



CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1973

Members of the Historical Security Council of 1973:

Australia	Panama
Austria	Peru
China	Sudan
France	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Guinea	United Kingdom
India	United States of America
Indonesia	Yugoslavia
Kenya	

ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The 2011 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council - 1973 (HSC-1973) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 21 February 1973. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolve around the situations in Africa, including Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The conflict in the Middle East is of significant concern, especially with relations between Israel and her neighbors after the Arab defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War. The war in Vietnam is also a key underlying factor in world politics, although it received limited formal attention in the Security Council. However, the Cold War struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union have been muted somewhat through the policy of *détente*, allowing both sides to work together on more issues of mutual concern.

In 1973, Kurt Waldheim was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Richard Nixon the US President, and Leonid Brezhnev the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Shah's government was in power in Iran, and the Peoples Republic of China, rather than the Republic of China (on Formosa/Taiwan), was officially represented in the United Nations.

AMUN's HSC-1973 is unique not only in its topics, but also in its treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media, and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation is assigned to begin. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role-playing for an HSC Member State will not be just a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1973. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations - and reevaluations - of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government made in 1973 was necessarily the wisest. While role replays must be, by definition, in character, it is not a sure thing that - given a second opportunity to look at events - any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for a second chance.

It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN itself has often been but a bystander to regional or international conflict. This inability or unwillingness to actively work toward solutions to crises was rarely more evident than during the late years of colonialism and early years of the Cold War. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues. One major factor in whether or not to be actively involved or to be a bystander, which representatives must consider, is the costs of peacekeeping with the deployment of regional missions. High costs often caused the Security Council to reprioritize their peacekeeping efforts.

While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters. This year's simulation will often feature regional crises being treated as internal by those involved as well as other crises which are so global in nature as to require UN involvement.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of 1972 and early days of 1973, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically in the past 38 years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the period will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should also peruse periodicals from mid-to-late 1972 to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a *Readers Guide to Periodical Literature* or the *New York Times* Index, should provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation's Representative to the UN. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy

decisions of their countries, or they may be relatively in the dark on their countries' moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulation Staff before making ANY operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the actual home office of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee/Council, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee/Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

Some of the delegations which may be called before the HSC during the 1973 time frame include Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia [current-day Zimbabwe], among others.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 21 February 1973. The prominent events of 1972 are discussed, as well as some questions which will face the Security Council at the turn of the year. This research is intended merely as a focal point for Representatives' continued exploration of the topics.

GENERAL BACKGROUND ENTERING 1973

1972 was a pivotal year for international affairs, a time in which several regional crises dramatically heightened world tensions, while new cooperation between the US, USSR, and Communist China began to ease the superpower conflict which had been raging.

With Communist China receiving full recognition and assuming the Chinese seat at the United Nations in 1972, world focus was

turned in this direction. US President Nixon's historic visit to China in February, followed by full diplomatic relations between the two countries in March, was a highlight of the spread of détente which occurred in 1972. China pushed for the complete removal of all references to "Taiwan" at the UN, and this request was grudgingly granted. New Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim visited China in August, and China and Japan ended their formal state of war (in existence since WWII) in September. On the opposite side, China alienated international opinion in March by conducting an above ground nuclear test.

US and Soviet relations also improved dramatically in 1972, with Nixon and Brezhnev signing a Strategic Arms Limitation pact in May, and finalizing a US/Soviet trade pact in October. Soviet and Chinese relations, however, deteriorated in 1972. This was evidenced with territorial disputes, the Soviets accusing China of attempting to break apart the Communist world, and China supporting anti-Soviet governments wherever possible.

The recognition of Bangladesh as a state, along with its admittance to the UN, was a major stumbling block for international relations in 1972. The USSR and US led the international community in supporting Bangladesh's independence, with the USSR offering trade agreements in March, and the US formally recognizing Bangladesh in April. China, however, continued to support its trading partner Pakistan in efforts to prevent Bangladesh's (formerly East Pakistan) independence. China postponed the issue of Bangladesh's UN admittance for most of the year, and in August cast its first Security Council veto to prevent Bangladesh's admittance as a Member State. This deadlock continues into 1973.

Two issues specific to the Security Council highlighted new movements in 1972. The historic UN Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February was the first ever meeting in Africa, and served to dramatically highlight African issues. Also, in November, Guinean Ambassador Mrs. J.M. Cisse became the first woman ever to preside over the Security Council, giving additional focus to women's equality issues around the world. Finally, the November agreement by East and West Germany to begin diplomatic relations served to pave the way for their future acceptance as UN Member States. After a year of debates, the agreement was reached and the US, USSR, United Kingdom and France announced they would support joint admittance to the UN in 1973, upon ratification of a formal treaty.

Overall, 1972 was a difficult year for the United Nations. The permanent members chose to handle many of their conflicts and agreements outside of the UN, leaving the other Member States feeling that internationalism was going backward, and that the UN might go the way of the League of Nations. In particular, US relations with the UN significantly deteriorated in 1972, with the US going so far as to state that they would use their veto more liberally and no longer take a soft stance on "bad" resolutions, namely those which did not actively deal with world problems from a US perspective. This is the atmosphere in which Representatives will begin their deliberations in the 1973 Security Council.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

After the 1967 war, Arab and Israeli hostilities continued as before in the Middle East, with increased hostilities and continual small conflicts vexing the region. Between 1967 and 1970, Egypt and Israel engaged in a three-year border war known as the War of Attrition. A ceasefire was finally approved in 1970, but continued clashes along the Suez Canal continue into 1973. While the conflicts were not on as large a scale on other borders, Israel did have several clashes with Syria and with Palestinian guerillas operating from Lebanon.

Military incidents involving Israel continued throughout the year, mainly revolving around Arab guerilla bases in Lebanon and Syria. Numerous Israeli attacks occurred, always in response to “terrorist” attacks by Arabs into Israel. In September 1970, Jordan went on the offensive against Palestinian guerillas operating from within Jordanian borders, ousting them to keep retaliation attacks from Israel down. The peak of these attacks happened in September, with the 1972 Olympic Games incident in which 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed by Arab gunmen at the Games. This invoked significant world opinion against the attacks, and led to a large-scale retaliation by Israel against Arab bases in Lebanon and Syria. The US continued to prevent strong Security Council action against Israel, supporting only resolutions which led to a non-specific cessation of hostilities, and not allowing for Israeli condemnation at the hands of the UN.

The question of a Palestinian state was another continuing issue in 1972, with the most dramatic action being a Jordanian proposal for a semi-autonomous state in the occupied West Bank in March. This proposal was quickly rejected by Israel. Other Arab states rejected the proposal as well, especially since Jordan had ousted the Palestinian guerillas from Jordan in September 1970.

In July 1972, Anwar Sadat took a significant step in expelling all Soviets from Egypt and nationalizing all former Soviet military bases in that country. This move to counter Soviet influence was a significant step toward lessening the superpower conflict which exists in the Middle East. Soviet advisors peacefully departed Egypt by early August.

Finally, heavy border fighting between North and South Yemen occurred in September, and the potential exists for continued clashes in 1973.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include the following

- What actions can be taken to prevent future Arab/Israeli violence and terrorist activities along the Lebanon and Syria borders?
- Can a Palestinian state be successfully achieved in the Israeli occupied territories (or elsewhere)?
- What can the United Nations do to help ensure lasting peace in the Middle East between Israel and her Arab neighbors?

THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA

After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Southern Rhodesia in 1965, the issue has continued to receive significant international attention at the United Nations. Negotiations between

the British and the Rhodesian government have not made the headway hoped by the African nations. This led to British-sponsored Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. However South Africa and Portugal continued to violate the sanction resolutions of the United Nations. By 1972, the lack of change in the government’s policies regarding formal discrimination against black Africans was the focus of most UN attention. Additional limits on black land ownership in “European” areas and Rhodesia’s continued reticence to accept UN initiatives were two critical issues.

The US and Great Britain’s continued tacit support for the Rhodesian government significantly complicated the issue from the UN’s perspective. The resumption of trade in chrome and nickel between the US and Rhodesia, in direct violation of the UN’s 1968 embargo against trade, flew in the face of international opinion. In July, the US abstained in a 14-0 Security Council vote to condemn “all acts violating” the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, considering US actions to be outside of these sanctions. In September, the United Kingdom vetoed an African-sponsored resolution on Rhodesia, calling for stronger economic sanctions and a direct settlement of the Rhodesian issue. This resolution also called for three significant points: no independence before majority rule is established; the use of universal suffrage, including secret ballots and a 1-man, 1-vote process for determining Rhodesia’s future; and a request to the UK to “try its utmost to bring about free expression of rights and self-determination” in Rhodesia.

The international community did make a significant statement in 1972, however, in barring Rhodesian athletes from participation in the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. This came in direct response to a threatened boycott of the Games by many African states, as well as by black athletes in the US, and highlighted the country’s struggle for international recognition.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include the following

- How can the government of Rhodesia be brought into compliance with international desires for a majority government?
- What actions can the Security Council take that will be acceptable to the Western powers, especially the US & UK?
- What other options are available on a regional or international level to help solve the conflict in Southern Rhodesia?

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

In 1971, the International Court of Justice confirmed that the United Nations had authority over Namibia. However, in direct violation of a UN mandate, South Africa continued to administer the territory of Southwest Africa (known as Namibia by the United Nations), justifying its actions via the League of Nations mandate which made South Africa the original administrator. In late 1971, a general strike in Southwest Africa paralyzed the Namibian economy, causing South Africa to imprison strike leaders and to declare a state of emergency. Throughout 1972, Secretary-General Waldheim, at the request of the Security Council, was in direct contact with the South African government, attempting to resolve the issue of independence.

The dispute continued to revolve around South Africa's insistence on pressing for a "homelands" policy for Southwest African natives, thus limiting independence and continuing South African governance. South Africa also favored the creation of an "advisory council" of regional leaders to assist South Africa in the governance of Southwest Africa. Both of these proposals were seen as unacceptable by the United Nations because the Council maintained that these proposals would lead to the fragmentation of Namibia.

The Security Council is scheduled to continue the debate on Southwest Africa in early 1973, including the issue of whether to extend the Secretary-General's mandate to continue direct negotiations with South Africa.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following

- How can the government of South Africa be enticed or induced into complying with UN resolutions for the independence of Southwest Africa (Namibia)?
- Should the Security Council extend the Secretary-General's mandate to continue direct negotiations with South Africa?
- What can the United Nations do to encourage representation of Namibian nationals in the independence process?

THE SITUATION IN UGANDA

In 1971, General Idi Amin launched a coup in Uganda, sending President Obote into hiding in Tanzania. Over the next two years, General Idi Amin's government in Uganda came under increased international scrutiny, largely because of its potential destabilizing influence on the East African region.

Guerilla raids, insurgencies and the incursion of over 1,000 troops from Tanzania into Uganda occurred throughout September 1972. These troops, consisting mainly of Ugandan rebels sponsored by Tanzania and loyal to ex-Ugandan President Milton Obote, were counting heavily on mass defections by the Ugandan military to supplement their force. When these defections failed to materialize, guerilla raids continued throughout September, ending in mid-October with a formal agreement to end hostilities between Tanzanian and Uganda.

Also in September, General Amin formally ordered the expulsion of all Asians (mostly Gujaratis of Indian origin) from Uganda, calling them traitors and spies for the imperialist British government. This racist policy was decried by the UN, and provisions were rapidly made to deal with the large exodus of Ugandan refugees. Many went to the United Kingdom, as well as the United States and several European countries. The expulsion began a significant political conflict between Uganda and the United Kingdom, mainly focused on the treatment of the refugees and on their ability to take material goods out of the country, which was severely limited by Uganda.

Finally, the 18 December 1972 seizure by Amin's government of all foreign owned tea plantations and eight of the biggest commercial companies in Uganda (7 British and 1 American) raised anew the question of Uganda's destabilizing influence in the area. Uganda's break-off of ties with Israel, its tenuous new relationship with Libya, and the perceived dangerous and unpredictable nature of Idi Amin all threatened to bring Uganda further into the international spotlight in 1973.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following

- What actions, if any, should be taken to prevent the spread of instability or violence in Eastern Africa?
- What actions can the United Nations take to encourage Member States to not harbor terrorists or guerilla fighters in their countries?
- What can the United Nations do to help with the refugee problem from African states?

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

In the mid-1960s, Republic of Vietnam and the United States, its primary ally, began a more aggressive approach to push the North Vietnamese out of South Vietnam and to destroy North Vietnamese operations near Saigon and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong fought back violently. On 31 January 1968, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong began numerous surprise assaults on cities, towns, and military installations in South Vietnam, known as the Tet Offensive.

In 1968, peace talks began in Paris between the US and the North Vietnam, which refused to recognize the government of South Vietnam. The talks resulted in an agreement to partially halt bombing. The Paris talks continued into 1969. By early 1969, the US began secret bombing attacks on Cambodia to target North Vietnamese supply caches. After a coup deposed Cambodian head-of-state Prince Sihanouk in 1970, the US launched heavy airstrikes into Cambodia and Laos against North Vietnamese supply camps in January 1971.

On 10 March 1971, China pledged complete support of the North Vietnamese struggle against the US. While the North and South Vietnamese situation was discussed heavily in the General Assembly in 1972, the issue was kept out of formal Security Council discussions because of US insistence that the Vietnam War was strictly in the US sphere of influence. Tensions from this conflict, however, continue to spill over into and influence Security Council relations in other areas. Vietnam was very much an issue behind the scenes, with the USSR and China continuing to support North Vietnam and with many nations opposed to the continued bombing of North Vietnam by the US.

In March 1972, North Vietnam attacked South Vietnam across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which resulted in US retaliatory bombing of the DMZ and North Vietnam in April. Between March and September 1972, over 200,000 North Vietnamese soldiers waged an all-out attempt to conquer South Vietnam in a campaign known as the Easter Offensive. This Offensive left several cities in North Vietnamese hands, some of which were won back in fighting in October 1972. Bombing by the US continued throughout the year with little abatement.

The conflict peaked in December with heavy carpet bombing by the US. Along with significant reports of bombing of civilian structures, including some foreign embassies and hospitals, significant portions of heavily populated civilian areas in Hanoi were "reduced to rubble" by the bombings. In December 1972, a cease fire was upheld for two days over Christmas, but this was followed by the resumption of heavy US bombing.

The Paris Peace talks also continued throughout 1972, with US Secretary of State Kissinger engaging North Vietnamese leaders. These private talks continued to meet with limited political success, although it was rumored that some significant technical and military issues were closer to resolution as a result. On 27 January 1973, the Paris Agreement was signed by the four parties: North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, South Vietnam, and the US. Details were worked out regarding US troop reduction, prisoner of war exchanges, etc. A final significant issue was the presence of North Vietnamese troops in neighboring Cambodia. Occupied portions of Cambodia were utilized as a staging area for advances by the North, and the effect of any US/North Vietnam peace negotiations brings into question the possible disposition of troops in Cambodia after a separate US peace.

Currently, the four party negotiations are working to enforce the cease fire among the parties and to coordinate US troop reduction. On 17 February, the four parties issued a joint appeal for all parties concerned to observe the cease fires. As the negotiations and troop withdrawal continues, more emphasis on keeping the cease fire in effect will be needed.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following

- What actions, if any, are appropriate for the Security Council to take in working to maintain the cease fire agreement between the four parties?
- What actions can the Council take to limit the spread of the conflict to other nations in the region?
- What is your country's position on the war in Vietnam and how do the parties involved influence your country's decisions towards the conflict?

OTHER OPEN ISSUES

Any issue on the world scene in 1973 will be fair game for discussion in the Historical Security Council. Representatives should have broad historical knowledge of the world situation as it stood through 21 February 1973.

Bibliography

Please note: The books and documents listed below provide both contemporary and historical information on the year 1972. Any information provided for dates after 21 February 1973 will not be considered factual or appropriate in debates before the Council.

It is strongly recommended that representatives to the Historical Security Council consult contemporary materials, especially periodical sources from late 1972. These might include the UN Chronicle, the New York Times, Time magazine, and similar sources to get a better feel for the time in which the simulation occurs.

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UN Documents

S/Res/309 - The Situation in Namibia (4 Feb 72)

S/Res/310 - The Situation in Namibia (4 Feb 72)

S/Res/311 - The Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (4 Feb 72)

S/Res/313 - The Situation in the Middle East (28 Feb 72)

S/Res/314 - Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia (28 Feb 72)

S/Res/316 - The situation in the Middle East (26 Jun 72)

S/Res/317 - The situation in the Middle East (21 Jun 72)

S/Res/318 - Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia (28 Jul 72)

S/Res/319 - The situation in Namibia (1 Aug 72)

S/Res/320 - Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia (29 Sep 72)

S/Res/322 - Question concerning the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration (22 Nov 72)

S/Res/323 - The situation in Namibia (6 Dec 72)

S/Res/326 - Provocation by Southern Rhodesia (2 Feb 73)

S/Res/327 - Zambia's Decision to Impose Sanctions (2 Feb 73)