



THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1993

Members of the Historical Security Council of 1993:

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ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The 2010 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 23 May 1993. The events of 1993 demonstrated the compelling urgency for the United Nations (UN) to promote three underlying goals of its efforts: peace, development and democracy. In the words of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, “these goals must be interlocking and mutually reinforcing.”

During the early months of 1993, UN peace operations in the field, most prominently in Cambodia, El Salvador, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, ranged beyond the traditional notion and definition of peace-keeping, as they took on political, social, humanitarian, and environmental dimensions. The concept of development also adopted an integrated approach; it was no longer merely a matter of economic policy and resources. Development meant social and cultural nation-building and took into account educational and environmental imperatives.

AMUN’s HSC is unique not only in its topics, but also in its treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC’s media and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council’s simulation begins. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role-playing for an HSC member-state will be not just a rote replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1993. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations, and reevaluations, of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government made in 1993 was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must by definition be in character, it is not a sure thing that given a second opportunity to look at events, any given national government would do things exactly the same way. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for “second chances.” It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country’s national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues, which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation.

While national governments often did not want international meddling’ in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in solving crises. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the member states’ national characters.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. One major factor in whether or not to be actively involved or to be a bystander which representatives must consider is the costs of peacekeeping with the deployment of regional missions. The increase in costs often caused the Security Council to reprioritize their peacekeeping efforts.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through 23 May 1993, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The changes of the past 11 years will not be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview,

Representatives should pursue periodicals from late 1992 through May of 1993 to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the New York Times Index, should provide a much better ‘historical perspective’ and ‘feel for the times’ than later historical texts, which can also be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives’ policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible.

In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation’s Representative to the UN. This person may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their country, or they may be relatively “in the dark” on their countries moment-to-moment actions in the world. In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation’s spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make.

Representatives must, however, always consult with the simulation staff before making ANY operational statements. Operational

statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the U.N. In these cases, the simulation staff would be equated with the actual 'home office' of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time.

Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee/Council, preferably

with a second Representative who can cover that Committee/Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 23 May 1993. The prominent events of early 1993 are discussed, as well as some questions which may face the Security Council through mid 1993. This research is intended merely as a starting point for Representatives continued exploration of the topics.

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu is long standing with roots back in Belgian rule. The Belgians first chose to govern Rwanda through the preferential treatment and empowerment of the Tutsis; however this favored status switched to Hutus several years later and further complicated relations. In 1962 Rwanda was granted independence, a Hutu revolution installed a new president, and the next decade was marked by the massacre of Tutsis. In 1973 General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power and pledged to restore order; however the establishment of a one-party state, ethnic quotas, and preferential treatment of Hutus did little to bridge the ethnic divide. To further exacerbate poor social conditions, Rwanda's economy experienced a harsh shock in 1989 when coffee prices fell dramatically; Rwanda's primary export products are coffee and tea, and the falling prices have caused severe economic hardship throughout the country.

Economic, ethnic, and political tensions began to peek in Rwanda at the beginning of the decade. In 1990 the Hutu government in Rwanda began receiving pressure from the Tutsi refugee diaspora living in Uganda. In the sixties many Tutsi fled across the border into Uganda to escape political persecution. Over the last thirty years resentment and the desire to return home among these Tutsi refugees has been growing. In 1990 a new group among the refugees emerged called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Many RPF members were former members of the Ugandan military or had fought in the recent Ugandan civil war. The RPF became increasingly angry with the Habyarimana government after it failed to follow through on promises to restore a democratic state and repatriate the estimated 500,000 Tutsi diaspora. Tensions came to a head on 1 October 1990 when RPF forces invaded from Uganda. Despite fewer numbers, the RPF, which had more experience and training, made significant progress against the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). Before the RPF was able to reach Kigali, the Rwandan government called upon Belgium, France, and Zaire for military and financial assistance. It was for this reason that the RPF offensive was unable to successively overtake Rwanda.

In response to the RPF's invasion, Rwandan government forces launched a massive counter-offensive with heavy military equipment. The RPF was unprepared to contend with heavy military resistance for a prolonged conflict and was ultimately repelled. For the next several years, the Rwandan government created and trained civilian

militias known as Interhamwe which began a campaign of killing Tutsi civilians in response to the RPF attacks. After suffering heavy losses the RPF, now under Paul Kagame's leadership, pulled back to the border with Uganda, reorganized, and multiplied its forces. The war continued for almost two years until a cease-fire agreement was signed 12 July 1992, in Arusha, Tanzania. This agreement set a timetable for the cessation of hostilities, promoted political talks, had the goal of arranging a peace accord with power-sharing, and authorized the Organization for African Unity (OAU) as a neutral military observer.

In a February 5 letter to the Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, President Habyarimana argued that the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi was the inevitable result of the RPF invasion. On February 8, the RPF violated the cease-fire, reached the outskirts of Kigali, and drove Rwandan troops south. French forces were once again called upon to come to the Rwandan government's aid. Meanwhile, Rwandan soldiers took vengeance on Tutsi civilians and opponents of the regime. They killed at least 147 persons and beat, tortured and raped many more. They burned and looted hundreds of homes and businesses. In some communes, the military even distributed arms to groups of civilians whom supported the President. Approximately 350,000 displaced Rwandans were being fed and sheltered in camps in the northern part of the country.

After hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February, the number of displaced persons escalated to nearly one million. Calculating the need for 13,000 tons of food a month, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a warning of a major catastrophe and increased its budget for Rwanda eightfold. On 22 February, Uganda and Rwanda sent separate letters to the President of the UN Security Council asking for the deployment of UN military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, specifically arms transportation. In response, the Secretary-General sent a goodwill mission from 4 to 18 March.

Meanwhile, efforts by the OAU and Tanzania led to a meeting between the warring factions from 5 to 7 March in Dar es Salaam. In a joint communiqué, the two sides agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and to resume peace talks in Arusha. In a speech to military commanders in Mid-March President Habyarimana suggested that

the RPF itself was to blame for the massacres. On 12 March 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 812 (1993), called on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to respect the renewed ceasefire and requested the Secretary-General to examine the requests of Rwanda and Uganda for the deployment of observers. A technical mission was dispatched to the border area of Uganda from 2 to 5 April and Rwanda on 6 April. The mission reported that it would be possible to deploy UN military observers to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it. However, because RPF control of the border area was extensive, the military observers had to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border.

The Arusha talks convened on 16 March. As the result of a request by the President of Rwanda to the Secretary-General, the UN launched an inter-agency appeal on 15 April for international assistance to Rwanda for \$78 million to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people, approximately 13% of the population. An inter-agency mission was fielded between 18 and 25 March to prepare a consolidated appeal focusing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education. During April, the only public statements the Rwandan government made were to deny the existence of any 'death Squads' and deny that any of the massacres of February and March were planned. On 20 May, the Secretary-General formally recommends the establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- How can international assistance best be used to help the people of Rwanda?
- If this is an internal conflict, should the UN become involved?
- How critical is UN involvement to the future peace in Rwanda?
- If violence continues, what action can and should be taken?
- How can the UN help reconcile the differences between the two warring parties?

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S/RES/812 (12 Mar 1993)

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

In the aftermath of decolonization, Somalia has experienced persistent internal warfare accompanied by poor social and economic conditions. More recently political, social, and economic conditions have been rapidly deteriorating. In January of 1991 the United Somalia Congress, a coalition of opposing clans, took over political control of Somalia. However, Continuing internal conflict between the Somali National Movement (SNM), General Mohamed Farrah Aidid's party, and other factions resulted in a lack of a recognized central government and a collapse of state. Since the collapse of state, food sup-

plies have become a precious resource in Somalia. Warring between clans, poor economic and social conditions, as well as a wide spread draught have destroyed the agricultural system within Somalia resulting in wide spread famine and the starvations deaths of at least three hundred thousand Somalis since 1991. Control of food supplies has been used by the militias to buy the loyalty of local leaders, and it is commonplace for internationally supplied food to be stolen and exchanged for weapons.

On 3 March 1992, the leaders of opposing factions signed a ceasefire agreement which also allowed for the UN to deploy a monitoring mission into Somalia which oversaw arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance to the region. In July, fifty UN military observers were sent to Mogadishu to monitor conditions in accordance with the ceasefire agreement. The Security Council approved the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) on 24 April with Resolution 751, and on 15 August the UN's humanitarian "Operation Provide Relief" commenced. However, due to insufficient security the UN was unable to provide food and supplies to starving Somalis. Relief efforts were unsuccessful as flights were looted, food convoys hijacked, and aid workers assaulted. UNOSOM I was regarded as a failure and with Resolution 794 the Security Council called upon UN member nations to contribute military forces to help establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

In December President George H. W. Bush responded to the UN's request and proposed that United States forces lead an international UN force to meet the UN's request. The US would enter Somalia to provide a secure environment so that international food aid could reach the starving population, and would then turn over leadership of the operation to UN peacekeeping forces. The UN accepted this plan on 5 December, and 25,000 US troops supplemented by 17,000 troops from over twenty countries were ordered into Somalia. This United Task Force (UNITAF) was named "Operation Restore Hope."

On 9 December 1992, UNITAF forces landed on the coast of Mogadishu without opposition. Within days, forces had taken the airfield at Baledogle and also Baidoa. While UNITAF forces were proceeding with their objectives of securing key installations and providing for the open and safe passage of food and relief supplies, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali began a campaign of national reconciliation for Somalia. A conference for reconciliation and unity was assembled by the Secretary-General from 4 to 15 January 1993 and representatives from fourteen Somali political movements were in attendance. By the end of the conference, three agreements had been reached: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993; the Agreement On Implementing The Cease-fire And On Modalities Of Disarmament, and; the Agreement On The Establishment Of An Ad Hoc Committee.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted his recommendation to the Security Council that the UN-led UNOSOM II replace UNITAF as the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in resolution 814 on 26 March 1993 and officially succeeded UNITAF on 4 May 1993. UNOSOM II would seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF. To that end, a military component of 20,000 troops to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel for logistic support was required, along with a civilian staff of approximately 2,800. The mandate of UNOSOM II extended beyond humanitarian relief and carried enhanced enforcement powers. Nation building was at the heart of UNOSOM II and critical to the operation were the disarmament of the Somali people, restoring law and order, restoring infrastructure, and establishing a representative government. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the com-

mitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. Additionally, all States were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under resolution 733. The Secretary-General also identified three major challenges facing the UN in 1993: “facilitating the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons; providing jobs for the millions of unemployed Somalis, including members of armed gangs, militias and various private armies; and helping the Somalis in rebuilding their society and rehabilitating the decayed infrastructure.”

To meet these challenges, the UN established a Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for the war- and drought-ravaged country which was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Some 190 Somali representatives, as well as senior representatives of donor Governments, international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs attended the Conference. The Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. On 27 March 1993, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia; the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants. The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. As the situation stand now in May, however, implementation of the agreement has stalled and militias are again maneuvering for positions of power and fighting has renewed.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective include the following:

- How effective is UNOSOM II compared to UNOSOM I? What can be done to increase the effectiveness?
- Are there other ways in which the UN could better address the challenges identified by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali?
- How should the UN respond to escalating violence? Would this have a positive or negative impact on your country’s willingness to contribute troops and funding?

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 S/RES/733 (23 Jan 1992)
 Presidential Statement, 16 Oct 1992.

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Haiti’s most recent political problems stem from the coup d’état which deposed the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September of 1991. Reaction to the coup was violent and soon Haiti was plunged into disorder and violence. From the onset of the coup the Organization of American States (OAS) with the help of the UN has worked to bring stability and peace back to Haiti and reinstate the presidency of Aristide. All negotiation efforts thus far, however, have been a failure. The political unrest has caused a great humanitarian crisis within Haiti. The coup government under General Raoul Cédras has committed numerous civil rights violations. Civil rights violations over the past year and a half have included among other things the unlawful detention, torture, and execution of Haitian citizens who either supported or were suspected of supporting the Aristide presidency. Citizens in throughout the country were harassed and threatened on a daily basis. The climate of fear throughout Haiti has caused a massive displacement issue as an estimated 300,000 Haitians have been forced to flee from their homes. In addition to the internally displaced, tens of thousands of Haitians have also attempted to leave Haiti for neighboring nations.

In March 1993, the United Nations and OAS launched a consolidated appeal for a humanitarian plan of action designed to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the Haitian people. In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Assembly establish the United Nations component of the joint International Civilian Mission in Haiti. The United Nations component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component.

On 20 April 1993 the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/20B approving the Secretary-General’s report and authorizing the United Nations participation, jointly with OAS, in the International Civilian Mission to Haiti. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy with a view to resolving the political crisis in Haiti. It also reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the de facto regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament that took place in January 1993, would be considered illegitimate.

Envoys of the Clinton Administration and the United Nations have since arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti for talks with the country's military leaders. Diplomatic talks have centered on the planned deployment of about 500 foreign police officers in Haiti to create an international police force, seen by some as a crucial final element to reaching a negotiated settlement. The drive to deploy the police force, led by the United Nations mediator for Haiti, Dante Caputo, and President Clinton's special advisor on Haitian affairs, Lawrence A. Pezzullo, has been repeatedly delayed, however, by negotiations with President Aristide, many of whose supporters are opposed to any armed international presence in Haiti.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- How crucial is the presence of an international police force to maintain order?
- If President Aristide will not agree to an international peace presence, what other actions can be taken to ensure peace?
- If political talks are fruitless, what actions can the UN take to address the urgent humanitarian situation in Haiti?

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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia left the world with an increasingly volatile situation that was both political and humanitarian in nature. The once loosely held together ethnic groups now left to their own devices began to wage war upon each other over centuries of ethnic and religious grievances. At the seat of the most heated violence sat the newly independent nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From its conception Bosnia was fraught with civil war. Immediately after independence was granted in 1992, Serb National Forces barricaded themselves around the city of Sarajevo and began wage artillery attacks on the city. Serb forces and internal Ethnic Serbian Militias within Bosnia working for a larger Serbian homeland also began a systematic invasion and takeover of much of the rural land within Bosnia-Herzegovina. As part of their crusade, Serbian forces forced all non-Serbs out of the territory they controlled creating thousands of refugees. In addition reports of ethnic violence against non-Serbs, particularly Muslims, began surfacing in early 1992. By the end of 1992 Serbian Forces controlled 70% of Bosnia creating a political and humanitarian emergency of increasing urgency.

In response to the growing humanitarian situation and political unrest the UN authorized the creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with resolution 743 on 21 February 1992. UNPROFOR's original mandate was to ensure conditions for peace talks and to help maintain peace in several UN designated "safe zones". UN peacekeepers were successful in securing humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia, but little was accomplished in the way of

securing the peace. To place more political pressure on the region the Security Council imposed a series of economic sanctions against what remained of Yugoslavia starting in May of 1992. The sanctions imposed were stringer than any other sanctions levied by the Security Council to date. All import, export, and transport to and from Yugoslavia were forbidden; monetary transactions of any sort were strictly curtailed; all social and cultural contracts were broken off; and diplomatic representation was drastically reduced. Though the sanctions succeeded on bringing to bear harsh economic consequences for Yugoslavia, the war and the humanitarian conflict still dragged on unabated.

In an effort to bring peace to the region the UN along with the European Union sent a negotiation team led by two men: David Owen and Cyrus Vance. In late 1992 the team unveiled what was to be known as the Vance-Owen peace plan. Debate over the plan reached into the spring of 1993. Muslim and Croat faction agreed to the plan after further negotiation, but the plan ran into problems while negotiating Serbian support. The US became highly critical of the plan claiming that its provisions rewarded the Serbs for their aggression. The US instead lobbied for a "lift and strike" plan which involved editing the terms of the arms embargo to provide weapons support for the Muslim and Croat soldiers as well as using US and NATO air forces to conduct air raids on Serbian forces. The US plan, however, failed to gain any support within the Council. With the threat of US force off the table, the Serbs saw no need to agree to the Vance-Owen plan and the plan collapsed in mid May.

With the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan new levels of violence have erupted within Bosnia. Muslim and Croat forces that had been united in an uneasy alliance against the Serbs are now starting to war with each other. Despite calls by the Security Council and UNPROFOR, hostilities between the two former allies have continued. The fighting has intermittently blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and has further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNCHR in the area.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- The war within Bosnia is multifaceted. Which aspects are the most important or urgent to deal with?
- How can the UN better address the humanitarian emergency in Bosnia?
- What policies will better advance the situation towards peace that is acceptable for all involved parties?
- How can the UN leverage Serbian interests towards peace?
- How can the UN continue to fund UNPROFOR along with its other current peacekeeping operations?

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S/RES/776 (14 Sept 1992)

S/RES/777 (19 Sept 1992)

S/RES/779 (6 Oct 1992)

S/RES/781 (9 Oct 1992)

S/RES/786 (10 Nov 1992)

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S/RES/819 (16 Apr 1993)

S/RES/816 (31 Mar 1993)

S/RES/815 (31 Mar 1993)

S/RES/808 (22 Feb 1993)

S/RES/807 (19 Feb 1993)

S/RES/802 (25 Jan 1993)

S/25700 Report to the Security Council

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As of 1993 three peace-keeping operations remained in place in the region: two peace-keeping forces, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Headquartered at Jerusalem, with liaison offices at Amman, Jordan, and Beirut, Lebanon, UNTSO's 57 unarmed military observers continued to assist UNDOF and UNIFIL in performing their tasks. UNTSO also manned five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and operated four mobile teams in the Israeli-controlled section of the UNIFIL area.

Late 1992 saw a brief period of renewed Iraqi aggression which included several small incursions by Iraqi troops into the demilitarized zone along the border with Kuwait in an attempt to recapture munitions and supplies left behind during the Iraqi withdrawal. Renewed Iraqi aggression led to the Security Council condemnation of Iraq, followed by a series of United States, United Kingdom, and French air raids in Iraqi anti-missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq. Following the implementation of the air raids the Security Council

authorized the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM, the peace keeping force along the border) to take direct physical action in response to any future violation of the demilitarized zone in res 806 on 5 February 1993.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- What is your country's position regarding the air raids being conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France?
- How much concern is the renewed Iraqi aggression along the Kuwaiti border?

TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL

In response to increased violence in the territories, and two specific killings of an Israeli citizen on 28 March and two Israeli policemen on 30 March, Israel imposed complete closure of the territories on 31 March. The closure decision has effectively divided the territories into five distinct areas: Gaza, the northern West Bank, the southern West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan Heights. The closure has created unprecedented hardship on the population of the territories, a majority of whom already live below the poverty line. Special permits are required for entry into Jerusalem and Israel as well as for travel between the West Bank and Gaza and within the West Bank itself. The measure has had a serious negative impact on commerce, medical care, education and access to services, including those provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What is your country's position on Israel's closure decision?
- What should be done to alleviate the suffering of the populations who have been adversely impacted by the closure decision?
- What can be done to restore unfettered access to UNRWA services?

KURDISH RELIEF PROGRAM

In a letter sent to the president of the Security Council on 21 May Secretary General Boutros-Ghali indicated that the Iraqi Government has agreed to extend the accord under which the United Nations provides relief assistance to the Iraqi Kurds for another six months. But he also warned that unless the United Nations receives more money and food from donor countries, he would be forced to suspend the whole relief program in Iraq as well as in the Kurdish controlled northern areas by the end of May or mid June. Donor countries failed to respond to his April 1992 appeal for \$490 million to pay for another year of the relief program. Because of this shortage of money, the Secretary General indicated that he has already been forced to cut 50 guards from the 136-member United Nations force tasked with protecting relief workers in northern Iraq. He warned that the remaining guards would be withdrawn by mid-June unless new financing was found.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- How does the lack of monetary and food aid affect the Kurdish relief program? Can this be changed?

- Given the other issues facing the Council how urgent is the problem of supplying a guard force for the relief workers in northern Iraq?

SANCTIONS ON THE LYBIAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (the Arab Maghreb Union), in an 8 April letter to the President of the Security Council, urged the Council to reconsider its resolutions so that the embargo and restrictions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, resulting from the Pan Am 103 incident, could be lifted, with a view to ending the suffering and eliminating the risks inherent in the continued application or strengthening of sanctions.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- Are the sanctions being imposed on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya fair?

UN Documents

S/RES/ 806 (5 Feb 1993)

S/RES/803 (28 Jan 1993)

THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

Cambodia has suffered from civil war and ethnic violence for decades. Following the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978 and the fall of the Khmer Rouge as the official government, in 1981 Cambodia was left in a state of disarray with no fewer than four factions vying for power. The two main players in the conflict consisted of the ousted Khmer Rouge now the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) and the new founded leftist government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The PRK claimed political control of Cambodia, but official recognition of the PRK in the UN was halted by the United States, China, and the United Kingdom who all favored the Khmer Rouge's PDK and its ousted dictator, Pol Pot. As a result the PRK became the defector government of Cambodia. Though, it is important to note that UN representation was still held by representatives of the Khmer Rouge. The political conflict between the different parties vying for power resulted in heavy violence throughout Cambodia. In addition to the political strife, ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia were targeted in a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

The situation in Cambodia was first considered by the United Nations Security early in 1979. Later in the same year, the General Assembly considered the question at its regular session and adopted the first in a long series of resolutions on the subject. In the subsequent resolutions the UN tasked the Secretary General of monitoring the situation and using his office to help in the promotion of peace. Resolutions also provided for the Secretary General to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts for the Cambodia people.

Some progress was made in 1991 with the signing of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict on 23 October in Paris. The agreement held provisions for, among other things, the organization of elections, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and the rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure. To bolster the implementation of the

Paris Agreement the Security Council, in full cooperation with the PRK, approved the creation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with the passage of resolution 745 on 28 February 1992. With UNTAC in place movement was made towards establishing elections and restoring order.

With the passage of resolution 783 on 13 October 1992, the Security Council officially expressed its support for elections in Cambodia to be carried out no later than May of 1993. And in March of 1993, the SC endorsed the proposed election dates starting 23 May. As the election process moved forward, violence continued. The Khmer Rouge continued to attack ethnic Vietnamese within Cambodia. Attacks were also waged against UNTAC peacekeepers, some of which brought fatalities. Electoral campaigning began on 5 April as scheduled. During the six week campaign period, scores of political meetings and rallies attended by tens of thousands of people took place without major incident through the country. UNTAC civilian police monitored these rallies, and also provided protection for political party offices considered to be most at risk. On 13 April the PDK declared that it would not be participating in the elections. Subsequently, the PDK closed its offices in Phnom Penh and withdrew from the capital. The PDK also vowed to disrupt voting on election days.

On 15 May, in his final pre-election report to the Security Council, the Secretary General outlined the security measures that have been taken to protect polling in the elections. By mid-May all necessary electoral equipment and supplies, including the ballot papers and boxes, have been delivered to Cambodia under heavy guard. Training is under way for some 900 International Polling Station Officers from 44 countries and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 130 more from the United Nations Secretariat and 370 more within UNTAC, as well as for more than 50,000 Cambodian electoral staff. The PRK, through its political party the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) raised questions about some of the technical preparations but pledged its confidence in UNTAC's electoral work.

On 20 May 1993, in resolution 820, the Security Council expressed its satisfaction with the arrangements made for the conduct of elections, deplored all acts of non-cooperation with the Paris Agreements and condemned all acts of violence committed on political and ethnic grounds, as well as intimidation of and attacks on UNTAC personnel. It expressed full support for the measures taken by UNTAC to protect the polls and reminded all Cambodian parties of their obligation to comply fully with the election results. 21 May saw more attacks on UNTAC peacekeepers and more fatalities. In response the Security Council released a Presidential Statement condemning the attacks and urging the Cambodian people exercise their right to vote. Due to the increasing violence perpetrated by the PDK, UNTAC personnel have recently decided to cancel planned polling in areas controlled or heavily concentrated with PDK armed forces.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How should the UN respond if violence surrounding the elections increases and prevents large numbers from voting?
- What steps should be taken to ensure that the election results are accepted by all parties concerned without major objection?
- What support should the UN provide if the election results result in more violence and chaos?

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The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, United Nations: New York, 1995.

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S/RES/826 (20 May 1993)
S/RES/810 (8 Mar 1993)
S/RES/792 (30 Nov 1993)
S/RES/783 (13 Oct 1993)

Additional Web Resources

Cambodian Information Center: Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict: http://www.cambodia.org/facts/Paris_Peace_Agreement_10231991.php
Cambodia National Assembly: Historical Archives of Parliamentary Election Results 1993 Archives: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2051_93.htm

OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT

On 30 January 1992, eight years after acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) finally signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) allowing for inspections of nuclear facilities. Inspections were set to begin in June of 1992, however problems soon inhibited progress. Negotiations to establish a bilateral inspection regime, a part of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) established by the previous Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on 20 January 1992, were stalled and going nowhere. In addition the IAEA had questions as to the validity of the levels of plutonium production being disclosed by the DPRK. In early 1993 the IAEA requested access to two previously unreported facilities that were expected of holding nuclear waste, but the DPRK refused access. In a response to the stalled bilateral inspection regime creation and the accusations of the IAEA, on 12 March 1993 the DPRK announced its intentions to withdraw from the NPT. The announcement effectively brought all progress in the region to a halt and increased tensions between the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States.

The Security Council met to address the problem of the DPRK's threat to withdraw from the NPT on 11 May 1993. The Council invited both the DPRK and the ROK to participate in the discussion. In a response the DPRK released a statement asserting that the Council had neither legal nor technical grounds to address what it deemed a fictitious nuclear problem. The statement also reiterated the DPRK's intent to withdraw from the NPT citing the increasing nuclear threats from the United States and what it saw as the United States' manipulation of the IAEA. Despite the DPRK's objections the Council passed resolution 825 calling for the DPRK to reconsider its intention to withdraw from the NPT and to reopen its country to IAEA inspections. The DPRK characterized the resolution as

unreasonable and rejected it as interference in its international affairs and an infringement on its sovereignty.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- How can the Council defuse the anger of the DPRK and get it back to the negotiating table?
- What further efforts can be made to get the DPRK to abide by the terms of both the NPT and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?

PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

On 14 May, the United Nations announced to the world that peacekeeping costs were expected to rise by more than a third this year to \$3.7 billion. The failure of member nations to pay their share of peacekeeping costs serves as a major problem and an exacerbating influence. Serious doubts exist as to the United Nations' ability to finance future operations and adequately sustain peace efforts already under way. The current Somali mission is expected to cost \$1.2 billion a year. and if the Serbs in Bosnia can be persuaded to accept an international peace plan, the United Nations plans to deploy some 70,000 troops to the area, a mission that could cost \$2 billion a year. By the end of April unpaid peacekeeping dues amounted to \$1.5 billion. It is also important to note that there also exists a \$970 million shortfall in unpaid dues for the regular budget.

Adding to the problem, developing countries have joined in criticism of the United Nations for failing to fully reimburse them for the costs of the peacekeeping troops they provide. Some member nations are withdrawing their peacekeeping troops and refusing to participate in new peacekeeping operations.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective include the following:

- How can the UN better enforce the collection of past due amounts and current costs?
- How can the UN calm the anger of the countries threatening to withdraw their troops and not support future operations?
- What impact will the budget shortfall have on your decisions to create or extend peacekeeping operations?

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S/RES/822 (30 Apr 1993)
S/RES/818 (14 Apr 1993)
S/RES/813 (26 Mar 1993)
S/RES/809 (2 Mar 1993)
S/RES/805 (4 Feb 1993)
S/RES/825 (11 May 1993)