatives have a broad knowledge base regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals and online sources are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended sources include among others: *The New York Times*, *UN Chronicle*, *The Times of London*, *Al Jazeera*, *Mail & Guardian*, *Foreign Policy* and *the Economist*. The UN Foundation's online daily newsletter, UN Wire, is also an excellent resource for timely information.

Whenever possible it is also recommended that representatives stay abreast of the most recent report(s) published by the Security Council and other relevant UN bodies. These can be found via the UN homepage under the [Security Council section](). Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on UN sources with some news sources provided for background on certain aspects of topics.

Unlike many other simulations, Security Council members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions that will change the course of the simulation. It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems throughout the simulation. While AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with Council members, Representatives are welcome and encouraged to make whatever declarative statements—including real or implied threats and deals—that do not carry operational implications outside of the UN. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulation Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions that would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the actual "home office" of the involved Member States(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the Contemporary Security Council or one of the Historical Security Councils. Delegations representing these countries, if present at AMUN, will be asked to participate in deliberations by the body, if they are not present or choose not to participate in deliberations an AMUN staff member will represent them as necessary. It is customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant Member States during discussion of topics, however it is not required. Any nation mentioned in the background research for a specific Security Council is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any related to any topic of relevance to international peace and security. For delegations that may be asked to appear before one of the

Historical Security Councils these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. All delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

A NOTE ABOUT HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCILS

AMUN's HSCs are unique not only in their topics, but also in their treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation is assigned to begin. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective roleplaying for an HSC Member State will be not just a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in that year. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations—and reevaluations—of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government took in that year was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must be, by definition, in character, it is not a sure thing that - given a second opportunity to look at events - any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musing of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for second chances.

It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues. One major factor in whether to be actively involved or to be a bystander which Representatives must consider, is the costs of involvement by the United Nations. The increase in costs often causes the Security Council to reprioritize their efforts.

While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of the previous year and should do their research accordingly. In studying their roleplaying assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically over the years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should peruse periodicals from 3-5 years prior to the year in question to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the *New York Times* Index, should provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts, which can be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are roleplaying the individual assigned as their nation's Representative to the UN. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their countries, or they may be relatively in the dark on their countries' moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulation Staff before making ANY operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the home office of the involved nation(s).

OPEN ISSUES

A unique feature of the Security Councils in simulations at AMUN is the ability to set its own agenda. This allows that, in addition to the situations outlined in the council specific topic guides on the following pages, the Security Councils can discuss any topic that the body wishes. For the contemporary Security Council this includes any real-world event up until the day the simulation convenes. For the Historical Security Councils, representatives should have a working knowledge of the events prior to and including the start date for their respective simulation. For the Historical Security Council of 1956, the start date is 18 June 1956. For the Historical Security Council of 1994, the start date is 07 January 1994.

For the time periods in question open issues could include any active UN peacekeeping operations, the work of any UN body active at the time, and any social or economic issue of the day. It is *strongly recommended* that all Representatives be well versed on current and historical global events relevant to their simulation.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Councils. For the contemporary Security Council these briefs are current as of spring 2013. Information for the Historical Security Councils covers information available up until the respective start dates of each simulation (HSC-1956 - 18 June 1956; HSC-1994 - 07 January 1994). It is recommended that representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of the background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.

THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY COUNCIL

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:

- How did this conflict begin? Is this a new conflict or a re-ignition of a previous conflict?
- How have similar situations and conflicts been solved peacefully?
- What States and regional actors are involved in this conflict?
- If there are non-State actors involved in a conflict, are there any States supporting them? If so, which ones?

THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The Great Lakes region has seen nearly perpetual violence from civil wars, ethnic conflicts and military interventions over the last 20 years. Although the Second Congo War (1998-2003) ended a decade ago, the mineral rich eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been vulnerable to spill-over violence and rebel groups receiving disclaimed support from neighboring states. Military intervention, intended to combat these rebel groups, has often created more problems than they have solved; more civilians have been killed as a result of this intervention than those killed by rebel groups.

During the Second Congo War the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to monitor the cease-fire agreements between warring factions within the DRC. As foreign armies pulled out of the DRC, violence increased as militant domestic factions evolved, merged and split over time. This ultimately created significant instability in the eastern provinces of Orientale, North Kivu, and South Kivu. The shifting security situation required greater peacekeeping forces over time, and the MONUC mandate shifted from monitoring cease-fires and the withdrawal of military forces to protecting civilians and monitoring human rights abuses. Eventually the mandate shifted further, including active pursuit of armed groups operating within the DRC as well as supporting the Congolese army, Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).

MONUC discovered evidence that mass murders had occurred in the eastern DRC. This led the Secretary-General to create a mapping exercise aimed at finding the most serious human rights and humanitarian violations that had taken place. Conducted between 2008 and 2009, the exercise found reasonable suspicion that over 600 violent incidents, most of which had multiple victims, had occurred during the ten-year civil war and each of these incidents pointed to "the possible commission of gross violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law." This exercise also found that foreign forces had played significant roles in many of the violent incidents.

In July 2010, the United Nations Organization and Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) replaced MONUC. The change was largely symbolic, emphasizing the political aspects of the mandate. The change also reinforced the Mission's mandate to support the DRC government and its efforts to aid in the political stabilization and peace efforts in eastern DRC following normalization of relations with its neighbors.

Even given the cooperation between MONUSCO and FARDC, many militant groups continue to perpetrate violence, especially in eastern DRC. In late 2012, M23, a group that had splintered from the formerly strong rebel group National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), launched an offensive that led to the conquering of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu that lies on the border with Rwanda. Reports on M23 have tied it to Rwanda to varying degrees, though the government of Rwanda has been quick to deny these claims. While M23's occupation of Goma was brief, the Security Council still passed resolution 2076 condemning the occupation.

Following this aggression, leaders from eleven regional nations signed a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in early 2013 aimed at creating a lasting peace in the region. Neither M23 nor any other rebel groups were involved in the negotiations leading to this Framework. Experts have expressed doubt that the Framework will actually create the lasting peace that it aims to achieve. Shortly thereafter Bosco Ntaganda, military chief of staff from the CNDP voluntarily presented himself to the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, asking to be transported to the International Criminal Court to face the charges against him.

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THE SITUATION IN MALI

The Situation in Mali began in early 2012, escalated throughout the year and featured the introduction of foreign military forces in early 2013. The conflict initially began as a rebellion of Tuaregs, largely within the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) many of whom are veterans from both sides of the Libyan Civil War. Near the start of the conflict, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré was overthrown in a coup d'état by the Malian military. The military installed Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, only to remove him in a second coup d'état in December of that same year.

The conflict between the separatist Tuaregs, who declared independence for Azawad, an area comprising approximately 60 percent of Mali, and the government of Mali began as a two-sided conflict, but over the following year, the conflict became more complicated as rebel groups fractured and other groups entered the conflict. Islamist forces also joined in the fighting, seeking to create an independent Azawad based on Sharia law. The situation spilled over the border into Algeria, with an Islamist group attacking a gas facility, taking dozens of workers hostage. This situation ended with over sixty dead.

In December 2012, the Security Council passed resolution 2085, which authorized the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) composed of neighboring nations that are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Following this authorization, but before AFISMA deployment, France, with help from European allies and the United States, contributed troops to assist the government of Mali. International involvement has encouraged the initial Tuareg separatists to both begin negotiations with the Malian government and fight against Islamist rebels.

Resolution 2085 was followed in April 2013 by Resolution 2100, which switched AFISMA from an African operation to the UN-led United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA took over on 1 July 2013. With the increase in troops from African governments, France began to withdraw its troops in April. The government of Mali has encouraged France to delay its drawdown.

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THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Late 2012 saw the destruction of nearly a decade of stability when a loose coalition of rebels, calling itself Séléka, began an offensive against President François Bozizé. In January 2013, the Economic Community of Central African States held peace talks that resulted in a declaration of principles, ceasefire and political agreement that has become known as the Libreville Agreements. One outcome of the agreement was a national unity government composed of members of Séléka and those loyal to President Bozizé. This government lasted a few short months; fighting quickly resumed and President Bozizé was ousted on 24 March 2013.

Michel Djotodia, who was First Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense in the unity government and a prominent leader of Séléka, declared himself President, suspended the constitution and dissolved the unity government. The African Union Peace and Security Council condemned the seizure of power, while the United Nations Security Council released a statement calling for the Libreville Agreements to continue to be the framework for a peaceful solution.

Mr. Djotodia has spent the time since then solidifying his hold on power. He initially appointed a National Transitional Council that appointed him "Head of the Transition." The composition of this council was challenged by the Economic Community of Central African States, which called for the Council to be larger and more inclusive. The people of the Central African Republic, including members of Séléka and other opposition groups, have protested, leaving the capital city of Bangui in a state of turmoil.

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THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

The Sudanese Civil War, which ended in 2003, left two million dead, four million internally displaced, and six hundred thousand refugees. Hostilities between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army have continued. Since 2004, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan has been attempting to ease tensions in the region and deal with the aftermath of the war, including the situation in Darfur. South Sudan officially became independent on 9 July 2011; however, independence has done little to stabilize the situation in the region.

Currently there are three peacekeeping missions in the Sudan: United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The situation on the ground has improved in Darfur, which has led to a recommendation for a UNAMID troop reduction. The security situation in Abyei has also largely improved since the deployment of UNISFA. However, while the immediate security situation has stabilized within Abyei, both Sudan and South Sudan are in direct violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area and have failed to remove their armed forces from Abyei. No political progress has been made toward the resolution of the final status of Abyei. The security improvements in Darfur and Abyei, however, have come at a time of increased conflict along the North-South border.

On 24 April 2012, the African Union issued a three-month deadline for resolving the long-standing disputes in the region. At its expiration the parties would be forced into binding international arbitration. Soon after, the United Nations Security Council took action on the issue, reinforcing the African Union Peace and Security Council's roadmap for peace as well as demanding that Sudan and South Sudan address key issues of dispute: oil revenues and transit fees, status of nationals living in the other country, resolution of disputed and claimed border areas and the final status of Abyei. The UN Security Council gave these demands additional force with the threat of the use of Article 41 if the parties failed to comply.

Following the signing of a non-aggression pact at talks on outstanding secession issues and a later commitment by Sudan to pull its troops out of the border region of Abyei, negotiations were held in June 2012 in an effort to comply with the African Union roadmap and Security Council resolutions 2046 and 2047, calling for the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee and activation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). At these talks Sudan and South Sudan agreed to activate the JBVMM and to create an Ad Hoc Committee. Throughout this time, cross-border attacks continued from both sides of the border.

The parties met again in September 2012 and signed agreements that finally delineated the SDBZ and fully activated the JBVMM. Finally, the parties met again on 19 March and 22 April 2013 under the JBVMM, outlining the timeline of withdrawal of forces from the SDBZ and the control of police forces and communities on their side of the Border Zone.

Despite all of the progress through the latter part of 2012 and early 2013, some 655,000 people have been displaced by the fighting between the army and rebels in states bordering South Sudan. Even though the two states struck a last minute deal on South Sudan's export of oil via pipelines that transect Sudan, the parties continued to accuse each other of maintaining an armed presence inside the Border Zone and clashes with rebels in Darfur and the South Kordofan region continue. The accusations culminated in Sudan informing South Sudan that it would freeze all oil and economic agreements and stop allowing oil to flow through the two export pipelines in its territory.

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THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

The unrest in the Syrian Arab Republic has continued for over two years despite attempts by the international community to quell the violence and bring about a return to normalcy for the citizens of Syria. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has reported that over 1.4 million refugees have fled Syria and 2.5 million are internally displaced.

Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has been in power since the death of his father in 2000. He has claimed that the opposition is largely due to enemies from outside Syria. Despite occasional signs of consolidation, the opposition has been split since just about the beginning. The Free Syrian Army is the largest opposition military group and maintains an affiliation with the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Both groups are largely Sunni Muslim, which is the majority religion in Syria. Kurdish rebel groups also are fighting throughout Syria. The Kurdish people have been oppressed for many years inside Syria; many were stripped of their passports in the 1960's, forced to live as stateless people.

Thus far, the work of the Joint Special Envoy from the League of Arab States and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has largely proven fruitless. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed to this position on 23 February 2013. Mr. Annan introduced a six-point plan that required both sides to actively work toward peace. After the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2043 on 21 April 2013, which established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), a mix of civilian and military observers entered Syria, ushering in a brief ceasefire.

By the second month of the UNSMIS deployment fighting had expanded beyond pre-ceasefire levels. UNSMIS saw its activities constantly hampered by both the government of President Bashir al-Assad and opposition forces. As the initial 90-day mandate for UNSMIS drew close to expiring with fighting only having intensified, the Security Council passed Resolution 2059, allowing UNSMIS 30 days to wind down its operations. Shortly thereafter Mr. Annan resigned from his position as Joint Special Envoy.

The second Joint Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, has had similar levels of success as his predecessor. Fighting has continued to escalate, with heavy weapons such as cluster bombs, rockets and gunships becoming de rigueur.

The latest concerns have centered upon the potential and rumored use of sarin and other chemical and biological weapons by one or both sides of the conflict. U.S. President Barack Obama stated that he had evidence that chemical weapons had been used, but that it was inconclusive as to which side had used it.

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THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Korean War ended by truce, not by peace treaty, in 1953. Since that time a demilitarized zone has been in effect between the two countries. In June 2000, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea signed an accord to ease military tensions and promote economic cooperation. Cooperation has been slow, especially after an early research effort by the DPRK using uranium caused problems in 2002. At the time, the DPRK said it was only using plutonium to try to build atomic bombs. This led to the Six Party Talks in 2003, which included the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. The countries involved in the Six Party Talks managed to offer the DPRK formal economic assistance in return for taking steps to end its nuclear weapons development.

Between 2006 and 2009, the DPRK launched ballistic missiles, conducted nuclear tests, announced it would begin uranium enrichment and weaponizing its plutonium stockpiles, and declared the truce that ended the Korean War void. These actions were met by increasingly more severe condemnations and sanctions by the international community and the Security Council. The DPRK complied with Security Council Resolution 1718, which condemned missile tests and demanded that the DPRK return to the Six Party Talks and retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Security Council Resolution

1874, which condemned a nuclear test and further missile launches, demanded the return of the DPRK to the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and strengthened the sanctions imposed under Resolution 1718.

On 17 December 2011, Kim Jong-il suffered a fatal heart attack and his son Kim Jong-un was hailed as the "Great Successor." Kim Jong-un formally took over ruling party leadership in April 2012. The DPRK immediately conducted a long-range missile test, subsequently withdrawing from an agreement prohibiting such tests. In response to an October 2012 missile deal between the Republic of Korea and the United States, the DPRK announced that it had missiles that could hit the mainland of the United States and followed up this threat with a widely condemned launch that put a satellite into orbit.

On 12 February 2013, the DPRK state media announced that it had conducted an underground nuclear test, resulting in an explosion measured to be twice as large as the 2009 test. The Security Council immediately followed the test with a new range of sanctions targeting cash transfers and diplomatic travel. Further ratcheting up tensions, the DPRK announced it would respond to the new sanctions by re-starting all facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex and withdrawing its workers from the South-Korean-funded Kaesong joint industrial park. The DPRK rejected later offers of talks to reduce tensions and described it as a "crafty trick" to disguise Seoul's hostility.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1956

The 2013 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 18 June 1956. The key international security concerns of this time revolve around the situations in the Middle East in relation to the General Armistice Agreements; the treatment of ethnic groups in South Africa; issues of colonialism, human rights, and self-determination in Algeria, Cyprus, West Irian, and many other areas seeking independence; and military clashes, territorial disputes, and disputes over UN representation continue between the two Chinas. As it has for years, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union permeates international politics and remains a constant undercurrent in how world affairs are seen and handled.

In 1956, Dag Hammarskjold was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dwight Eisenhower, the US President, and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier. The Shah's government was in power in Iran, Batista's Cuba was in the American sphere of influence, and the Republic of China (on Formosa/Taiwan), rather than the People's Republic of China, was officially represented in the United Nations. During this decade, Cold War tensions grew, decolonization created a plethora of new States and membership in the United Nations subsequently expanded by leaps and bounds. Issues of "Palestine" revolved around continued violations of the General Armistice Agreements that followed the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the only issues involving "Palestinians" were regarding their status as refugees. There were numerous "internal" conflicts in this time period (including South Africa, Algeria and Morocco), but most never reached the Security Council or were discussed with no action taken, due to the powerful patronage of one or more of the Permanent Members.

From time to time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Some of the delegations that may be called before the HSC include: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, South Africa, Algeria, Greece, Morocco, Hungary and India.

The following are brief synopses of select international situations facing the Security Council in mid-1956. The prominent events of late 1955 and early 1956 are discussed, as well as some of the questions that will face the Security Council in the latter half of the year. The briefs provided are intended merely as starting points for Representatives' continued exploration of the topics. Any issue on the world scene in 1956 is fair game for discussion in the Historical Security Council; the following topic brief list is not considered to be all inclusive regarding topics that the Council may face. At AMUN Representative actions as well as Simulation Directors shape the flow of the simulation and the topics brought before the Council.

Therefore, it is highly recommended that Representatives have a broad historical knowledge of world affairs as they stood prior to 18 June 1956.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:
- Should the U.N. be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the U.N. play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the region?

THE PALESTINE QUESTION: INCIDENTS ON LAKE TIBERIAS

Incidents on the disputed Lake Tiberias, located along the 1949 Armistice line between Syria and Israel, were the basis of conflicts between Syria and Israel in 1955 and early 1956. In December 1955, Israeli armed forces attacked Syrian civilians and military personnel on the shores of Lake Tiberias from both the land and sea. In response, Syria brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council in December 1955.

These attacks were documented by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) personnel stationed in the region. The UNTSO reports noted that Israel deliberately violated provisions of the General Armistice Agreements (GAA) by engaging in government-authorized military operations in the lake region. The report also noted, however, that Syrian authorities had, over the past year, interfered with legitimate Israeli commercial and civilian activities on the lake in violation of the GAA provisions. Israel claimed this violation as the basis for its military actions in December, but was rebuked by both the UNTSO report and the Security Council.

On 19 January 1956, the Security Council passed Resolution 111 (S/3538) condemning Israel for its attacks on Syria and calling for a cessation of hostilities and return to the terms of the GAA. The resolution passed unanimously, and all members of the Council also verbally condemned the Israeli attacks. While hostilities remain high in the region, no further attacks have been noted.

THE PALESTINE QUESTION: STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS

The most difficult question facing the Council in 1955- 1956 involved the overall status of compliance with the GAA, in particular issues arising along the Egyptian and Israeli borders. Throughout 1955, the Council discussed this aspect of the Palestine Question, focusing on Israeli and Egyptian military incursions into the Gaza Area, which was formally laid out in the GAA as a demilitarized zone (DMZ).

On 29 March 1955, the Council passed Resolution 106, which condemned attacks by the Israeli regular military against Egyptian regular military forces in the Gaza area. With tensions heightening, on 30 March the Council also passed Resolution 107, requesting the assistance of the UNTSO Chief of Staff in facilitating consultation with the governments of both parties on ways to lessen the strain in the area and maintain the Armistice provisions. Following the apparently successful efforts of the Chief of Staff in negotiations with Israel and Egypt, the Council on 8 September also passed Resolution 108 (S/3435), calling for a ceasefire, which had already been accepted by the parties, and the free movement of UN observers in the Gaza area. While steps taken by the Council in 1955 led to verbal declarations of reduced hostility, tensions remained high along the lines of demarcation moving into 1956.

Throughout March and April of 1956, the Council held six discussions regarding compliance with Armistice Agreements. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria were invited participants in these discussions. The general consensus among Council Members at this time was that commitments by the parties to reduce tensions had not been carried out, and that further actions were needed. On 4 April 1956, the Council adopted Resolution 113 (S/3575) on these issues. This document requested the Secretary-General's (SG) assistance in completing an "enforcement survey" of the GAA provisions, and in seeking discussions by all parties to adopt already accepted GAA measures. It also requested the withdrawal of all forces to the demarcation lines specified in the GAA, the continued freedom of movement of observers, and the creation of local arrangements, in each area, for the prevention of future incidents. The Council realistically noted the improbability of full compliance with the GAA, but stressed the importance of all parties' attempts to comply whenever possible.

From 10 April through 3 May 1956, Dag Hammarskjold traveled to all of the countries involved in the Armistice Agreements, seeking the cooperation requested by the Council. In his reports of 2 May and 9 May, the SG noted that he regarded his mandate to include negotiations between the parties to re-establish full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, and he also reported generally positive results. While the Council had not specifically sought to include the SG in negotiations, they did respond positively to the results of the trip.

The SG's reports noted that, while all parties accepted the GAA provisions as in their overall best interests, political and practical circumstances had led to the current state of affairs in the region. Namely, mutual mistrust, combined with an inability to guarantee compliance by any given party, was contributing greatly to tensions, which all parties stated they would rather avoid. The SG received personal assurances from each party that they would unconditionally observe the cease fire clauses in the GAA and subsequent Council resolutions, reserving only the right to self-defense. This specifically included the idea that the parties would not respond with military force to anything less than an attack by the regular military of another party.

As a show of good will on this issue, the SG also reported that Egypt and Israel, on 18 April, both gave strict orders to abide by ceasefire assurances, which served to relieve tensions along the Gaza demarcation line. Additionally, Egypt and Israel provided specific assurances that they would seek to actively prevent crossing of the demarcation lines, including both the Gaza DMZ and the contested El Auja region, in which both sides had a military presence in violation of the GAA provisions.

The SG noted two key issues left unanswered by his trip. The first was the issue of Egyptian interference in Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. This issue was first raised in September 1951, and was still on the table through early 1956. Major concerns included the harassment of Israeli vessels as they passed through the area and the potential that Egypt might block access to this vital shipping lane.The second unanswered issue involved a recent Israeli plan for diversion of the Jordan River, which would be disastrous for Jordan and another likely precursor to renewed conflict in the region.

On 4 June 1956, the Council passed Resolution 114, commending the SG on this report, endorsing the view that full compliance with the GAA provisions as the key to peace in the region, and asking the SG to continue his Good Office efforts to ensure the cease fires and bring the parties closer to full Armistice compliance in the future.

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THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA

In April 1956, seventeen Asian and African Member States brought before the Security Council a request to discuss the situation in Algeria. While the issue was ultimately not brought to the floor, the question within the Council centered on the body's competency to discuss an issue described by France as an internal issue within the purview of France's domestic jurisdiction. The French assertion of the situation in Algeria was disputed by many as a threat to peace involving the flagrant violation of human rights and violation of the Algerian people's right to self-determination. While the topic was being discussed prior to a vote on adding the item to the agenda, debate focused on France's policy of repression and extermination of Algerian people including a possible violation of the Genocide Convention. A significant increase in troop numbers from approximately 150,000 in 1955 to over 400,000 in 1956 was cited as a significant "threat to peace."

France however maintained that consideration of the situation in Algeria would violate the UN Charter declaring the situation in Algeria an internal matter. After its conquest in 1830, Algeria was incorporated as a department of France, which meant that France considered Algeria to be an integral part of France rather than a mere colony. The French government asserted that its occupation of Algeria began at a time when no other government was recognized as having sovereignty over the territory and no other State had challenged its claim to the territory in over 120 years.

On 18 June 1956 a letter was submitted by the Secretary General to the Council on behalf of 13 Member States requesting reexamination of the topic of Algeria, citing "grievous loss of human life" due to recent French military actions.

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The treatment of peoples of Indian origin and the issue of Apartheid in South Africa are two of the issues the UN has confronted. The deteriorating racial situation in South Africa along with the government's public refusal to redress the issues, created a difficult situation for the UN. Although the topic has been primarily discussed by the General Assembly, the Council has monitored the situation for possible international repercussions arising out of the Bantu Education Act (1953), Separate Registration of Voters Act (1951), and other public policies. While the Security Council has taken no official action on either issue, it has monitored the political situation closely. Political changes within opposition groups to the South African government may provoke violence as both groups seek equality.

To date, outside of debating the issue, the UN has not gone further than attempting to create an atmosphere that would facilitate resolution of the matters through diplomatic discussions and encouraging South Africa to observe its obligations under Article 56 of the UN Charter.

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THE QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

Since the inception of the United Nations, the Republic of China has held the official Chinese seat, including in the Security Council. The rise of the People's Republic of China on the mainland, however, has raised questions about the legitimacy of this arrangement. This issue has been most strongly stressed by the Soviet Union in discussions before the Council. First discussed in January of 1955, the Council invited a representative of the central government of the People's Republic of China to participate without a vote in the Council's discussion of the issue.

The issue is complicated by continued acts of violence between the forces of the two Chinas in 1955. These actions included raids by the Republic of China into the People's Republic of China and the shelling and seizure of disputed islands by the People's Republic of China. While the military situation has stalemated due in part to nuclear brinkmanship between their respective supporters in the USSR and USA, tensions remain high. To date, the Council has decided to take no action on seating the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China retains UN representation.

THE SITUATION IN WEST IRIAN (WEST NEW GUINEA)

West Irian (West New Guinea) is one of many colonial disputes in the world accompanied by minor international hostilities. A colonial possession of the Netherlands, the political status of West Irian is currently an object of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesia feels that West Irian should either be ceded to Indonesia, or given the right of self-determination, and some hostilities have arisen over the issue.

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

Cyprus is another colonial territory embroiled in a dispute over the right to self-determination. This colony of the United Kingdom, with a significant Greek population, is currently seeking independence from the UK. This has so far been denied due to the island's significance as a military base in close proximity to the Middle East. Incidents which most concern the Security Council include a rise in terrorism on the island, attacks on police, military, and government installations

apparently incited by Greece against the UK government on Cyprus, and continued calls by Greece and peoples inside Cyprus for the right to self-determination.

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Admission of New Member States

With many former colonial territories gaining independence, and more expected in 1956, the Security Council has been dealing with the issue of admitting new Member States to the United Nations. In 1955 alone, Resolution 109 (S/3509) of 19 December recommended the admission of sixteen new members to the UN: Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain. The question was again addressed with Resolution 112 (S/3546) on 6 February 1956, recommending the admission of Sudan. The recent independence of Morocco and Tunisia may also lead to their request for admission in the near future. It should be noted that, following the submission of a request for admission to the Secretary-General, potential Member States must be recommended by the Security Council before they can be accepted into the UN by a vote of the General Assembly.

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Please note: The books and documents listed below provide both contemporary and historical information on the years 1955 and 1956. Any information provided for dates after 18 June 1956 will not be considered factual or appropriate in debates before the Council. It is strongly recommended that representatives to the Historical Security Council consult period materials, especially from late 1955 and the first half of 1956. These might include the *UN Chronicle*, the *New York Times*, *Time* magazine and similar sources.

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THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

MEMBERS OF THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

ARGENTINA	FRANCE	RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BRAZIL	NEW ZEALAND	RWANDA
CHINA	NIGERIA	SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC	OMAN	UNITED KINGDOM
DJIBOUTI	PAKISTAN	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1994

The 2013 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) - 1994 will simulate the events of the world beginning on 7 January 1994. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolved around the unrest in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslav Republic. From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Some of the delegations that may be called before the HSC-1994 include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Somalia, Uganda, Georgia and Haiti.

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 7 January 1994. The prominent events of 1993 are discussed, as well as some questions that will face the Security Council at the turn of the year. This research is intended merely as a focal point for Representatives' continued exploration of the topics. Any issue on the world scene in 1994 will be fair game for discussion in the Historical Security Council. Representatives should have broad historical knowledge of the world situation as it stood through 6 January 1994.

For each topic area, Representatives should consider the following questions. These questions should assist Representatives in gaining a better understanding of the issues at hand, particularly from your country's perspective:
- Should the U.N. be involved in the situation? If yes, what role can the U.N. play in the situation?
- How can regional organizations be utilized?
- Does your government feel that this situation is a threat to international peace and security?
- What are your government's interests in the region?

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

In 1962, Rwanda became independent from Belgian colonial rule, organized as a one-party state controlled by the Hutu-dominant government. The new Rwandan government continued discrimination and ethnic quotas created by the colonial powers in employment and education against the Tutsi ethnic group. In response, Tutsi refugees in Zaire and Tanzania began attacking Hutus. The government reacted strongly with violence against Tutsi-guerilla reprisals. In 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana took power of southern Hutus over the northern Hutu faction, and promised to restore peace, national development, and unity. However, preferential treatment of Hutus aggravated the ethnic tensions throughout the following years. By the end of the 1980s, nearly 500,000 Tutsis sought refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania.

In the late 1980s, individuals from the Tutsi refugee diaspora in Uganda created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political and military organization to reform the Rwandan government and return Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. Members of the RPF blamed the government for its failure to democratize and to resolve the refugee problem. On 1 October 1990, a force of 7,000 RPF troops launched a major attack from the safe haven of Uganda onto Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF). Despite their small numbers, the RPF troops' prior military experience in the Ugandan civil war allowed them to make significant gains against the Hutu forces.

As ethnic tensions increased, Tutsis inside Rwanda and moderate Hutus were labeled accomplices of the RPF, and designated traitors by the government. Violence from the civil war and reprisals from the RAF increased tension and caused many civilian deaths. The Rwandan government sought military and financial assistance from Belgium, France and Zaire in response to the RPF attacks. The RAF launched a counter-offensive with heavy military equipment but the RPF was unable to sustain a long-term campaign.

France, the United States and the Organization of African Unity organized peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, on 12 July 1992. An early agreement from these talks set a timetable for ending the fighting, promoted further peace-talks between parties, addressed the repatriation of refugees, and authorized the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to act as a neutral military observer. The Arusha Accords concluded on 4 August 1993 with a final agreement calling for a democratically-elected government, the formation of a transitional government consisting of power sharing between the current government and the RPF until elections were held and the repatriation of refugees. The Arusha Accords caused an open split among Hutus in power, with radical Hutu groups opposing the Habyarimana government, leading to government formed and trained Hutu militias known as the Interhamwe which, with other radical Hutu militias, conducted organized campaigns to kill Tutsi civilians and Hutu moderates.

In June 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) with the purpose of verifying that no military assistance reached Rwanda over the northern Ugandan border. In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Resolution 872 to aid in the implementation and monitoring of the Arusha Accords and to support the transitional government for an initial period of six months. UNAMIR's headquarters became operational on 1 November 1993. Shortly after arriving, UNAMIR Commander General Romeo Dallaire informed UN officials that there was the potential for large-scale, serious violence in Rwanda. However, UN officials did not respond.

On 10 December 1993, the Rwandan government, the RPF, and the Special Representative of UNAMIR issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitments to the Arusha Accords, and agreed to set up a broad-based transitional government before 31 December 1993. On 20 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 891 extending UNOMUR's mission for six months.

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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In 1946, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a constituent republic of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which governed numerous ethnic groups. After the death of President Joseph Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia quickly plunged into political and economic turmoil. Ethnic unrest spread, and the republics of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began to declare their independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from SFRY and became an independent state on 3 March 1992. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina's declaration of independence was opposed by Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian-controlled federal government of Yugoslavia. Following Bosnia-Herzegovina's declaration of independence, ethnic groups previously incorporated under the SFRY began to wage war upon one another in an effort to gain territorial control within the former Yugoslav territory.

When Bosnia's independence was recognized by the European community and the United States, Serbian National Forces immediately began strikes upon Sarajevo, the newly-declared capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over the next several months, the Serbian National Forces gained control over nearly two-thirds of Bosnian territory. As part of their attacks, Serbian forces drove out nearly all of the non-Serbians in the Serbian controlled areas, creating a large displaced persons and refugee population. Additionally, reports of ethnic violence against Bosnians and Croats began surfacing.

Accordingly, the UN passed Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, which created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the purpose of promoting peace talks and maintaining peace in UN safe-zones and no-fly zones. Initially, UNPROFOR redirected observers from other parts of Yugoslavia to Bosnia, but later brought in additional observers. Although UNPROFOR was able to achieve some success, the continued fighting led to a series of economic sanctions against all of Yugoslavia in May 1992. Through a series of resolutions, the Security Council imposed stricter sanctions prohibiting all import, export, and transportation of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; the embargo excluded weapons and military equipment intended for UNPROFOR.

The UNPROFOR mandate was expanded by a series of resolutions passed in October and November 1992. These resolutions aimed to bring stability to Bosnia by deploying additional observers and limiting military flights to only those that were part of the UNPROFOR mission. By March 1993, fighting had increased in eastern Bosnia, with Serb military forces attacking civilian populations and interfering with humanitarian operations. Fighting intensified as Muslims from surrounding areas were driven into the town of Srebrenica by Serbian military forces.

The large populations of Croats and Serbs further complicated the ethnic tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the Croat-Serb war began in 1991 upon Croatia's declaration independence. In May 1993, Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces were in a tenuous alliance against Serb forces when fighting erupted in central Bosnia. The fighting interrupted main supply routes to northern Bosnia and disrupted UNPROFOR operations. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that a significant lack of funding for UN missions threatened to interrupt necessary day-to-day operations in the coming months. On 4 October 1993, the Security Council extended the UNPROFOR mandate for an additional 6 months to 31 March 1994. In November 1993, the Security Council issued statements noting its concern that the increasing military actions posed significant threats to the civilian population and demanding that the attacks stop. Numerous peace plans and cease-fires were signed in November 1993, but failed to curb fighting and stop attacks on UNPROFOR.

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, war with Ethiopia as well as the actions of the corrupt Siad Barre regime decimated the Somali economy through military spending and foreign debt. Increasingly oppressive tactics including jailing and the disestablishment of clanism by government caused the Somali population to grow dissatisfied. Civil war erupted with opposition groups overthrowing the Barre government in 1991. In November 1991, Somalia's interim president Ali Mahdi Mohamed and anti-government factions fought heavily in Mogadishu. The fighting started during a severe drought, both of which caused extreme food shortages with experts estimating that nearly 300,000 people died of starvation by 1992. Additionally, nearly two million people were displaced due to the fighting, driving them into in different parts of Somalia or neighboring countries.

On 3 March 1992, the warring parties signed a ceasefire agreement. The Security Council created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM I) on 24 April 1992, to provide observers and facilitate the ceasefire. In July 1992, the UNISOM I mandate was strengthened, and four operational zones established. At the same time, the UN Secretary-General called for a 100-day plan to address the dire humanitarian crisis. Conditions continued to deteriorate as factions became increasingly hostile toward the UN operation.

After the Security Council passed resolution 794 on 4 December 1992, the United States agreed to take control of the Unified Task Force (UNTAF). As troops came aground during Phase I of UNTAF, the Secretary-General convened a meeting for national reconciliation in January 1993, ultimately reaching the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1993. Meanwhile, the Security Council passed resolution 814 where UNISOM II replaced UNTAF. UNISOM II was tasked with monitoring all factions' compliance with the ceasefire; preventing the resumption of violence; seizing small arms from unauthorized elements; maintaining control of heavy weapons; securing ports and means of communication necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid; protecting UN and NGO operations and their workers; demining the region; and repatriating refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

By May 1993, it became clear that not all signatories to the March Addis Ababa agreements intended to cooperate. General Mohammed Farah Aidad, leader of the Somali National Alliance, teamed with other factions and began engaging in armed attacks against UNISOM II, killing international troops and workers. Resolution 837 condemned these attacks and called for ground and air operations in Mogadishu, which began on 12 June 1993. UNISOM II continued operations and additional ground forces from the United States were brought in for support, but fighting continued until October 1993 when Aidad unilaterally stopped actions against UNISOM II, but reports indicated that fighting between factions and against UNISOM II continued elsewhere.

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

On 16 December 1990, democratic elections were held in Haiti under supervision by the United Nations. Father Jean Aristide was elected on a platform of a new economic deal for the poor and a cleansing of the civil service, though most of the legislation was blocked by the Haitian Parliament. On 29 September 1991, a military coup ousted Aristide but allowed him to escape to Venezuela after diplomatic intervention by the U.S., French, and Venezuelan ambassadors. Under the leadership of General Raoul Cedras, the military immediately began slaughtering supporters of Aristide, killing more than a thousand in two weeks. Over 200,000 people fled the capital in response to the killings. The Organization of American States (OAS) imposed economic sanctions on Haiti and the United States, France and Canada suspended all economic assistance. On 8 October 1991, the OAS urged all member countries to freeze Haitian assets and proposed a civilian force that would mediate disputes and monitor compliance.

The OAS and the United States pushed for Aristide's return to power. On 23 February 1992, an OAS-mediated agreement granted amnesty to the coup plotters. However, on 27 March, the Haitian Supreme Court and Senate rejected the accord. Hostilities continued in Haiti

as international pressure mounted to make the trade embargo on oil and weapons universal. On 23 April 1993, the General Assembly authorized the United Nations to take part in a UN/OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti to deploy human rights monitors in the country, after which, the Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a comprehensive fuel and arms embargo in Haiti. On 3 July 1993, Cedras and Aristide signed the Governor's Island Agreement, which stated that Aristide would resume power on 30 October 1993. On 27 August 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 861 suspending the sanctions against Haiti. Four days later, Resolution 862 was adopted and called for the dispatch of a small contingent to assess requirements for the UN Mission in Haiti.

Prior to Aristide's return to power in October, however, violence broke out in Haiti. Anti-Aristide gunmen menaced government workers and a UN team in the area, causing the Security Council to pass Resolution 867 on 23 September to immediately dispatch the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). American and Canadian troops sailed to Haiti but were blocked by anti-Aristide forces from docking, and the United States ordered the ship to return. The Security Council passed Resolution 873 on 13 October reinstating the sanctions of Resolution 841. UN envoy Dante Caputo organized talks with the Haitian military leaders to restore Aristide to power, but the talks fell apart. With the failure of the talks and continued violence, Caputo withdrew all civilian monitors from the island by the end of October.

On 22 December 1993, the United States, France, Canada and Venezuela cautioned Haiti's military leaders that the embargo would be expanded if Aristide were not allowed to return to power by 15 January 1994. Meanwhile, Aristide announced that he was organizing a conference in Miami on 15 January 1994 to help restore democracy to Haiti.

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THE SITUATION IN GEORGIA

In 1917, Abkhazia gained independence after the Russian revolution, but maintained treaty relations with Georgia. Between 1921 and 1931, Abkhazia and Georgia were constituted as a full Soviet Socialist Republic. By 1931, Abkhazia became an autonomous republic within Georgia. During Stalin's rule, Georgian assimilation of Abkhazia was enforced, causing nearly 46 percent of the Abkhaz population to be of Georgian ethnicity by the end of 1989. Clashes broke out as the Georgians began an anti-Abkahz campaign and relations between the two deteriorated. In March 1991, Georgia proposed a new law that ensured a small Abkhaz majority would be elected, but was boycotted in the elections.

The Republic of Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, fueling separatist and nationalist concerns by citizens in the Abkhaz region of Georgia. On 23 July 1992, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet voted to return to the 1925 Constitution where Abkhazia was a Soviet Union republic and not part of Georgia. The State Council of the Republic of Georgia declared the act void. In response, Abkhazian separatists took 11 hostages of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs when they went to negotiate for peace. On 14 August 1992, 3,000 Georgian troops headed into Abkhazia and attacked the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, sending many into hiding. After Russian troops in Abkhazia came under fire, Russian forces evacuated nearly 12,000 Russian nationals. Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, called for a ceasefire and helped broker a successful one on 3 September 1992; however, hostilities continued with both sides blaming the other for the violation.

On 17 September 1992, a United Nations mission was sent to Abkhazia on a fact-finding investigation. Abkhazian forces resumed the conflict with Georgia in October 1992, reinforced by Russian equipment and assisted by Russian helicopters. In November 1992, a brief ceasefire agreement was reached, but was broken within weeks as Abkhazian separatists bombed Sukhumi while Georgians shelled two Abkhazian strongholds. Hostilities continued on 16 March 1993 when Abkhazian secessionists attacked the Georgian-held capital of Tbilisi. More than 25 Georgian troops were killed and 52 wounded in the fighting.

On 2 July, Abkhazian forces attacked the Abkhaz capital city, Sukhumi, killing 39. Georgia declared martial law in Abkhazia on 6 July as separatist forces advanced towards the capital. On 9 July, the Security Council passed Resolution 849, calling for plans to dispatch military observers once a ceasefire began. The ceasefire came into effect on 27 July and on 6 August, in Resolution 854, the Security Council called for an advance team of 10 military observers to be sent to Abkhazia. On 24 August, Resolution 858 established the UN

Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), authorizing 88 military observers to verify compliance with the ceasefire and investigate violations.

Abkhazian forces launched another attack on Sukhumi on 16 September 1993, winning control of the city on 27 September. The Security Council passed Resolution 881 on 4 November, approving the extension of UNOMIG until 31 January 1994. On 1 December 1993, UN-sponsored negotiations began in Geneva where Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Memorandum of Understanding and promised not to use force against each other during the negotiations. The negotiations stalled when Abkhazia refused to recognize Georgia's territorial integrity. On 22 December 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 892 authorizing the phased deployment of 50 additional military observers.

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