21ST ANNUAL
AMERICAN MODEL UNITED NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

ISSUES AT AMUN

BRINGING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES TO FUTURE LEADERS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
20 - 23 NOVEMBER 2010

2010 AMUN International Executive Committee

Secretary-General
Sarah Naeger
Under-Secretary-General
Rachel M. Peterson
Under-Secretary-General for Research
Jacqueline E. Whitt
Deputy-Under-Secretary-General for Research
Caraleigh Holverson
Under-Secretary-General for Rapporteur Department
John Gaustad
President of the General Assembly
Adam Dour
Vice President of the General Assembly
Kristen Pudenz

For further information, please write or call
American Model United Nations International
1212 N. Columbian Avenue
**Oak Park, Illinois 60302**
Phone: (773) 777-AMUN
Fax: (708) 386-3806
E-mail: mail@amun.org
Web: www.amun.org

American Model United Nations
21ˢᵀ Annual International Conference
Issues at AMUN Representative Handbook

Introduction

The *Issues at AMUN* Handbook is published to assist Representatives in their preparations for the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Conference. When combined with students' own research on the nations they represent and the topics of discussion, this handbook provides Representatives with all the substantive information they will require to function effectively at the simulation. Its sister handbook, *AMUN Rules and Procedures*, provides an overview of the Committee/Council rules and Conference logistics with which Representatives need to familiarize themselves for the simulation.

The following pages contain brief overviews of the topics to be discussed in the Committees, Councils and International Court of Justice at the 2010 Conference. These are intended as a guideline and basis for Representatives' further research of the issues involved. In keeping with this, each overview includes a bibliography to guide Representatives to appropriate sources of additional information.

The overviews give a brief background concerning each topic and states some areas of current United Nations (UN) and international activity on the topic. In many cases, the overviews will frame the topic in terms of a few, limited aspects of a complex issue. For example, the general issue of "the environment" has dozens of sub-issues — in such a case, the overview may direct Representatives to concentrate their research on "Ozone Depletion" and "Limiting the Destruction of the Rain Forests," only two of the many smaller issues. This format allows Representatives to go into greater detail in their preparations, without the need to research all aspects of the multifaceted main issue.

AMUN's philosophy in providing these topic overviews is to give Representatives *direction* in their research, but to leave the work up to them. **These overviews are not intended to be the sole source of Representatives' research on the topics prior to the Conference.**

In addition, *Chapter I - The United Nations* provides essential background information to give all Representatives a common orientation to the history of the UN. This section begins with the origins of the UN and covers some important points about the organization. Finally, the chapter focuses on problems confronting the UN today.

Use of the Internet

Many of the works cited in this *Issues at AMUN* Handbook are resources located on the Internet. Full text of many periodical sources is available to AMUN participants online. Please visit AMUN's homepage at **www.amun.org** for a list of recommended research links.

Three online sources of particular note are the United Nations homepage (**www.un.org**), the *New York Times* online (**www.nytimes.com)**, and the *UNWire* (**www.smartbrief.com/un_wire/)**. The *UNWire* is a daily briefing on UN issues provided by the United Nations Foundation; note that *UNWire* articles published prior to August 2004 can be found at **www.unwire.org**. These sources are heavily referenced throughout the issues briefings in this handbook. Most documents cited in these bibliographies can be found with the help of an internet search engine. For a more thorough discussion of online research sources, see "Utilizing the Internet" on page 11 of the *AMUN Rules and Procedures* Handbook.

The Purview of Each Simulation

Each simulation's background guide contains a brief overview of that simulation's purview, which provides a general outline of the types of discussions each simulation might have on the topics in question. This is extremely important in the UN system, where a variety of different Committees and Councils may discuss different aspects of an international problem. Representatives should exercise great care in researching a topic, so their deliberations can focus on the piece of the problem considered within their simulation's purview. These purview briefs are guidelines for the discussions of each body.

An excellent example of this shifting focus among Committees and Councils is the Palestinian question. The First Committee might discuss aspects of the situation dealing with weapons shipments. At the same time, the Second Committee may discuss a variety of financing initiatives to help the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, the Third Committee, or in some cases the Economic and Social Council, might discuss the social and humanitarian considerations that arise from Israeli occupation of various territories. And the Sixth Committee may discuss the legal aspects of treaty violations in the region if this is specifically encompassed in one of that Committee's topics. Only the GA Plenary Session would discuss the problem in its entirety, including the possible creation of a legal Palestinian State or member status for that State. The Security Council would deal with any appropriate peace and security issues that arose on the situation. Clearly, different aspects of a single problem are regularly discussed in different bodies. More importantly, at the UN, delegations are typically careful to *only* discuss those aspects relevant to their own Committee/Council, leaving other aspects to others in their delegation to address in the appropriate forum.

Chapter One
The United Nations

Representatives participating in the American Model United Nations Conference should be familiar with the history of the United Nations, as well as the rapidly changing role the organization plays in international affairs. This section provides a brief background on the UN system and on some of the issues it faces today.

Origins of the United Nations

The United Nations came into existence on 24 October 1945. On that day, the United Nations Charter became operative, having been signed by the fifty-one original Members. The concept of all nations uniting together in one organization designed to settle disputes peacefully was born of the desire of civilized nations to avoid the horrors of and produced by the First and Second World Wars. The United Nations developed as a successor to the League of Nations, which represented the first attempt by nations to achieve this unity.

In 1942, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt first coined the term "United Nations," when forty-seven nations signed the Declaration of the United Nations in support of the Atlantic Charter. In 1944, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China met in Washington, DC at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the first blueprint of the United Nations was prepared. In 1945, the final details for the United Nations were worked out at the Yalta Conference. Fifty-one nations gathered from 24 April through 26 June in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the United Nations, which was signed on 26 June 1945.

Purpose of the United Nations

The primary purposes for which the United Nations was founded are detailed in Chapter I, Article 1 of the Charter. These are

1. To maintain international peace and security;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion;
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

How the United Nations Seeks to Achieve Its Purpose

Since 1945, the United Nations has established itself as a forum for discussing international disputes. Also, Member States recognize that the United Nations has an established machinery which can be utilized to solve international problems. The United Nations seeks, both through its principal organs and various subsidiary bodies, to

settle disputes through peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force. It should be recognized that the United Nations is not a world government, nor does it "legislate." Rather, the actions of the United Nations, as evidenced by resolutions passed by its bodies, have a strong moral persuasive effect. The Member States frequently find it within their own best interests to follow UN recommendations.

Structure of the United Nations

The United Nations has six primary bodies:

The General Assembly (GA): The GA is the central organ of the United Nations. The GA has been described as the nearest thing to a "parliament of mankind," as all Member States are Members of the GA, and each Member has one vote. The GA makes recommendations on international issues, oversees all other UN bodies which must report to the GA annually, approves the UN budget and apportions UN expenses. On the recommendation of the Security Council, the GA elects the Secretary-General and holds the authority to admit and expel Member States. Voting in the GA is ordinarily by simple majority, although on "important questions" a two-thirds majority is required.

The Security Council (SC): The Security Council is charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It has the power to employ United Nations forces and direct action against threats to the peace. Fifteen Members sit on the Security Council, including five Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten at-large Member States, which the General Assembly elects for two-year terms. A majority in the Security Council consists of nine Members voting "yes;" however, a "no" vote by any of the Permanent Members has the effect of vetoing or blocking motions.

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): ECOSOC is the primary body dealing with the economic, social, humanitarian and cultural work of the United Nations system. ECOSOC oversees five regional economic commissions and nine functional, or "subject-matter," commissions, along with a sizeable system of committees and expert bodies. ECOSOC is composed of fifty-four Member States, elected by the GA for three-year terms.

Trusteeship Council (TC): In 1945 there were eleven Trust Territories, which were regions without their own governments. These eleven regions were placed under the TC, which helped them prepare for and achieve independence. With the admittance of Palau as a UN Member State in 1994, the TC has now completed its original mandate. Today, the TC is inactive, but is formally composed of the permanent Security Council Members.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ): The International Court of Justice, or World Court, is the primary judicial organ of the UN and decides international legal disputes. All UN Members are automatically able to bring matters before the ICJ; however, States

must agree to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ before it can decide a dispute involving that State. Fifteen judges serving nine-year terms sit on the Court.

Secretariat: The Secretariat is composed of the Secretary-General and the United Nations staff. Approximately 16,000 people are employed as the staff of the UN, one-third of whom work at the UN headquarters in New York City. The other two-thirds work for various subsidiary bodies of the United Nations. The Secretary-General serves a five-year renewable term.

In addition to the six main bodies, the United Nations includes a large family of specialized agencies and programs which the UN administers. Examples include the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Bloc Politics

Nations with mutual interests have used a system of "bloc politics" to organize their efforts within the UN. These blocs tend to be made up of nations with similar political, historical or cultural backgrounds. They are often formed on a geographical basis, but this is not exclusively the case. By organizing themselves with other nations that hold similar interests, bloc Members hope to increase their influence above the level that they would have as a single nation in the General Assembly.

Bloc politics in the UN today is a misunderstood and rapidly changing phenomenon. The necessity of blocs in the UN was formally established in 1957, when the General Assembly endorsed four regional groups: the Latin American group, the Asian and African group, the Western European and Others group, and the Eastern European group. Since that time, the bloc system has grown to encompass many of the political, economic and military organizations of the world. Examples of the major blocs include the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the European Union (EU).

Please note, however, that these groups do not have official standing as caucus groups at the UN, but are rather groups that meet, depending on the circumstances, in an attempt to reach a consensus on various issues. Blocs are often thought of as "Voting Blocs," but this is a definite misnomer. They can be more realistically seen as "Caucusing Blocs": groups which discuss issues together based on areas of mutual interest, but that often do not reach full agreement on all issues. A key consideration is that every country in a bloc will have different priorities **based on its own national interests**. Countries will often discount bloc considerations and vote in their own best interest in these priority areas.

Blocs usually attempt to form a consensus among their Members, allowing them to act as a cohesive group. The effectiveness of any given bloc in exerting its positions in the General Assembly often depends upon its ability to form a consensus among its own Members. These acts of compromise form the basis of UN politics, and often must occur within the various caucusing groups before they can begin to apply to the UN as a whole.

Bloc politics have changed considerably over time. Their viability as a political tool is diminishing, and blocs are falling out of use. For example, the most historically cohesive bloc, the Warsaw Pact, has ceased to exist as a military and political unit. Several other blocs, including the Western bloc, are undergoing structural changes that will have a profound effect on the future of UN politics. The more organized blocs at present are the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), the Organization of American States, and the European Union.

One often misinterpreted area of bloc politics is that of the "Third World," or developing bloc. A "Third World Bloc" has never existed: in actuality, several blocs of developing countries have existed. The Group of 77 (now consisting of more than 125 nations) is the largest and is still sometimes thought of as the Third World Bloc. There are, however, developing nations which are not Members of this organization, and many Members also belong to several other organizations, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement.

Representatives should be aware that the Member State they represent may no longer actively participate in bloc politics, or may vote outside of its traditional bloc based on the circumstances. For example, at the June 1992 Environmental Summit in Rio de Janeiro, several Group of 77 countries including India, a previous leader of the bloc, ignored bloc positions on environmental issues and followed their own national interests at the Summit. The most accurate thing which can be said about bloc politics today is that they are in a state of flux. Many States are increasingly neutral on issues on which they once held strong views and that were shared with other Members of their respective bloc. Other States are becoming increasingly independent on issues, or are concerned only with regional issues. One example of a more recently formed bloc is the "Alliance Against Biopiracy" formally known as the "Group of Allied Mega-Biodiverse Nations," which was formed to work together on sustainable development and similar issues. This group is comprised of 12 of the most biodiverse countries on the planet (China, Brazil and India, among others), with a combined total of over 70% of the world's biodiversity within their collective borders.

At AMUN, blocs will not be treated as official bodies. Representatives are encouraged to caucus in their bloc groups **only when appropriate**. Please remember there are many issues which cross bloc lines and many opportunities to invite an interested party to another bloc caucus in an effort to achieve a consensus.

Representatives to the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional. The Security Council may discuss any international peace and security issue brought before it. For this reason, Representatives must have a broad base of knowledge on current events in the international community. Also, the overviews provided below are only current through the publication of this handbook. Many of the topics listed below will change significantly before the Conference, and Representatives should be familiar with the up-to-date situations. Periodicals are one of the best recommended sources available for day-to-day updates. These include among others: *The New York Times, UN Chronicle, The London Times, Foreign Policy, The Economist* and *Keesing's Record of World Events*.

Also, the UN Foundation's online daily newsletter, the *UN Wire*, is an excellent resource for timely information. Whenever possible, AMUN recommends that Representatives familiarize themselves with the most recent report(s) published by the Secretary-General on each situation, along with other UN documents. These can be found on the UN homepage under the Security Council documents section (www.un.org/Docs/sc/). Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on UN sources, with some news sources provided for background on important aspects of the various situations.

Initial background research is provided below for each region, with one or two topics receiving a brief analysis. Security Council Representatives are neither limited to the main topics discussed nor to any of the topics listed. Should world events move in a different direction from the topics provided in this handbook, the Security Council is welcome to discuss any peace and security matter which it desires.

Please note that draft resolutions should be written on the sub-topics of each regional area: i.e., resolutions would not be written about "Issues in Africa," but rather about "The Situation in Sierra Leone" or similar sub-topics within the region.

The Situation in Israel

The Palestinian Question remains one of the most discussed topics in the Security Council since Israel declared its independence in 1948. The problem of Palestinian refugees has existed since 1948, following Israel's defeat of neighboring states Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. The resulting Palestinian refugee crisis caused the General Assembly, in Resolution 194, to lay out a course for those driven from their homes and wishing to live in peace to return. In the 1949 Armistice, what remained of the state of Palestine was occupied by Egypt (the Gaza Strip), and Transjordan (the West Bank). These territories were seized by Israel in a 1967 preemptive attack against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Within six days Israel had seized the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. This prompted the Security Council to pass Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied. Israel maintained control of all occupied territories, and Syria and Egypt attacked jointly in 1973 in what became known as the Yom Kippur War, prompting Resolution 338, which affirmed Resolution 242 and called for peace talks. Israel withdrew from the Sinai after a 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. However, in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in order to destroy Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces there. While this drove the PLO from Lebanon, it also caused the formation of Hezbollah. In 1987 Jordan ceded its rights to the West Bank to the PLO, which recognized Israel, and began negotiations for peace. The Palestinian Authority replaced the PLO in 1994 in governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the signing of the Oslo Accords.

After the breakdown of the peace process and the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000, work towards peace in the Middle East has been a difficult process. The most recent progress occurred in 2003 with the Quartet, composed of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, backing what is known as the Road Map. The Road Map suggests a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel rejected some portions of the Road Map, while the Palestinian Authority pledged its support.

The situation in Gaza has been tense since the administration of a blockade started in 2007 as Hamas gained control of the Gaza strip after an internal Palestinian conflict. The blockade has cut food, medicine and fuel supplies to critical levels and keeps certain materials such as concrete and steel out of Gaza over concerns that Hamas would use them for military purposes. The ensuing economic crisis in Gaza from such restrictions has lead to an increase in smuggling using tunnels beneath the Egyptian border. Both Egypt and Israel have attempted to stop this with Egypt constructing an underground wall and Israel regularly bombing suspected tunnel exits along the border. In May 2010, Gazans began cutting through the underground wall to continue smuggling items needed. The UN has estimated that nearly 80% of all imports to Gaza come through the tunnels.

Rocket attacks from within Gaza led to conflict from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. This conflict led to the deaths of 1,010 Palestinians and damage to 1,008 buildings in Gaza. This conflict led to an investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) which issued a 575 page report and found both Israeli forces and Palestinian militants guilty of committing war crimes and breaching humanitarian. The report found the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) directly targeted and arbitrarily killed Palestinian civilians and directly targeted industrial and water installations while using Palestinians civilians as human shields. It also found Palestinian militants affiliated with Hamas to be guilty of deliberately targeting civilian populations. Additionally several UN facilities were struck. Sporadic

rocket fire from Hamas positions in Gaza and Israeli airstrikes in response continue to this day.

Efforts at restarting the peace process and moving toward a two state solution, originally envisioned in General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947, have reached a stumbling block due to Hamas control of Gaza and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has stated that expansion of Israeli settlements is illegal and acts against international law. The Secretary-General has also called for a lift of the blockade on Gaza. The Palestinian president has warned that Hamas has been smuggling large amounts of weapons into the West Bank just ahead of the peace talks resuming there. Israeli officials have voiced concerns about Hamas toppling the Abbas' government in the West Bank. The question of how to establish and maintain a lasting peace in Israel, Palestine, and neighboring states remains.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What steps can be taken to persuade Israel, Palestine, and surrounding nations to adhere to the Road Map? Is the Road Map still a viable solution?
- Is a two-state solution is a viable way to resolve conflict and bring about the changes envisioned in Resolution 242 and subsequent documents?
- How can the Palestinian refugee problem be solved? What should be done about illegal Israeli settlements in occupied territories? How can the humanitarian crisis in Gaza be solved?
- What can be done to ensure mutual security for Israel and Palestine?

Bibliography

Donnison, Jon. "Gazans cut through Egypt's border barrier," *BBC News*, 6 May 2010.
"Palestinian leader warns of Hamas arms smuggling," *Associated Press*, 6 May 2010.
"Secretary-General calls again on Israel to ease Gaza blockade," *UN News Centre*, 19 June 2009, www.un.org/news.
"UN Human Rights Probe Wraps up Public Hearings in Gaza," *UN News Centre*, 29 June 2009, www.un.org/news.
Hass, Amira, "Norwegian Doctor: Israel Used New Kind of Weapon in Gaza," *Haaretz*, 20 January 2010.
"UN Chief Says Israeli Settlement Activities Illegal," *Xinhua*, 27 March 2010.
"Israel to Allow Clothes, Shoes Into Blockaded Gaza," *Reuters*, 29 March 2010.

UN Documents

A/HRC/12/48
S/2003/529
S/PRST/2009/14
S/RES/1860 (8 Jan 2009)
S/RES/1850 (16 Dec 2008)
S/RES/1515 (19 Nov 2003)
S/RES/338 (22 Oct 1973)
S/RES/242 (22 Nov 1967)
A/RES/181
A/RES/194

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

In 2003, a rebellion broke out in the Darfur region of Sudan, separate from the civil war that was already engulfing the country. Even though the north-south civil war ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), conflict remained in Darfur. Rebels called the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) attacked government and military facilities throughout Darfur, which led to retaliation of local militias known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed are backed by the Sudanese government and have often worked in conjunction with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The conflict in Darfur has resulted in the deaths of over 300,000 people and the displacement of over three million more. While several Member States and NGOs have declared the events in Darfur to be genocide, the United Nations has not declared the fighting to be genocide.

Resolution 1769 (2007) established the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The UNAMID was created to assist the African Union force already in place (AMIS) and to respect the sovereign wishes of the government of Sudan by placing a peacekeeping force primarily composed of African peacekeepers in the region. The UN assumed full authority in January 2008. UNAMID's mission in Darfur is to monitor the humanitarian and security situations and the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Violence continued between the SAF and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, preventing the return of refugees from Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia in late March 2009. At least 300,000 people are estimated to have died and 2.7 million more have been driven from their homes in the fighting. In December 2009, civil society and armed movements agreed to re-start consultations in January 2010 to be followed by direct talks between the Government and movements on January 24, 2010 in Qatar. However those talks were frozen when the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), the largest rebel group in Darfur said it would suspend talks after an attack on its positions near the Sudan/Chad boarder.

While Darfur has been an ongoing issue, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has been stepping up patrols in Southern Sudan to help defuse tensions and reduce reprisal attacks and deadly ethnic clashes. UNMIS has also been preparing for the arrival of humanitarian assessment teams. At least 2 million people were killed and 4 million others uprooted over the 20 years of fighting between the southern separatists and the national Government in the north until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. UNMIS was set up to help parties implement the accord, including providing for a referendum on independence for the south next year. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon announced in early 2010 that there have been many recent developments that are positives towards implementing the peace agreement, such as passing legislation governing next year's referendum as well as registering over 16 million voters. However, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also noted that a return to conflict is a very real possibility and that it would take the combined efforts and support of the international and regional communities. The Secretary-General did make it clear that the UN was taking no position on next year's referendum. While many Member States encourage the referendum, questions regarding its accuracy and transparency have been highlighted after the results of the first presidential election in 24 years, which have been called into question by several Member States and independent groups.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- Are there ways to make UNAMID more successful in Darfur?
- What can the UN do to further the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?
- Why has the violence in Darfur continued to escalate despite the Darfur Peace Agreement? How might these factors be overcome?
- How might neighbor state involvement further complicate the security situation in Darfur?
- What is your government's position on the referendum in southern Sudan? Is this valuable in seeking a solution to the conflict?

Bibliography

Ban Calls for Renewed Commitment to Peace Pact from Sudan Ahead Critical Year," *UN News Centre*, 10 March 2010, www.un.org/news.

"Darfur: Security Situation Worsens After Deadly Attacks on UN-African Peacekeepers," *UN News Centre*, 6 December 2009, www.un.org/news.

"Darfur Peace Process Has Reached 'Critical' Juncture, Ban Says," *UN News Centre*, 21 December 2009, www.un.org/news.

"Sudan: UN Cites Challenges for North-South Peace Deal Despite Progress," *UN News Centre*, 22 January 2010, www.un.org/news.

"Sudan: UN Sends Long Range Patrol to Scene of Deadly Ethnic Clash in South," *UN News Centre*, 8 January 2010, www.un.org/news.

"UN Neutral in Next Year's Southern Sudan Referendum, Ban Stresses," *UN News Centre*, 2 February 2010, www.un.org/news.

UN Documents

S/RES/1870 (20 May 2009)
S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008)
S/RES/1784 (31 Oct 2007)
S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007)
S/RES/1755 (30 Apr 2007)
S/RES/1665 (29 Mar 2006)
S/2009/83-Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.
S/2009/61-Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

The Situation in the Democratic People's Republic of the Congo

Since the end of the Second Congo War, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains a country in conflict. Rich in natural resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo remains divided by several militant groups vying for control of the country's vast mineral wealth. Ethnic violence also continues from the wake of the Rwandan genocide when militant groups, both Hutu and Tutsi, crossed into the eastern portions of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other militant groups arose in response to these incursions. These groups along with the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC) came into conflict in 2008. Following a conflict on

August 28th 2008 large-scale hostilities broke out in the eastern part of the DRC between Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and FARDC. FARDC, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) and various Mai-Mai groups fighting the CNDP led to the displacement of 250,000 people between August and November 2008. Fighting continued until a ceasefire was negotiated by UN special envoy, former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, in November 2008. Following the arrest of CDNP leader Laurent Nkunda in January 2009, the remaining CNDP, under the command of Bosco Ntaganda, reached an agreement with FARDC integrating them into the Democratic Republic of Congo's armed forces although integration met with limited success.

Although much of the fighting in the Ituri region has ended, eastern and northern portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo still remain in conflict. After the launch of a joint operation between (FARDC) and the Rwandan armed forces, to hunt down the FDLR, violence increased in the form of reprisal killings against suspected collaborators. Nearly 160,000 people were newly displaced by the joint Rwandan-Congolese offensive and FDLR counter offensive between January and March 2009. The FDLR forged an alliance with the Mai Mai in the mineral rich region of Opienge. FARDC once again went on the offensive against FDLR troops claiming 600 killed or captured between January and March 2010 with UN peacekeepers backing the mission. Additionally FARDC, Ugandan and semi-autonomous South Sudanese armed forces formed a task force in order to attack Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) bases in the Garamba National park, after Joesph Kony, leader of the LRA, failed to appear to sign a peace deal with the Ugandan government to end its rebellion. The most brutal of retaliatory attacks by the LRA seems to have taken place in December 2009 with LRA forces killing at least 321 and abducting 250 including 80 children.

Militant groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been accused of terrorizing civilian populations through brutal killings, forced labor, rape, and conscription of child soldiers. Throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) force is strained despite its size (approximately 22,000 personnel). This force, active since February 2000, is tasked with attempting to protect civilians from militant groups and undisciplined elements of FARDC largely in eastern portions of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Strained by lack of donor states for peacekeeping forces and equipment, the country's poor infrastructure and size, the situation is further complicated by the exploitation of the Democratic Republic of Congo's mineral resources in the form of gold, tin, copper, cobalt, coltan, and wolframite smuggled through neighboring states to industrialized nations across the world. This mineral exploitation is fueled by ongoing support from neighboring countries, notably including Rwanda and Uganda.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is requesting a troop draw down and withdrawal of peacekeepers from western portions of the nation as well as a complete withdrawal by mid-2011. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes ended a recent tour of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May 2010 and has stressed the vital need for UN peacekeepers to remain beyond the August 2011 deadline. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon agreed, stating that the 11-year-old force has helped restore some stability to a war-ravaged country. On 4 May

2010, the UN refugee agency was able to reach 35,000 refugees after five weeks of government operations against ethnic militias. The UN and its partners have requested over 820 million dollars for humanitarian actions, about 27% of which was received.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- Should support continue for FARDC missions?
- Would this problem be exacerbated by withdrawal of UN peacekeepers?
- What can be done to alleviate the humanitarian crisis especially with regard to women and children?
- How can the aspect of conflict minerals and their role in fueling this crisis best be addressed?

Bibliography

"DR Congo: UN Regains Access to Groups Cut Off by Military Operations," *UN News Centre*, 4 May 2010, www.un.org/news.

Smith, David, "UN Begins Talks on Withdrawal from Congo," *Guardian*, 4 March 2010.

"Over 600 Rebels Killed or Captured: DR. Congo Army," *AFP*, 17 March 2010.

"UN Presence in DR Congo Crucial Despite Call for Early Withdrawal, Says Relief Chief," *UN News Centre*, 3 May 2010, www.un.org/news http://www.un.org/news.

UN Documents

S/RES/1906 (23 Dec 2009)
S/RES/1857 (22 Dec 2008)
S/RES/1856 (22 Dec 2008)
S/RES/1843 (20 Nov 2008)
S/RES/1794 (21 Dec 2007)
S/RES/1279 (30 Nov 2009)
S/2008/773
S/2008/218
S/1999/790

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Following the 1991 collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's government, the United Nations sent a force of 35,000 troops in Operation Restore Hope. The mission made initial progress until 1994 when American and European troops began to withdraw from the force. The United Nations Mission to Somalia (UNISOM II) ended in 1995 with the withdrawal of the rest of the troops. Between 1995 and 2000, the situation deteriorated with the capital of Mogadishu divided between rival warlords. By 2000, the situation began to look promising as Abdikassim Salat Hassan was elected transitional president by various clan leaders in Djibouti. In 2002, the transitional government signed a cease-fire with 21 clan-based factions at talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government emerged from a two year peace process led by IGAD and the government of Kenya.

However, by 2006, the apparent political progress began to erode. Militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of Mogadishu and southern Somalia. The Security Council in S/RES/1725 (2006) authorized IGAD and the African Union (AU) to send a peacekeeping force to help prop up the transitional government. Prior to the deployment of the African Union Mission in So-

malia (AMISOM), Ethiopian forces helped engage the UIC militias, driving them out of Mogadishu. The UIC and affiliated anti-government groups continued to fight with the government and Ethiopian forces throughout early 2008. This resulted in high civilian casualties, often due to the use of mortar and field gun attacks in highly populated areas by Ethiopian forces. In light of these developments, the African Union Peace and the Security Council requested the transition of peacekeeping from AMISOM to United Nations forces as noted in S/RES/1801.

Since January 2009, attacks have continued with al-Shabab taking control of Somalia's seat of government, Baidoa, in February 2009. The violence escalated with the Islamist insurgents killing 11 Burundi soldiers in Mogadishu who were part of the African Union peacekeeping force there. These attacks, coupled with pirates increasingly using Somalia as a safe haven to carry out attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, have made the security situation in Somalia worse, especially since the government has little ability to enforce law and no navy to help combat the piracy. This has led to several countries sending warships to the area to help protect merchant traffic and pursue pirate vessels. Security Council members have called for tougher laws on piracy as a result of the Somalian piracy problem. With Islamist insurgents seizing the town of Xarardheere in early May, the effects on piracy are uncertain. Islamists claim they have stopped the piracy there and will enforce Shariah law, however there is concern that the Islamist groups, some with links to Al Qaeda, will continue using piracy to gain access to funds to support their battle with the Transitional Federal Government forces.

In late December 2009, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea for supporting insurgents trying to topple the nascent government. The Council expressed concern over Eritrea's rejection of the Djibouti Agreement to ease tensions in Somalia. However, fighting continues to engulf Somalia. By late January 2010, over 63,000 people have been displaced from their homes by ongoing fighting. In Mogadishu, nearly 20,000 people have been uprooted from their homes since the beginning of the year by renewed clashes between forces of the Transitional Federal Government and opposition groups. Within the first week of March 2010, over 900 Somalis were registered in neighboring Kenya as refugees from the violence.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- Why has the Somali civil war persisted for so long despite significant international attention?
- What can the UN do to keep Member States like Eritrea from inciting violence?
- Are there ways the international community can assist to combat the violence and lack of a federal government?

Bibliography

"Nearly 20,000 Somalis Have Fled Capital So Far This Month, UN Reports," *UN News Agency*, 19 February 2010, www.un.org/news.

"Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Eritrea," *UN News Centre*, 23 December 2009.

"Insurgents' Seizure of Pirate Base in Somalia Raises Questions About Its Future," *New York Times*, 2 May 2010.

"Somali Violence Uproots 80,000 Civilians in January Alone, Reports UN Agency,*UN News Agency*," 2 February 2010, www. un.org/news.

"UN Agency Says 63,000 Somalis Already Uprooted by Fighting This Year," *UN News Centre*, 19 January 2010, www.un.org/news.

"Violence Continues to Claim Lives in Somali Capital, UN Says," *UN News Centre*, 5 March 2010, www.un.org/news.

UN Documents

S/RES/1863 (16 Jan 2008)
S/RES/1846 (2 Dec 2008)
S/RES/1801 (20 Feb 2008)
S/RES/1772 (20 Aug 2007)
S/RES/1766 (23 July 2007)
S/RES/1744 (21 Feb 2007)
S/RES/1725 (6 Dec 2006)
S/2009/146-Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia
S/2009/132-Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia

THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Although allegations of an Iranian nuclear program have existed for decades, those rumors gained new credibility following the exposure of two nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak in August 2002 by a group of dissidents known as the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The exposure of these facilities brought into question the intention of the Iranian nuclear program and drew an immediate investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This prompted suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities and Iranian agreement to modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Agreements in 2003 and 2004 respectively. However Iran announced its intention to resume all research and development activities again in January 2006. In April 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had "joined the nuclear countries of the world," and that Iran had no intention of giving up its right to enrich uranium as part of negotiations over its nuclear program. Following multiple UN Security Council resolutions and resumption of uranium enrichment at both the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, Iran unilaterally withdrew from the provisions of modified Code 3.1 in March 2007.

Not deterred by this, the Security Council agreed in early June 2006 on a set of proposals for Iran, containing both incentives and disincentives with the goal of deterring Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran rejected the proposals, calling them "insulting and humiliating." Following the rejection of the proposals, the Security Council issued five resolutions between July 2006 and September 2008 banning arms exports, freezing assets, and restricting the travel of individuals, groups, and companies associated with the nuclear program. Later an effort by Russia, France and the United States offering to send a large portion of Iran's nuclear fuel abroad for further processing in 2009 was initially refused by Iran and later accepted after the proposal was withdrawn following the exposure of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Shortly after the initial rejection, it was revealed to the IAEA by Iran and several member nations that Iran was constructing a fuel enrichment plant in a tunnel complex on a Revolutionary Guard base in Fordow near the city of Qom. The construction of the FFEP started in 2006 when Iran was bound under modified Code 3.1 to reveal the plans for construction of such a facility as construction began. This revelation added another concern over a possible military component to Iran's nuclear program. Other issues that have been repeatedly called into question by the IAEA are: high-explosives; detonator and long range missile testing; documents revealing re-entry vehicle work; uranium metal milling; green-salt experiments; continued uranium enrichment; as well as a lack of cooperation regarding transparency efforts in allowing access to companies producing components for nuclear research and development; refusal of access to heavy water facilities; and uranium processing and mining facilities.

Iran claims these issues have arisen from forged documents and that these are "politically motivated" and "baseless" accusations. Iran continues to call all Security Council resolutions concerning the Iranian nuclear program "illegal," claiming it is not bound by modified Code 3.1 and that its actions do not violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran continually reminds the IAEA of its compliance and findings in Board of Governors' reports that Iran has not diverted any nuclear material from those sites the IAEA is allowed to access. Following the replacement of Mohamed ElBaradei by Yukiya Amano as Director General of the IAEA, allusions to the western bias of the new director general have been drawn by several Iranian officials.

The issue of intense distrust remains on both sides of the negotiating table. Western diplomats continue to call into question the validity of Iran's proposal to domestically supply fuel for its nuclear program as well as the design of its research reactor under construction at Arak. They also question if the Arak reactor is to be a replacement for the Tehran Research Reactor and why the Iranian government proceeded to enrich uranium to 20% against IAEA recommendations and without IAEA safeguards as reported in GOV/2010/10. There have been repeated statements by the Iranians about building as many as ten new enrichment facilities. While ten new facilities is widely dismissed as propaganda, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization was recently quoted as saying two new plants would be "built inside mountains," and that, "God willing, we may start the construction of two new enrichment sites" in the new year.

President Ahmadinejad attended the global gathering on disarmament in New York where countries are urged to exchange ideas on how to cut the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons. More than 100 senior officials from NPT party states are expected to attend the nearly month-long event. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is hoping the forum will build on recent disarmament measures, including the Russian-United States agreement in April 2010 on slashing nuclear arsenals. The Secretary General has urged President Ahmadinejad to restore the trust in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and to resume talks with China, France, Russia, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States. Speaking at the forum on 3 May 2010, President Ahmadinejad stated that "the nuclear bomb is a fire against humanity rather than a weapon for defense." He also noted that some states use double standards by trying to force the rest of the world into compliance, but allowing the Zionist regime to stockpile weapons. As of 12 May 2010, Israel has declined to sign the NPT and has kept its vague policy neither acknowledging or denying it possesses nuclear weapons.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
• How does the presence of the Iranian nuclear program affect the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

• What are appropriate actions for the international community to take with regard to Iran's nuclear program?

Bibliography

Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, "Statement Before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," 3 May 2010.

"Ban Tells Iran's Ahmadinejad to Restore International Trust in Nuclear Programme," *UN News Centre*, 3 May 2010, www.un.org/news.

"Nuclear Forum at UN Offers Iran Chance to Reassure World-Official," *UN News Centre*, 29 April 2010, www.un.org/news.

Sanger, David, "Agencies Suspect Iran Is Plotting Atomic Sites" *New York Times*, 27 March 2010.

"Iranian Cooperation and Transparency Crucial, UN Nuclear Watchdog Chief Says," *UN News Centre*, 29 October 2007, www.un.org/news.

Pollack, Kenneth, *The Persian Puzzle*, Random House 2005.

Ryan, Rosalind, "Iran Resumes Uranium Enrichment," *The Guardian*, 8 August 2005.

"Security Council Receives Additional Reports on Iran Sanctions," *UN News Centre*, 17 March 2008, www.un.org/news.

Teibel, Amy, "Israel Refuses to Address World Pressure on Nukes," *Associated Press*, 6 May 2010.

UN Documents

GOV/2010/10
GOV/2009/8
GOV/2003/40
INFCIRC/786
INFCIRC/724
INFCIRC/214
S/RES/1835 (27 Sept 2008)
S/RES/1803 (3 Mar 2008)
S/RES/1747 (24 Mar 2007)
S/RES/1737 (23 Dec 2006)
S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006)

THE SITUATION IN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

The Korean War ended by truce, not by peace treaty, in 1953. Since that time a demilitarized zone has been in effect between the two countries. In June 2000, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea signed an accord to ease military tensions and to promote economic cooperation. Cooperation has been slow, especially after an early research effort by the DPRK using uranium caused problems in 2002. At the time, the DPRK said it was only using plutonium to try to build atomic bombs. This led to the Six Party Talks in 2003, which included the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. The Six Party Talks managed to offer the DPRK formal economic assistance in return for taking steps to end its nuclear weapons development.

In July 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution1695 condemning the DPRK for launching ballistic missiles, and encouraging them to return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions. In October 2006, the DPRK conducted a nuclear test against Security Council resolutions. The Security Council passed Resolution 1718, condemn-ing the test and demanding that the DPRK return to the Six Party Talks and retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); which the DPRK eventually did.

In response to a missile launch on April 5, 2009, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the launch as directly in contravention to Resolution 1718, demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea comply with Resolution 1718 by abstaining from further launches, and urging a resumption of the Six Party Talks. While the DPRK claimed this was a "successful" satellite launch, most of the international community saw this as a thinly veiled test launch of a Taepodong-2 missile. Relations between the DPRK and the rest of the world deteriorated as DPRK announced on April 14, 2009, that it was pulling out of the Six Party Talks and the NPT and resuming its nuclear program. Furthermore the DPRK stated that it would consider any pressure or sanctions applied in response to its launch a "declaration of war."

On May 25, 2009, the DPRK carried out its second underground nuclear test sparking international concern and leading the Republic of Korea to join a United States led initiative to combat the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. On May 27, 2009 the DPRK declared the truce that ended the Korean War void. The Security Council on June 12, 2009 unanimously approved Resolution 1874 condemning the nuclear test and further missile launches, demanding the return of the DPRK to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and strengthening the sanctions imposed under Resolution 1718. Reacting to the Security Council Resolution, DPRK announced it would begin uranium enrichment and "weaponizing" its plutonium stockpiles. Resolution 1874 also recommend that United Nations Member States inspect cargo vessels and airplanes suspected of carrying arms in or out of the DPRK be stopped and searched. The Council has called on Member States to report back to it within 45 days to discuss implementation of the resolution. The DPRK has warned that it will be considered an act of war if any of their ships are detained.

Things were mainly calm through the remainder of 2009, but on March 26, 2010, tensions were likely to rise again with the sinking of a Republic of Korea ship, Cho An. The ship was sunk in Yellow Sea killing 46 of 104 crew members on board after a torpedo detonated near the ship. The contested waters between North and South Korea see occasional naval clashes, but this was the largest loss of life in a single incident since the 1953 truce. Although South Korean and US intelligence sources have come to the same conclusion that the DPRK was responsible for the sinking of the vessel, no formal accusation has been leveled against DPRK. DPRK has denied responsibility for the sinking of the Cho An. Leading up to the March 26 events, the North had given every signal, amid its usual bellicose rhetoric and accusations, that it was seeking to re-enter negotiations with other world powers in the lead up to a formal resumption of the six-party talks between the Koreas, China, Japan, the United States and Russia. In a recent visit to China by Kim Jong-Il reiterated DPRK's willingness to provide favorable conditions for the resumption of Six-Party talks. South Korean officials however have urged companies to halt trade with the North. DPRK has previously attempted to raise tensions or create a "crisis" to make itself seem unpredictable and dangerous and to draw attention to the inherently unstable security arrangement on the peninsula, thereby gaining leverage for itself in the talks.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- Why have the Six Party Talks continued to fail to get the DPRK to end its nuclear weapons development? What actions can the UN take to facilitate a nuclear free Korean peninsula?
- What are ways that the UN can help minimize conflict from this latest incident?
- What further steps can be taken to persuade North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks and work to end its nuclear weapons program? Does your government feel offering incentives to DPRK is an appropriate response to bring the DPRK back to the Six Party Talks?

Bibliography

"North Korea, South Korea: Keeping an Eye on the Peninsula," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 26 March 2010, www.stratfor.com.

" Red Alert: South Korean Ship Sinking in Yellow Sea," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 26 March 2010,www.stratfor.com.

"Red Alert Update II: Keeping an Eye on the Peninsula," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 26 March 2010,www.stratfor.com.

"UN Chief Offers Condolences to Korean Families After Navy Boat Sinking," *UN News Centre*, 28March 2010, www.un.org/news.

UN Documents

S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009)
S/RES/1718 (14 Oct 2006)
S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006)

The Historical Security Council of 1993

Members of the Historical Security Council of 1993:

Brazil	New Zealand
Cape Verde	Pakistan
China	Russian Federation
Djibouti	Spain
France	United Kingdom
Hungary	United States of America
Japan	Venezuela
Morocco	

About the Historical Security Council

The 2010 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 23 May 1993. The events of 1993 demonstrated the compelling urgency for the United Nations (UN) to promote three underlying goals of its efforts: peace, development and democracy. In the words of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, "these goals must be interlocking and mutually reinforcing."

During the early months of 1993, UN peace operations in the field, most prominently in Cambodia, El Salvador, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, ranged beyond the traditional notion and definition of peace-keeping, as they took on political, social, humanitarian, and environmental dimensions. The concept of development also adopted an integrated approach; it was no longer merely a matter of economic policy and resources. Development meant social and cultural nation-building and took into account educational and environmental imperatives.

AMUN's HSC is unique not only in its topics, but also in its treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation begins. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role-playing for an HSC member-state will be not just a rote replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1993. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations, and reevaluations, of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government made in 1993 was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must by definition be in character, it is not a sure thing that given a second opportunity to look at events, any given national government would do things exactly the same way. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for "second chances." It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues, which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation.

While national governments often did not want international meddling' in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in solving crises. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the member states' national characters.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. One major factor in whether or not to be actively involved or to be a bystander which representatives must consider is the costs of peacekeeping with the deployment of regional missions. The increase in costs often caused the Security Council to reprioritize their peacekeeping efforts.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through 23 May 1993, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The changes of the past 11 years will not be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview,

Representatives should pursue periodicals from late 1992 through May of 1993 to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the New York Times Index, should provide a much better 'historical perspective' and 'feel for the times' than later historical texts, which can also be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible.

In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation's Representative to the UN. This person may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their country, or they may be relatively "in the dark" on their countries moment-to-moment actions in the world. In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make.

Representatives must, however, always consult with the simulation staff before making ANY operational statements. Operational

statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the U.N. In these cases, the simulation staff would be equated with the actual 'home office' of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time.

Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee/Council, preferably

with a second Representative who can cover that Committee/ Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 23 May 1993. The prominent events of early 1993 are discussed, as well as some questions which may face the Security Council through mid 1993. This research is intended merely as a starting point for Representatives continued exploration of the topics.

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu is long standing with roots back in Belgian rule. The Belgians first chose to govern Rwanda through the preferential treatment and empowerment of the Tutsis; however this favored status switched to Hutus several years later and further complicated relations. In 1962 Rwanda was granted independence, a Hutu revolution installed a new president, and the next decade was marked by the massacre of Tutsis. In 1973 General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power and pledged to restore order; however the establishment of a one-party state, ethnic quotas, and preferential treatment of Hutus did little to bridge the ethnic divide. To further exacerbate poor social conditions, Rwanda's economy experienced a harsh shock in 1989 when coffee prices fell dramatically; Rwanda's primary export products are coffee and tea, and the falling prices have caused severe economic hardship throughout the country.

Economic, ethnic, and political tensions began to peek in Rwanda at the beginning of the decade. In 1990 the Hutu government in Rwanda began receiving pressure from the Tutsi refugee diaspora living in Uganda. In the sixties many Tutsi fled across the border into Uganda to escape political persecution. Over the last thirty years resentment and the desire to return home among these Tutsi refugees has been growing. In 1990 a new group among the refugees emerged called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Many RPF members were former members of the Ugandan military or had fought in the recent Ugandan civil war. The RPF became increasingly angry with the Habyarimana government after it failed to follow through on promises to restore a democratic state and repatriate the estimated 500,000 Tutsi diaspora. Tensions came to a head on 1 October 1990 when RPF forces invaded from Uganda. Despite fewer numbers, the RPF, which had more experience and training, made significant progress against the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). Before the RPF was able to reach Kigali, the Rwandan government called upon Belgium, France, and Zaire for military and financial assistance. It was for this reason that the RPF offensive was unable to successively overtake Rwanda.

In response to the RPF's invasion, Rwandan government forces launched a massive counter-offensive with heavy military equipment. The RPF was unprepared to contend with heavy military resistance for a prolonged conflict and was ultimately repelled. For the next several years, the Rwandan government created and trained civilian

militias known as Interhamwe which began a campaign of killing Tutsi civilians in response to the RPF attacks. After suffering heavy losses the RPF, now under Paul Kagame's leadership, pulled back to the border with Uganda, reorganized, and multiplied its forces. The war continued for almost two years until a cease-fire agreement was signed 12 July 1992, in Arusha, Tanzania. This agreement set a timetable for the cessation of hostilities, promoted political talks, had the goal of arranging a peace accord with power-sharing, and authorized the Organization for African Unity (OAU) as a neutral military observer.

In a February 5 letter to the Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, President Habyarimana argued that the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi was the inevitable result of the RPF invasion. On February 8, the RPF violated the cease-fire, reached the outskirts of Kigali, and drove Rwandan troops south. French forces were once again called upon to come to the Rwandan government's aid. Meanwhile, Rwandan soldiers took vengeance on Tutsi civilians and opponents of the regime. They killed at least 147 persons and beat, tortured and raped many more. They burned and looted hundreds of homes and businesses. In some communes, the military even distributed arms to groups of civilians whom supported the President. Approximately 350,000 displaced Rwandans were being fed and sheltered in camps in the northern part of the country.

After hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February, the number of displaced persons escalated to nearly one million. Calculating the need for 13,000 tons of food a month, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a warning of a major catastrophe and increased its budget for Rwanda eightfold. On 22 February, Uganda and Rwanda sent separate letters to the President of the UN Security Council asking for the deployment of UN military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, specifically arms transportation. In response, the Secretary-General sent a goodwill mission from 4 to 18 March.

Meanwhile, efforts by the OAU and Tanzania led to a meeting between the warring factions from 5 to 7 March in Dar es Salaam. In a joint communiqué, the two sides agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and to resume peace talks in Arusha. In a speech to military commanders in Mid-March President Habyarimana suggested that

the RPF itself was to blame for the massacres. On 12 March 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 812 (1993), called on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to respect the renewed ceasefire and requested the Secretary-General to examine the requests of Rwanda and Uganda for the deployment of observers. A technical mission was dispatched to the border area of Uganda from 2 to 5 April and Rwanda on 6 April. The mission reported that it would be possible to deploy UN military observers to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it. However, because RPF control of the border area was extensive, the military observers had to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border.

The Arusha talks convened on 16 March. As the result of a request by the President of Rwanda to the Secretary-General, the UN launched an inter-agency appeal on 15 April for international assistance to Rwanda for $78 million to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people, approximately 13% of the population. An inter-agency mission was fielded between 18 and 25 March to prepare a consolidated appeal focusing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education. During April, the only public statements the Rwandan government made were to deny the existence of any 'death Squads' and deny that any of the massacres of February and March were planned. On 20 May, the Secretary-General formally recommends the establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
   • How can international assistance best be used to help the
      people of Rwanda?
   • If this is an internal conflict, should the UN become involved?
   • How critical is UN involvement to the future peace in Rwanda?
   • If violence continues, what action can and should be taken?
   • How can the UN help reconcile the differences between the
      two warring parties?

Bibliography

Barnett, Michael, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002.

Destexhe, Alan, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, New York University Press, New York, 1994.

Human Rights Watch, *Beyond the Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda*. New York, 1993.

Jones, Bruce D., *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, Rienner Publishers, Boulder Co. 2001.

UN Documents
S/RES/812 (12 Mar 1993)

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

In the aftermath of decolonization, Somalia has experienced persistent internal warfare accompanied by poor social and economic conditions. More recently political, social, and economic conditions have been rapidly deteriorating. In January of 1991 the United Somalia Congress, a coalition of opposing clans. took over political control of Somalia. However, Continuing internal conflict between the Somali National Movement (SNM), General Mohamed Farrah Aidid's party, and other factions resulted in a lack of a recognized central government and a collapse of state. Since the collapse of state, food sup-

plies have become a precious resource in Somalia. Warring between clans, poor economic and social conditions, as well as a wide spread draught have destroyed the agricultural system within Somalia resulting in wide spread famine and the starvations deaths of at least three hundred thousand Somalis since 1991. Control of food supplies has been used by the militias to buy the loyalty of local leaders, and it is commonplace for internationally supplied food to be stolen and exchanged for weapons.

On 3 March 1992, the leaders of opposing factions signed a ceasefire agreement which also allowed for the UN to deploy a monitoring mission into Somalia which oversaw arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance to the region. In July, fifty UN military observers were sent to Mogadishu to monitor conditions in accordance with the ceasefire agreement. The Security Council approved the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) on 24 April with Resolution 751, and on 15 August the UN's humanitarian "Operation Provide Relief" commenced. However, due to insufficient security the UN was unable to provide food and supplies to starving Somalis. Relief efforts were unsuccessful as flights were looted, food convoys hijacked, and aid workers assaulted. UNOSOM I was regarded as a failure and with Resolution 794 the Security Council called upon UN member nations to contribute military forces to help establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

In December President George H. W. Bush responded to the UN's request and proposed that United States forces lead an international UN force to meet the UN's request. The US would enter Somalia to provide a secure environment so that international food aid could reach the starving population, and would then turn over leadership of the operation to UN peacekeeping forces. The UN accepted this plan on 5 December, and 25,000 US troops supplemented by 17,000 troops from over twenty countries were ordered into Somalia. This United Task Force (UNITAF) was named "Operation Restore Hope."

On 9 December 1992, UNITAF forces landed on the coast of Mogadishu without opposition. Within days, forces had taken the airfield at Baledogle and also Baidoa. While UNITAF forces were proceeding with their objectives of securing key installations and providing for the open and safe passage of food and relief supplies, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali began a campaign of national reconciliation for Somalia. A conference for reconciliation and unity was assembled by the Secretary-General from 4 to 15 January 1993 and representatives from fourteen Somali political movements were in attendance. By the end of the conference, three agreements had been reached: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993; the Agreement On Implementing The Cease-fire And On Modalities Of Disarmament, and; the Agreement On The Establishment Of An Ad Hoc Committee.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted his recommendation to the Security Council that the UN-led UNOSOM II replace UNITAF as the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in resolution 814 on 26 March 1993 and officially succeeded UNITAF on 4 May 1993. UNOSOM II would seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF. To that end, a military component of 20,000 troops to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel for logistic support was required, along with a civilian staff of approximately 2,800. The mandate of UNOSOM II extended beyond humanitarian relief and carried enhanced enforcement powers. Nation building was at the heart of UNOSOM II and critical to the operation were the disarmament of the Somali people, restoring law and order, restoring infrastructure, and establishing a representative government. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the com-

mitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. Additionally, all States were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under resolution 733. The Secretary-General also identified three major challenges facing the UN in 1993: "facilitating the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons; providing jobs for the millions of unemployed Somalis, including members of armed gangs, militias and various private armies; and helping the Somalis in rebuilding their society and rehabilitating the decayed infrastructure."

To meet these challenges, the UN established a Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for the war- and drought-ravaged country which was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Some 190 Somali representatives, as well as senior representatives of donor Governments, international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs attended the Conference. The Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. On 27 March 1993, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia; the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants. The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. As the situation stand now in May, however, implementation of the agreement has stalled and militias are again maneuvering for positions of power and fighting has renewed.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How effective is UNOSOM II compared to UNOSOM I? What can be done to increase the effectiveness?
- Are there other ways in which the UN could better address the challenges identified by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali?
- How should the UN respond to escalating violence? Would this have a positive or negative impact on your country's willingness to contribute troops and funding?

Bibliography
Afrah, Mohamoud M., *Mogadishu: A Hell on Earth*, Copos Ltd. Nairobi, Kenya, 1993.

Amnesty International, *Somalia: A long-term human rights crisis*, 1988.

Chronology of Conflict Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, George Mason University, 1991.

"Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti Country Report, No. 1 1993," *The Economist*, London 1993.

Fleitz Jr., Frederick H, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990*, Praeger, Westport, CT 2002.

Hirsch, John L. and Oakley, Robert B., *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1995.

Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed, *Somalia*, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995.

Omar, Mohamed, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair*, Somali Publications, New Delhi, 1996.

"United Nations and the Situation in Somalia," UN Dept. of Public Information, April 30, 1993.

UN Documents
S/RES/814 (26 Mar 1993)
S/RES/794 (3 Dec 1992)
S/RES/775 (28 Aug 1992)
S/RES/767 (27 Jul 1992)
S/RES/751 (24 Apr 1992)
S/RES/746 (17 Mar 1992)
S/RES/733 (23 Jan 1992)
Presidential Statement, 16 Oct 1992.

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Haiti's most recent political problems stem from the coup d'état which deposed the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September of 1991. Reaction to the coup was violent and soon Haiti was plunged into disorder and violence. From the onset of the coup the Organization of American States (OAS) with the help of the UN has worked to bring stability and peace back to Haiti and reinstate the presidency of Aristide. All negotiation efforts thus far, however, have been a failure. The political unrest has caused a great humanitarian crisis within Haiti. The coup government under General Raoul Cédras has committed numerous civil rights violations. Civil rights violations over the past year and a half have included among other things the unlawful detention, torture, and execution of Haitian citizens who either supported or were suspected of supporting the Aristide presidency. Citizens in throughout the country were harassed and threatened on a daily basis. The climate of fear throughout Haiti has caused a massive displacement issue as an estimated 300,000 Haitians have been forced to flee from their homes. In addition to the internally displaced, tens of thousands of Haitians have also attempted to leave Haiti for neighboring nations.

In March 1993, the United Nations and OAS launched a consolidated appeal for a humanitarian plan of action designed to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the Haitian people. In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Assembly establish the United Nations component of the joint International Civilian Mission in Haiti. The United Nations component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component.

On 20 April 1993 the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/20B approving the Secretary-General's report and authorizing the United Nations participation, jointly with OAS, in the International Civilian Mission to Haiti. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy with a view to resolving the political crisis in Haiti. It also reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the de facto regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament that took place in January 1993, would be considered illegitimate.

Envoys of the Clinton Administration and the United Nations have since arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti for talks with the country's military leaders. Diplomatic talks have centered on the planned deployment of about 500 foreign police officers in Haiti to create an international police force, seen by some as a crucial final element to reaching a negotiated settlement. The drive to deploy the police force, led by the United Nations mediator for Haiti, Dante Caputo, and President Clinton's special advisor on Haitian affairs, Lawerence A. Pezzullo, has been repeatedly delayed, however, by negotiations with President Aristide, many of whose supporters are opposed to any armed international presence in Haiti.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How crucial is the presence of an international police force to maintain order?
- If President Aristide will not agree to an international peace presence, what other actions can be taken to ensure peace?
- If political talks are fruitless, what actions can the UN take to address the urgent humanitarian situation in Haiti?

Bibliography

Bailey, Sydney, *The U.N. Security Council and Human Right*, St. Martin's Press: New York, 1994.

Malone, David, *Decision Making in the UN Security Council: The case of Haiti, 1990-1997*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998.

Ridgeway, James, ed, *The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis*, Essential Books, Washington D.C., 1994.

Organization of American States: Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, OEA/Ser.L/VII.83 Doc. 18, 9 March 1993.

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia left the world with an increasingly volatile situation that was both political and humanitarian in nature. The once loosely held together ethnic groups now left to their own devices began to wage war upon each other over centuries of ethnic and religious grievances. At the seat of the most heated violence sat the newly independent nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From its conception Bosnia was fraught with civil war. Immediately after independence was granted in 1992, Serb National Forces barricaded themselves around the city of Sarajevo and began wage artillery attacks on the city. Serb forces and internal Ethnic Serbian Militias within Bosnia working for a larger Serbian homeland also began a systematic invasion and takeover of much of the rural land within Bosnia-Herzegovina. As part of their crusade, Serbian forces forced all non-Serbs out of the territory they controlled creating thousands of refugees. In addition reports of ethnic violence against non-Serbs, particularly Muslims, began surfacing in early 1992. By the end of 1992 Serbian Forces controlled 70% of Bosnia creating a political and humanitarian emergency of increasing urgency.

In response to the growing humanitarian situation and political unrest the UN authorized the creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with resolution 743 on 21 February 1992. UNPROFOR's original mandate was to ensure conditions for peace talks and to help maintain peace is several UN designated "safe zones". UN peacekeepers were successful in securing humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia, but little was accomplished in the way of

securing the peace. To place more political pressure on the region the Security Council imposed a series of economic sanctions against what remained of Yugoslavia starting in May of 1992. The sanctions imposed were stringer than any other sanctions levied by the Security Council to date. All import, export, and transport to and from Yugoslavia were forbidden; monetary transactions of any sort were strictly curtailed; all social and cultural contracts were broken off; and diplomatic representation was drastically reduced. Though the sanctions succeeded on bringing to bear harsh economic consequences for Yugoslavia, the war and the humanitarian conflict still dragged on unabated.

In an effort to bring peace to the region the UN along with the European Union sent a negotiation team led by two men: David Owen and Cyrus Vance. In late 1992 the team unveiled what was to be known as the Vance-Owen peace plan. Debate over the plan reached into the spring of 1993. Muslim and Croat faction agreed to the plan after further negotiation, but the plan ran into problems while negotiating Serbian support. The US became highly critical of the plan claiming that its provisions rewarded the Serbs for their aggression. The US instead lobbied for a "lift and strike" plan which involved editing the terms of the arms embargo to provide weapons support for the Muslim and Croat soldiers as well as using US and NATO air forces to conduct air raids on Serbian forces. The US plan, however, failed to gain any support within the Council. With the threat of US force off the table, the Serbs saw no need to agree to the Vance-Owne plan and the plan collapsed in mid May.

With the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan new levels of violence have erupted within Bosnia. Muslim and Croat forces that had been united in an uneasy alliance against the Serbs are now starting to war with each other. Despite calls by the Security Council and UNPROFOR, hostilities between the two former allies have continued. The fighting has intermittently blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and has further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNCHR in the area.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- The war within Bosnia is multifaceted. Which aspects are the most important or urgent to deal with?
- How can the UN better address the humanitarian emergency in Bosnia?
- What policies will better advance the situation towards peace that is acceptable for all involved parties?
- How can the UN leverage Serbian interests towards peace?
- How can the UN continue to fund UNPROFOR along with its other current peacekeeping operations?

Bibliography

Bennett, Christopher, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences*, New York University Press, New York, 1995.

Burg, Steven L, *The War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing and International Intervention*. Sharpe, New York, 1999.

Dragnich, Alex N., *Yugoslavia's Disintegration and the Struggle for Truth*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.

Gibbs, David, *First Do No Harm*, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 2009.

Gerolymatos, Andre, *The Balkan Wars*, Basic Books, NewYork, 2002.

Gutman, Roy, *A Witness to Genocide*, Macmillian Publishing, New York, 1993.

Little, Allan and Laura Silber, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, Penguin, New York, 1997.

Raamet, Sabrina, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from Death of Tito to Ethnic War*, Westview Press, Oxford, 1996.

UN Documents
S/RES/743 (21 Feb 1992)
S/RES/749 (7 Apr 1992)
S/RES/752 (15 May 1992)
S/RES/755 (20 May 1992)
S/RES/756 (29 May 1992)
S/RES/757 (8 June 1992)
S/RES/758 (8 June 1992)
S/RES/760 (18 June 1992)
S/RES/762 (30 June 1992)
S/RES/764 (13 July 1992)
S/RES/771 (13 Aug 1992)
S/RES/776 (14 Sept 1992)
S/RES/777 (19 Sept 1992)
S/RES/779 (6 Oct 1992)
S/RES/781 (9 Oct 1992)
S/RES/786 (10 Nov 1992)
S/RES/798 (18 Dec 1992)
S/RES/824 (6 May 1993)
S/RES/821 (28 Apr 1993)
S/RES/820 (17 Apr 1993)
S/RES/819 (16 Apr 1993)
S/RES/816 (31 Mar 1993)
S/RES/815 (31 Mar 1993)
S/RES/808 (22 Feb 1993)
S/RES/807 (19 Feb 1993)
S/RES/802 (25 Jan 1993)
S/25700 Report to the Security Council

The Situation in the Middle East

As of 1993 three peace-keeping operations remained in place in the region: two peace-keeping forces, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Headquartered at Jerusalem, with liaison offices at Amman, Jordan, and Beirut, Lebanon, UNTSO's 57 unarmed military observers continued to assist UNDOF and UNIFIL in performing their tasks. UNTSO also manned five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and operated four mobile teams in the Israeli-controlled section of the UNIFIL area.

Late 1992 saw a brief period of renewed Iraqi aggression which included several small incursions by Iraqi troops into the demilitarized zone along the border with Kuwait in an attempt to recapture munitions and supplies left behind during the Iraqi withdrawal. Renewed Iraqui aggression led to the Security Council condemnation of Iraq, followed by a series of United States, United Kingdom, and French air raids in Iraqi anti-missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq. Following the implementation of the air raids the Security Council

authorized the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM, the peace keeping force along the border) to take direct physical action in response to any future violation of the demilitarized zone in res 806 on 5 February 1993.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What is your county's position regarding the air raids being conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France?
- How much concern is the renewed Iraqi aggression along the Kuwaiti border?

Territories Occupied by Israel

In response to increased violence in the territories, and two specific killings of and Israeli citizen on 28 March and two Israeli policemen on 30 March, Israel imposed complete closure of the territories on 31 March. The closure decision has effectively divided the territories into five distinct areas: Gaza, the northern West Bank, the southern West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan Heights. The closure has created unprecedented hardship on the population of the territories, a majority of whom already live below the poverty line. Special permits are required for entry into Jerusalem and Israel as well as for travel between the West Bank and Gaza and within the West Bank itself. The measure has had a serious negative impact on commerce, medical care, education and access to services, including those provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:
- What is your country's position on Israel's closure decision?
- What should be done to alleviate the suffering of the populations who have been adversely impacted by the closure decision?
- What can be done to restore unfettered access to UNRWA services?

Kurdish Relief Program

In a letter sent to the president of the Security Council on 21 May Secretary General Boutros-Ghali indicated that the Iraqi Government has agreed to extend the accord under which the United Nations provides relief assistance to the Iraqi Kurds for another six months. But he also warned that unless the United Nations receives more money and food from donor countries, he would be forced to suspend the whole relief program in Iraq as well as in the Kurdish controlled northern areas by the end of May or mid June. Donor countries failed to respond to his April 1992 appeal for $490 million to pay for another year of the relief program. Because of this shortage of money, the Secretary General indicated that he has already been forced to cut 50 guards from the 136-member United Nations force tasked with protecting relief workers in northern Iraq. He warned that the remaining guards would be withdrawn by mid-June unless new financing was found.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How does the lack of monetary and food aid affect the Kurdish relief program? Can this be changed?

- Given the other issues facing the Council how urgent is the problem of supplying a guard force for the relief workers in northern Iraq?

SANCTIONS ON THE LYBIAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (the Arab Maghreb Union), in an 8 April letter to the President of the Security council, urged the Council to reconsider its resolutions so that the embargo and restrictions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, resulting from the Pan Am 103 incident, could be lifted, with a view to ending the suffering and eliminating the risks inherent in the continued application or strengthening of sanctions.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- Are the sanctions being imposed on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya fair?

UN Documents
S/RES/ 806 (5 Feb 1993)
S/RES/803 (28 Jan 1993)

THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

Cambodia has suffered from civil war and ethnic violence for decades. Following the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978 and the fall of the Khmer Rouge as the official government, in 1981 Cambodia was left in a state of disarray with no fewer than four factions vying for power. The two main players in the conflict consisted of the ousted Khmer Rouge now the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) and the new founded leftist government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The PRK claimed political control of Cambodia, but official recognition of the PRK in the UN was halted by the United States, China, and the United Kingdom who all favored the Khmer Rouge's PDK and its ousted dictator, Pol Pot. As a result the PRK became the defector government of Cambodia. Though, it is important to note that UN representation was still held by representatives of the Khmer Rouge. The political conflict between the different parties vying for power resulted in heavy violence throughout Cambodia. In addition to the political strife, ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia were targeted in a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

The situation in Cambodia was first considered by the United Nations Security early in 1979. Later in the same year, the General Assembly considered the question at its regular session and adopted the first in a long series of resolutions on the subject. In the subsequent resolutions the UN tasked the Secretary General of monitoring the situation and using his office to help in the promotion of peace. Resolutions also provided for the Secretary General to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts for the Cambodia people.

Some progress was made in 1991 with the signing of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict on 23 October in Paris. The agreement held provisions for, among other things, the organization of elections, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and the rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure. To bolster the implementation of the Paris Agreement the Security Council, in full cooperation with the PRK, approved the creation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with the passage of resolution 745 on 28 February 1992. With UNTAC in place movement was made towards establishing elections and restoring order.

With the passage of resolution 783 on 13 October 1992, the Security Council officially expressed its support for elections in Cambodia to be carried out no later than May of 1993. And in March of 1993, the SC endorsed the proposed election dates starting 23 May. As the election process moved forward, violence continued. The Khmer Rouge continued to attack ethnic Vietnamese within Cambodia. Attacks were also waged against UNTAC peacekeepers, some of which brought fatalities. Electoral campaigning began on 5 April as scheduled. During the six week campaign period, scores of political meetings and rallies attended by tens of thousands of people took place without major incident through the country. UNTAC civilian police monitored these rallies, and also provided protection for political party offices considered to be most at risk. On 13 April the PDK declared that it would not be participating in the elections. Subsequently, the PDK closed its offices in Phnom Penh and withdrew from the capital. The PDK also vowed to disrupt voting on election days.

On 15 May, in his final pre-election report to the Security Council, the Secretary General outlined the security measures that have been taken to protect polling in the elections. By mid-May all necessary electoral equipment and supplies, including the ballot papers and boxes, have been delivered to Cambodia under heavy guard. Training is under way for some 900 International Polling Station Officers from 44 countries and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 130 more from the United Nations Secretariat and 370 more within UNTAC, as well as for more than 50,000 Cambodian electoral staff. The PRK, through its political party the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) raised questions about some of the technical preparations but pledged its confidence in UNTAC's electoral work.

On 20 May 1993, in resolution 820, the Security Council expressed its satisfaction with the arrangements made for the conduct of elections, deplored all acts of non-cooperation with the Paris Agreements and condemned all acts of violence committed on political and ethnic grounds, as well as intimidation of and attacks on UNTAC personnel. It expressed full support for the measures taken by UNTAC to protect the polls and reminded all Cambodian parties of their obligation to comply fully with the election results. 21 May saw more attacks on UNTAC peacekeepers and more fatalities. In response the Security Council released a Presidential Statement condemning the attacks and urging the Cambodian people exercise their right to vote. Due to the increasing violence perpetrated by the PDK, UNTAC personnel have recently decided to cancel planned polling in areas controlled or heavily concentrated with PDK armed forces.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:
- How should the UN respond if violence surrounding the elections increases and prevents large numbers from voting?
- What steps should be taken to ensure that the election results are accepted by all parties concerned without major objection?
- What support should the UN provide if the election results result in more violence and chaos?

Bibliography

Doyle, Michael, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate,* Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Co. 1995.

The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, United Nations: New York, 1995.

UN Documents

S/RES/826 (20 May 1993)
S/RES/810 (8 Mar 1993)
S/RES/792 (30 Nov 1993)
S/RES/783 (13 Oct 1993)

Additional Web Resources

Cambodian Information Center: Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict: http://www.cambodia.org/facts/Paris_Peace_Agreement_10231991.php

Cambodia National Assembly: Historical Archives of Parliamentary Election Results 1993 Archives: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2051_93.htm

OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT

On 30 January 1992, eight years after acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) finally signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) allowing for inspections of nuclear facilities. Inspections were set to begin in June of 1992, however problems soon inhibited progress. Negotiations to establish a bilateral inspection regime, a part of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) established by the previous Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on 20 January 1992, were stalled and going nowhere. In addition the IAEA had questions as to the validity of the levels of plutonium production being disclosed by the DPRK. In early 1993 the IAEA requested access to two previously unreported facilities that were expected of holding nuclear waste, but the DPRK refused access. In a response to the stalled bilateral inspection regime creation and the accusations of the IAEA, on 12 March 1993 the DPRK announced its intentions to withdraw from the NPT. The announcement effectively brought all progress in the region to a halt and increased tensions between the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States.

The Security Council met to address the problem of the DPRK's threat to withdraw from the NPT on 11 May 1993. The Council invited both the DPRK and the ROK to participate in the discussion. In a response the DPRK released a statement asserting that the Council had neither legal nor technical grounds to address what it deemed a fictitious nuclear problem. The statement also reiterated the DPRK's intent to withdraw from the NPT citing the increasing nuclear threats from the United States and what it saw as the United States' manipulation of the IAEA. Despite the DPRK's objections the Council passed resolution 825 calling for the DPRK to reconsider its intention to withdraw from the NPT and to reopen its country to IAEA inspections. The DPRK characterized the resolution as unreasonable and rejected it as interference in its international affairs and an infringement on its sovereignty.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How can the Council defuse the anger of the DPRK and get it back to the negotiating table?
- What further efforts can be made to get the DPRK to abide by the terms of both the NPT and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?

PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

On 14 May, the United Nations announced to the world that peacekeeping costs were expected to rise by more than a third this year to $3.7 billion. The failure of member nations to pay their share of peacekeeping costs serves as a major problem and an exacerbating influence. Serious doubts exist as to the United Nation's ability to finance future operations and adequately sustain peace efforts already under way. The current Somali mission is expected to cost $1.2 billion a year. and if the Serbs in Bosnia can be persuaded to accept an international peace plan, the United Nations plans to deploy some 70,000 troops to the area, a mission that could cost $2 billion a year. By the end of April unpaid peacekeeping dues amounted to $1.5 billion. It is also important to note that there also exists a $970 million shortfall in unpaid dues for the regular budget.

Adding to the problem, developing countries have joined in criticism of the United Nations for failing to fully reimburse them for the costs of the peacekeeping troops they provide. Some member nations are withdrawing their peacekeeping troops and refusing to participate in new peacekeeping operations.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How can the UN better enforce the collection of past due amounts and current costs?
- How can the UN calm the anger of the countries threatening to withdraw their troops and not support future operations?
- What impact will the budget shortfall to have on your decisions to create or extend peacekeeping operations?

Bibliography

Bennis, Phyllis, *Calling the Shots*, Interlink Publishing, New York, 1996.

UN Documents

S/RES/822 (30 Apr 1993)
S/RES/818 (14 Apr 1993)
S/RES/813 (26 Mar 1993)
S/RES/809 (2 Mar 1993)
S/RES/805 (4 Feb 1993)
S/RES/825 (11 May 1993)

Chapter Four
The General Assembly and Committees

Introduction

The General Assembly is the main deliberative policy-making body of the United Nations (UN) and is empowered to address all international issues covered by the Charter. In many ways, it acts as the central hub of the United Nations. Many UN bodies report to the General Assembly, but not all of these bodies are subsidiary to the GA. For example, the Security Council constantly updates the General Assembly on its work, but it is an independent body; its work does not require the General Assembly's independent approval. In contrast, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and is governed by General Assembly mandates. Other subsidiary bodies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), also have direct reporting relationships with the General Assembly.

The UN Charter assigns each of the main Committees of the General Assembly specific tasks and topics to discuss during each session. Because every Member State has a seat in every Committee, it is important to note that the points of discussion do not overlap; that is, even if two or more Committees are discussing a general topic area, each Committee is responsible for discussing a very specific point or aspect of that topic. For example, the Fourth Committee may discuss the Israeli-Palestine conflict with regard to its political components. However, issues concerning the legal, social, or economic components of the Israeli-Palestine conflict are left to other Committees, the General Assembly Plenary, or the Security Council. Therefore, Representatives in each Committee should take care not to expand the discussion of any topic beyond the limitations set by their Committee's mandate and into another Committee's area of discussion. This is known as the Committee's purview.

A note concerning funding: The Fifth Committee makes financing decisions concerning only the UN's regular, annual budget, not those decisions dealing with voluntary contributions or new outlays. Even though AMUN will not be simulating the Fifth Committee, other Committees generally do not act unless sufficient funds are available for their proposals, thus financial questions should still be considered during the other Committees' deliberations. Therefore, if a Committee creates a new program or initiative, that Committee should specify how the program can or will be funded, and if the program falls within the UN's regular annual budget, that resolution should defer to the Fifth Committee to establish funding.

The purpose of the Combined Plenary session on the final day is to ratify the resolutions which passed in the four Main GA Committees and build consensus. While a small amount of additional debate is typical, it is expected that the work done by each Committee over the first three days of the Conference will be respected. It would thus be rare for significant changes to be made, or for a resolution to fail in the Plenary session after passing in Committee.

The following are brief descriptions of each Committee simulated at AMUN, along with the Committee's agenda, a brief purview of each committee, a brief background and research guide for each agenda topic, and the Committee's website address. Representatives should use this information as the first step in their research on the powers and limitations of their particular Committee in relation to the agenda topics.

The Concurrent General Assembly Plenary

Purview of the Simulation

The General Assembly Plenary typically considers issues that several Committees would have the power to discuss, but which would best be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Likewise, the General Assembly Plenary is also responsible for coordinating work between the many different bodies of the United Nations. For example, the 60th General Assembly recently established a Peacebuilding Commission that will oversee the United Nations' peacebuilding processes and coordinate the work of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General, and Member States emerging from conflict situations. Note that if the Security Council, which is given the primary task of ensuring peace and security by the Charter, is discussing a particular issue, the General Assembly (Plenary) will cease its own deliberations and defer to the Security Council.

Website: http://www.un.org/ga/

The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict

Conflict diamonds, according to the United Nations, are rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine and overthrow legitimate governments. The United Nations has been central in advocating the position that promoting legitimate diamond trading will lead to peace, which will lead to development. Despite universally-acknowledged links between diamonds and conflict across Africa, consensus on how to resolve the problem has been difficult, and enforcement of international standards even more so. The language surrounding the issue is intensely political, in part due to the large number of stake-holders and in part due to the vast wealth at stake. Stakeholders in the issue include governments, NGOs, the United Nations, the diamond industry, arms dealers and smugglers, finance companies, consumers, traders, as well as paramilitary and extra-governmental groups.

Civil wars and violent conflict have erupted throughout the 1990s and 2000s in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and most recently in Zimbabwe, where diamonds are frequently mined by rebel groups to use as capital to buy arms and foster civil conflicts. The diamonds from contested regions in Africa are less expensive than gems from other parts of the world, and many corporations have a vested interest in keeping diamond prices low, which has led some to charge the industry with complicity in the problem.

The cycle of trade between diamonds and arms increases the difficulty of successful government intervention and implementation of international standards. Governments are often unable to halt diamond mining by rebel groups. In states in conflict, areas run by rebel groups are difficult, if not impossible, to control. Standards and legitimacy are often non-existent in such situations and often governments themselves are dependent on minerals for their own export purposes. And once diamonds are in the marketplace, their origin is increasingly difficult to trace. After the diamonds are polished, they become unidentifiable.

The United Nations' attempts to restrict the trade in conflict diamonds began in 1998 with Security Council resolutions that placed an embargo on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels, who profited by selling diamonds in order to facilitate civil war. The Security Council adopted similar schemes with respect to the governments of Sierra Leone and the DRC to deprive each country's rebel groups of income. Even after these Security Council resolutions, the rebels continue to mine and sell diamonds in order to purchase arms to continue the conflict.

In May 2000, in response to growing international concern, governments and industry officials gathered in Kimberley, South Africa, to develop a strategy for ensuring that diamond certification schemes have internationally recognized standards. The result was the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which was signed by fifty-two countries by November 2002, and was fully implemented in August 2003. The Kimberley Process mandates that participating countries to export their diamonds in tamperproof containers with forgery-proof export certificates that are tracked in a universal database. The Kimberley Process has been widely embraced by the international community, but significant challenges remain. Many consider the most significant weakness of the Kimberley Process to be its emphasis on "voluntary self regulation" by the diamond industry to ensure that diamonds are not from conflict regions. Thus, there is no neutral, outside observer to ensure compliance; if an entity claims to abide by KPCS regulations, it is difficult to prove otherwise. Though it is widely believed that the KPCS has reduced trade in conflict diamonds, its effectiveness is both difficult to measure and admittedly imperfect. Independent experts in Sierra Leone, for example, estimate that illicit sales make up between 15-20 percent of total trade, while official estimates suggest trade in conflict diamonds has dropped to around 1 percent in the seven years since the KCPS's implementation.

The KCPS meets annually to review progress and discuss current issues, and the UN General Assembly frequently notes and comments on these meetings and broad international goals. In the June 2010 meeting in Tel Aviv, Israel, the worsening situation in Zimbabwe was at the top of the agenda, but the parties left the meeting without agreement. At issue is Zimbabwe's adherence to the minimum requirements of the KPCS, especially in relation to rough diamonds from the Marange mining area. The Zimbabwean inspector certified the country's compliance, while a report from Global Witness, an NGO stakeholder in the KPCS, called for a six-month suspension of Zimbabwe from the KPCS while compliance could be established and verified. The Tel Aviv meeting ended without consensus on the issue, and the situation in Zimbabwe will likely be at the center of future discussions about conflict diamonds generally and about the efficacy of the Kimberley Process in particular.

The problem of conflict diamonds is complicated by the complex relationship between the relevant UN organs, which include the General Assembly, the Security Council, and various UN missions. In addition to diamonds, the situation also brings into question issues of arms trading, labor, and violence directed toward communities and groups of people. How the various stakeholders, especially paramilitary and rebel groups without formal standing in the international system, relate to one another are critical issues for the United Nations to address. The General Assembly is also examining how it responds to these issues in cooperation with the Security Council and various UN missions in affected countries. It has called on states with significant interest in the issue to continue open discussions, and it has asked for further reports and considerations on technical issues. Future actions may include further study, funding, developing a new certification scheme, or altering the current one.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- Is your country a participant in the Kimberley Process? Why or why not?
- What is the appropriate role of NGOs and corporate or commercial actors in this process? Specifically, what is the role of the industrialized world, as the primary consumers of diamonds, in preventing conflict?
- What is the relationship between the General Assembly and the UN Security Council regarding rough diamonds and conflict?
- How can the relationship between poverty, underdevelopment and conflict diamonds be broken or its effects reduced?

Bibliography
Allen, Michael, "The 'Blood Diamond' Resurfaces," *Wall Street Journal*, 19 June 2010.
Campbell, Greg, *Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.
Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, "Interlaken Declaration on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds", 5 November 2002, online.
Dugger, Celia W., "Zimbabwe Diamonds Fail to Get Conflict-Free Approval," *NY Times*, 24 June 2010.
Global Witness, "Diamond Meeting Ends without Consensus on Zimbabwe; Serious Challenges Ahead for Landmark Certification Scheme," 24 June 2010, online.
Hill, Amelia, "Blood Diamonds from Zimbabwe To Flood International Market, Watchdog Warns," *The Guardian* (London), 8 July 2010.
"Kimberley Process Too Weak, Author On Conflict Gems Says," *UN Wire*, 21 August 2002.
"Liberia Can't yet Fund Diamond Certification Scheme Needed To End Sanctions," *UN News Centre*, 29 September 2004, online.
"Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe's New-Found Diamond Wealth," *Global Witness*, 14 June 2010, online.
"The Blood Diamond is Making a Comeback," *IRIN News*, 30 June 2010, online.
"U.N. General Assembly Backs Certification Plan," *UN Wire*, 16 April 2003.
"UN supports certification process for non-conflict rough diamonds," *UN News Centre*, 15 April 2004, online.
Zachary, G. Pascal, "Africa's Blood Diamonds, Bloody Still," *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 June 2010.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/109
A/RES/63/134
A/RES/62/11
A/RES/61/28
A/RES/60/182
A/RES/59/144
A/RES/58/290
A/RES/57/302
A/RES/56/265
A/RES/56/263
A/RES/55/56
A/58/L.59
A/57/489
A/55/56
S/RES/1459 (2003)
S/RES/1408 (2002)
S/RES/1385 (2001)
S/RES/1344 (2001)
S/RES/1295 (2000)
S/RES/1295 (2000)
S/RES/1176 (1998)
S/RES/1173 (1998)
S/RES/864 (1993)
SC/6886 (2000)
SC/6871 (2000)
S/2000/203

Additional Web Resources

www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/ - Global Witness (NGO)

www.kimberleyprocess.com/ - Official Website for the Kimberley Process

www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html - UN-related information on conflict diamonds

www.worlddiamondcouncil.com - The World Diamond Council

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/dark-side-of-natural-resources/diamonds-in-conflict.html - Global Policy Forum, Diamonds in Conflict

Special note: for searching purposes in UN Documents, the word "fuelling" is spelled in the British fashion.

OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE WORLD FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

In 2009, years of unsustainable growth patterns and systemic weaknesses in the global economy came to a head, resulting in a financial and economic crisis the size of which had not been seen since the Great Depression. While the exact causes of the crisis are debatable, it is clear that each country has faced negative internal and external consequences, and the ramifications of the collapse were only dramatized by the speed of late twentieth-century globalization. The impact felt within developing nations is of particular significant concern, as economic repercussions threaten to curtail financial progress and could even reverse recent gains. Such was the consensus of the UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development, held last year as a response to the crisis.

The financial and economic crisis's effects on development were—and as of this writing, remain—severe. While the financial effects of the crises have been noted worldwide, perhaps those countries most affected were the developing nations of Eastern Europe and Argentina. China's historically insulated banking system has allowed it to largely sidestep the recession, while industrial economies such as the United States of America, Germany, and Japan have witnessed stock market declines, yet remain among the least affected. Burgeoning rates of unemployment and poverty have been noted in several countries, while industrialized countries have witnessed overall disenchantment with financial institutions. The trend toward increasing world trade has been reversed, and nearly every market has suffered reductions in investment and growth, leading to fears of protectionism and isolationism. Such trade measures have also taken a toll on already fragile economies as they caused markets to shrink and economic activity to decline.

The potential fragility of the international economic system was not unknown before the financial collapse. In 2002, the UN International Conference on Financing and Development met and produced the Monterrey Consensus, a document that underscored the value of the United Nations' relationship with international financial institutions and outlined six areas that would require attention for international development. Additionally, it outlined steps that Member States could take at the national and regional level to ensure the highest level of global financial cooperation.

As the crisis developed, however, and came to a head Member States of the United Nations established—via the Doha Declaration at the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2008—a mandate for a summit to be held in June 2009. The Summit would involve heads of state as well as members of civil society with vested interests in the proceedings. What emerged from the roundtable discussions was a wide-ranging report, adopted by consensus, known as the Outcome Document. This document issued recommendations to counter the recession and to strengthen global cooperation and reform of global financial and economic institutions. It called for 1) a global stimulus that would work for both individual countries as well as regional blocs; 2) consensus on how to contain the effects of the crisis; 3) plans to cushion and prevent future global economic and financial stress; and 4) the improved regulation and monitoring of global institutions.

The final section of the Outcome Document called on various intergovernmental and UN bodies to increase the cohesiveness and soundness of international cooperation. It requested the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) act as a leader in this cause, establishing ways for ECOSOC to make recommendations to the General Assembly and promote and assess the strength of international policies related to the world's financial and economic institutions. Though the Outcome Document is largely prescriptive in nature, suggesting international agenda topics and market reform, it lays forth concrete measures for international organizations to follow.

Following the Outcome Document, bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-Parliamentary Union held meetings to continue addressing the need to revive the global economy. At the top of the agenda, alongside remedial payments to counteract immediate job loss and unemployment, is monetary assistance to those developing countries which have been hardest hit. While many countries have seen increasingly optimistic data surrounding economic growth and faith in financial institutions, the world is still reeling from the aftershocks of the collapse. The future prosperity of

all Member States lies in the hands of public policy experts at both local and international levels.

In August 2009, the General Assembly established an ad hoc open-ended working group to follow up on the issues brought forth in the June summit. The working group decided to hold a series of six meetings that ended in June of this year. This body and various other UN bodies and committees have discussed and offered measures to begin restructuring and/or countering the recession. These measures include, among other things, improving the liquidity of international funds, developing new lending agencies, and revising the dominance of developed nations in the Bretton Woods institutions. These meetings are expected to culminate in a report of the Working Group, to be presented to the General Assembly.

Perhaps the largest impediment to United Nations action in overcoming future economic and financial crises is Western opposition to large structural change within the UN. The mandate of the conference essentially split those countries present along developed and developing country lines. While the summit was convened to not only examine the current issue but also address the future of development, such Member States as the United States reported negative feelings toward reform of such things as reserve systems and global architecture and institutions. Developed countries also noted major disagreement in discussions of legitimate trade defense measures and the potential for an international reserve currency arose. This divide was further evident in disagreements about the relationship between the financial crisis and development, specifically in relation to the Millennium Development Goals. There is some fear, especially among developing nations, that the financial crisis may retard progress toward the MDGs while increasing unemployment, decelerating growth, growing deficits, and reducing access to credit.

Future actions and initiatives will require countries and institutions to work together to coordinate responses to the crisis. Measures will need to benefit as many of the involved parties as possible, with an emphasis on safeguarding economic progress that has already been made, guaranteeing adequate support for immediate action, and ensuring that long-term solutions are considered and implemented. It is also necessary to consider the human and social effects that the crisis has on vulnerable populations, including migrant workers, women and other impoverished groups. Additionally, future actions should be made with consideration towards a continued world-wide commitment to climate change and environmental sustainability. The General Assembly's role in this effort is twofold: first, it must work to coordinate efforts among various countries and institutions, and second, it must explore ways in which the United Nations itself can work to achieve these goals.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What have been the adverse human costs related to the economic downturn? Does recent worldwide data reflect increasing trust in financial institutions, or does it suggest a bleaker outlook?
- What steps have been taken to address the crisis and what can be done to ensure that future measures are beneficial at both national and international levels?
- G20 countries: have you held up your financial commitments made at the London Summit in April of 2009? Developing countries: how has humanitarian action in your country shifted in light of the collapse? Has your country's focus on the Millennium Development Goals changed since the economic

downturn? What responsibility do states have towards one another when faced with extreme economic pressures?
- How can the UN ensure the implementation of the goals outlined in the Outcome of the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development?

Bibliography

"Financial Transmission of the Crisis: What's the Lesson?" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 2009, online.

Heilprin, John, "UN Urges Systemic Fix to Global Economic Failings," *Associated Press*, 29 June 2010, online.

"Human Rights Must Figure Prominently in Tackling Financial Crisis, UN Summit Told," *UN News Centre*, 25 June 2009.

Choike: A Portal on Southern Civil Societies, "Impact of the Crisis on Civil Society Organizations," 18 July 2009, online.

"International Support for World's Poorest Nations Must Not Waver—UN Official," *UN News Centre*, 19 March 2010, online.

Mankiw, N. Gregory, "The Trilemma of International Finance," *New York Times*, 9 July 2010.

"Parliamentary Conference on the Global Economic Crisis," *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, 18 August 2009, online.

"World's Poorest Countries Must Diversify Economies To Beat Poverty—UN," *UN News Centre*, 18 February 2010, online.

United Nations Department of Public Information, "Wide-Ranging Proposals to Mitigate World Financial Crisis Adopted by Consensus at United Nations Conference in New York," 26 June 2009.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/193
A/RES/64/190
A/RES/63/305
A/RES/63/303
A/RES/63/277
A/RES/63/239
A/RES/63/208
A/RES/63/205
A/64/418/Add.2
A/64/322
A/64/178
A/63/L.57
A/63/838
A/63/413
A/CONF.214/8
A/CONF.214/3
A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1
A/CONF.212/6/Add.1
A/CONF.198/11
A/C.2/64/L.66

Additional Web Resources

www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit - United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis

www.un.org/esa/ffd/index.htm - United Nations Financing and Development

www.imf.org/external/index.htm - International Monetary Fund

www.brettonwoodsproject.org - Bretton Woods Project

www.globalpolicy.org/world-economic-crisis.html - Global Policy Forum, The World Economic Crisis

The General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and International Security

Towards an Arms Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms

There are currently a half billion military small arms around the world, responsible for somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 deaths a year, yet there is no international trade agreement that limits their sale or transfer. Illicit arms transfers exacerbate regional and sub-regional conflicts, and the lack of transparency and oversight in the production, sale, and transport of these weapons means that millions fall into the wrong hands each year, but licit sales and transfers of small arms are also cause for considerable concern. Furthermore, without a common international framework to control these transfers, international sanction regimes are severely impeded and violent groups continue to operate outside the realm of international law. The United Nations has determined that small arms trafficking is a threat to international peace and stability, and there is a growing movement in support of an arms trade treaty (ATT).

Small arms are weapons carried and used by individual infantry soldiers, making up the bulk of military hardware around the world. Small arms are cheap, mobile, lethal, easy to conceal and difficult to track. These characteristics have made them the weapons of choice for gang activity, narcotics trafficking, organized crime and terrorism, as well as inter-state and civil wars. The vast majority of direct conflict deaths are attributable to the use of small arms.

Current debate surrounding international small arms controls has focused on a few vital areas: manufacture, end-use verification, tracking, stockpile management and ammunition. Global patterns of supply have changed drastically over the last several decades. The proliferation of regional manufacturing, along with increased use of intermediary, non-state brokers, has enormously complicated the task of tracking and regulation. End-use verification regimes focus on keeping complete records for possession of weapons for their entire life span. Successful tracking allows for weapons to be traced back to their last legitimate owner and provides accountability for illicit proliferation. Controlling stockpiles of existing weapons is crucial in order to avoid a secondary flow of illicit light arms which avoid the regulations placed on newly manufactured weapons. Ammunition monitoring is also a vital component of any effective regime. Currently over 80 percent of ammunition transfers fall outside of reliable export data reporting.

As early as 1988, individual delegations had raised the issue of a need to regulate small arms and the General Assembly had even passed resolutions affirming the threat posed by small arms. In 1999, the issue of small arms came before the UN Security Council. That same year, the General Assembly voted to hold a conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The result of that meeting was the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (POA). Aimed at preventing illicit trade in small arms, the POA called for tight controls on the sale of arms. Member States agreed to issue end-user certificates for weapons exports, to mark guns to help identify point of manufacture for tracking, and to better enforce weapon trade embargoes, among other provisions. On other contentious issues, however, the POA is silent or vague; for example, the POA does not mention human rights, address the problem of illicit transfers of small arms to non-state actors, or indicate how states might regulate small arms within their own populations.

After follow-up meetings in 2003 and 2005, the General Assembly, in 2006, requested that the Secretary-General assemble a group of experts to analyze the feasibility, contours and policy possibilities of a comprehensive, legally binding treaty creating international standards for the transfer of conventional weapons (A/RES/61/89). The resulting document identified previous attempts at arms control, specifically the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms of 1991 and the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditure that preceded it in 1980. The report affirmed the complexity of the issue, but concluded that a treaty was feasible if constructed with the consensus of the international body and the UN Charter as its core (A/63/334). The United States was the only Member State to vote against the ATT conference resolutions, though it reversed its position in 2009 and has since declared its support for a legally binding trade regime. With the adoption of A/RES/64/48, the UN formalized plans to work toward an arms trade treaty, primarily through a series of preliminary committee meetings, with the intent of concluding negotiations at a conference in 2012.

Several challenges remain in the effort to create a global arms trade treaty. Some Member States are hesitant to support any treaty until certain questions are settled, including concerns that any agreement could erode their ability to transfer weapons within their borders. Others are hesitant to support any treaty that would impose limits on the trade of ammunition, fearing that such a measure could be used to curtail a state's ability to supply its armed forces. Major weapons exporters fear the possible economic repercussions to their arms industries and that they may be held accountable for what happens to the weapons once they leave their national territories. Member States that face growing security threats are also concerned that an ATT could erode their stability. Furthermore, several key questions that need to be addressed by any conventional arms treaty remain. One is a definition of light and conventional weapons. Land mines, cluster bombs, and many forms of mobile artillery currently fall within a definitional gray area. The specifics of enforcement are also crucial to resolve. The current patchwork of national, regional, and international organizations exercising jurisdiction will need to be harmonized.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- What types of domestic regulatory infrastructure does your country currently use? How can the UN craft an ATT that will not infringe upon domestic transfers of weapons?
- How successful have various regional small arms reduction efforts been? What successful measures might be applicable on an international scale? What problems remain to be overcome?
- How can the burden of enforcement and accountability be shared appropriately between exporters and importers?
- How can the UN ensure full transparency of arms sales while still finding the necessary international consensus?
- Are different mechanisms required to deal with licit and illicit small arms sales?

Bibliography

Agande, Ben, "Nigeria: Permanent Secretary Blames Slow Devt on Proliferation of Arms," *Vanguard*, 14 April 2010.

Grimmett, Richard F., "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2008," Congressional Research Service, 4 September 2009, online.

Lynch, Colum, "U.S. Is Open to Talks on Conventional Weapons," *Washington Post*, 16 October 2009.

Muscara, Aprille, "Talks Continue on Arms Treaty, an Instrument for 'Extreme Cases,'" *Inter Press Service*, 10 July 2010, online.

"New Treaty to Combat Illicit Arms Trafficking Crucial for Central Africa, Says Ban," *UN News Centre*, 30 April 2010, online.

Rizvi, Haider, "U.N. Passes Arms Trade Treaty Over U.S. Opposition," *Inter Press Service*, 26 October 2006.

Shah, Anup, "A Code of Conduct for Arms Sales," Global Issues, 30 November 2008, online.

Shah, Anup, "Arms Trade – They Cause 90% of Civilian Causalities," Global Issues, 21 January 2006, online.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/51
A/RES/64/50
A/RES/64/48
A/RES/64/30
A/RES/63/67
A/RES/63/62
A/RES/61/89
A/RES/60/68
A/65/6 (Prog. 3)
A/63/334
A/AC.277/2009/1
A/C.1/64/L.38/Rev. 1
S/2008/258

Additional Web Resources

http://www.iansa.org - International Action Network for Small Arms

http://www.un.org/disarmament - United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

http://www.controlarms.org/en – Control Arms, a joint campaign of IANSA, Amnesty International, and Oxfam

www.poa-iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx - Programme of Action Implementation Support System

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is a groundbreaking component of the international law system. Since its entry into force in 1970, the NPT has been the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as it is the only multilateral treaty containing a binding commitment to nuclear disarmament by the known nuclear-weap-

on states. One hundred eighty-nine countries are party to the treaty, making the NPT one of the most-broadly supported treaties in the modern system. The treaty has three main pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It promotes cooperation in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons while promoting the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.

Two main bodies are tasked with implementing the NPT: The General Assembly First Committee is primarily tasked with maintaining a disarmament regime, whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily tasked with monitoring the more peaceful uses of the energy technology. The two bodies work together to ensure and fulfill the treaty's provisions.

The requirements of the NPT disarmament regime have been a source of ongoing discussion and negotiation among signatories. The disarmament regime has been particularly difficult to implement because it requires Member States to balance the assertion of their national sovereignty with their international commitments. Recent agreements in the international community, especially bilateral safeguard agreements, have shown a growing commitment to taking substantive steps toward a reduction of nuclear arms. One role for the First Committee is to assist in enabling and fulfilling these agreements.

Though it has widespread support, the NPT suffers from two major weaknesses. First, there are still nations which have not signed the treaty, which limits the international community's ability to enforce the treaty's terms. India, Pakistan, and Israel have not signed the NPT, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) withdrew from the treaty in 2003. India and Pakistan are declared nuclear powers, which is disallowed under the current treaty's terms, and Israel maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding its nuclear status. These three states argue that the NPT creates an untenable division between nuclear states and non-nuclear states based on what they view as an arbitrarily set standard. The DPRK conducted an underground nuclear explosive test in October 2006. Addressing countries' reservations is key to expanding the effectiveness of the NPT in the future. Second, the international community has specific questions regarding certain states and their compliance with the NPT, including whether their goal is to pursue peaceful energy uses or potential weapons status.

A major source of concern and discussion for many states is Article X of the treaty, which establishes a state's right to withdraw from the treaty after giving three-months' notice. Because the treaty allows for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, reasons for withdrawing from the NPT usually fall into two categories. First, withdrawal could be taken as an indication that a State wishes to develop nuclear weapons. Second, States may argue that the treaty's force breaks down as more nuclear states, both declared and undeclared, develop, thus withdrawing from the treaty is a proactive security measure against increased proliferation in violation of the treaty. One oft-cited problem with the "opt-out" clause is that it does not require a Member State to declare its intentions before opting out, which increases uncertainty in the international community.

Every five years the NPT is subject to a required review as set forth by the conditions of the treaty. In 2005, there was an intensive review of the state of and attitude toward the NPT. Many of the attendees at the 2005 conference perceived a crisis of legitimacy stemming from a lack of leadership on the global stage. The participants agreed that an effective enforcement regime would promote confidence in the existing NPT framework. Other key elements discussed in the 2005 conference were nonproliferation and counter-proliferation. The participants reached consensus on the need to strengthen counter-proliferation activities, but agreed that in many instances the international community

lacked the political will to effect implementation. Furthermore, S/RES/1540 took an important step by declaring proliferation itself a direct threat to national security. Yet not all states were content with the results of the 2005 review, claiming that it failed to go far enough to promote the non-proliferation regime, a primary failing of which was the non-participation of Member States. Between the 2005 and 2010 Conferences, the international community saw a renewed level of commitment to the goals of the treaty among Member States and among non-governmental organizations. This renewed commitment was due in part to frustration at the 2005 review's failures, growing public support for nuclear disarmament, and an expressed desire to reaffirm the fundamental aims of the NPT as a viable part of international law.

The 2010 Review Conference was colored by intense negotiations, but resulted in agreements on specific steps to speed progress on nuclear disarmament, advance non-proliferation, and work towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Conference resolved that the nuclear-weapon States commit to further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Specifically, the Russian Federation and the United States were urged to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). Additionally, the Conference participants agreed to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced program of work. Reaffirming the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon states in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances, the Conference also resolved that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately begin discussing effective international arrangements for such guarantees. Following the 2010 review, the First Committee will assess the outcomes of the Conference and focus on furthering those agreements and will discuss future steps and initiatives to further the overall objectives of the NPT.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What is the nuclear status of your state? How does your state's nuclear status affect its stance on the NPT?
- How effective was the 2010 NPT review in furthering the broad goals of the NPT?
- What is the relationship between nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear energy? Are they separate issues or must they be considered together?

- What are the next steps to be taken by the First Committee to advance the goals of the NPT and the progress made in the 2010 NPT review?

Bibliography

Cirincione, Joseph, "The Incredible Shrinking Iranian Influence," *Foreign Policy*, 6 May 2010.

Erokhina, Anya, "NPT Review Conference: Did Egypt Succeed," Bellum: A Project of the Stanford Review, 3 June 2010, online.

Feaver, Peter, "Assessing a Benchmark in Obama's 'Yes, but' Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, 1 June 2010.

Lederer, Edith M., "Go-ahead for Conference to Take First Step to Ban Nuclear Arms in Mideast—If Israel Agrees," *Associated Press*, 29 May 2010.

Hibbs, Mark, "What the China-Pakistan Nuclear Agreement Means," *Foreign Policy*, 4 June 2010.

MacFarquhar, Neil, "189 Nations Reaffirm Goal of Ban on Nuclear Weapons," *New York Times*, 28 May 2010.

"UN Talks Back Conference on Nuclear-Free Middle East," *BBC News*, 29 May 2010.

"US Won't Persuade 'Very Special Friends' India, Pak to Sign NPT" *Economic Times*, 22 April 2010.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/31
A/RES/64/27
A/RES/64/26
A/RES/62/24
A/RES/61/70
S/RES/1540 (2004)
A/C.1/64/L.14/Rev.1
A/C.1/64/L.18
A/C.1/64/L.19
A/C.1/64/L.20
A/C.1/64/L.32/Rev.2
A/C.1/64/L.36
A/C.1/64/L.48
A/C.1/64/L.54
A/C.1/64/L.51

Additional Web Resources

http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/index.shtml - 2010 Review Conference

The General Assembly Second Committee: Economic and Financial

MACROECONOMIC POLICY QUESTIONS

The broad range of Macroeconomic Policy Questions addressed by the UN General Assembly's Second Committee are divided into four subtopic areas that comprise Macroeconomic Policy Issues: International Trade and Development, International Financial Systems and Development, External Debt and Development, and Commodities. The content of debate and draft resolutions shape global economic strategies that address the maintenance of global economic stability, responses to general or specific economic crises, and adjustments to macroeconomic frameworks. The Second Committee works to coordinate the work of various global financial organizations, including the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Paris and London Clubs, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), among other entities. Additionally, the Second Committee focuses its work on independent UN actions. Additionally, under the topic of Macroeconomic Policy Issues, the Second Committee deals with systemic monitoring mechanisms that consider the quality of global economic patterns, analyzes the progressive effect of policy initiatives, and determines possible remedies. Through extensive debate and multilateral negotiation, regional economic structures, bilateral programs, economic initiatives and proposed regulations are formulated according to one of the four Macroeconomic Policy Issues areas. Each subtopic area is assessed and addressed by draft resolutions independently.

While the potential areas for discussion are broad, recent work has focused on the interrelationship of the four subtopic issues, especially as they relate to the recent global financial crisis and the status of developing nations. At the start of the new millennium, nations around the world embarked on a mission to achieve a set of new goals to meet the needs of the world's poorest people; collectively these were defined as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Many have since concluded that the global recession, which began in 2008, has reversed many of the gains made in the early part of the decade and subsequently jeopardized the attainment of the Goals. The global economic outlook is still uncertain. Some economists tentatively declared that the world was emerging from the recession in early 2010, while others proposed a grimmer outlook, even suggesting the possibility of a "double-dip" economic recession in light of economic events in Europe in the spring and summer of 2010. Unquestionably, however, the international community faces a number of macroeconomic policy issues that stand in the way of further progress towards the MDGs. The relationship of developing nations to the MDGs, the global financial crisis, and macroeconomic policy issues are deeply interrelated. Take, for example, the case of commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDCs) Given the recent dramatic price declines of some commodities, they may find it much harder to service their debt obligations at a sustainable level.

On the issue of international trade and development, discussion has focused on the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) trade talks and improving the state of the least developed countries. In this area, actions might include increasing regulation and reform of the international finance system in the wake of the financial crisis. Regarding debt, debate has centered on sustainability and ameliorating the precarious situation of many deeply indebted nations following the global recession. Finally, in regard to commodities, the international community is concerned with volatility in the commodity and capital markets and the plight of CDDCs, which have particularly struggled in the crisis environment. The many booms and busts in the international commodity markets are damaging to these vulnerable economies, as they depend on commodities as a main source of income and employment.

Many past resolutions (e.g. A/RES/64/192, A/RES/64/188) have called for the completion of the Doha Round of negotiations of the World Trade Organization, which many hope will lead to improved market access for many developing nations. At the Sixth World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, nations agreed to implement duty-free and quota-free market access for the least developed countries, though this has not yet been fully implemented. Launched in 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative has provided aid to 26 countries and helped to reduce their debt to sustainable levels. In 2005 the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Fund started the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), in which those organizations gave up their debt claims for nations that had reached the completion point of the HIPC Initiative. Although these initiatives have helped the overall debt situation in many countries, several others continue to have difficulties fulfilling the obligations and enacting the necessary policies to participate in the HIPC Initiative. Furthermore, some countries that passed the completion point of the program have returned to unsustainable levels of debt. The UNDP has also noted the HIPC has not been comprehensive enough in its coverage to be effective, and the MDRI has failed to address the total scope of global debt.

The Common Fund for Commodities was established in 1989 as an external organization operating outside of a national framework and instead based around commodities. It provides direct funds to produc-

ers in projects focused on single commodities. Over the years, it has expanded its membership to over 100 countries. More recently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has taken the lead in the formation of new policy recommendations on commodities through the formation of the Multiyear Expert Meeting on Commodities, held in March 2010. Among its recommendations was a need to increase commodity trade finance, as its scarcity was slowing the growth of developing countries, especially the CDDCs. To help address this need, regional development banks such as the African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank initiated Trade Finance Programs with over $1 billion in seed capital; additionally, the G20 made a major pledge of $250 billion in aid for trade finance, a portion of which was dedicated to commodity trade finance. To help develop a coordinated response to the financial crisis, The Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development was held in 2009. One highlight from the outcome of the summit was the encouragement for the formation and deepening of regional economic communities (RECs). In the future, these types of organizations would be better placed to help their members through financial challenges such as liquidity shortfalls and short-term balance-of-payment difficulties. In addition, there were calls for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to both loosen their lending practices and loan stipulations as well as offer new programs, such as flexible credit lines. In some instances, global financial institutions are re-evaluating their policies. The ban against capital controls, for instance, is being re-examined because countries may benefit from buffers against the effects of rapid inflows and outflows of capital.

The impact and importance of each interrelated component of Macroeconomic Policy Issues is far reaching and global in scope, having an economic ripple effect on all UN Member States. Intersections of financing, international exchange of trade, currency and credits, domestic governance, and global development all hinge on congruent coordination and sustainable multilateral policy innovations, in order to achieve common wealth and equity in concert with the UN Charter, and the UN Millennium Goals.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
  • How did the global financial crisis affect your country's economy, especially in relation to the four areas considered by Macroeconomic Policy Issues?
  • What area of macroeconomic policy does your nation think is most important to domestic and global economic recovery and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals? What areas are most important for your main trading partners and allies?
  • What regulatory and institutional changes are most necessary in the wake of the global recession and what mechanisms can be used to affect those changes?
  • What measures would be the most likely to have positive immediate and long-term effects on the global economy? Which measures are most sustainable? What can the UN do in coordination with other organizations?

Bibliography

"Africa Faces 'Enormous Difficulties' on Macroeconomic Convergence - UN," *UN News Centre*, 14 November 2008, online.

"Asia-Pacific Region Faces 'Triple Threat' to Economic Development, Warns UN Report," *UN News Centre*, 26 March 2009, online.

Frewen, Justin. "Debt Burden Cripples Poorer Nations," *Irish Left Review*, 2 April 2010, online.

Gallagher, Kevin. "Capital Controls Back in IMF Toolkit," *The Guardian* (London), 1 March 2010.

Krishnan, Barani. "New Wave of Gains Seen for Commodities" *Reuters*, 11 June 2010.

Monaghan, Angela. World Bank Warns of Double-Dip Risk. *Telegraph* (London). 11 June 2010.

Samuelson, Tracey D. Global Recession ends, Economists Predict Recovery in 2010 *CSM* 8 February 2010

Wassener, Bettina. "Asian Economies Urged to Raise Interest Rates," *New York Times*, 13 April 2010.

World Bank. Causality between External Debt and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa. 1 September 2009.

World Bank. Protecting Progress: The Challenge Facing Low-Income Countries in the Global Recession. 16 September 2009.

"Year-end UN Snapshot Shows Asia-Pacific Leading Global Economic Recovery," *UN News Centre*, 30 November 2009.

UN Documents
A/RES/64/192
A/RES/64/191
A/RES/64/190
A/RES/64/188
A/RES/63/303
A/64/418
A/64/184
A/64/178
A/64/177
A/64/167
TD/B/C.I/MEM.2/11
TD/B/C.I/MEM.2/10
TD/B/C.I/MEM.2/5

Additional Web Resources
www.wto.org – World Trade Organization
www.unctad.org – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ – United Nations Millennium Goals
www.worldbank.org – The World Bank
www.imf.org – The International Monetary Fund

PROTECTION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF HUMANKIND

The earth's climate is changing because of human activity, and the rate of warming is accelerating. There is near-uniform acceptance of these facts by the scientific community, though in other circles the causes and consequences of global climate change are still disputed. For the international community, the debate over climate change distills to several questions: how urgent is the situation and how quickly and to what extent should humans act to reverse or halt global climate change? Additionally, the economic implications of climate change and regulation are of major import to UN Member States. Despite many conferences and meetings, the international community has yet to negotiate a legally binding plan that a majority of states – includ-

ing industrialized and developing nations – can agree upon. The most vulnerable nations include the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the small-island developing nations and African nations. The Second Committee focuses its efforts on the economic questions and policies involved in preventing, reducing, and mitigating the effects of climate change in these regions.

Both industrialized and developing nations must be involved in any agreement on climate change. While every person in the world is affected by weather, the poor are often most vulnerable to changes in climate patterns. In the industrialized world, social safety nets can buffer the impact of climate-related disasters. In contrast, in the developing world, where a majority of the population lives in poverty, there are few social safety nets to cushion any natural disaster. Water supplies have dried up in some regions, while others are impacted by violent storms that have grown in intensity in recent decades.

Environmental protection has been a priority for the United Nations since its inception. However, the protection of the Earth's atmosphere and climate has taken longer to become a priority. The first United Nations Scientific Conference was held in 1949, but the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was the first United Nations body to make climate change an agenda item in 1968. At the first Earth Summit in 1972, governments were warned to be mindful of activities causing climate change, and stations were established around the world to monitor long-term climate trends. In 1985, the United Nations adopted the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and similar resolutions aimed at reducing sulfur emissions into the air by thirty percent. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed to assess the scientific knowledge on global warming, and it later concluded that there was a broad international consensus that climate change was induced by human activity.

In 1992 the Earth Summit produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a step towards action to stabilize climate trends. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC—the most influential climate change legislation at that point—was adopted. The Kyoto Protocol set emission reduction targets for industrialized countries. It has resulted in the stabilization of emissions in some countries, but overall was not successful in significantly reducing emissions in industrialized countries. While the Kyoto Protocol has been the only binding piece of work that the nations have been able to agree on, not every Member State signed on. A few influential industrialized nations protested that Kyoto put too great a burden on industrialized countries to reduce their national emission levels. Some industrialized nations viewed Kyoto as disadvantaging their own national economies while placing too little responsibility on developing nations. The question of the right to industrialize is an important one; the economic impact and costs of climate change and industrial regulation are high, especially for developing nations.

Despite the Kyoto Protocol, emission rates have continued to rise in aggregate, while decreasing within some Member States. In December 2009, Member States met in Copenhagen to design the Copenhagen Accord—a framework for fighting against global warming—and devised a double-track plan which set targets for both industrialized and developing nations. Governments that signed the Copenhagen Accord agreed to make deep cuts in their emission rates as soon as possible, but many developing nations wanted the richer, industrialized nations to make much greater cuts in their emission rates than promised. Under the terms of the Copenhagen Accord, the fulfillment of states' pledges will be reviewed. The Accord also calls for a

slowing in deforestation and an increase in international aid, and it establishes a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund to channel aid and accelerate the use of green technologies.

While the Copenhagen Accord is not likely to be as effective as most nations would desire, it has propelled the international community into negotiations for a better version of the Kyoto Protocol, which would be binding on all Member States and would build on the cooperation of the Copenhagen Accord. The United Nations continues to focus on a strengthened international commitment to fighting global warming while simultaneously pursuing an agenda for sustainable development for developing nations. Throughout 2010 the UNFCCC will spearhead international negotiations on climate change ahead of the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP16) in Cancun in December 2010.

A recent document by the Second Committee (A/C.2/64/SR.29) states that there is wide support for the UN taking an active role in combating climate change in order to achieve a successful conclusion to ongoing negotiations. Member States generally agreed that collective action would be required to mitigate the effects of climate change, that greenhouse gas emissions would have to be reduced, and that the global community should take steps to improve recovery and resilience. They further enumerated linkages between climate change and other problems, including poverty, food security, water resources, land degradation, soil erosion and the reduction of biodiversity. Member States recognized, however, that these measures would be costly. They concluded that industrialized nations, which were historically responsible for climate change, must be involved in providing financial and technical assistance.

In bringing this matter to the attention of the Committee, representatives from both developing and developed nations have been key voices, emphasizing not only global initiatives, but also the importance of regional organizations. Climate change is a global problem that has pronounced local effects, and resolving such issues will take coordinated national, transnational, and international efforts that address the specific concerns of individual countries and regional blocs. Significant hurdles remain. There are still significant disagreements about the specifics of how to measure emissions outputs and their contributions to climate change. The issue of cost and financing has been a major hurdle in working toward international solutions to the climate change problem. Furthermore, countries disagree about the extent to which the Copenhagen Accord should be used as a basis for future negotiations.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What are your country's policies on curbing contributions, especially related to emissions, to global climate change?
- How do global warming and climate change relate to larger issues of economic and social development? How can Member States be encouraged to implement practices that cut emission levels to contribute to the global reduction?
- How can industrialized Member States contribute to the sustainable development of developing states? What should the balance be between preventing future emissions and lessening current sources of emissions?
- How can the international community address the issues of cost control and the financial implications of climate control and recovery?

Bibliography

Ball, Jeffrey, "Review Finds Issues at Climate Panel," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 July 2010.

"Ban Reports on Progress Towards Possible Climate Change Deal Later This Year," *UN News Centre*, 16 March 2010, online.

"Before the Next Disaster Strikes: The Humanitarian Impact of Climate Change," *UN Chronicle*, 1 June 2007.

"Climate Change Around the World: A View from the UN Regional Commissions," *UN Chronicle*, 1 June 2007.

"Copenhagen Climate Talks (UNFCCC)," Times Topics, *New York Times*, 2010, online.

"Devastating For the World's Poor: Climate Change Threatens The Development Gains Already Achieved," *UN Chronicle*, 1 June 2007.

Doyle, Alister, "FACTBOX- The Copenhagen Accord and Global Warming," *Reuters*, 31 March 2010.

Eilperin, Juliet, "An Interview with Yvo de Boer, the United Nations Former Climate-Change Chief," *Washington Post*, 11 July 2010.

"From Stockholm to Kyoto: A Brief History of Climate Change," *UN Chronicle*, 1 June 2007.

Gardiner, Beth, "Lack of Direction on Climate Change Hobbles Carbon Trading," *New York Times*, 15 February 2010.

"'Warming of the Climate System is Unequivocal': Highlights of the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report," *UN Chronicle*, 1 June 2007.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/73
A/RES/63/32
A/RES/61/201
A/RES/61/200
A/64/695
A/64/426
A/64/420/Add.4
A/62/276
A/64/255
A/C.2/64/8
A/C.2/64/SR.29
A/C.2/64/SR.5
A/C.3/64/SR.4
A/C.2/64/SR.3
UNEP/GC /24/2
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Copenhagen Accord to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Additional Web Resources

www.europeanclimate.org – European Climate Foundation
www.un.org/climatechange - UN Gateway on Climate Change
www.unep.org – United Nations Environment Program
http://unfccc.int – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Purview of the Simulation

While the Committee's areas of concern and its work often overlap with other United Nations organs, the Third Committee focuses its discussions on social, humanitarian and cultural concerns that arise in the General Assembly. The Third Committee discusses issues with, recognizes reports of, and submits recommendations to the General Assembly in coordination with other United Nations organs, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For more information concerning the purview of the UN's General Assembly as a whole, see page 20.

Website: http://www.un.org/ga/third/index.shtml

Eliminating Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in All Their Manifestations

Although condemned by the international community, rape and other forms of sexual violence remain pervasive throughout the world; the UN estimates that one in three women will experience physical or sexual violence in her lifetime. Violence can occur within a family, in the general community, and in some places it is perpetrated or condoned by the state. Sexual violence includes acts such as marital rape, sexual abuse, sex slavery, sex trafficking, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy and systematic sexual violence used as an instrument of war by participants in violent conflict, including soldiers. Mass and systematic uses of sexual violence most often occur in societies in which gender equality is not fully or at all recognized.

Sexual violence affects not only the physical and mental health of victims but also the health, peace, and stability of societies at large. Many countries confront challenges arising from a high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, many cases of which are a direct result of rape and other acts of sexual violence. In poverty-stricken areas, the repercussions of sexual violence radiate throughout entire countries. As many of the victims who have contracted diseases as a result of acts of sexual violence are unable to afford medical care, and as some countries are unable to provide adequate medical care to those victims, mortality rates rise. This often leads to broken families and orphaned children, which further strains societal stability. Unintended pregnancies also add to the social and financial burdens women, families, and societies have to bear, and these burdens are exacerbated when HIV/AIDS and other diseases are passed from mother to child. Rape victims also often face considerable stigma stemming from cultural attitudes surrounding rape and may find themselves ostracized from their family and social networks.

In the past, the United Nations has taken several steps to address the issue of eliminating rape and other forms of sexual violence. Past resolutions have consistently called upon states to prevent and prosecute rape and other forms of sexual violence, while past conventions have set specific protections for victims of sexual violence, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols additional thereto and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute have also played a significant role in past actions of the United Nations. The Geneva Conventions have outlined sexual violence against women during armed conflict, including acts such as systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, as violations of human rights. Similarly, the Rome Statute established jurisdiction to try crimes of sexual violence, such as rape as a tool of war, within the established framework of international law. Additionally, in 2000 the Security Council specifically addressed the gravity of violence against women in armed conflict (Resolution 1325).

The UN has sponsored four World Conferences on Women since 1975, the last of which took place in Beijing in 1995. There were 12 areas of concern identified in the Beijing Platform for Action, several of which pertained to rape and sexual violence. The Declaration addressed violence against women in armed conflict as a critical area of concern requiring urgent action. At the five- and ten- year reviews of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, international observers expressed harsh criticism that significant gaps persisted between commitments pledged and actions taken by Member States and alleged that the conditions for women around the world actually worsened after 1995.

Despite affirmations of strong commitment, the international community remains challenged in its attempts to implement effective courses of action to reduce sexual violence. In adopting A/62/134 in 2008, the General Assembly strongly reaffirmed the obligations of Member States to work to eradicate rape and sexual violence, in particular those States party to past conventions on sexual violence. While calling upon countries to provide support services to the victims of rape and sexual violence, the body further stipulated that a comprehensive strategy of prevention and prosecution of rape be developed and its implementation monitored.

Also in 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon launched the UNiTE to End Violence against Women, which seeks to coordinate relevant UN agencies and offices to help prevent and punish violence against women. The Secretary-General's campaign has targeted five national-level outcomes to achieve by 2015: adoption and enforcement of national laws, effective implementation of multi-sector plans of action, increased support for data collection and monitoring, renewed attention to social mobilization and prevention strategies, and firm commitment from Member States to address sexual violence in conflict situations.

Earlier this year, the 15-year review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action was held. Much of the review focused on the accomplishments and improvements achieved concerning the elimination of rape and other forms of sexual violence, but it was again underscored that strong action is still needed from the international community. While Member States have repeatedly made

strong commitments to reducing sexual violence against women, the issue remains complicated in terms of accountability, prevention, protection, and reporting. Further investments in capacity building and information dissemination are needed.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What progress has your state made in implementing improved laws to punish sexual violence? Does your state have a multi-sector plan to address violence against women?
- Why has implementation of effective strategies been so difficult? How can the international community better encourage Member States to devote the resources necessary to fully implement the laws and policies necessary to eliminate rape and other forms of sexual violence?
- How is national sovereignty affected by this issue, particularly with regard to nations still in conflict? How can the UN strengthen accountability mechanisms?
- What can the General Assembly do to assist in the full implementation of existing agreements already addressing the issue?

Bibliography

Arriga, Alexandra, "Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict," 2008, Amnesty International, online.

Coleman, Isabel, "Helping Women Help the World," *Foreign Affairs*, January 2010, online.

Dealey, Sam and Khor Abeche, "Sudan and Rape: Who Speaks for Her?" *Time*, 28 August 2005.

"EU Guidelines on Violence Against Women and Girls and Combating All Forms of Violence Against Them," European Union, 2008, online.

"For Many Women, a Lost Decade," New York Times, 5 March 2005.

Park, Jennifer, "Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War in International Humanitarian Law," *International Public Policy Review*, v.1 no.3, 2007, 13-18.

"Rape Must Never Be Minimized as Part of Cultural Traditions, UN Envoy Says," *UN News Centre*, 25 March 2010, online.

Wanga, Judith, "Why Congo is the World's Most Dangerous Place for Women," *The Observer*, 28 March 2010.

"Work of the General Assembly on Violence against Women since 2000," United Nations Women Watch, 2009, online.

"Victims of Violence against Women Must Be Supported, Perpetrators Punished – Ban," *UN News Centre*, 11 March 2010, online.

Zeitlin, June, "Beijing Betrayed," Women's Environment and Development Organization, 2005, online.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/137
A/RES/63/155
A/RES/62/134
A/RES/61/143
A/RES/60/136
A/RES/48/104
A/63/216
A/63/214
A/60/211
E/2009/27
E/CN.6/2010/8
EGM/BPFA-MDG/2009/REPORT
S/RES/1325
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols
Millennium Development Goals
Vienna Declaration

Additional Web Resources

http://5wcw.org/ - 5th World Conference on Women
http://endviolence.un.org - UN Campaign to End Violence Against Women
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ - UN Division for the Advancement of Women

STATUS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AS IT RELATES TO CHILD LABOR

Child labor is an international crisis exposing over 200 million children to increased exploitation and abuse. The most prominent issues concerning child labor are the trafficking of child laborers, poverty, and the ignorance of parents and children regarding the dangers of working conditions. Child labor negatively affects other children's rights by threatening their health and education, leading to further abuse and reducing the quality of their lives. The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) estimates that individuals under 18 years represent 40 to 50 percent of all victims of forced labor, and that 1.2 million children are trafficked annually. Child labor is considered to be both a cause and consequence of poverty. Although poverty is associated with higher levels of child exploitation, industrialized countries are not immune to this form of human rights violation. Meeting children's rights is not only essential for their development but also for achieving the vision of the Millennium Declaration.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted in 1990, recognizes that children need special rights in addition to those presented in the Declaration of Human Rights. Despite past United Nations actions relating to child labor, the Convention became the first legally binding international treaty to establish civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights for all children. The treaty details these rights in 54 articles and two Optional Protocols. Formally adopted by 193 states, the Convention is currently the most widely endorsed human rights treaty in history. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has been tasked with monitoring the progress of the Convention. Once a year, the Committee submits a report to the Third Committee.

The Convention has been a successful instrument in transforming the way children are viewed and treated worldwide. The Convention defines child labor as any form of labor which may be harmful to the safety, health, or wellbeing of children under the age of 18 years. The Convention also sets minimum ages for various types of employment. In addition, the Convention has helped connect child labor to other child rights violations. In 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted two optional protocols to specifically address the exploitation of children in sex trafficking and armed conflicts. The protocols use a multifaceted approach to tackle child exploitation by reducing

demand for children in those industries and increasing awareness of these problems. By strengthening the international legal framework, the Convention continues to play a major role in creating local and global policies and programs that support the advancement of children. As a result of Member States' commitments to the Convention, more children are surviving, attending school, and are not forced into child labor.

Recently, the Convention has been a driving force behind encouraging technical global cooperation. UNICEF, the World Bank, the International Labour Organization and state and non-governmental organizations are expected to share statistical data to provide support at the national level. In the past, the international community solely relied on the ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) for statistics. Greater data sharing is expected to increase both the quality and relevance of information gathered, which will enable states to enact more effective policies in response.

Though it is estimated that the number of child laborers decreased by 11 percent between 2000 and 2004, the progress made in recent years on child rights has been threatened by the recent global economic crisis. The food and fuel crises led to a decline in household incomes, and economic hardship threatens to push more children out of school and into the workforce. UNICEF indicates that these children are more likely than others to suffer from malnutrition, resulting in stunted growth and decreased intellectual development. Both of these factors increase poverty rates and are overall disadvantageous to long-term global economic development.

The Third Committee considered the status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as it relates to child labor in October 2009. The Committee's main concerns included violations of children's rights in the form of abuse, prostitution, sexual violence and forced labor. The body noted the challenges in asserting children's rights as presented in the 2009 UNICEF report on the subject, and reiterated that education remained a key component to reducing the exploitation of child laborers. While noting that the economic crisis was likely to contribute to an increase in global child labor, the Committee encouraged all states to ratify the CRC and its subsequent optional protocols and integrate protections against child labor into all applicable areas of national policy.

In order to eliminate the worst forms of child labor by 2016, Member States will need to fully adopt the strategies outlined in the 2009 Status of the Convention of the Child Report. These include increasing the quality of education, strengthening physical and social protection of children, promoting cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations at the local, national and international levels, and raising awareness on the root causes and effects of child labor. Prioritizing the safety and well-being of children through difficult austerity measures will also be a key determinant as to whether the economic crisis erases the international community's progress on this issue.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What actions can Member States take to support the initiative of technical cooperation aimed at eliminating child labor?
- What are the main causes of the large regional disparities in child labor? What are the actions needed to ensure global consistency?
- In what ways can the international community improve collaborative efforts in order to ensure the most effective use of resources during the current global economic crisis?

Bibliography

"Action Against Child Labour 2008-2009: IPEC Progress and Future Priorities," *International Labour Organization*, 2010.

Edmonds, Eric V., "Does Child Labor Decline with Improving Economic Status?" *Journal of Human Resources*, v. 40, no. 1, Winter 2005, 77-99.

Estocio, Emee V. and David F. Marks, "Child Labour and the International Labour Organization's Convention 182: A Critical Perspective," *Journal of Health Psychology*, 2005.

Goonesekere, Savitri, P*rotecting the World's Children: Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Diverse Legal Systems, Introduction and Overview*, UNICEF, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

International Labour Conference, 95th session 2006, "The End of Child Labour: Within Reach," Report I /B, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2006.

Kane, June, "What the Economic Crisis Means for Child Labour," *Global Social Policy*, 2009, 9.

Polakoff, Erica G., "Globalization and Child Labor: Review of the Issues," *Journal of Developing Societies*, 2007, 23.

"Training Manual to Fight Trafficking in Children for Labour, Sexual and Other Forms of Exploitation: Understanding Child Trafficking," *International Labour Organization*, 2009.

United Nations Children's Fund, Progress for Children: A Report Card on Child Protection, no. 8, September 2009, online.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/146
A/RES/63/241
A/RES/62/141
A/RES/61/146
A/RES/60/231
A/RES/54/263
A/RES/S-27/2
A/64/435/CORR.1
A/64/172
A/61/299
A/HRC/13/L.5
GA/SHC/3968
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)

Additional Web Resources

www.ilo.org - International Labour Organization
www.ungift.org - United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking
www.unicef.org – United Nations Children's Fund

The General Assembly Sixth Committee: Legal

NATIONALITY OF NATURAL PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE SUCCESSION OF STATES

Every person has the right to be a citizen of his or her country. "Natural persons" are defined as actual persons (in contrast to legal entities, such as corporations). The two most common principles in determining nationality are "the law of the soil" and "the law of the blood." Jus soli, the "law of the soil," recognizes citizenship in the country of birth. Jus sanguinis, the "law of blood," recognizes citizenship in the country of the parents. In many cases, nationality can also be acquired by a process of naturalization, and some states confer their citizenship by a simple declaration. However, the nationality of natural and legal persons is affected by the succession of states. "State succession" refers to events such as secession, transfer of part of a state's territory, unification or dissolution. The number of refugees throughout the world shows that states do not always follow international norms for determining and conferring nationality on natural persons. Examples can be found in Israel, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Viet Nam, Central and Western Africa, and Iran.

The topic of nationality has been an important part of international discourse ever since mass de-nationalization events were associated with the atrocities of World War II, namely the refugee situations created by the Holocaust. The International Law Commission (ILC) was created in 1947 by the UN General Assembly. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHR) of 12 December 1948 recognizes that every person has a right to a nationality and that no person should be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality. The Convention on the Reduction of Stateless Persons was adopted in 1954, and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was adopted in 1961. These Conventions affirm that the rights of the stateless person must be protected and place an obligation on ratifying States to eliminate statelessness.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s demonstrated that, while the right to nationality may be recognized, a clear framework is needed to protect that right and provide guidance to States. Throughout the 1990s, the International Law Commission (ILC), different working groups, the Secretary-General, Special Rapporteurs, this body, and the General Assembly as a whole all addressed the topic.
In 2000, the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/55/153, which declares that "every individual who, on the date of the succession of states, had the nationality of the predecessor state, irrespective of the mode of acquisition of that nationality, has the right to the nationality of at least one of the states concerned, in accordance with the present articles." In Resolution A/RES/59/34, the General Assembly re-invited Governments to consider issues of nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of states. The most recent manifestation of these discussions was A/RES/63/118 which, like earlier resolutions, encourages States to consider the elaboration of legal instruments, regionally or sub-regionally, regulating questions of nationality. This resolution also invites Governments to take into account the draft articles originally submitted by the ILC. These various documents recognize the legitimate interests of the state and the individual and the importance of preventing statelessness. They urge States to enact nationality laws, to respect family unity, and to prohibit discrimination. They also seek to prohibit a predecessor state from withdrawing a person's nationality in certain instances. One of the challenges facing this body is to determine if the ILC's work, found in the annex of A/RES/55/153, could contribute to the elaboration of another instrument in the future.

The continued existence of statelessness and/or the risk of becoming stateless clearly demonstrates that work on mitigating the effects of the succession of states on the nationalization of natural and legal persons is still needed. Although there have been numerous attempts to ensure that every person has an opportunity to obtain a nationality, there has never been an effective, comprehensive convention or other legal document drafted.

The development of human rights laws has imposed new restrictions on the discretionary power of states with respect to nationality. While nationality is essentially governed by domestic law, certain restrictions on the freedom of action of states derive from international law, which therefore has a role to play in this area. The human rights aspect of the topic is particularly highlighted in this respect.

The main function of international law concerning the protection of human rights, in the context of State succession, is to prevent either the detrimental effects of the unjustified withdrawal by the predecessor State of its nationality from certain categories of persons or the unjustified refusal of the successor State to grant its nationality to certain individuals. In contrast, the function of the principle of effective nationality is to control the abusive exercise of the discretionary power of the State to grant its nationality by depriving such nationality of its effects vis-à-vis third-party States.

This body should consider whether the topic should be addressed by general statements of principles and guidelines for future cases of State succession or by legally binding instruments. Article I of the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws recognized that "It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States insofar as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law recognized with regard to nationality." The principle that nationality is determined by internal state law is broadly accepted (A/CN.4/467). Thus, a primary issue is to determine the extent to which international norms can or should constrain this traditional state power. Would a general statement of principles achieve the proper balance, or does the rise of human rights as an international norm justify the codification of legal obligations?

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What, if anything, may be done to provide a framework to guide future determinations of nationality in situations of State succession?
- How might any instrument balance the human right to a nationality, the effects of statelessness, the respect for a person's choice of nationality with the inherent right of each State to determine who its citizens are?
- How can disputes where no states are willing to accept stateless persons be resolved?
- If this body should take further action, what form of action should be taken? Specifically, to what extent should the principles and rules to be drafted constitute binding international law?

Bibliography

Batchelor, Carol A., "Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status," *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 1998.
Blackman, JL., "State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality under International Law," *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 1997.
Blitz, Brad K. and Maureen Lynch. "Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A Comparative Study," Refugee Research Network, 31 July 2009, online.
Council of Europe-Treaty Office, "Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession (CETS No. 200)," 2006, online.
"EU Presidency Statement on the Nationality of Natural Persons through Succession of States." 28 October 2004, online.
Hanes, Stephanie, "Locked Out: The 12 Million People without a Country, and the Need To Become a Citizen," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 July 2010.
Rochleau, Matt, "Will US Revoke the Right of American Citizenship to Foreigners Born Here?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 June 2010.
Somers, Margaret, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights*, 2008.
UNHCR, "2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons," 15 June 2010, online.
Van Waas, Laura, *Nationality Matters: Statelessness under International Law*, 2008.
Weissbrodt, David S. and Clay Collins. "The Human Rights of Stateless Persons," *Human Rights Quarterly*, February 2006.

UN Documents

A/RES/63/118
A/RES/55/153
Annex to A/RES/ 55/153
A/RES/54/112
A/63/436
A/63/113
A/59/180
A/59/34
A/CN.4/L.572
A/CN.4/L.507
A/CN.4/497
A/CN.4/493
A/CN.4/474
A/CN.4/467
A/C.6/63/SR.11
A/C.6/63/L.14
A/C.6/59/SR.15
Statute of the International Law Commission, Adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981.

Additional Web Resources

www.un.org/law/ilc/ - International Law Commission
http://unhcr.org – UN High Commissioner for Refugees

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION

Reform of the United Nations has been on the agenda almost since the organization's founding in 1945. Created at the height of American power at the dawn of the Cold War, the UN system essentially reflects the balance of power in 1948. The victorious Allies of World War II saw themselves as the only states powerful enough to enforce the global peace and usher in the "end of war" envisioned in the Charter. These circumstances were used to justify the Security Council veto granted to the Permanent Five (P5), their initial monopoly of power in bodies like the Commission on Human Rights and ECOSOC, and the requirement for P5 consensus on changes to the UN Charter. The dynamic established in the 1940s rapidly changed following the explosion in UN membership in the 1960s and 1970s. New African Member States and the rising Non-Aligned Movement sought to change the balance of power and limit the hegemonic power of the P5. The Security Council and ECOSOC were expanded in 1965 (and ECOSOC again in 1973), but since then, change has been limited and sporadic.

Yet the movement for UN reform advanced in other ways. In 1974, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Nations to review and consider recommendations in regards to making the UN a more effective institution in meeting its goals. In 1975, the General Assembly restructured the Ad Hoc Committee into the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. The Special Committee considers proposals dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security, the expansion of cooperation between Member States, and the promotion of the rules of international law. Additionally, the Special Committee examines ways of improving the working methods of UN bodies and suggests broader reforms that would not require amending the UN Charter. While the Committee has no permanent mandate, the GA has requested it to reconvene every year since its founding.

Numerous concepts considered part of the modern UN originated in the Special Committee, including the concept of open informal negotiations on resolutions; the goal of consensus on resolutions; and the wide-spread use of fact-finding missions. Some of its past tasks from the Sixth Committee include streamlining the General Assembly negotiation process, setting guidelines for peaceful settlement of disputes, and making suggestions on how to strengthen the GA's role in peace and security matters.

Other initiatives by the Committee have not been so successful. Sanctions reform has largely languished, and efforts to shape the role of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the Security Council on issues of international peace and security have stalled. While some members of the Non-Aligned Movement continue to advance a more robust role for the General Assembly on peace and security issues in the Special Committee, they have not succeeded in convincing the majority to specify what expanded role is appropriate for the GA.

The Special Committee convened for its annual session from 1-9 March 2010. As instructed by the GA, the Committee continued to consider proposals regarding the maintenance of international peace and security in all its aspects. The Committee also reviewed the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the provision of assistance to third-party States (those States not targeted, yet negatively affected by Chapter VII international sanctions). Other items of discussion included the promotion of peaceful settlements of dispute between States, the consideration of proposals to improve the efficiency of the Committee's working methods, and the consideration of proposals passed on from the General Assembly.

In regard to the relationship between the GA and the Security Council on matters of peace and international security, the Special Committee is now considering a proposal by Cuba. It asks the Secretariat to expand the General Assembly's defined jurisdiction in urgent matters of peace and international security. This concept is opposed by permanent members of the Security Council and supported by many members of the Non-Aligned Movement. While its ramifications are unclear, a stronger General Assembly role could provide a stopgap mechanism in the case of inaction by the Security Council. It could, however, also lead to contradictory signals from the UN, weakening the entire UN system's response. The Special Committee has also taken up the discussion of States' unilateral use of force under the broad definition of self-defense. Another paper, submitted by Belarus and the Russian Federation, seeks to clarify the legitimacy of the use of force without Security Council authorization. At the heart of the debate is the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which lacked Security Council authorization. Currently, the draft paper seeks an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion, though it would not be legally binding.

In 2009, the Committee also produced a document laying out principles governing the use of sanctions. Despite malaise expressed by permanent members of the Security Council, the Special Committee will continue its work on the effects of sanctions on third-party states during its 2010 session. While it was widely agreed that sanctions were an important tool of the international system, there was also concern that sanctions could have negative consequences for civilian populations or for third-party States unrelated to the intended target. A working paper from the Russian Federation recommended that future sanctions should have a greater level of transparency to show the specific implications and effects of sanctions. It was suggested that appropriate bodies craft sanctions to include timetables, benchmarks, and other mechanisms aimed at improving the targeting and calibration of sanctions to ensure effectiveness and avoid unintended harm to third parties. Several States support requesting a ruling from the ICJ on the legal consequences of the imposition of sanctions, the imposition of unilateral sanctions in violation of international law, and the responsibility of the UN and the Security Council with regard to unlawful sanctions and harmful consequences upon third-party States and their civilian populations.

With the Secretary General's recent attention on issues arising from the imposition of sanctions and in light of several States' unilateral use of force in the past decade, the Special Committee will continue to place a great deal of importance on these issues. Because of the nature of the Committee, delegations should prepare substantive draft proposals on the reform of the United Nations as if it were emerging from the Special Committee deliberations. Proposals should focus around one of the issues that the Special Committee is currently addressing.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- In what ways should the General Assembly take action on issues of peace and security (for example, mediation and dispute-resolution, fact-finding concerning human rights violations, or some other actions)? If the Security Council has discussed an issue but not produced a resolution or statement, does this burden fall to the General Assembly?
- What exceptions exist to the need for Security Council authorization for use of armed force, outside of self-defense? What role should the International Court of Justice play in the promotion of international peace and security? Were armed interventions in Iraq and in the former Yugoslavia illegal?
- What new mechanisms could be suggested to the General Assembly and the Security Council to promote the effectiveness of international sanctions while mitigating negative and unintended consequences for untargeted populations?
- What steps toward these ends can the General Assembly enact without amendments to the UN Charter itself?

Bibliography

"EU Presidency Statement - United Nations: Special Committee on Charter of the UN and Strengthening the Role of the Organization," 17 February 2009, http://www.europa-eu-un.org.

Knight, W. Andy, *A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance*, MacMillan, 2000.

Kochler, Hans, "The United Nations Organization and Global Power Politics: The Antagonism between Power and Law and the Future of World Order," *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2006.

Peterson, M. J., *The UN General Assembly*, Routledge, 2005.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform," *The American Journal of International Law*, 2005.

"UN Reform," *The Economist*, 12 January 2006.

Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, and Roger Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Westview Press, 2005.

Weiss, Thomas G., *What's Wrong with the United Nations (and How to Fix It)*, Polity, 2008.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/115
A/RES/63/127
A/RES/62/69
A/RES/57/26
A/RES/46/59
A/RES/45/45
A/RES/37/10
A/65/33
A/64/450
A/64/33(SUPP)
A/64/225
A/64/125
A/63/33 and preceding
A/59/2005
A/AC.182/2000/INF/2
GA/L/3152
GA/L/3137
Charter of the United Nations

Additional Web Resources

www.globalpolicy.org/un-reform.html - Global Policy Forum, UN Reform

www.un.org/law/chartercomm/ - Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening the Role of the Organization

www.un.org/law/repertory/ - Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs

www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoire/ - Repertoire Of The Practice Of The Security Council

www.un.org/reform/ - Reform at the United Nations

www.un.org/depts/dhl/reform.htm - Bibliography of published monographs (through 1996) on UN reform

Members of the Economic and Social Council:		
Argentina	Guinea-Bissau	Portugal
Bahamas	India	Republic of Korea
Bangladesh	Iraq	Republic of
Belgium	Italy	Moldova
Brazil	Japan	Russian Federation
Cameroon	Liechtenstein	Rwanda
Canada	Malaysia	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Chile	Mauritius	Saint Lucia
China	Mongolia	Saudi Arabia
Comoros	Morocco	Slovakia
Congo	Mozambique	Sweden
Cote d'Ivoire	Namibia	Ukraine
Egypt	New Zealand	United Kingdom
Estonia	Niger	United States of
France	Norway	America
Germany	Pakistan	Uruguay
Ghana	Peru	Venezuela
Greece	Philippines	Zambia
Guatemala	Poland	

Purview of the Simulation

The Economic and Social Council is the principal UN organ responsible for coordinating economic, social and related works of 14 specialized agencies, 10 functional commissions and five regional commissions. ECOSOC accepts reports and recommendations from other UN bodies, including the Commission on Status of Women (CSW) and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Along with its coordinating role, ECOSOC gathers information and advises Member States on economic, social, humanitarian and human rights programs. ECOSOC also coordinates and collaborates with autonomous specialized agencies that work closely with the United Nations. These organizations include multilateral financial and trade institutions, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

Website: www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/

Protection against Products Harmful to Health and the Environment

In recent years, news headlines have increasingly reported incidents where lead, melamine, salmonella, and e. coli have been discovered in globally traded consumer products such as foods, toys, and hygiene products. These products have been found to cause serious infection, poisoning, and other adverse reactions in children and adults. While many countries have regulated the use of harmful ingredients in domestically-produced products, regulations on imported items have not always followed a uniform standard, with political considerations sometimes taking precedence over health and wellbeing-based criteria. In light of the increasingly interconnected nature of global trade, the international community has a vested interest in strengthening international law and agreements to protect individuals and the environment from harmful products.

As early as 1979, the General Assembly recognized the need to address at an international level the adverse health and environmental effects of exported hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products. In 1982, to alleviate the potential dangers of these products on importing countries, the UN mandated that the Secretary-General compile a list of products whose consumption and/or sale have been banned, withdrawn, severely restricted or, in the case of pharmaceuticals, not approved by governments. This list, first published in 1983, was created with the help of various importing countries, United Nations bodies, and intergovernmental organizations. Updated and revised annually, the list has since been divided into two separate lists: chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In addition to the publication of the consolidated lists, the Secretary-General was mandated in 1984 to report every three years to the GA, through the Economic and Social Council, on the implementation of resolutions pertaining to protection against products harmful to health and the environment. The triennial reports began in 1986, and the most recent report was presented in 2007.

Since its inception, the Consolidated List has been a valuable tool for Member States, acting as a source of both current information on the regulatory decisions of other Member States and guidance for future regulatory action regarding usage of hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceuticals. At the same time, the debate over the inclusion of certain chemicals has at times been contentious, with Member States at times differing sharply over whether the benefits of using a certain chemical outweighed its negative impacts. Debate is often contoured by countries' differing resource abilities and levels of national development. Examples in recent years include the widespread use of asbestos in building materials and the controversial usage of DDT in anti-malarial efforts in developing countries. As technical capacity also affects the ability of developing countries to implement guidance provided from the Consolidated List, Resolution 39/229 tasked relevant bodies of the United Nations with providing technical assistance to developing countries that request assistance in establishing or strengthening systems to use the information provided in the list, as well as providing assistance to adequately monitor the importation of those products.

As the production and distribution of hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products has expanded, so has the number of organizations, conventions, and treaties that oversee their production and distribution. In 1998, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rotterdam, the Netherlands adopted the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, which is more simply known as the Rotterdam Convention. It entered into force in 2004 and creates legally binding obligations on states to share responsibility and information with regard to the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals. The Convention applies to chemicals that, for health or environmental reasons, have been banned or severely restricted. Specifically, the Convention seeks to advance information sharing through labeling and notification requirements surrounding the import and export of certain chemicals.

In 2002, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation was agreed upon at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). Among other things, it laid out initiatives to ensure that chemicals are produced and used in ways that minimize significant adverse effects on the environment and human health by 2020. The Plan also includes a globally-harmonized system for labeling chemicals. In 2006, the International Conference on Chemicals Management (ICCM) adopted the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), a policy framework meant to achieve the 2020 goals stated in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The combination of these initiatives, as well as the 1992 Basel Convention and 2004 Stockholm Convention, have in many ways replaced the need for the mandated triennial report of the Secretary-General.

In the Secretary-General's May 2007 report (E/2007/62), three recommendations were made to the Economic and Social Council to aid in the achievement of the 2020 goals of the WSSD. The first recommendation encourages Member States to implement national strategies to achieve the 2020 goals, noting that the adoption of strategies that are consistent with life-cycle management approaches to chemicals is essential to effectively monitoring potentially dangerous substances. The second recommendation urges multilateral, bilateral, and donor agencies continue the work of capacity building in developing countries to improve the environmentally sound management of hazardous chemicals, as greater technical assistance and capacity building will be necessary for developing countries to comply with existing international protocols. Finally, the Secretary-General requested that in light of the chemical conventions like the Stockholm and Basel Conventions, the Council consider recommending the elimination of the original mandate of resolution 37/137 to regularly update the Consolidated List.

In light of the Secretary-General's report, the Economic and Social Council will need to discuss how overlapping international efforts regarding harmful chemicals can be further harmonized, and in particular whether the continuance of the Consolidated List is desirable.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What can be done to eliminate the confusion that occurs as a result of various conventions, treaties, and oversight organizations orchestrating the production, use, distribution, and disposal of hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceuticals?
- Should any special circumstances be granted to developing countries in their use, distribution, and disposal of hazardous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceuticals?
- Would the elimination of the mandate of resolution 37/137 to regularly update the Consolidated List help or hinder the process of achieving the 2020 goals as laid out in the 2002 WSSD's Johannesburg Plan of Implementation?

Bibliography

"As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China," *New York Times*, 19 June 2007.
"China Tainted Milk Problem Kept Secret for Months," *USA Today*, 7 January 2010, online.
"China's Troubled Food and Drug Trade," Council on Foreign Relations, 17 October 2008, online.
"Climate Change and Poisonous Chemicals Focus of New UN Study," *UN News Centre*, 12 March 2010, online.
"Health and the Environment," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, February 2008, online.
"More Chemicals To Be Added to UN-backed Pact Banning Hazardous Substances," *UN News Centre*, 13 October 2008, online.
"Three Hazardous Substances Considered for UN Treaty 'Watch List,'" *UN News Centre*, 22 October 2008, online.
"UN-Backed Conference Promotes Elimination of Poisonous Chemicals," *UN News Centre*, 4 May 2009, online.
"UN Outlines Global E-Waste Goals," *BBC News*, 6 March 2007, online.

UN Documents
A/RES/39/229
A/RES/38/149
A/RES/37/137
A/53/156
ECOSOC Resolution 2008/13
ECOSOC Resolution 2007/264
ECOSOC Resolution 2004/55
ECOSOC Resolution 2001/33
E/2010/84
E/2007/62
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development - Johannesburg Plan of Implementation

Additional Web Resources
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/public.htm - Consolidated List of Products
http://www.pic.int/ - Rotterdam Convention Website
http://chm.pops.int/ - Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FORUM: SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Since its founding, the United Nations has placed a strong emphasis on sustainable development. Traditionally, efforts focused on North-South Cooperation (NSC) relationships, which are usually characterized by the transfer of financial and technical support from a northern donor nation to a southern beneficiary. In recent decades, South-South Cooperation (SSC), or southern nations providing financial and technical development assistance to another southern nation, has emerged as a strong complement to traditional NSC. Within the past decade, SSC has evolved to include Triangular South-South Cooperation (Triangular SSC). Triangular SSC pairs a northern donor with a southern nation that is assisting another southern nation. The northern donor covers the financial costs, and the southern donor provides the technical assistance.

As of 2006, nearly ten percent of all aid assistance - equivalent to more than twelve billion US dollars - was defined as either South-South or Triangular. As development aid flows from developed countries were significantly affected by the global financial crisis, South-South development cooperation rose sharply to US$16.2 billion in 2008; it is widely believed that the scope of such practices has continued to comprise a growing percentage of development assistance.

Triangular SSC projects are currently operating across the globe, though a large number are concentrated in Africa, and most projects fall within infrastructure, medicine, and agricultural sectors. Approximately 90 percent of SSC focused on project finance and technical assistance. The 2010 Secretary General's report noted a high degree of complementarity in infrastructure development aid,

with South-South cooperation gaining prominence in assistance for roads, water supply, power systems, electrification, and telecommunications. South-South medical cooperation has been largely focused on health delivery, and is often targeted at problems specific to developing countries (e.g., malaria). South-South and triangular cooperation in the agricultural sector has been primarily comprised of technical cooperation and technology transfer, with the Arab States, Brazil, China, India and South Africa as primary providers, mostly in partnership with Africa.

Due to the rising emphasis on Triangular SSC, the United Nations has chosen to make it one of the key themes of the 2010 Development Cooperation Forum (DCF). The DCF was established by A/RES/60/1 and first took place in July 2008. The second DCF took place in July 2010.

The 2010 DCF is not the first time the UN has focused resources on efforts to study and better implement SSC and Triangular SSC. UN Resolution 3251 of 4 December 1974 established the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Special Unit for Technical Cooperation between Developing Counties (TCDC). In 2003, the name of the unit was changed to the UNDP Special Unit for South-South Cooperation. The unit serves as the main secretariat to the General Assembly's High Level Committee on South-South Cooperation, which was established in response to the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. Triangular SSC has also been a key focal point of the Marrakesh Framework for the Implementation of South-South Cooperation (2003), the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and efforts by the Group of 77.

In advance of the July 2010 meeting, the Secretary-General issued a report which addressed trends and progress in international development cooperation. Noting that the global economic climate had fundamentally shifted since the 2008 DCF, the Secretary-General noted with alarm that "development gains made over the past decade or more are beginning to erode." The report emphasized the renewed importance of effective development cooperation in light of the economic situation, as well as further South-South and triangular cooperation. The report also recommended that the DCF further strengthen its work on policy coherence, in particular through identifying best practices for policies which "go beyond aid" and promote other types of financing for development.

As Triangular SSC continues to play a larger role in the development agenda, the UN is currently focusing on three areas of improvement to ensure the continued success of Triangular SSC. The first is ensuring that the goals of the development assistance are in alignment with the priorities of the beneficiary nation, as emphasized in the Paris Declaration in 2005. Second, beneficiary nations must be actively engaged in the project; national leadership is a vital component of any development strategy, and developing nations must ensure they are showing national leadership to their residents. And third, that there are clear assignments of roles and responsibilities designated within the framework of the project to ensure each member is confident of their duties and are able to carry them out. Establishing clear goals also ensures no action is being duplicated and that all resources are being used efficiently.

In preparatory meetings leading up to the 2010 DCF, two issues have received extensive attention: the lack of a standard definition of Triangular SSC and the need to create better reporting and accountability mechanisms. Without a definition for Triangular SSC, the research and data collection is not as accurate as possible, and there are concerns about aid transfers being double counted or not counted at all.

With South-South trade growing at almost double the rate of overall global trade, Triangular SSC will continue to rise as a complement to North-South Cooperation. As the UN moves closer to the 2015 deadline for the Millennium Development Goals, Triangular SSC will continue to play a vital role in helping to eradicate extreme poverty and provide employment opportunities. Member States must continue their efforts to better streamline the aid process overall and to utilize the benefits of Triangular SSC to the maximum potential.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How should Triangular and South-South Cooperation be defined?
- How can the matching of needs and assets in triangular cooperation be promoted? In other words, how can the international community better identify and match developing countries with relevant expertise to offer to other developing countries?
- What mechanisms should be put in place to promote information gathering and sharing? Should it be placed on individual organizations and governments or should there be a central source?
- What lessons can Member States learn from Triangular SSC and how can those lessons be transferred to concurrent North-South Cooperation efforts?

Bibliography

"Ban Urges Greater Cooperation among Developing Nations to Tackle Current Crises," *UN News Centre*, 19 December 2008, online.

"Developing Countries Must Help Each Other Weather Financial Crisis, UN Official Says," *UN News Centre*, 4 February 2009, online.

Fordelone, Talita Yamashiro, "Triangular Cooperation and Aid Effectiveness," OECD/DAC Policy Dialogue on Development Co-operation, Mexico City, 28-29 September 2009, online.

"Global Economic Turmoil Has Cemented Bonds between Poorer Nations, UN Hears," *UN News Centre*, 28 September 2009, online.

Hiroki, Shigeyuki, "South-South and Triangular Cooperation: Recent Trends and Progress." Cairo High Level Symposium, Cairo, 20 January 2008, online.

Mwanda, Jerome, "South-South Cooperation: The Unnoticed Reality," I*nDepth News Service*, 1 December 2009, online.

Nogueira, Ruy, "Trends in Development Cooperation: South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Aid Effectiveness," Cairo High Level Symposium, Cairo, 19-20 January 2008, online.

Task Force on South-South Cooperation, "Boosting South-South Cooperation in the Context of Aid Effectiveness: Telling the Story of Partners Involved in more than 110 cases of South-South and Triangular Cooperation," High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development, Bogota, 24-26 March 2010.

UN Documents

A/RES/64/1
A/RES/63/233
A/RES/62/209
A/RES/60/1 – Word Summit Outcome
A/RES/60/212
A/RES/59/250
A/60/111 – Doha Declaration
A/60/257
E/2010/93
E/2008/56

Resolution 3251 (December 1974)
Buenos Aires Plan of Action for promoting and Implementing
    Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (1978)
Marrakesh Framework for the Implementation of South-South
    Cooperation (2003)
Paris Declaration (2005)
Accra Agenda for Action (2008)

Additional Web Resources

http://ssc.undp.org/ - UNDP Special Unit on South-South
    Cooperation
http://southsouthconference.org/ - High Level Conference on South-
    South Cooperation
www.un.org/ecosoc/dcf - Development Cooperation Forum

Technical Assistance for Implementing the International Conventions and Protocols Relating to Terrorism

In striving to keep with its mission of bringing together the world for peace and development, the United Nations has taken a stance towards combating and preventing terrorism. Accordingly, many Member States have entered into international conventions and protocols that focus on eliminating the threat of terrorism. An additional problem has arisen, however, where some Member States who have willingly joined into these conventions and protocols have been unable to implement them due to technological limitations. As such, technical assistance for these countries has become a priority in the mission to combat terrorism. The issue of terrorism has been dealt with extensively by many organs and agencies of the UN. As part of its mandate to encourage educational cooperation on international economic and social issues, the Economic and Social Council has addressed the specific issue of the provision of technical assistance.

In addition to numerous regional conventions and protocols, there currently are thirteen international conventions in place which relate to terrorism, and were developed through the United Nations, UN specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These address a wide range of terrorism-related issues, including nuclear materials, hostages, maritime and airport protocols, plastic explosives, terrorist financing, and nuclear terrorism, among others. Most recently, a Global Counter Terrorism Strategy was universally adopted by all 192 Member States on 8 September 2006, marking the first time that all Member States reached agreement on a common approach to fighting terrorism.

The annex to this strategy includes a section dedicated to capacity building, including thirteen key elements that should be undertaken to provide such technical assistance. Capacity building refers to the strengthening of a country's human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities. In recent years, capacity building has been seen as an increasingly relevant aspect of terrorism prevention. First, capacity building may provide a country the ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. Second, effective capacity building can often dampen the ability of terrorist cells to recruit within a country. Thus, capacity building and the implementation of anti-terrorism protocols are interrelated. Capacity building is necessary to implement the conventions and protocols related to terrorism, and the act of capacity building itself may work alongside such conventions and protocols to reduce the threat of terror worldwide.

In recent years, a number of resolutions have addressed technical assistance with regard to the implementation of conventions and protocols on terrorism. The majority of these resolutions frame the technical assistance as a means to developing capacity building. Common among the resolutions are certain key aspects of technical assistance. First, when within its purview, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been tasked to provide technical assistance to Member States in need of such assistance. Second, Member States have been encouraged to cooperate in both information sharing and technical assistance measures, especially in regard to training, so as to better allow the UNODC to provide technical assistance. Finally, the resolutions encourage Member States not already party to the relevant conventions and protocols regarding terrorism to enter into them.

Technical assistance for the implementation of conventions and protocols relating to terrorism is not without controversy. First is a question of what expectations are to accompany such technical assistance. The extent to which assistance can be utilized will differ from state to state, and often is dependent upon such key factors as size, geography, and individual needs. Second, the question arises as to which types of assistance are most effective. While assistance ought to be tailored to the particular needs of a country, it is often unclear whether the state in need or the body offering assistance has the final say in determining resource allocation. This also raises questions about the implementation of such assistance, as ineffective implementation may to be counterproductive to the strategies laid out within past protocols and conventions.

The 13 protocols and conventions regarding terrorism, along with the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and regional conventions and agreements, provide a strategic framework in which Member States may work together to combat terrorism. Recently, discussions on terrorism have also included efforts to negotiate an additional treaty that would serve as a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. However, the key to success for both ongoing and future efforts will lie in the abilities of Member States to effectively implement the conventions and protocols, and such successful implementation appears contingent on technical assistance geared towards capacity building.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
   • To which international conventions and protocols has your government signed on? How effective has your government been in implementing these agreements?
   • Aside from technical assistance geared towards capacity building, what other technical assistance might allow for successful implementation of the conventions and protocols related to terrorism?
   • What tools could be used by countries to more successfully implement terrorism protocols in the future?
   • What further assistance is necessary for successful implementation of the conventions and protocols?

Bibliography

"All Views, All Legal Arguments Now on Table for Comprehensive
    Anti-Terrorism Convention, General Assembly Ad Hoc
    Committee Chair Says at Session's Close," *UN News Centre*, 16
    April 2010, online.
Byrd, M., "Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy," *JFQ:
    Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 46, April 2006, 127-130.

Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk, *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, Rand, 2003.

English, Richard, *Terrorism: How to Respond*, Oxford, 2009.

Council of the European Union, "EU-U.S. and Member States 2010 Declaration on Counterterrorism," June 2010, online.

Floros, Christos and Bruce Newsome, "Building Counter-Terrorism Capacity Across Borders: Lessons from the Defeat of "Revolutionary Organization November 17th" Journal of Security Sector Management, July 2008.

Harmon, Christopher C., *Terrorism Today*, First Class Publishers, 2000.

"Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003, online.

"Speakers in Security Council Call for Unified, Global Counter-Terrorism Effort, Following Briefings by Chairs of Committees Set Up to Spearhead Fight," *UN News Centre*, 11 May 2010, online.

UN Documents
A/RES/64/177
A/RES/63/195
A/RES/62/272
A/RES/60/288
A/RES/57/173
A/63/89
A/63/195
A/62/898
A/60/825
A/60/164
A/59/187
ECOSOC Resolution 2009/21
ECOSOC Resolution 2007/18
ECOSOC Resolution 2005/19
ECOSOC Resolution 2004/19
ECOSOC Resolution 2003/22
ECOSOC Resolution 2002/19

REPORTS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA) AND THE COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (CSW)

In addition to the three main topics on ECOSOC's agenda, the Council will also receive reports on the final day from the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). As functional and regional commissions established by ECOSOC, ESCWA and CSW are required to make annual reports on their activities to the members of ECOSOC. While these reports are generally accepted pro forma, ECOSOC may also choose to take some action on the recommendations contained in the report. These bodies may also present their recommendations in resolution format, allowing ECOSOC the chance to review and formally pass the proposals.

To facilitate this process, the final day will culminate in a joint session at which the reports and recommendations will be made to ECOSOC. Following each presentation, it will be up to the joint session to take further action. Please be aware that, as commissions of ECOSOC, these bodies have been given significant responsibilities to study, review, debate and decide on recommended actions within specific topical areas that ECOSOC felt should be dealt with in greater detail than could be addressed by the main body. It is recommended that all Representatives assigned to ECOSOC also review the background section on ESCWA (Chapter VI) and CSW (Chapter VII); Representatives may also choose to do some additional research on these topics in preparation.

CHAPTER SIX
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR
WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA)

Purview of the Simulation

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) is one of five regional commissions of the Economic and Social Council. UN-ESCWA is responsible for promoting economic and social development through regional and subregional cooperation and integration in the region. The Commission provides a framework for the harmonization of Member States' sectoral policies, while focusing on meeting Arab states' unique needs and emerging global challenges in development. UN-ESCWA reports to ECOSOC on Western Asia's economic challenges, progress, and proposals for the future.

Website: www.escwa.un.org/

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY: WATER RESOURCES

Water is a necessity of life, and water scarcity poses a serious challenge to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. The Member States of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) collectively encompass the most water-stressed region in the world. Water supply issues are affected by a combination of geographic, economic, political and social challenges. Population growth in the region has stressed already-scarce water resources by further reducing the amount of water per capita. Climate change has also exacerbated the region's environmental challenges by making water scarcity more prevalent and drought more common than in the past.

However, perhaps most significant, is the complexity of water resource sharing within the region. There are seven major shared surface watercourses in the ESCWA region, as well as a number of shared aquifers. For instance, the Mediterranean and Jordan River Basin are shared water resources of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Syrian Arab Republic. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict has also played a significant role in the determination of water policies in the Jordan River Basin. The combination of these challenges has produced a progressively untenable situation, with Member States facing immense pressure to meet growing demand with diminishing capacity. The development of more effective integrated water resource management (IWRM) practices will be essential to reducing the risk of conflict over water.

To confront these challenges, recent ESCWA discussions have prioritized strengthening the legal framework of international water law and enhancing knowledge and coordination between States. International legal principles clarify the obligations and rights of states in water management issues. Key principles include equitable and reasonable utilization and participation, as well as the obligation not to cause significant harm. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to protect and develop it. According to the

Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, while states have the right to utilize international watercourses in their territories, they are also obligated to take measures to prevent causing significant harm to other watercourse states. Though these principles provide guidance to states regarding water sharing arrangements, they are frequently a point of contention. Downstream states, or lower riparians, tend to emphasize the "no harm" principle, while upper riparians often emphasize the principle of equitable utilization. Though current international treaties on shared water usage - including both the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and the Law of Transboundary Aquifers - have not yet entered into force, they have had considerable influence in the negotiation of a number of regional and bilateral treaties in the ESCWA region.

In addition to strengthening the legal framework surrounding water usage rights, the development of sound water management policies depends, in part, on adequate access to information and knowledge. Improving the quality and coordination of information gathering is essential. Joint technical activities, such as monitoring or data collection on water quantity and quality, have the potential to further build trust and cooperation between Member States. The implementation of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), in particular, has been discussed as an avenue to increase the availability and quality of data available to Member States. As described in ESCWA Drought Report I, GIS could help to prevent socio-economic drought as well as mitigate climate change effects.

Because conventional water resources have been unable to adequately meet demand, Member States have turned increasingly to non-conventional water resources, including desalination programs and the use of treated waste water, However, given the substantial capital investment and significant energy and environmental costs of desalination practices, alternative water resources are unlikely to be sufficient in redressing regional water issues.

Thus, the primary challenges facing ESCWA countries as they confront regional water scarcity will be building sufficient capacity

and increasing coordination in national and regional water policies. Developing effective integrated water management regimes will require building on internationally accepted legal principles, supporting transparent knowledge gathering and sharing, encouraging further development of technical capacity to monitor and manage water resources, and promoting coherence between state and regional policies. Without a coordinated regional response to shared-water issues, sustainable development in the ESCWA region will be further imperiled.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- How does your state's national water policy interact with regional water policies?
- How can ESCWA further assist in building the capacity of Member States to develop integrated water resource management policies?
- How can institution building, both at the national and regional levels, contribute to improved management of shared water resources?
- To increase monitoring and management of shared water resources, what further investments in technical and human capacity should be promoted by ESCWA?

Bibliography

Antelava, Natalia, "Lack of Mid-East Peace Deepens Water Crisis," *BBC News*, 13 October 2009, online.
Bromberg, Gidon, "The Middle East's Water Crisis: Will the Jordan River Run Dry?" *Yale Environment* 360, 24 September 2008, online.
Bucknall, Julia, *Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management Results in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank, 2007, online.
Burleson, Elizabeth, "Equitable and Reasonable Use of Water Within the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin," *Environmental Law Institute*, January 2005, online.
Droogers, Peter, Walter Immerzeel, and Chris Perry, "Application of Remote Sensing in National Water Plans: Demonstration Cases for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia," *Future Water*, February 2009, online.
"Executive Secretary Visits Oman, Participates in G77 Water Forum," *United Nations Information Services*, 24 February 2009, online.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "Knowledge Management and Analysis of the Capacity of ESCWA Member Countries in Managing Shared Water Resources," 2009, online.
Salman, M.A. Salman, "The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?" *International Water Resources Association*, Water International, v. 3 no. 1, March 2007.
"Water Scarcity Becoming a Critical Issue for the Arab World – UN Report," *UN News Centre*, 16 March 2010, online.
Weiss, Stanley, "Water for Peace," *New York Times*, 13 July 2009.

UN Documents

A/CN.4/591
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2009/4
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2009/1
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2009/Technical Paper.3
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2009/Glossary.1
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2007/6
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2007/WP.3
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2005/9
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2003/18
E/ESCWA/SDPD/2003/13
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses
The Law of Transboundary Aquifers

Additional Web Resources

http://www.escwa.un.org/ - ESCWA Sustainable Development and Productivity: Water Resources
http://www.unesco.org/water/ - UNESCO Water
http://www.unsgab.org/index.htm - Secretary General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation
http://www.unwater.org - UN Water Portal

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: POPULATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Population trends and socioeconomic development are inextricably intertwined. For Member States in the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), rapid changes in population demographic structures have important consequences for the region's social and economic development. Average annual population growth in Arab countries has increased at 2.45 percent since 1980, compared to the world average of 1.5 percent. The real result of this population growth is the projected addition of 35 million people to the region between 2005 and 2010, which will also continue to skew regional populations younger. Similar to global trends, the population of ESCWA Member States is moving from rural to urban areas. By 2020, the urban population of the Arab region is estimated to reach 59.7 percent. In addition, the past three decades have also seen substantially decreased infant mortality rates coupled with significantly increased life expectancy. In sum, the rapidly changing demography will test the region's capacity to deal with the challenges posed by social change, economic strains, globalization, and political instabilities. However, careful policy planning among ESCWA Member States may harness the human resource potential and capitalize on their respective population growth to further spur national development.

The Population and Social Development (PSD) Section of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia works to increase Member States' abilities to take emerging demographic shifts into consideration in national and regional development policies. In recent years, the PSD Section has focused on, among other population issues, how youth, ageing, and the changing structural-age demography of the region's population affect countries' development efforts. With the assistance of technical experts, the Population PSD Section strengthens the ability of member nations to coordinate their efforts through disseminating information regarding the relevance of demographic changes on development policy. Support is also provided to Member States to fully implement population and development goals that have arisen from past UN conferences and agreements aimed at addressing population-related issues, including the Cairo Programme of Action on Population and Development, World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY), Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, and the Millennium Declaration.

One significant issue to address is the looming quandary of the "youth bulge." Over 30 percent of the population in the ESCWA region is aged 15-24, the highest in the region's history. A quarter of youth in the region of are unemployed (compared to 14 percent internationally). The rapid growth in the size of youth has also not yet peaked, and by 2025, the youth population is projected to still make up around 20 percent of the population. Some experts argue that the "youth bulge" represents an enviable opportunity for a readymade economic boon to the region, while others contend that the substantial influx of young people will foster economic and political instability throughout the region. Regardless of the outcome, the "youth bulge" will significantly shape the course of the region in future years. A 2008 survey of ESCWA Member States' efforts to implement World Progamme of Action for Youth found that national and regional development strategies are frequently organized in a sectoral arrangement (i.e. education, health, or labor) which fails to address youth as a specific socio-demographic group. ESCWA reported that many Member States had not developed appropriate policies to engage their youth, noting that the failure to address specific challenges facing youth in development strategies exacerbates youth poverty and unemployment.

A second major issue has been the rural to urban shift of the working-age population, and a concurrent urban to rural migration of the over-65 population, which has accelerated the rate of rural ageing. Both migration and urbanization trends have weakened societal and familial networks that have traditionally cared for the elderly. Thus, despite the aforementioned "youth bulge," ESCWA Member States are also confronting the challenge of addressing specialized needs of its ageing rural populations. The PSD Section has also been working to assist Member States in the implementation of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA) at the regional level. ESCWA has worked to engender awareness regarding the importance of addressing the needs of ageing populations proactively. Currently, most ESCWA Member states lack sufficient social security and health services to meet the needs of the increasing population of vulnerable elderly people.

Despite the host of demographic challenges facing ESCWA Member States, some experts assert that this demographic transition may offer a certain "demographic window of opportunity" within the region, wherein the larger working age population could lead to increased savings and investment in economic and social development. Carefully formulated regional and national policies will be necessary to maximize the potential socioeconomic benefits while minimizing the negative societal effects of shifting population dynamics.

In May 2009, ESCWA participated in Conference on Population and Development in the Arab Region, which marked the fifteenth anniversary since the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). Emerging population trends were analyzed in light of the ICPD Plan of Action, and the potential to learn from the experiences of other global demographic shifts was also discussed. Going forward, ESCWA Member States will continue to confront demographic issues in the difficult context of the destabilizing effects of the world economic crisis and, in some states, internal political dissent. Further support will be needed to help states channel the "youth bulge" towards positive outcomes for the region. ESCWA Member States bear the responsibility to develop and implement policies that lead to sustained economic growth while avoiding instability.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What do your country's population pyramids and other demographic indicators in the region look like? How are they expected to change in coming years? What policies, if any, have ESCWA Member States enacted in response?
- What strategies should be undertaken by Member States to better incorporate the specific challenges faced by youth in their national development policies?
- How have labor migration patterns impacted rural and urban populations in your country?

Bibliography

"Age Structural Transitions in Arab Countries: Policy Implications for Development," Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, December 2008.

"Arab Plan of Action on Ageing to the Year 2012," Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Arab Preparatory Meeting for the Second World Assembly on Ageing, Beirut, 5-8 February 2002, http://www.escwa.un.org/popin.

"The Demographic Profile of Arab Countries- Ageing of Rural Populations," Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 31 December 2007, www.globalaging.org

Dhillon, Navtej and Tarik Yousef, *Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East*, Brookings, October 2009.

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "Statement to the Commission on Population and Development at the Forty-second Session," 30 March-3 April 2009, online.

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "The Youth Bulge: Social Implications and Future Vision," June 2008, v 2 n 1, online.

"Proceedings of the Conference," Ageing in the Arab Countries - Research Policy and Development, Beirut, Lebanon, 18-19 November 2009, online.

"Population Ageing in Arab Countries: Building a Society for All Ages," Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, *Social Development Bulletin*, v. 1 no. 2, June 2007, online.

"Western Asia: Ban Urges Greater Efforts to Reduce Inequality and Create Jobs," *UN News Centre*, 20 May 2010, online.

UN Documents
A/RES/62/130
A/RES/62/126
A/RES/61/142
A/RES/50/81
A/62/61/Add.1-E/2007/7/Add.1
E/CN.9/2009/4
E/ESCWA/OES/2009/WG.1/WP.2
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/Technical Paper.9
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/8
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/7
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/4
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/3
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/1
E/ESCWA/SDD/2008/Technical Paper.6
E/ESCWA/SDD/2008/Technical Paper.2
E/ESCWA/SDD/2008/5
E/ESCWA/SDD/2008/3
E/ESCWA/SDD/2008/1

E/ESCWA/SDD/2007/WP.5
E/ESCWA/SDD/2007/WP.4
E/ESCWA/SDD/2007/WP.1
E/ESCWA/SDD/2007/Technical Material.2
E/ESCWA/SDD/2007/Booklet.1/Rev.1

Additional Web Resources

www.escwa.un.org/popin/ - ESCWA Population Information
    Network
www.unfpa.org/ - United Nations Funds for Population
    Activities
www.un.org/esa/population/ - United Nations Population Division
www.mdgafrica.org - MDG Africa Steering Group

Chapter Seven
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)

This year, AMUN's simulation will include the Commission on Status of Women (CSW), one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Participation on the Commission is open to two members from any country currently represented on the CSW (see list above). The CSW will meet all four days of the Conference, and will report to a combined ECOSOC plenary session on Tuesday afternoon.

Purview of the Committee

The CSW was established in June 1946 to promote implementation of the principle that men and women shall have equal rights. The Commission has forty-five members elected by the Economic and Social Council to four-year terms with broad regional representation. It meets annually for a period of ten working days to prepare recommendations and reports to ECOSOC on promoting women's rights in political, economic, civil, social and educational fields. The CSW also makes recommendations to the Council on urgent problems requiring immediate attention in the field of women's rights.
Website: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/index.html

The Equal Sharing of Responsibilities Between Women and Men, Including Caregiving in the Context of HIV/AIDS

Though unremunerated and not measured in national economic accounts, domestic work and caregiving are crucial components to social and economic development in every society. Such "caring labor" is defined as the work of looking after the physical, psychological, emotional, and developmental needs of one or more people. Caring labor is not only informal, unpaid, and devalued by formal economic analyses; it is also highly gendered. In all regions of the world, most household and caregiving is performed by women, regardless of their employment and socio-economic status. On average, women spend twice as much time on caring labor as men; the value of such time has been estimated by some experts as equivalent to half of a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and ultimately represents both a hidden subsidy to national economies and a "reproduction tax" on women's labor. The failure to quantify the value of unpaid work by women has the effect of undervaluing women's full contributions to economic and social development, and contributes to the unequal sharing of responsibilities.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic has further exacerbated the gender inequalities surrounding unpaid work. In 2009, UNAIDS estimated that over 33 million people worldwide suffer from HIV/AIDS, with approximately three million receiving medical treatment. Millions of households have been affected by the epidemic, with the heaviest burden falling on women and girls; women provide approximately 90 percent of all caregiving to those afflicted with HIV/AIDS. This unequal sharing of caregiving responsibilities between men and women can deprive women of access to resources, including education, political power, property rights, and income generating activities. Girls may be required to leave school to care for ailing family members, while elderly women often assume the burden of caring

for ailing adult children or orphaned grandchildren. In addition to the caregiving burden, women are also encumbered by the need to procure income to support the surviving household. Consequently, the additional responsibilities shouldered by women carry significant implications for their health and well-being.

The Beijing Platform for Action, adopted in 1995 as a landmark document for women's rights, specifically addressed the importance of gender-sensitive initiatives towards HIV/AIDS, emphasizing in particular the equal sharing of caregiving responsibilities. International human rights treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), also recognize the obligations that State parties have to promote the equal sharing of responsibility between women and men.

Since 1996, the Commission on the Status of Women has sought to address the issue of unequal sharing of responsibilities between men and women. The Commission's 2004 Agreed Conclusions focused on the role of men and boys in achieving gender equality, recognizing that institutionalized gender stereotypes also create discriminatory barriers for men and emphasize that both men and women must participate in promoting gender equality. Noting the negative effects of gender inequality on the whole society, the Commission also called for men and boys to use their full capacity to positively change societal norms, relationship dynamics, and women's access to resources and decision-making. In its 2007 resolution on "Women, the girl child, and HIV/AIDS," the CSW noted its concern that women and girls continued bear a disproportionate burden to provide care and support to those living with HIV/AIDS, and encouraged Member States to provide more resources to women who face the double burden of providing both caregiving and economic support.

The issue of equal sharing was targeted as the CSW's priority theme for its 53rd session. In March 2009, the Commission called upon Member States to acknowledge the significant responsibilities faced

by women and girls during home-based care in the context of HIV/AIDS and to find strategies to strengthen the role of men in providing support. The body noted that past policy responses have also often been linked to other issues, and have not explicitly targeted the reduction of unequal division of labor between men and women directly. While calling for more explicitly targeted policy responses, the body also noted that increasing the equitable sharing of responsibilities was necessary, but in itself not sufficient to fully address the growing challenges facing women and girls who provide unpaid caring labor. In addition to drawing attention to the need for greater support services for women and girls, the CSW noted the problematic implications of leaving unpaid labor out of national accounts and called for greater valuation of care work, suggesting an increase in the employment of time-use surveys and other measurement instruments to document the value of such work.

In order to further encourage the equal sharing of responsibilities between women and men, including caregiving in the context of HIV/AIDS, Member States will need to expand economic opportunities for young women and social services that support caregiving and health, as well as adopt policies that encourage more equitable participation rates of men and women in both the formal workforce and in informal caring labor. Institutional and systemic change will be necessary if the full value of women's labor is to be measured, and Member States will need to design and implement cross-sectoral policies which recognize and account for the value of care work. The elimination of institutionalized gender stereotypes is crucial, and both men and women will need to play an active part.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What inequalities exist globally between men and women in relation to unpaid work, including caregiving? How are both sexes affected by HIV/AIDS?
- What concrete steps, if any, have Member States taken to quantify the value of unpaid, caring labor?
- What actions have Member States taken to encourage a more equal sharing of domestic and caregiving responsibilities between men and women in the context of HIV/AIDS?
- Are there any barriers to men's participation in care work? What role should Member States play in encouraging a shift in societal norms?

Bibliography

"Agreed Conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women on 'The role of men and boys in achieving gender equality,'" 48th session, 2007, extracted from E/2004/INF/2/Add.2, online.

"Agreed Conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women on 'The equal sharing of responsibilities between women and men, including caregiving in the context of HIV/AIDS,'" 53rd Session, 2009, extracted from E/2009/27-E/CN.6/2009/15, online.

Barker, Drucilla K. and Susan F. Feiner, *Liberating Economics: Feminist Perspectives on Families, Work, and Globalization*, University of Michigan Press, 2004, pp. 41-55.

"Caregiving Burden Must be Valued, Shared, Supported by Governments as Crucial to Sustaining Society, Building Human Capital, Women's Commission Told," *UN News Centre*, 3 March 2009, online.

"Caregiving; Women and HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Crisis," Joint Report by UNAIDS, UNFPA, and UNIFEM, 2004, online.

Mendoza, Diana G., "Poverty Still Has a Woman's Face," *Terraviva*, 18 February 2010, online.

Ogden, Jessica, Simel Esim, and Caren Grown, "Expanding the Care Continuum For HIV/AIDS: Bringing Carers into Focus," Population Council and International Center for Research on Women, 2004.

Standing, Guy, "Care Work: Overcoming Insecurity and Neglect," in *Care Work: The Quest for Security*, ed. Mary Daly, International Labour Organization, 2001, pp 15-31.

Stephey, M.J., "Why Sexism Kills: Global Women's Health Report by WHO," *Time*, 11 November 2009.

"Women's Commission Ends Session, Calls for Shared Responsibility for Caregiving Between Men, Women in Context of HIV/AIDS, Reducing Care Burden on Households," *UN News Centre*, 13 March 2009, online.

UN Documents

A/RES/60/262
A/CONF.177/20
E/CN.6/2010/L.2/Rev.1
E/CN.6/2009/12
E/CN.6/2009/6
E/CN.6/2009/2
E/CN.6/2009/4
E/CN.6/2009/NGO/34
E/CN.6/2009/CRP.4
E/CN.6/1996/5
EGM/ESOR/2008/BP.2
E/2009/L.23
E/2008/27
E/2007/27
E/2004/11
Millennium Declaration
Beijing Platform for Action
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

Additional Web Resources

www.ilo.org – International Labour Organization
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/53sesspriorityhtm.htm/ - Commission on the Status of Women

WOMEN'S EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND IN POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

International and intranational conflicts affect all members of the societies involved. Women, who may not enjoy full participation in or protection from conflict, are just as affected as men, although in different ways. Men may more frequently bear the burden and trauma of combat and soldiering, but women's physical safety may also be threatened if conflict zones are not clearly delineated from civilian areas. And both women and men must deal with the financial, social, and psychological tolls of war and societal instability caused by conflict. Furthermore, women are only occasionally involved in the formal mechanisms that control conflict prevention, management, and resolution, evidence of wider inequalities that exclude women

from the traditionally male dominated domains of politics, war, and economics more generally. Some experts have argued that increasing the force of the feminine voice within such arenas may lead to more peaceful outcomes, suggesting that women may offer a unique perspective on conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The dearth of women's involvement in processes related to conflict also means that issues of particular importance to women are often ignored or downplayed in relation to conflict and its causes, conduct, and consequences.

Since 1995, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) has been reviewing and addressing the areas of concern identified in the Beijing Platform for Action, and is working to highlight new areas of concern. Many key points of the Platform dealt directly with the role of women in conflict prevention, management, and peacebuilding, giving the CSW the unique opportunity to take further action on these issues. Furthermore, the Millennium Development Goals, officially established by the UN in 2000, emphasize the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women, a goal that the CSW has worked to address over the last ten years.

In the past two years, the UN has seen an increasing amount of discussion and action on the subject of women's roles in peace-building. In the fall of 2009, the Security Council prepared the way for the 54th Session of the CSW by approving two resolutions. S\RES\1888 and S\RES\1889 address increased efforts to prevent sexual violence as a tactic in war and the need to create greater roles for women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Also in 2009, the General Assembly adopted A/RES/63/311, urging system-wide coherence—specifically in the increase of institutional support for gender equality and the empowerment of women.

Furthering its efforts to promote coherent and effective strategies across UN agencies, in July 2010 the General Assembly voted unanimously to create UN Women, a composite entity which will encompass four UN agencies currently addressing issues affecting women. UN Women will be led by an Under-Secretary-General and report to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council. UN Women will play a key role in prioritizing the promotion of women's full and equal participation in the post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. The Secretary-General's proposal for the creation of UN Women also targeted applied research, knowledge management, and capacity-building as key priorities for ensuring formal, worldwide participation of women in formal and informal post-conflict peace-building processes. Though this development will not directly affect the Commission on the Status of Women and its reporting relationship to the Economic and Social Council, it promises to affect the broader dialogue and work of the United Nations in addressing women's issues.

In March 2010, the 54th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women worked to review and reflect on the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the outcome document of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly titled "Gender equality, development, and peace for the twenty-first century." The Chair also challenged the commission to reassess its actions in relation to the Millennium Development Goals, noting that gender equality is both a goal, and a means of achieving other goals. Discussions centered on strengthening institutional arrangements of the UN for support of gender equality and empowerment, while again calling for the complete implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

Although important steps have been made toward incorporating women at all stages, there is still much that must be done to reach the goal of equal participation. The UN itself has few women serving in lead mediation roles in UN-sponsored peace talks, and as of February 2010, only 9 of 27 United Nations peacekeeping operations, special political missions and peace-building support offices were led by women. Women's participation in national level efforts has been even rarer, with women representing on average less than 10 percent of official negotiating delegations in peace talks in the past 20 years. There are also very few women trained and involved as mediators or ceasefire monitors. These statistics demonstrate two interrelated challenges for the international community: one is ensuring that women have access to education and training regimes to provide them with appropriate credentials for such activities, and the second is taking conscious steps to place qualified women in such positions.

In the context of responses to conflict, the UN, along with other international agencies, must make a conscious effort to actively include and support women in the peace-building process. At the national level, Member States must take steps to engage women in police, military, and justice systems so that they can participate equally in conflict prevention, management and resolution. While an increasing number of states are formulating national strategies regarding women, peace, and security, as of June 2010 only 24 Member States have enacted such policies.

Future actions by the Commission on the Status of Women must focus on addressing the Millennium Development Goals - both through current UN actions and through new measures taken by the committee. The Commission must also consider sexual violence, including rape, human trafficking and genital mutilation, as tactics of war. Sexual violence against women must be officially condemned and punished, and the rights of women to participation in post-conflict processes affirmed through active education, training, and engagement with relevant stakeholders. As reflected in past UN resolutions, coherence among all actions is extremely important in addressing issues of gender quality and women's empowerment and involvement in the peace-building process. The full inclusion of women in peace processes will require that future peace agreements account for security issues from a gender perspective, with peace agreement provisions which address the gendered dimensions of demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, and rehabilitation. Other priorities for the CSW to address include the need to continue support for capacity-building, particularly in civil society for women's organizations, as well as the need to further strengthen the gender advisory capacity and gender sensitive training programs for UN staff in missions related to armed conflicts.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What issues prevent women from equally and fully participating in post-conflict peace-building process, and how can Member States effectively address them?
- What additional measures are needed to fully mainstream gender perspectives into security and peace processes?
- How can the CSW encourage greater capacity-building support for civil society organizations in post-conflict environments?

Bibliography

"Agreed conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women on women's equal participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution and in post-conflict peace-building," 48th Session, 2004, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw48.

"As Role of Police Grows in Peace Missions, UN Wants More Female Officers in Ranks," *UN News Centre*, 10 June 2010, online.

"Ban Calls for Boosting Women's Participation in Peace Efforts," *UN News Centre*, 30 September 2009, online.

"Facts & Figures on Women Worldwide," UN Women, July 2007, www.unwomen.org.

Klot, Jennifer F., "Women and Peacebuilding," United Nations Development Fund for Women and The Peacebuilding Support Office, 29 January 2007, online.

"Gender Parity Leads to Greater Efficiency, Effectiveness, Secretary-General Tells Meeting on Increasing Women's Participation in United Nations Policing," *UN News Centre*, 4 June 10, online.

"Millennium Development Goals: Confronting the Challenges of Gender Equality and Fragile States," *Global Monitoring Report*, World Bank, 2007.

Rehn, Elisabeth and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building," *Progress of the World's Women*, v. 1, 2002, online.

"Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community Towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes," United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2005, online.

"Taking Action: Achieving gender equality and empowering women," Task Force on Education and Gender Equality, UN Millennium Project, Earthscan, 2005.

Valasek, Kristin, "Securing Equality, Engendering Peace: A Guide to Policy and Planning on Women, Peace and Security (UN SCR 1325)," United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2006, online.

"Women must play full part in peace-building, Security Council declares," *UN News Centre*, 5 October 2009, online.

UN Documents

A/RES/63/311
A/64/L.56
A/59/2005
A/57/731
A/CONF.177/20
E/2004/INF/2/Add.2
E/CN.6/2010/L.3
E/CN.6/2004/10
S/2010/173
S/2009/465
S/RES/1989 (2009)
S/RES/1988 (2009)
S/RES/1820 (2008)
S/RES/1325 (2000)
PBC/2/BDI/10
Beijing Platform for Action
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

Additional Web Resources

www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/ - Commission on the Status of Women

www.unwomen.org/ - UN Women

www.womenwarpeace.org/ - Women, War, and Peace

Along with simulating the General Assembly Plenary and its First, Second, Third and Sixth Committee, AMUN will also be simulating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA will meet all four days of the Conference, and will report on its findings to the Combined General Assembly Plenary on Tuesday afternoon. IAEA's membership is open to all member-states, and as such, participation is open to one member from each delegation represented at the Conference. Requests for a second seat on this simulation should be directed to the AMUN Executive Office.

Purview of this Simulation

The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy. The IAEA Statute, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956, outlines the three pillars of the Agency's work: nuclear verification and security, safety and technology transfer. During the AMUN 2010 Conference, the simulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency will be a special session. For the purposes of this simulation, all UN Member States will be considered to have a seat in the special session. In order to facilitate a simulation in four days, the special session will focus on two issues: Nuclear Power & Iran and Nuclear Energy and Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle. The Assembly may, at their discretion, create either reports or resolutions to cover these issues. The IAEA will also present a final summary report on their work, including their resolution/reports, to the GA Plenary on the last afternoon session of the Conference. It is also possible, based on the results of the discussion, that a briefing to the Security Council may be necessary.

Website: http://www.iaea.org/

Nuclear Power and Iran

Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the day it was opened for signature, 1 July 1968, and ratified it on 2 February 1970. The Pahlavi regime, in power at the time, enjoyed an extremely cordial relationship with the West. The United States had already begun aiding the development of Iran's civilian nuclear operations in 1957 as a part of its "Atoms for Peace" program. The Shah continued this nuclear program until the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when the new Iranian regime experienced resistance in obtaining nuclear technology from states who were capable of providing it. Few nations were willing to provide Iran with substantial materials or data concerning nuclear development - largely because of US pressure - until an Iran-Russia cooperation pact concerning the development of peaceful nuclear activities was initiated in July of 1989. Significant nuclear cooperation from other states did not follow, however.

The current disagreement between Iran and the IAEA began in 2003 when the Board of Governors issued report GOV/2003/40, reporting that Iran had breached its Safeguards Agreement by not reporting significant nuclear development activity occurring since 1987 to the IAEA. Regardless of whether Iran's intentions were peaceful or military in nature, and despite Iran's subsequent and substantial cooperation with the IAEA to answer outstanding questions regarding its nuclear program, the withholding of this information until 2003 was still a clear violation of its Safeguards Agreement. While the IAEA has found that no declared nuclear material in Iran has been diverted for military purposes, Iran's history of not reporting nuclear activity is a major source of many nations' distrust of its nuclear intentions today.

These suspicions of Iran's intentions by other Member States are mirrored by Iran's distrust of others' intentions towards its national security. Though the regime currently fears that domestic dissident movements are being aided by foreign governments, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been offered minimal international assistance towards its nuclear aspirations since the 1980s. The Iranian government argues that because it was denied access to peaceful nuclear technology when it initially tried to acquire the materials in a public manner, Iran was forced to work through alternative channels. The unwillingness, or inability, of many states to contribute to Iran's nuclear development was most recently demonstrated by the failure of the November 2004 Paris Agreement between Iran and the EU-3 (France, the UK and Germany). The Agreement's general conditions specified that in return for Iran's suspension of its uranium enrichment program, the EU-3 would implement substantial aid to support the nuclear program and security of Iran. The Agreement broke down in August 2005, with both sides alleging the failure was a result of the others' actions. Iran attempted to amend the agreement and proclaimed that it had no intention to permanently suspend its enrichment program. Similarly, Iran claims the EU-3 did not act swiftly to fulfill its obligations to support Iran's nuclear program.

After the breakdown of the Paris Agreement, the Iranian uranium enrichment program was restarted, causing the IAEA Board of Governors to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council in 2006. This was the first instance of the IAEA bringing Iran's nuclear program before the SC. The Security Council's first resolution concerning Iran's nuclear program, S/RES/1696, threatened sanctions if Iran refused to follow the IAEA's recommendations and cease enriching. By then the moderate President Khatami had left office and the more conservative President Ahmadinejad had been elected. Iranian-US diplomatic relations became more strained than at any other point in recent years.

The suspicion that Iran is concealing information regarding its nuclear program still instills distrust among many parties and contributes to the current predicament over Iran's nuclear program. The current, most contentious issue between Iran, and the IAEA and the Security Council is Iran's refusal to cease enriching uranium and constructing nuclear facilities, though these developments are allowed by the NPT. Despite continued verifications that no declared nuclear resources are being diverted for military uses, uncertainty remains as to whether all of Iran's nuclear resources are accounted for. This continued distrust of Iranian intentions has been perpetuated by the recent revelation of the existence of the Qom nuclear site in late 2009. In addition, a New York Times article published on 27 March 2010 which quoted the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, as saying that President Ahmadinejad ordered work to begin soon on two more nuclear plants.

Late last year, Russia expressed interest in developing an arrangement with Iran, wherein low-enriched uranium would be shipped out of Iran in exchange for high-enriched uranium. Iran ultimately rejected the offer. However, in May 2010, a joint declaration issued

by Iran, Brazil, and Turkey detailed a similar diplomatic arrangement for a fuel supply exchange. At the time, the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano heralded the deal as a confidence-building measure. Iran's subsequent declaration of its intent to continue its enrichment process, however, led the Security Council to demand once again that Iran suspend its enrichment activities. S/RES/1929, adopted in June 2010, imposed additional sanctions against Iran and called upon Iran to cooperate with the demands of both the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council.

Much of what determines a state's stance on Iran's nuclear program is whether or not that state accepts Iran's declarations that it only wishes to fulfill its right established by the NPT to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and is not diverting any for military use. In 2003, there was a diplomatic rift over the discovery of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Natanz facility, which is indicative of nuclear weaponry. An IAEA report later concluded it to be residual contamination from machinery intended for peaceful purposes imported from Pakistan. Theoretically, if Iran had purchased the equipment through legal channels and the HEU had then been found, the IAEA would have had strong evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program; however, because the materials were purchased through the nuclear black market, the presence of the HEU did not necessarily provide indisputable evidence of a weapons program. It is intricate and complicated matters like this that dominate the debate over Iran's nuclear program and create ambiguity for all parties.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- Should the possibility that a nation might develop nuclear weapons be sufficient reason to require it to freeze its nuclear program?
- What kind of trust-building measures can be put in place to link Iran and the rest of the world?
- Are punitive actions needed to bring Iran into compliance? If so, what measures are needed, and how likely are they to succeed?

Bibliography

Bâli, Asli Ü., "The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse," *Middle East Report*, No. 241, Iran: Looking Ahead, Winter 2006, pp. 12-21.
"Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Programme, 1957-2007," Oxford Research Group, 26 March 2010, online.
"Citing Iran's Failure to Clarify Nuclear Ambitions, UN Imposes Additional Sanctions," *UN News Centre*, 9 June 2010, online.
"Iranian Nuclear Programme is 'Special Case,' says Head of UN Agency," *UN News Centre*, 7 June 2010, online.
"Iran's New Nuclear Proposal Could be a Confidence-Building Measure – Ban," *UN News Centre* 24 May 2010, online.
Linzer, Dafna, "No Proof Found of Iran Arms Program," *Washington Post*, 23 August 2005.
Sanger, David E., "Agencies Suspect Iran Is Planning Atomic Sites," *New York Times*, 27 March 2010.
"Transcripts," *CNN, Fareed Zakaria* GPS, 1 February 2009, online.
"UN Chief Urges Iran to Desist from Vow to Enrich More Uranium to 20 Percent," *UN News Centre*, 28 May 2010, online.

UN Documents

GOV/2010/28
GOV/2010/10
GOV/2009/74
GOV/2009/55
GOV/2009/35
GOV/2009/8
GOV/2008/4
GOV/2007/58
GOV/2006/64
GOV/2006/15
GOV/2005/87
GOV/2005/67
GOV/2004/83
GOV/2003/81
GOV/2003/40
INFCIRC/796
INFCIRC/795
INFCIRC/793
INFCIRC/786
INFCIRC/779
INFCIRC/761
INFCIRC/749
INFCIRC/711
INFCIRC/628
INFCIRC/140
S/RES/1835 (2008)
S/RES/1803 (2008)
S/RES/1747 (2007)
S/RES/1737 (2007)
S/RES/1696 (2006)

Additional Web Resources

www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ - IAEA & Iran
www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/ - Global Policy: UN Sanctions Against Iran

NUCLEAR ENERGY AND MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO THE FUEL CYCLE

International cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle has a long and storied history. From the onset of the nuclear age, the international community has aimed to internationalize the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology while securing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Recognizing the dangers that nuclear weapons pose and the awe-inspiring potential of nuclear energy, the United States led the charge with the 1946 Baruch Plan, which laid out basic principles of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the exchange of peaceful technology that the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would later codify. Implementing these concepts, however, proved difficult as states used peaceful technology to develop weapons or illegally acquired weapons technology. Yet others have declined entirely to ratify the NPT, and have invariably developed nuclear weapons.

Multilaterization of the fuel cycle has long been discussed as a way to mitigate the risks associated with the use of nuclear energy. The processes used to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes – enrichment, fuel production, reprocessing, spent fuel storage, and final spent fuel disposal – could also lead to further nuclear proliferation. A multilateral fuel cycle, in theory, necessitates a cooperative effort wherein no single country has complete control over the supply chain processes necessary to produce nuclear fuel.

Since the 1970s, the IAEA has discussed specific proposals for a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle. Proposals fall into two broad categories: front-end and back-end systems. Front-end systems, which focus on the procurement and assurance of a fuel supply, receive the majority of attention. Back-end systems instead focus on the transportation, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. There are also a limited number of proposals related to the construction of nuclear power facilities themselves, although the advent of successful market-based solutions seems to have lessened focus on this aspect. Most proposals to date focus on only one aspect of the fuel cycle, but a comprehensive plan will need both front-end and back-end solutions.

Early studies by the IAEA focused on the development of regional fuel centers and methods to ensure the adequate disposal of plutonium. More recent proposals included providing backup assurances of supply; establishing regional or IAEA-controlled, low enriched uranium (LEU) reserves; and setting up international uranium enrichment centers. Other front-end possibilities include placing all new enrichment and reprocessing activities exclusively under multilateral control, to be followed by the conversion of all existing facilities from national to multilateral control. Yet another approach would be to "lease" nuclear fuel to states, which would use the fuel and return the waste to a multilateral organization for long-term storage. Despite the plentitude of proposals, the IAEA has not reached consensus on any of them: either non-nuclear states were not confident that they would be adequately provided for, or nuclear states believed that the proposal would not prevent the illicit sale or exchange of nuclear secrets.

In part because of the difficulty of developing comprehensive agreements, the IAEA General Conference established a voluntary program in 2001 to test new ideas on how to best bring together technology holders and users to meet energy needs without compromising nuclear security. In addition to fostering collaboration among its 30 members, The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) also publishes numerous studies on the fuel cycle and innovative technology that can help meet the world's nuclear needs.

With the increasing focus on diminishing fossil fuel resources and rising electricity needs in developing countries, there as marked resurgence of interest in nuclear power, and the debate over the nuclear fuel cycle has once again become urgent. Developing countries are interested in beginning sustainable nuclear power programs to meet rising demands for energy, and the continued distrust from nuclear countries threatens these efforts.

This resurgence began with former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's 2003 article on peaceful nuclear energy in The Economist and culminated in the February 2005 Expert Group Report on the multilateral fuel cycle, which summarized existing proposals and offered targeted suggestions based on the current political will of the international community. Discussion continued during a September 2006 IAEA Special Event on a new framework for the nuclear fuel cycle, which discussed current and potential proposals. Since 2006, at least a dozen, mutually complementary proposals for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle have been put forward, many of which build upon plans submitted by IAEA experts over the last 40 years and draw heavily from the Expert Group Report. While developed states have offered strong support for many of the proposals, developing states feel that their needs have not been adequately represented thus far.

In March 2009, donations from Member States met the international financial target necessary to move forward with the proposal to create a multinational fuel bank. In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the first international LEU reserve, operated by the Russian Federation under the IAEA's auspices. This move proved to be controversial and has not been successful in resolving problems facing states. The bloc of developing states continues to allege a double standard, wherein nuclear states have access to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle but seek to deny comparable access to other states. Consequently, some developing states urge a complete multilateralization of the fuel cycle. Second, the current fuel bank only provides fuel if existing supplies are cut off. It does not expand the fuel supply for states, nor does it include additional safeguards to prevent non-proliferation. Third, the IAEA has still not addressed the back-end of the fuel cycle. As recent U.S. counter-terrorism reports have highlighted, nuclear waste can be a devastating weapon.

The main challenge now is to find a framework which can garner consensus from the international community. Two key elements will need to be successfully addressed: Ensuring that states have adequate access to uranium fuel (low enriched uranium or LEU), nuclear reactors, and spent fuel storage facilities, and ensuring that none of these processes endanger the non-proliferation regime. Member States will need to build off existing complementarities between proposed frameworks and achieve a consensus that addresses these issues.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:
- What are the non-proliferation risks associated with the existing multilateral fuel cycle proposals? How can these be mitigated?
- Within the multilateral fuel cycle, what measures will best foster the development of secure nuclear energy in developing countries?
- Which proposals are complementary and can be combined to create a comprehensive strategy? How can the concerns of states on all sides of the issue be resolved?

Bibliography

Congressional Research Service, "2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications," 3 May 2010, online.
ElBaradei, Mohamed, "Towards a Safer World," *The Economist*, 16 October 2003.
International Atomic Energy Agency, "Chairman's Report on New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century: Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation," 2006, online.
"Multinational Fuel Bank Proposal Reaches Key Milestone," *IAEA News Centre*, 6 March 2009, online.
Müller, Harald, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, "Multilateral Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Arrangements," 2005, online.
Rauf, Tariq and Fiona Simpson, "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is It Time for a Multilateral Approach?," *Arms Control Today*, December 2004, online.
Rauf, Tariq and Zoryana Vovchok, "Fuel for Thought," *IAEA Bulletin*, v. 49 no. 2, 2008, online.
"Report on Possible New Framework for Using Nuclear Energy," *IAEA News Centre*, 15 June 2007, online.
Westall, Sylvia, "IAEA Governors Approve First Nuclear Fuel Bank Plan," *Reuters*, 27 November 2009, online.

UN Documents
INFCIRC/782
INFCIRC/760
INFCIRC/759
INFCIRC/758
INFCIRC/755
INFCIRC/728
INFCIRC/708
INFCIRC/667
INFCIRC/659
INFCIRC/640
GOV/INF/2006/10
NPT/CONF.2010/50 (NPT Review Conference 2010 Outcome)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Baruch Plan

Additional Web Resources
www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/FuelCycle/ - Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle
www.iaea.org/INPRO/ - International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles

Belgium v. Senegal: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite

In February 2009, Belgium began proceedings before the International Court of Justice against Senegal claiming that a dispute exists between the two countries because of Senegal's non-compliance with regard to its obligation to prosecute Hissène Habré, the former president of Chad, or to extradite him to Belgium to enact criminal proceedings. Belgium also submitted a request for provisional measures, citing its need to protect its rights pending the court's ruling on the merits of its application.

Belgium asserts that Senegal, where Mr. Habré has been exiled since 1990, has repeatedly ignored requests to prosecute the former Chadian President for crimes against humanity and acts of torture. Given this history of negligence, Belgium asks that Senegal extradite Mr. Habré. Belgium's requests to the Court are based, in part, on complaints brought in Belgian courts by a Belgian national of Chadian origin and various Chadian nationals.

In January of 2000, Mr. Habré was indicted in Dakar for "crimes against humanity acts of torture and Barbarity." The Dakar Court of Appeal eventually dismissed this indictment in July of that year, on the grounds that "Senegalese courts cannot hear acts of torture committed by a foreigner outside Senegalese territory regardless of the nationalities of the victims."

In 2005, Senegalese authorities detained Habré in compliance with an international arrest warrant issued by Belgian authorities. The relevant Senegalese court concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the case, since, insofar as extradition is concerned, Habré has the protection of sovereign immunity as head of the state of Chad when the alleged crimes were committed.

Belgium argues that under international law, Senegal's failure to prosecute Mr. Habré, and the subsequent failure to extradite him to Belgium to answer for his crimes, violates the UN Convention Against Torture, specifically Article 5, paragraph 2; Article 7, paragraph 1; Article 8, paragraph 2; and Article 9, paragraph 1. Belgium asserts that Senegal's failure to extradite Mr. Habré to answer for his crimes also violates Senegal's obligations under customary international law to punish crimes against international humanitarian law and treaty law.

Senegal argues that it should be allowed to continue its efforts to try Mr. Habré in Senegal. As evidence of its good-faith efforts to do so,

Senegal points to alterations in its constitution and domestic laws in 2008 to permit the prosecution of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture, regardless of where the acts occurred. Senegal also submitted that Mr. Habré's immunity as a head of state was revoked in 1993, shortly after he arrived in the country, while noting that the immunity still holds as regards extradition. Senegal has also made attempts to remove the case to the African Union.

Senegal reminds Belgium that the trial of Mr. Habré will involve many hundreds of witnesses scattered across the world and will be prohibitively expensive; accordingly, Senegal is in the process of seeking funding from a variety of sources. Senegal maintains, however, that it is determined to try the case, and that Belgium's request to move toward extradition is depriving Senegal of its rights to try the case under the Convention against Torture. Senegal argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the case since there is no legal dispute over the Convention against Torture; Senegal admits that the Convention obligates it to try Mr. Habré. Senegal has also made statements saying that it will not allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory while there was a present case pending before the court.

As a result of the discrepancies in interpretation and the overturned case in Senegal, Belgium asks that the court find four things:
1. That the court has jurisdiction to hear the dispute between Belgium and Senegal regarding Senegal's compliance with its obligation to prosecute or extradite;
2. Belgium's Application is admissible;
3. Senegal is obligated to bring criminal proceedings against Mr. Habré;
4. Senegal's continued failure to prosecute will legally obligate Senegal to extradite Mr. Habré to Belgium so that he can answer in Belgian courts.

In addition to their request to the court for extradition, Belgium filed a request for the indication of provisional measures, formally requesting the court to "indicate, pending a final judgment on the merits" requirements that the Respondent take "all the steps within its power to keep Mr. Habré under the control and surveillance of the judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly applied." On 28 May 2009, the Court rejected Belgium's request, finding that the potential prejudice to Belgium's rights was not significant enough to justify provisional measures in the face of Senegal's assurances to continue surveillance of Mr. Habré.

Questions to consider include the following:
- What, exactly, are Senegal's and Belgium's rights and obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture?
- Do the facts in this case meet the requirements provided for in the Statute of the ICJ for the indication of provisional measures?
- What is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction over the merits of this case?
- What, if any, is the legal basis for extradition if the state in which the defendant is found is currently attempting to try him within that state?

Bibliography

Bassiouni, M. Cherif and Edward M. Wise, *Aut Dedere, Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law*, 1995.

UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

UN Documents

The Statute of the International Court of Justice

ICJ Application Instituting Proceedings Belgium v. Senegal

Press Communiqué No. 2009/26

Press Communiqué No.2009/21

Press Communiqué No.2009/22

Press Communiqué No.2009/16

Press Communiqué No.2009/14

Press Communiqué No. 2009/13

Additional Web Resources

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=bs&case=144&k=5e – Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)

http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/10/167.html - The Hague Justice Portal

Ecuador v. Colombia: Aerial Herbicide Spraying

On 31 March 2008, Ecuador instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice in an effort to resolve an ongoing dispute between Ecuador and Colombia regarding Colombia's consistent and targeted program of toxic herbicide aerial spraying. At issue in this case are three fundamental claims. First, is the International Court of Justice the appropriate venue to address the grievances Ecuador has brought against Colombia? Second, to what extent, if any, must a nation take responsibility for the direct and/or indirect effect of its actions when the effect crosses international boundaries? Finally, to what extent must these effects be proved before the acting nation can be held responsible and/or liable?

Ecuador argues that Colombia's aerial spraying of toxic herbicides at locations "near, at, and across its border with Ecuador" have caused "serious damage to people, to crops, to animals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier, and poses a grave risk of further damage over time." Ecuador further asserts that repeated efforts to resolve the conflict bilaterally have been rejected by Colombia. Ecuador cites Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, known as the Pact of Bogota, to justify these proceedings. In the Application to Institute Proceedings, Ecuador also claims that the ICJ has jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of Aricle 32 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Ecuador submits three claims to this Court for adjudication. First, Ecuador claims Colombia has violated its obligations under international law by causing or allowing the deposit of toxic herbicides on Ecuadorian territory, causing damage to human health, property, and the environment. Second, Ecuador claims that Colombia, as the responsible party, must take financial responsibility for any loss or damage to human life, property, or the environment. Finally, Ecuador asks this Court to compel Colombia to respect the sovereign and territorial integrity of Ecuador by immediately ceasing the aerial herbicide spraying campaign so that Ecuador incurs no further damages to human health, property, and the environment. Ecuador asserts that the Colombia aerial dispersion program has caused anguish and concern among the populations and settlements in the Ecuadorian border area, given their aforementioned first claim. Furthermore, Ecuador claims that the program has generated increased migration of undocumented Colombians to Ecuador and the displacement of Ecuadorians from that area into the country's interior.

Colombia's program of aerial dispersion of a toxic herbicide is part of a comprehensive plan to eradicate illegal crops. Colombia is targeting illegal coca growers that supply drug trafficking organizations that export the drug as far as the United States and Europe. Colombian aerial dispersion is a part of Plan Colombia, an effort by the Colombia Government that includes ending drug traffficking in Colombia. This program is supported by the United States as a way to prevent drug trafficking into the United States. Colombia authorizes flights that spray high concentrations of glyphosate or Roundup, though the flights remain at least 10 km from the Ecuador border. In response to concerns that aerial dispersion was harmful to Ecuador, Colombia temporarily suspended spraying in the area bordering Ecuador in Janaury 2006. Furthermore, Colombia allowed the United Nations to conduct a study to determine the potential affects of the aerial dispersion campaign on health and the environment near the border of Ecuador. Colombia further agreed to consider the results and determine the appropriate measures to adopt. The preliminary study identified the need for additional studies in April 2006. Dismissing Ecuador's continuing health and environment concerns by citing an Organization of American States study determining the harmlessness of the chemicals used in its aerial dispersion campaign, Colombia resumed its aerial dispersion campaign near the Ecuador border on December 11, 2006. Colombian officials stressed the move as sovereign in nature, compelled by "the inescapable need to eradicate illicit crops" that formed "an essential aspect of the fight against the global drug problem." For the Colombian government, the aerial dispersion campaign is a national security issue that is part of the effort to combat drug-related terrorism financing.

For its part, Colombia asserts that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction to entertain this case because Ecuador has pursued this case in other forums, namely in a series of bilateral talks and three scientific commissions since 2000. One of the bilateral scientific commissions found in favor of Ecuador, while the other two adjourned without conclusion. Colombia further suggests that US involvement in the matter makes the issue one more appropriately addressed under the auspices of the Organization of American States.

Questions to consider include the following:
- Is the International Court of Justice the best forum for these parties to find redress?
- To what extent, if at all, must a nation take responsibility for the direct or indirect effect of its actions when the effect crosses transnational boundaries?
- To what extent must these effects be proved before the acting nation can be held responsible or liable?
- Is the ICJ the proper forum to weigh the right to environmental integrity against the right to pursue security and drug control measures along ones borders?

Bibliography

"Environment and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia," Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States, Washington, D.C.; 31 March 2005.

Organization of American States, "Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador on the Resumption of Spraying of Glyphosate and Auxiliary Substances in a Boarder Area Near Ecuador," No. 4-2-312/06, 20 December 2006.

Organization of American States, "Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Francisco Carrion Mena, to the OAS Permanent Council," Washington, D.C., 9 January 2007.

Organization of American States, "Speech by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia at the Permanent Council Meeting of January 9 2007," Washington, D.C., 9 January 2007.

"Plan Colombia: A Progress Report," Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 22 June 2005.

UN Documents

ICJ Press Release, No. 2008/5

Application Instituting Proceedings," No. 4-4-3/08, 31 March 2008.

Additional Web Resources

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&code=ecol&case=138&k=ee – Aerial Herbicide Spraying

http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/9/285.html - Hague Justice Portal

GEORGIA V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

This case concerns one of the many controversies surrounding the newly independent states created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Georgia is one of these states. Two regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are subjects of significant territorial controversy. Although Georgia claims these regions as part of its sovereign territory, they are under the de facto control of local governments claiming sovereign statehood. With the aid of the Russian military, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been in intermittent conflict with Georgia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Open military hostilities between Russian and Georgian forces in these territories ended with a peace agreement in 1992, which permitted Russian peacekeepers to remain in the contested territories.

The tensions between the regions again came to a head in 2008. On 7 August 2008, Georgian military forces entered the territory of South Ossetia, allegedly in response to a buildup of Russian military forces. On 8 August 2008, military forces from the Russian Federation invaded South Ossetia. A brief armed conflict occurred over the course of the next five days until a cease-fire was negotiated between the Russian and Georgian presidents. The Russian forces had expelled the Georgian military from all of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and had also pressed into Georgian territory. Later that month, only six months after many Western states recognized Kosovo as an independent state, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.

Georgia alleges that Russia's actions throughout the 1990s, and especially in the war of 2008, included the following acts, among others: dislocation of ethnic Georgians from their homes, killing of civilians, and refusal to allow ethnic Georgian refugees to return to their homes. Georgia claims that these acts of violence evidence a consistent and protracted pattern by the Russian government of the ethnic cleansing of these territories in violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Russia's actions are specifically alleged to have violated Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention. Both Georgia and Russia are parties to CERD without reservation (Russia is a party by succession, as the USSR was a party to the treaty, and Russia assumed the USSR's treaty obligations).

The Georgian government considers South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be independently administered territories within the overall sovereignty of Georgia, yet remains concerned about the rights of significant numbers of ethnic Georgians living in these territories. Georgia claims jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD, which permits either party to a CERD dispute to refer the dispute to the ICJ under certain circumstances.

Russia's main point is that this case is not an issue of racial discrimination but of military aggression and self-determination. On the merits of the case, Russia argues that the principle of self-determination, embodied in the UN Charter and various international conventions, permits the separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia—both majorities—to secede from the state of Georgia. Russia also claims that the obligations of Articles 2 and 5 of CERD do not apply extraterritorially but are instead obligations only required of a state within its own sovereign territory. Additionally, Russia claims that the 2008 wars began as a result of Georgian aggression in the contested territories, and that characterizing Russia as the aggressor in the war is a political response related to Georgia's expressed intentions to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Russia also contests the jurisdiction of the Court, arguing that the issues in controversy do not fall within Article 22 of CERD because they are not questions involving the application or interpretation of the treaty. Russia also notes that for the approximately 20 years of its independent existence, Georgia has failed to mention violations of CERD in Georgian-Russian relations or any Georgian communications with the UN or the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Russia claims that referral to the ICJ is indicated in Article 22 of CERD as a last resort, utilized only after all other measures provided for under CERD (including referral to the Committee and negotiation between the parties) have been exhausted.

By a vote of 8 to 7, on 15 October 2008, the Court promulgated an order of provisional measures directing both Russia and Georgia to cease acts violating CERD and allow for humanitarian assistance in the contested territories. The Court noted that it has a basis for jurisdiction sufficient to order provisional measures but reserved a final determination on jurisdiction and on the merits of the case. This final determination is now before the Court.

Questions to consider include the following:
- How should the Court resolve the conflict between self-determination and territorial integrity?
- What is the scope of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 22 of the CERD?
- What is the scope of a state's obligations under the CERD?

Bibliography

Dawar, Anil et al., "Russia Battles Georgia over Breakaway Region of South Ossetia," *The Guardian* (London), 8 August 2008.

Human Rights Watch, *Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Georgia – South Ossetia Conflict*, April 1992.

Lerner, Natan, *The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, 1980.

Oakley, Robin, *Policing and Minorities in the Russian Federation: Key International Guidance Documents and Case Studies*, 2008.

Zürcher, Christoph, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus*, 2007.

UN Documents

ICJ Press Release 2008/23

ICJ Press Release 2008/35

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (with special attention to Articles 2, 5 and 22)

Additional Web Resources

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&code=GR&case=140&k=4d – Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

AMUN REPRESENTATIVE DANCE

Deep down, do you want to be a *Real Housewife™*, vacation in the Hamptons, moonlight as a golf pro, or play tennis with a cardigan tied around your neck? If you do, then this dance theme's for you; you can try out the outfits and the affectations without judgment. Well. . . maybe not without judgment, for the country club gossip is vicious, but at least without getting weird looks for sporting argyle and a pink polo shirt.

Dance will be held on Monday, 22 November.

Professional DJ will be provided.

It isn't too early to start thinking about the 2011 AMUN

Committee on the Agenda

What will AMUN Discuss in 2011?

There's a lot going on in the world. Of the hundreds of issues the United Nations agenda covers each year, AMUN must decide which topics to discuss over the course of one weekend. Would you like to be a part of this decision making process? Do you have a burning issue that you want to recommend for next year's agenda? Would you like the opportunity to review AMUN's preliminary suggestions and provide feedback? Then come to the Committee on the Agenda meeting and contribute your suggestions for topics to be discussed at the 2011 AMUN Conference!

The Committee on the Agenda will meet on Sunday, 21 November

Each school is *highly encouraged* to send at least one representative to this important meeting.

ALWAYS REMEMBER

The Good the United Nations Achieves

"Learn from yesterday, live for today, and hope for tomorrow."
- Albert Einstein

American Model United Nations
1212 N. Columbian Avenue
Oak Park, IL 60302
mail@amun.org
www.amun.org

American Model United Nations International