




**20<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL  
AMERICAN MODEL UNITED NATIONS  
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE**



**ISSUES AT AMUN**



**TWENTY YEARS OF IMAGINING A  
MORE PEACEFUL TOMORROW**



**CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
21 - 24 NOVEMBER 2009**

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
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# INTRODUCTION

The *Issues at AMUN Handbook* is published to assist Representatives in their preparations for the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Conference. When combined with students own research on the nations they represent and the topics of discussion, this handbook provides Representatives with all the substantive information they will require to function effectively at the simulation. Its sister handbook, *AMUN Rules and Procedures*, provides an overview of the Committee/Council rules and Conference logistics with which Representatives need to familiarize themselves for the simulation.

The following pages contain brief overviews of the topics to be discussed in the Committees and Councils at the 2009 Conference. These are intended as a guideline and basis for Representatives' further research of the issues involved. In keeping with this, each overview includes a bibliography to guide Representatives to appropriate sources of additional information.

The overviews give a brief background into each topic and state some areas of current United Nations (UN) and international activity on the topic. In many cases, the overviews will frame the topic in terms of a few, limited aspects of a complex issue. For example, the general issue of "the environment" has dozens of sub-issues — in such a case, the overview may direct Representatives to concentrate their research on "Ozone Depletion" and "Limiting the Destruction of the Rain Forests," only two of the many smaller issues. This format allows Representatives to go into greater detail in their preparations, without the need to research all aspects of the multifaceted main issue.

AMUN's philosophy in providing these topic overviews is to give Representatives *direction* in their research, but to leave the work up to them. **These overviews are not intended to be the sole source of Representatives' research on the topics prior to the Conference.**

In addition, *Chapter I - The United Nations* provides essential background information to give all Representatives a common orientation to the history of the UN. This section begins with the origins of the UN and covers some important points about the organization. Finally, the chapter focuses on problems confronting the UN today.

## USE OF THE INTERNET

Many of the works cited in this *Issues at AMUN Handbook* are resources located on the internet. Full text of many periodical sources are available to AMUN participants on-line. Please visit AMUN's homepage at [www.amun.org](http://www.amun.org) for a full list of recommended research links.

Three on-line sources of particular note are the United Nations homepage ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org)), the *New York Times* on-line ([www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com)), and the *UNWire*, ([www.smartbrief.com/un\\_wire/](http://www.smartbrief.com/un_wire/)). *UNWire* is a daily briefing on UN issues provided by the United Nations Foundation; note that *UNWire* articles published prior to August 2004 can be found at [www.unwire.org](http://www.unwire.org). These sources are heavily referenced throughout the issues briefings in this handbook. Most documents cited in these bibliographies can be found with the help of an internet search engine. For a more thorough discussion of on-line research sources, see "Utilizing the Internet" on page 11 of the *AMUN Rules and Procedures Handbook*.

## THE PURVIEW OF EACH SIMULATION

Each simulation's background guide contains a brief overview of that simulation's purview. This provides a general outline of the types of discussions each simulation might have on the topics in question. This is extremely important in the UN system, where a variety of different Committees and Councils may discuss different aspects of an international problem. Representatives should exercise great care in researching a topic, so that their deliberations can focus on the piece of the problem considered within their simulation's purview. These purview briefs are guidelines for the discussions of each body.

An excellent example of this shifting focus among Committees and Councils is the Palestinian question. The First Committee might discuss aspects of the situation dealing with weapons shipments. At the same time, the Second Committee may discuss a variety of financing initiatives to help the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, the Third Committee, or in some cases the Economic and Social Council, might discuss the social and humanitarian considerations that arise from Israeli occupation of various territories. And the Sixth Committee may discuss the legal aspects of treaty violations in the region if this is specifically encompassed in one of that Committee's topics. Only the GA Plenary Session would discuss the problem in its entirety, including the possible creation of a legal Palestinian State or member status for that State. The Security Council would deal with any appropriate peace and security issues that arose on the situation. Clearly, different aspects of a single problem are regularly discussed in different bodies. More importantly, at the UN, delegations are typically careful to *only* discuss those aspects relevant to their own Committee/Council, leaving other aspects to others in their delegation.





# CHAPTER ONE

## THE UNITED NATIONS

Representatives participating in American Model United Nations should be familiar with the history of the United Nations, as well as the rapidly changing role the organization plays in international affairs. This section provides a brief background on the UN system and on some of the issues it faces today.

### ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations came into existence on 24 October 1945. On that day, the United Nations Charter became operative, having been signed by the fifty-one original Members. The concept of all nations uniting together in one organization designed to settle disputes peacefully was born of the desire of civilized nations to avoid the horrors produced by the First and Second World Wars. The United Nations developed as a successor to the League of Nations, which represented the first attempt by nations to achieve this unity. The League failed in large part because the United States never joined as a member.

In 1942, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt first coined the term “United Nations,” when the Declaration of the United Nations was signed by forty-seven nations in support of the Atlantic Charter. In 1944, the United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China met in Washington, DC at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the first blueprint of the United Nations was prepared. In 1945, the final details for the United Nations were worked out at the Yalta Conference. Fifty-one nations gathered from 24 April through 26 June in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the United Nations, which was signed on 26 June 1945.

### PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The primary purposes for which the United Nations was founded are detailed in Chapter I, Article 1 of the Charter. These are

1. To maintain international peace and security;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language and religion;
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

### HOW THE UNITED NATIONS SEEKS TO ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSE

Since 1945, the United Nations has established itself as a forum for discussing international disputes. Also, Member States recognize that the United Nations has an established machinery which can be utilized to solve international problems. The United Nations seeks,

both through its principal organs and various subsidiary bodies, to settle disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force. It should be recognized that the United Nations is not a world government, nor does it “legislate.” Rather, the actions of the United Nations, as evidenced by resolutions passed by its bodies, have a strong moral persuasive effect. The Member States frequently find it within their own best interests to follow UN recommendations.

### STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has six primary bodies:

**The General Assembly (GA):** The GA is the central organ of the United Nations. The GA has been described as the nearest thing to a “parliament of mankind,” as all Member States are Members of the GA, and each member has one vote. The GA makes recommendations on international issues, oversees all other UN bodies which must report to the GA annually, approves the UN budget and apportions UN expenses. On the recommendation of the Security Council, the GA elects the Secretary-General and holds the authority to admit and expel Member States. Voting in the GA is ordinarily by simple majority, although on “important questions” a two-thirds majority is required.

**The Security Council (SC):** The Security Council is charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It has the power to employ United Nations forces and direct action against threats to the peace. Fifteen Members sit on the Security Council, including five Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten at-large Member states, which the General Assembly elects for two-year terms. A majority in the Security Council consists of nine Members voting “yes.” However, a “no” vote by any of the Permanent Members has the effect of vetoing or blocking motions.

**Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC):** ECOSOC is the primary body dealing with the economic, social, humanitarian and cultural work of the United Nations system. ECOSOC oversees five regional economic commissions and nine functional, or “subject-matter,” commissions, along with a sizeable system of committees and expert bodies. ECOSOC is composed of fifty-four Member States, elected by the GA for three-year terms.

**Trusteeship Council (TC):** In 1945 there were eleven Trust Territories, which were regions without their own governments. These eleven regions were placed under the TC, which helped them prepare for and achieve independence. With the admittance of Palau as a UN Member State in 1994, the TC has now completed its original mandate. Today, the TC is inactive, but is formally composed of the permanent Security Council Members.

**The International Court of Justice (ICJ):** The International Court of Justice, or World Court, is the primary judicial organ of the UN and decides international legal disputes. All UN Members are

automatically able to bring matters before the ICJ; however, States must agree to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ before it can decide a dispute involving that State. Fifteen judges serving nine-year terms sit on the Court.

**Secretariat:** The Secretariat is composed of the Secretary-General and the United Nations staff. Approximately 16,000 people are employed as the staff of the UN, one-third of whom work at the UN headquarters in New York City. The other two-thirds work for various subsidiary bodies of the United Nations. The Secretary-General serves a five-year renewable term.

In addition to the six main bodies, the United Nations includes a large family of specialized agencies and programs which the UN administers. Examples include the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

## BLOC POLITICS

The system of "bloc politics" in the UN is one in which nations have organized themselves into groups based on areas of mutual interest. These blocs tend to be made up of nations with similar political, historical or cultural backgrounds. They are often formed on a geographical basis, but this is not exclusively the case. By organizing themselves with other nations that hold similar interests, bloc Members hope to increase their influence above the level that they would have as a single nation in the General Assembly.

Bloc politics in the UN today is a misunderstood and rapidly changing phenomenon. The necessity of blocs in the UN was formally established in 1957, when the General Assembly endorsed four regional groups: the Latin American group, the Asian and African group, the Western European and Others group, and the Eastern European group. Since that time, the bloc system has grown to encompass many of the political, economic and military organizations of the world. Examples of the major blocs include the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the European Union (EU).

Please note, however, that these groups do not have official standing as caucus groups at the UN, but are rather groups that meet, depending on the circumstances, in an attempt to reach a consensus on various issues. Blocs are often thought of as "Voting Blocs," but this is a definite misnomer. They can be more realistically seen as "Caucusing Blocs:" groups which discuss issues together based on areas of mutual interest, but that often do not reach full agreement on all issues. A key consideration is that every country in a bloc will have different priorities **based on its own national interests**. Countries will often discount bloc considerations and vote in their own best interest in these priority areas.

Blocs usually attempt to form a consensus among their Members, allowing them to act as a cohesive group. The effectiveness of any given bloc in exerting its positions in the General Assembly often depends upon its ability to form a consensus among its own Members. These acts of compromise form the basis of UN politics, and often must occur within the various caucusing groups before they can begin to apply to the UN as a whole.

Bloc politics have changed considerably over time. Their viability as a political tool is diminishing, and blocs are falling out of use. For example, the most historically cohesive bloc, the Warsaw Pact, has ceased to exist as a military and political unit. Several other blocs, including the Western bloc, are undergoing structural changes that will have a profound effect on the future of UN politics. The more organized blocs at present are the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), the Organization of American States, and the European Union.

One often misinterpreted area of bloc politics is that of the "Third World," or developing bloc. A "Third World Bloc" has never existed. In actuality, several blocs of developing countries have existed. The Group of 77 (now consisting of more than 125 nations) is the largest and is still sometimes thought of as the Third World Bloc. There are, however, developing nations which are not Members of this organization, and many Members also belong to several other organizations, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement.

Representatives should be aware that the Member State they represent may no longer actively participate in bloc politics, or may vote outside of its traditional bloc based on the circumstances. For example, at the June 1992 Environmental Summit in Rio de Janeiro, several Group of 77 countries including India, a previous leader of the bloc, ignored bloc positions on environmental issues and followed their own national interests at the Summit. The most accurate thing which can be said about bloc politics today is that they are in a state of flux. Many States are increasingly neutral on issues on which they once held strong views and that were shared with other Members of their respective bloc. Other States are becoming increasingly independent on issues, or are concerned only with regional issues. One example of a more recently formed bloc is the "Alliance Against Biopiracy" formally known as the "Group of Allied Mega-Biodiverse Nations," which was formed to work together on sustainable development and similar issues. This group is comprised of 12 of the most biodiverse countries on the planet (China, Brazil and India, among others), with a combined total of over 70% of the world's biodiversity within their collective borders.

At AMUN, blocs will not be treated as official bodies. Representatives are encouraged to caucus in their bloc groups **only when appropriate**. Please remember there are many issues which cross bloc lines and many opportunities to invite an interested party to another bloc caucus in an effort to achieve a consensus.



# CHAPTER TWO

## THE SECURITY COUNCIL

### Members of the Security Council:

Austria	Japan	Uganda
Burkina Faso	Libyan Arab	United Kingdom
China	Jamahiriya	United States
Costa Rica	Mexico	Viet Nam
Croatia	Russian Federation	
France	Turkey	

Representatives to the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional. The Security Council may discuss any international peace and security issue brought before it. For this reason, Representatives must have a broad base of knowledge on current events in the international community. Also, the overviews provided below are only current through the publication of this handbook. Many of the topics listed below will change significantly before the Conference, and Representatives should be familiar with the up-to-date situations. Periodicals are one of the best recommended sources available for day-to-day updates.

These include among others: *The New York Times*, *UN Chronicle*, *The London Times*, *Foreign Policy*, *The Economist* and *Keesing's Record of World Events*.

Also, the UN Foundation's on-line daily newsletter, the *UN Wire*, is an excellent resource for timely information. Whenever possible, AMUN recommends that Representatives familiarize themselves with the most recent report(s) published by the Secretary-General on each situation, along with other UN documents. These can be found on the UN homepage under the Security Council documents section ([www.un.org/Docs/sc/](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/)). Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on UN sources, with some news sources provided for background on important aspects of the various situations.

Initial background research is provided below for each region, with one or two topics receiving a brief analysis. Security Council Representatives are neither limited to the main topics discussed nor to any of the topics listed. Should world events move in a different direction from the topics provided in this handbook, the Security Council is welcome to discuss any peace and security matter which it desires.

Please note that draft resolutions should be written on the sub-topics of each regional area: i.e., resolutions would not be written about "Issues in Africa," but rather about "The Situation in Sierra Leone" or similar sub-topics within the region.

### THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

Iraq is a frequent subject of debate in the Security Council but rarely acted upon since the removal of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003. While the UN was forced to withdraw many of its personnel in Iraq following the August and September 2003 bombing of its offices, recently its presence has increased again.

Since the re-entry of UN personnel in Iraq, the Security Council's primary action was the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in August 2003. The mission of UNAMI was to promote the efforts of the Iraqi government in strengthening representative government, political dialogue, national reconciliation, diplomatic engagement of neighboring countries, assisting vulnerable groups like refugees and displaced persons, promoting human rights, and enabling judicial and legal reform. Instrumental in the December 2005 elections, UNAMI has also been active in assisting the Iraqi government with political and economic development as well as coordinating reconstruction and humanitarian assistance efforts.

Unfortunately, ongoing violence has served as an impediment to the successful work of UNAMI. In the past two years, the security situation in Iraq has improved, prompting the Security Council to expand the role of UNAMI as outlined in resolution S/RES/1770. UNAMI has also played an important role in prompting regional cooperation in Iraq from neighboring states such as Turkey. While there are promising signs for Iraq, there are many causes for concern. In late March 2009, Kurdish mourners were attacked and killed by a suicide bomber. In other areas Sunnis are challenging the government's authority and causing unrest throughout the country between the Sunni people, the government and foreign troops. This unrest is predicted to increase as the remaining British troops were scheduled to leave

by the end of May 2009, and the 31 August 2010 deadline for cessation of combat operations for US forces. Additionally, lingering questions remain about the government's ability to sustain gains in the security situation after the 30 June 2009 withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraqi cities. A further complication to the security problem is the Iraqi government's assumption of responsibility in October 2008 to pay for the more than 90,000 security volunteers. The Iraqi government was to start paying the last 10,000 volunteers still on the U.S. payroll on 1 April 2009. However, several leaders have complained that the government has not paid them in months and some are threatening to quit.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the role of UNAMI be expanded to further promote a representative government of all political groups? How might such expansion effect regional cooperation?
- Should UN peacekeepers assist in providing security for UNAMI humanitarian efforts?
- How does the security situation contribute to limited UN efforts?
- What can be done to improve the situation?
- What are ways the UN could help alleviate the financial problems with the security volunteers? Would it hinder other UN commitments in the region?

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A/RES/1790

S/RES/1770

S/RES/1762

S/RES/1500

S/RES/1483

## SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

The Palestinian Question remains one of the most discussed topics in the Security Council since Israel declared its independence in 1948. The problem of Palestinian refugees has existed since 1948, following Israel’s defeat of neighboring states Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. The resulting Palestinian refugee crisis caused the General Assembly, in Resolution 194, to lay out a course for those driven from their homes and wishing to live in peace to return. In the 1949 Armistice, what remained of the state of Palestine was occupied by Egypt (the Gaza Strip), and Transjordan (the West Bank). These territories were seized by Israel in a 1961 preemptive attack against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Within six days Israel had seized the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. This prompted the Security Council to pass Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied, and “just settlement of the (Palestinian) refugee problem.” Israel maintained control of all occupied territories, and Syria and Egypt attacked jointly in 1973 in what became known as the Yom Kippur War, prompting Resolution 338, which affirmed Resolution 242 and called for peace talks. Israel withdrew from the Sinai after a 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. However, in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in order to destroy Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces there. While this drove the PLO from Lebanon, it also caused the formation of Hezbollah. In 1987 Jordan ceded its rights to the West Bank to the PLO, which recognized Israel, and began negotiations for peace. The Palestinian Authority replaced the PLO in 1994 in governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the signing of the Oslo Accords.

After the breakdown of the peace process and the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000, work towards peace in the Middle East has been a difficult process. The most recent progress occurred in 2003 with the Quartet, composed of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, backing what is known as the

Road Map. The Road Map suggests a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel rejected some portions of the Road Map, while the Palestinian Authority pledged its support.

The situation remains tense in light of recent violence stemming from rocket attacks into southern Israel. Israel closed border crossings after Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007. A partial blockade that continues through today was imposed, dropping the imports of food, medical supplies and fuel supporting Gaza’s 1.5 million residents to critical levels. The blockade also crippled exports from Gaza causing an economic crisis. These actions led to a humanitarian crisis in Gaza by 2008. Rocket attacks from inside Gaza escalated during the fall of 2008, eventually leading to the start of an Israeli military campaign against Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009, killing 1,010 Palestinians and destroying or damaging approximately 1,008 buildings. Following the January 2009 cease-fire, Israel maintains the economic blockade of Gaza while allowing limited humanitarian assistance. During the twenty-two day campaign several UN facilities were struck, prompting an investigation by the Secretary-General’s office and the Human Rights Council in 2009. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon found the report, which included “grave offenses” and intentional targeting of civilians and UN institutions by Israeli forces, disturbing.

Conflict continues to surround the question of Palestine exacerbated by attacks from extremist groups, Israeli military retaliation, competition for water, illegal Israeli settlements, the erection of security walls, restriction of travel for Palestinians, economic blockades and arms smuggling. As the General Assembly originally proposed a two-state solution in Resolution 181 in 1947, the question of how to establish and maintain a lasting peace in Israel, Palestine, and neighboring states remains.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- What steps can be taken to persuade Israel, Palestine, and surrounding nations to adhere to the Road Map?
- Does your government believe a two-state solution is a viable way to resolve conflict and bring about the changes envisioned in resolution 242?
- How can the Palestinian refugee problem be solved? What should be done about illegal Israeli settlements in occupied territories? How can the humanitarian crisis in Gaza be solved?
- What can be done to ensure mutual security for Israel and Palestine?

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## THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Following the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's government, the United Nations established the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in April 1992 in an attempt to facilitate negotiations between the various parties. Due to deteriorating humanitarian conditions and continued conflict, the Security Council passed Resolution S/RES/794 on 3 December 1992 that authorized the creation and deployment of the Unified Taskforce (UNITAF) and authorized the use of "all necessary means" to help create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Consequently, 35,000 troops were deployed in Operation Restore Hope. The mission made initial progress until 1994 when American and European troops began to withdraw from the force. The United Nations Mission to Somalia II (UNISOM II) ended in 1995 with the withdrawal of the rest of the troops. Between 1995 and 2000, the situation deteriorated with the capital of Mogadishu became divided between two rival warlords.

By 2000, the situation began to look promising as Abdikassim Salat Hassan was elected transitional president by various clan leaders in Djibouti. In 2002, the transitional government signed a cease-fire with 21 clan-based factions at talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government emerged from a two-year peace process led by IGAD and the government of Kenya.

However, by 2006, the apparent political progress began to erode. Militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of Mogadishu and southern Somalia. The Security Council in S/RES/1725 (2006) authorized IGAD and the African Union (AU) to send a peacekeeping force to help prop up the transitional government. Prior to the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian forces helped engage the UIC militias, driving them out of Mogadishu. The UIC and affiliated anti-government groups continued to fight with the government and Ethiopian forces throughout early 2008. This resulted in high civilian casualties, especially when Ethiopian forces used mortar and field gun to attack highly populated areas. In light of these developments, the African Union and the Security Council requested the transition of peacekeeping from AMISOM to United Nations forces as noted in S/RES/1801.

The security situation in Somalia remains volatile even after the Djibouti Peace Agreement of November 2008. In January 2009, the Security Council passed S/RES/1863 calling for ANISOM to remain active through July 2009. The resolution also expressed the Security Council's intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation as a follow-on force to AMISOM, which will be subject to a further discussion in June 2009. Though Ethiopian forces completed their with-

drawal in January 2000, the Prime Minister stated that he would send troops back in if al-Shabab, Islamist fighters, regained a foothold.

Since January, attacks have continued with al-Shabab taking control of Somalia's seat of government, Baidoa, in February. The violence escalated with the Islamist insurgents killing 11 Burundi soldiers in Mogadishu who were part of the African Union peacekeeping force there. These attacks, coupled with the increase of pirates using Somalia as a safe haven to carry out attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden, have made the security situation in Somalia worse, especially since the government has little ability to enforce law and no navy to help combat the piracy. This has led to several countries sending warships to the area to help protect merchant traffic and pursue pirate vessels. On 18 May 2009 the President of the Security Council released a statement reaffirming the body's support for the Transitional Federal Government and expressing concern at reports of support of anti-government forces from Eritrea.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Why has the Somali civil war persisted for so long despite significant international attention?
- What might differentiate a new UN peacekeeping mission from AMISOM?
- What might be done to alleviate the piracy problem perpetuated from Somali shores?

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## THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

In 2003, a rebellion broke out in the Darfur region of Sudan, separate from the civil war that was already engulfing the country. Even though the north-south civil war ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), conflict remained in Darfur. Rebels called the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) attacked government and military facilities throughout Darfur, which led to retaliation of local militias known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed are backed by the Sudanese government and have often worked in conjunction with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The conflict in Darfur has resulted in the deaths of over 300,000 people and the displacement of over three million more. While several Member States and NGOs have declared the events in Darfur to be genocide, the United Nations has yet to make such a declaration.

Resolution S/RES/1769 established the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The UNAMID was created to assist the African Union force already in place (AMIS) and to respect the sovereign wishes of the government of Sudan by placing a peacekeeping force primarily composed of African peacekeepers in the region. The UN assumed full authority in January 2008. UNAMID's mission in Darfur is to monitor the humanitarian and security situations and the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Despite progress, violence still continues in western Darfur with SAF and allied groups continuing to launch attacks, especially against former opposition strongholds and what appears to be deliberate targeting of civilians. Cross border raids by rebel groups from Chad have also hindered the security situation in western Darfur.

Violence continued between the SAF and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, preventing the return of refugees from Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia in late March 2009. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suspended the repatriation of refugees once before in February when fighting broke out, which led to extensive looting of UN warehouses. UNAMID has reported that attacks on peacekeeping staff have risen and that the safety of the humanitarian workers is a rising cause for concern ever since President Omar Hassan al-Bashir was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity in March 2009. President al-Bashir responded to the indictment by expelling 13 nongovernmental organizations, accusing them of collaborating with the court. While things look bleak, UNAMID received a boost from the arrival of 100 Egyptian personnel at the end of March, bringing the operation closer to full strength. When fully staffed, UNAMID is slated to become the world's largest peacekeeping operation with over 26,000 military and police personnel. While increased forces have helped in some areas, violence still rages in Darfur.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What changes should be made in the mission of UNAMID?
- How should the Security Council respond to the government of Sudan with respect to its national sovereignty for its actions in Darfur?
- Why has the violence in Darfur continued to escalate despite the Darfur Peace Agreement? How might these factors be overcome?
- How might neighbor state involvement further complicate the security situation in Darfur?

- Does your government consider the situation in Darfur to be genocide? If so, how does this affect how the Security Council should react?

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## THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was launched in February 2000 in response to repeated violations of the July 1999 Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. This agreement was intended to bring an end to fighting within the Democratic Republic of the Congo that resulted from the 1997 invasion of Rwandan forces to flush out Hutu militias. The conflict, which lasted five years, is now known as the Second Congo War. Its end came in 2002 with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, creating a government of national unity among remaining warring rebel factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and calling for the withdrawal of 20,000 Rwandan troops.

Since the end of the Second Congo War the Democratic Republic of the Congo has remained a country in conflict. Rich in natural resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains divided by several militant groups vying for control of the country's vast mineral wealth. Ethnic violence also continues in the wake of the Rwandan genocide. Militant groups such as the Interahamwe, a Hutu militia that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide, fled into the



Democratic Republic of the Congo. This led to the rise of other militant groups such as the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), Mai-Mai, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO). These groups along with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) came into conflict in 2008.

After a conflict on 28 August 2008 between CNDP and FARDC large-scale hostilities broke out in the Ituri, South and North Kivu provinces in the eastern part of the DRC. FARDC, FDLR, PARECO and various Mai-Mai groups fighting the CNDP led to the displacement of 250,000 people between August and November. MONUC immediately attempted to broker a disengagement plan, but fighting continued until a cease-fire was negotiated in November by UN special envoy, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. On 29 January 2009 a combined force of the Rwandan Army and the FARDC engaged the CNDP and captured founding member General Laurent Nkunda. The capture of General Nkunda led to the CNDP ceasing all hostilities against the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and an accelerated integration of all CNDP forces into the FARDC. While over 12,000 elements were integrated into the FARDC in North Kivu alone, the accelerated nature of the integration led to several problems. For instance, several ex-CNDP units continuing erecting roadblocks used to levy illegal taxes, and integration in South Kivu saw limited progress.

Further complicating peace in the region are allegations that the Government of Rwanda is providing support to the existing CNDP elements and that Uganda is hosting training camps for the newly created Front Populaire pour la Justice au Congo (FPJC). On 12 December 2008 the Security Council Committee concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo released its final report, S/2008/773, discussing the continued violence since the end of the Second Congo War. The report gives a detailed understanding of the different parties involved in the continued violence, particularly North and South Kivu provinces. It also notes the link between natural resources and the financing of illegal armed groups by neighboring states. It recommends the implementation by Member States of targeted travel and financial measures imposed against individuals and entities involved in the conflict.

Although much of the fighting in the Ituri region has ended, eastern and northern portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo still remain in conflict. After the launch of a joint operation between FARDC and the Rwandan armed forces, to hunt down the FDLR, violence increased in the form of reprisal killings against suspected collaborators as FDLR rebels retook several strongholds seized by the joint force. Nearly 160,000 people were newly displaced by the joint Rwandan Congolese offensive and FDLR counter offensive between January and March. According to the UN OCHA and UNHCR, atrocities were committed on both sides. Assisting with the integration of CNDP and FARDC, MONUC has been assisting FARDC with training and military operations, leading to allegations that MONUC forces are actively collaborating with groups that are perpetrating atrocities against civilian populations. The FDLR has now forged an alliance with the Mai-Mai in the mineral-rich region of Opienge. Additionally, FARDC, Ugandan and semi-autonomous South Sudanese armed forces formed a task force to attack Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) bases in the Garamba National Park after Joseph Kony, leader of the LRA, failed to appear to sign a peace deal

with the Ugandan government ending its rebellion. The mission was touted as a success by the governments of DRC and its neighbors, resulted in nearly 1,000 killed by fleeing LRA troops and continued civilian killing and kidnapping once the joint force had withdrawn.

Militant groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been accused of terrorizing civilian populations through killing, rape, and forcing children to become soldiers. Throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUC's force is strained, attempting to protect civilians from militant groups and undisciplined elements of FARDC. MONUC is further strained by a lack of states willing to provide peacekeeping forces and equipment. Further complicating the situation is the exploitation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's mineral resources in the form of gold, tin, copper, cobalt, coltan, and wolframite smuggled through neighboring states to industrialized nations across the world.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What steps can be taken to limit the looting of resources that continues to perpetuate the conflict?
- What role does neighbor-state interference play in the ongoing conflict? How might this be limited?
- What can be done to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, especially with regard to women and children?

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## THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Although there have long been allegations of a secret Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons, these rumors took on new life when an Iranian opposition group revealed two previously unknown nuclear sites in 2002. Iran claims that its nuclear program exists solely to provide electrical power, but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has increased inspections aimed at determining whether or not Iran has a military nuclear program operating alongside its civilian program. Over the past seven years the IAEA has found numerous instances in which Iran failed to report nuclear activities and nuclear facilities. While the IAEA has confirmed Iran's ability to enrich uranium to low levels, the organization has admitted significant gaps in its ability to comprehensively monitor the Iranian nuclear program.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the EU3, held early negotiations with Iran. The Europeans sought to broker a deal that would allow Iran to develop nuclear reactors that would produce electric energy, but would be incapable of enriching uranium for use in a military program. The Iranians agreed to suspend controversial activities, such as enrichment, while the negotiations continued. In August of 2005, the negotiations reached a climax, with the EU3 making its final offer to Iran: a series of economic and political incentives to Iran in return for Iran's suspension of nuclear activities. Iran rejected the offer and resumed uranium enrichment shortly thereafter. In April 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had "joined the nuclear countries of the world," and that Iran had no intention of giving up its right to enrich uranium as part of negotiations over its nuclear program.

The Security Council agreed in early June 2006 on a set of proposals for Iran, containing both incentives and disincentives to cause Iran to abstain from uranium enrichment. Iran rejected the proposals, calling them "insulting and humiliating." Following the rejection of the proposals, the Security Council issued five resolutions between July 2006 and September 2008 banning arms exports, freezing assets, and restricting the travel of individuals, groups, and companies associated with the nuclear program. The latest resolution, S/RES/1835, was issued shortly after the IAEA Board of Governors report (GOV/2008/38). This report, while verifying non-divergence of declared nuclear material from the few facilities the IAEA had access to, cites several areas of question regarding high-explosives testing, missile and re-entry vehicle work, continued uranium enrichment and lack of cooperation regarding transparency efforts in nuclear research and development, uranium processing, and mining facilities. Since this report, the IAEA has faced many obstacles in its efforts to investigate Iran's nuclear program due to Iran prohibiting access to uranium mining facilities, milling facilities, nuclear-related companies in Iran's defense industry, heavy water production facilities, and research reactor IR-40. Iran claims that the Security Council's resolutions are "illegal" and a violation of its rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran also claims that the EU3 and the United States have been giving false information to the IAEA.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How does the presence of the Iranian nuclear program affect the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
- What are appropriate actions for the international community to take with regard to Iran's nuclear program?

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## THE SITUATION IN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

The Korean War ended by armistice, not by peace treaty, in 1953. Since that time a demilitarized zone has been in effect between the two countries. In June 2000, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea signed an accord to ease military tensions and to promote economic cooperation. Cooperation has been slow, especially after a uranium research effort by the DPRK caused problems in 2002. At the time, the DPRK said it was only using plutonium to try to build atomic bombs. This led to the Six Party Talks in 2003, which included the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, the Russia Federation, and the United States. The Six Party Talks offered the DPRK formal economic assistance in return for taking steps to end its nuclear weapons development.

In July 2006, the Security Council passed S/RES/1695, condemning the DPRK for launching ballistic missiles and encouraging them to return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions. In October 2006, the DPRK conducted a nuclear test against Security Council resolutions. The Security Council passed S/RES/1718, condemning the test and demanding that the DPRK return to the Six Party Talks and retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which the DPRK eventually did.

In response to a missile launch on 5 April 2009, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the launch as directly in contravention to Resolution 1718, demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea comply with Resolution 1718 by abstaining from further launches, and urging a resumption of the Six Party Talks. While the DPRK claimed this was a "successful" satellite launch, most of the international community saw this as a thinly veiled test launch of a Taepodong-2 missile. Relations between the DPRK and the rest of the world deteriorated as the DPRK announced on 14 April 2009 that it was pulling out of the Six Party Talks and the NPT, resuming its nuclear program, and expelling all inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Furthermore, the DPRK stated that it would consider any pressure or sanctions applied in response to its launch a "declaration of war."

On 25 May 2009, the DPRK carried out its second underground nuclear test, sparking international concern and leading the Republic of Korea to join an initiative led by the United States to combat the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. On 27 May 2009, the DPRK declared the armistice that ended the Korean War void. The Security Council on 12 June 2009 unanimously approved Resolution 1874 condemning the nuclear test and further missile launches, demanding the return of the DPRK to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and strengthening the sanctions imposed under Resolution 1718. Reacting to the Security Council Resolution, DPRK announced it would begin uranium enrichment and "weaponizing" its plutonium stockpiles. Resolution 1874 also calls upon United Nations Member States to inspect cargo vessels and airplanes suspected of carrying arms in or out of the DPRK. Furthermore, the Council has called on Member States to report back to it within 45 days to discuss implementation of the resolution. The DPRK has warned that the detainment of any ships will be considered an act of war.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Why have the Six Party Talks continued to fail to get the DPRK to end its nuclear weapons development? What actions can the UN take to facilitate a nuclear-free Korean peninsula?

- How likely is your government to implement all provisions of S/RES/1874?
- What further steps can be taken to persuade North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks and work to end its nuclear weapons program? Does your government feel that offering incentives to the DPRK is an appropriate response to bring the DPRK back to the Six Party Talks?

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# THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

## Members of the Historical Security Council of 1961:

Ceylon	Turkey
Chile	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
China	United Arab Republic
Ecuador	United Kingdom
France	United States of America
Liberia	

## ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The 2009 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning in early 1961. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolve around the continuing hostilities between the United States and the USSR, the civil war in the Congo and the rise of hostilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Another key issue confronting the Security Council is the emerging role of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, whose actions challenged the authority of the Security Council on several occasions.

In 1961, John F. Kennedy was the US President and Nikita Khrushchev the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Shah's government was in power in Iran and the Republic of China (on Formosa/Taiwan), rather than the mainland Peoples Republic of China, was officially represented in the United Nations. Cold War tensions were progressively growing, and countries which had been colonies of the European powers were now gaining their independence and joining the United Nations.

AMUN's HSC is unique in its topics and in its treatment of those topics. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation is assigned to begin. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and within the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role playing for an HSC Member State will not just be a replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1961. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government chose in 1961 was necessarily the most wise. While role replays must, by definition, be in character, it is not a sure thing that, given a second opportunity to look at events, any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for "second chances." It will be the job of Council representatives to utilize their countries' national policies and capabilities to solve the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative in any situation.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. This inability or unwillingness to work actively toward solutions of crises was rarely more evident than during the late years of colonialism and early years of the Cold War. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues.

While national governments often did not want international "meddling" in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solution. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters. This year's simulation will have the dichotomy of many regional crises being treated as "internal" by the superpowers, and other crises which are so global in nature that the UN must become involved.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of 1960, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically in the past 40 years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, representatives should pursue periodicals from mid-to-late 1960 to reflect accurately the worldview at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature or *The New York Times* Index, should provide a much better "historical perspective" and "feel for the times" than later historical texts.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred, modified by the representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible.

In maintaining realism, representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation's representative to the UN. This person may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their country, or they may be relatively "in the dark" on their country's moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Home Government organization will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements



would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make.

Representatives must, however, always consult with the Home Government organization before making any operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions, which would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, Home Government would be equated with the actual “home office” of the involved nation(s).

## OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any

time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee or Council, preferably with a second representative who can cover that Committee or Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

## BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 1 January 1961. The prominent events of late 1960 are discussed, as well as some questions which may face the Security Council in early 1961. This research is intended merely as a starting point for representatives’ continued exploration of the topics.

## THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

On 30 June 1960, the former territory of the Belgian Congo gained independence, marking the beginning of nearly four years of civil war and violence. Under the active guidance of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN was a very active player in the Congo during these years, embarking in ongoing attempts at peacekeeping in the region.

At the end of the colonial era, the Congo was ill-prepared for self-governance. Its great size, wealth of natural resources (mainly in the Katanga region), intense tribal loyalties and absolute dependence on the 10,000-strong Belgian colonial civil service placed the Congo in a precarious position. Although it had signed a Treaty of Independence and Cooperation with Belgium just prior to independence, this was never ratified, and was quickly disregarded.

The first government was a coalition, formed with two tribal leaders in key positions: Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. The provisional constitution called for a unitary system, joining the Congo provinces together in one government. However, another tribal leader, Moïse Tshombe, the President of the Katanga Province, believed in a federated system, and his disagreement quickly led to Katanga’s seceding from the rest of the Congo on 11 July.

Problems in the Congo began just five days after independence. From 5-9 July 1960 the Congolese army (renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise, or ANC) engaged in a series of rebellions and mutinies, aimed at eliminating their mostly European officer corps and installing Congo natives in command. The new, all-Congolese military created a frightening environment for the Europeans still living in and administering the Congo. On 10 July, Belgian troops unilaterally intervened in the situation, militarily reestablishing order in most of the cities. On 13 July, Belgian troops inhabited the capital city of Leopoldville.

Meanwhile, on 10 July the UN was formally brought into the situation for the first time. Ralph Bunche, the special envoy of the Secretary-General stationed in the Congo, had kept Hammarskjöld apprised of the situation as it progressed. On 10 July, the Congolese Cabinet formally requested UN help in the form of “technical assis-

tance in the military field.” The Congolese were very unfamiliar with the UN system, and while the wording for this request was suggested to them, it was the cause of many of the UN’s later problems in the region.

On 13 July, Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the Charter, requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation. A resolution, put forward by Tunisia and accepted, with abstentions by China, France and the UK, called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the establishment of UN “military assistance as necessary,” per the Congolese request (S/Res/143). On 18 July, the first 3,500 UN troops, composed mainly of African regiments, entered the Congo.

The first months of the Congo crisis saw many difficulties in connection with the UN forces. The original Security Council resolution had several problems: (1) it only made clear that the Secretary-General was to do something about the situation, not what specifically; (2) there was no timetable provided; (3) no description was given of the military assistance; (4) there was no mention of territorial integrity (the Katanga situation); and (5) UN troops were only to use weapons in self-defense and were not to become a party to any internal conflicts.

This period of time also saw intense arguments, both within the Congo and the UN, over the entry of UN troops into Katanga. These were only resolved by a personal visit from Hammarskjöld to Katanga on 12 August. Further, Lumumba grew extremely critical and distrustful of UN aid, making several ultimatums for the UN to do things his way or leave.

Hammarskjöld had taken very personal control of the entire Congo crisis, going back to the Security Council frequently for endorsement of his actions. On 8 August, the Council passed Resolution S/Res/146, backing Hammarskjöld’s plans and actions, specifying the territorial integrity issue, and again demanding the departure of Belgian troops. Although the first UN troops entered Katanga in mid-August, the Belgians did not leave completely until mid-October.

In early September, Kasa-Vubu dismissed Lumumba and declared a new government, with the support of the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Joseph Mobutu. Lumumba, in turn, announced that President

Kasa-Vubu was no longer Chief of State and called upon the people, the workers and the army to rise. The Council of Ministers published a communiqué declaring the Chief of State deprived of his functions, nullifying his ordinance, revoking the Government and accusing him of high treason. In votes by both houses of the Congolese parliament, Lumumba's claim to legitimacy was supported. With the opening of the General Assembly that fall, both factions vied for the Congo's GA seat. The Kasa-Vubu delegate was seated after a long, drawn out political battle.

One of the underlying factors in the Congo crisis was the interplay of Cold War politics, for which the Congo issue became a battleground. While the West mildly supported Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu, the Soviets and their allies supported the legitimacy of the Lumumba government and the Congolese Parliament and were providing military aid to several factions. Also, the Soviets used this crisis as an opportunity to attack Hammarskjöld. Khrushchev went so far as to attack Hammarskjöld specifically at the opening of the General Assembly in 1960. The Soviets did not appreciate the Secretary-General's "usurping" traditional Security Council authorities, and were determined not to allow him too much power or leeway.

The final major group of players in the Congo crisis was the other African states. 17 new African states were admitted to the GA in the fall 1960 session, and they immediately became an element in the negotiations and actions. While they joined the West in isolating the Soviet bloc, they were not united, and often disagreed with the West on specifics in the Congo. Three major African groups arose: those which backed Lumumba, those which backed the actions of the UN to date, and those which backed Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu.

Near the end of 1960, events once again moved toward an imminent crisis. On 28 November, Lumumba was arrested by forces loyal to Mobutu and jailed. He remained a captive at the end of the year. Katanga was still independent, with a strong Belgian infrastructure (if not troops) still in place. Finally, both the Belgians and Soviets were supplying various factions in bids to establish new independent territories.

In preparing for the situation in the Congo, representatives should become extremely familiar with the political and military climate surrounding both UN actions and actions in the Congo throughout 1960. This includes the UN and GA resolutions passed during the year. While it is inevitable that Representatives will have some idea of events in 1961, these should not form a basis for their deliberations, nor an expectation of what events might be to come.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the Security Council overcome its own infighting to improve the situation in the Congo?
- How can the Security Council overcome the mistrust of the UN held by the different Congolese factions?
- To what extent should the legacy of the UN and its effectiveness enter the decision making process?
- How can your country help counteract the negative effects that the proxy war mentality exhibited in the Council is having on the Congo Crisis?

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- S/4482, Discussion of plan for funding Congo operations
- S/4426 (8 Aug 1960), Discussion of S/Res/146
- S/4405 (22 Jul 1960), Discussion of S/Res/145
- S/4383 (13 Jul 1960), Discussion of S/Res/143, submitted by Tunisia

## THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Many Latin American and Caribbean countries were dealing with severe and mounting problems. The countries in this region faced the Herculean task of industrializing their economies, enacting effective land reform, and establishing civilian control over the military, all at the same time. The end results of the rapidly changing political and economic climate were political and social instability. After a short period of military rule, Argentina's newly elected government had to deal with general strikes in 1959 and massive inflation. Brazil, which was attempting "fifty years of economic improvement in five," was facing an imminent reckoning with foreign creditors and growing unrest in the military ranks. In addition, civil unrest was prevalent in El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Guatemala.

The deepening of mistrust between the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro and several other American states, most notably the United States, set the stage for heightened Cold War tensions. While Castro had not officially declared himself a Marxist, his populist policies, increasing reliance on the Communist Party for organizational support, and crackdown on anti-communist factions were more than enough to convince the US of Castro's intention to establish a Marxist regime in Cuba.



Moves by Cuba and the USSR to form stronger political, economic and military ties raised the possibility of a Communist military presence in the heart of the Americas, which would undermine the entire inter-American system of alliances, treaties, international organization and tacit understandings. Even without the establishment of bases by Communist powers, activities of Soviet bloc nations in supplying arms and military advice to an American state presented problems of hemispheric defense, and thus international politics.

The question of exactly what might constitute extra-hemispheric interference and aggression in the Americas again came to the fore. At a less apparent level, a government that specifically rejected the solutions of a capitalistic economic system, in favor of a massively socialized economic structure, posed an obvious problem in containment.

In turn, Cuba accused the US of promoting plans for intervention in Cuba, protecting Cuban war criminals, providing training facilities for counter-revolutionary elements, and multiple violations of Cuban air space. This situation was highlighted in the Council in July 1960, when the Cuban government requested a meeting to discuss what it termed “repeated threats, reprisals and aggressive acts” by the US against Cuba. The Council responded with Resolution 144 (19 July), which deferred the issue until a report was received from the Organization of American States, and called on all parties to reduce tensions in the region. While Cuba hoped for stronger language, the presence of a US veto precluded any more serious result.

Current issues facing the Council include the possibility of increased tension between Cuba and other states in the region and the likelihood of new political instability caused by political and economic development crises in the region.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- Where should the UN draw the line between threat and imminent threat when it comes to matters of international peace and security?
- How can the UN prevent ideological differences from becoming international security threats?
- How can the UN assist the transitioning nations in Central and South America to ensure that peace and security across the region is maintained?

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## OTHER OPEN ISSUES

Any issue on the world scene in 1961 will be fair game for discussion in the Historical Security Council. Representatives should have broad historical knowledge of the world situation as it stood through 1 January 1961. The following are two general issues, which may continue to influence the work of the Council through 1961.

## SECURITY COUNCIL / SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

During its early years, the UN was generally allowed only those duties the great powers were willing to cede to it. In that context the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General and his Secretariat was rarely acrimonious. The UN was rarely an active power broker in a crisis situation.

The relative lack of real international responsibility within the Secretariat quickly began to evaporate with Dag Hammarskjöld’s 1953 succession of Trygve Lie. Hammarskjöld’s perception of the ideals of the UN may not have been more expansive than those of his predecessor, but he was significantly more willing to take action. As Secretary-General he greatly extended the influence of the UN with his peacekeeping efforts, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.

Hammarskjöld took an activist view of the concept of “Good Offices.” Though rebuffed, he attempted to intercede during the Suez Crisis, and was constantly working to engage one Middle Eastern player or another. Hammarskjöld was most active, however, in the many African disputes of the era, especially in the later 1950s as decolonization reached its peak. Hammarskjöld regularly did more than just offer the Good Offices of the Secretariat. He was an active believer in the role of UN peace keeping forces.

Under Hammarskjöld, UN “Blue Helmet” forces were deployed to more areas of dispute and in greater numbers than at any time before or since. Given the level of interference often placed in the path of such operations, the troop levels deployed to the Congo were nothing short of staggering. Hammarskjöld’s activist view of the office of Secretary-General and the Secretariat often led to tensions, both within the UN bureaucracy and between the bureaucracy and Member States. Hammarskjöld was willing to take actions without having first gained what others accepted as “full approval” for those actions. The use of peace keeping forces, without specific Security Council resolutions allowing engagement of those forces, is but one example. Hammarskjöld often defended his actions on the general principles of working toward the maintenance of international peace and stability, or on expansive views of General Assembly actions and authority.

Regardless of where the authority for action derived, the activist nature in which the office of Secretary-General was viewed (both by the SG and by his Secretariat support staff) led to many internal UN disagreements. Several Member States publicly expressed disapproval with what they viewed as the Secretary-General’s meddling



in what were otherwise sovereign affairs or policies. It was, in fact, just this attitude that led to the Soviet attempt to have Hammarskjöld removed from the post of Secretary-General.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS

In 1960, Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR were reaching their highest levels. While many small events occurred during the year, a key political issue involved the shooting down of a US U-2 military plane by Soviet missiles as it flew over Soviet air space. This event, which took place during a Four Powers (France, USSR, UK and US) Summit in Paris on 1 May, significantly increased the already high levels of geo-political tension. The Security Council took up the discussion under the heading “The Question of Relations Between the Great Powers,” and discussions were held in several meetings from May through July 1960. A draft resolution concerning the violation of Soviet air space failed due to a lack of majority on 26 May, and this was followed with a more neutrally phrased resolution on 27 May (SC/Res/135). This resolution recommended the peaceful resolution of problems between states, appealed to UN members to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, called for continued disarmament talks between the major powers, especially on nuclear issues, and urged the Four Powers to continue discussions in order to reduce tensions. The USSR again complained to the Council of continuing aggressive acts by the US Air Force, and was met with repeated US denials. This led to three additional draft resolutions in July, but each failed due to negative votes by Permanent Members of the Council. It is in the context of these relationships that the Security Council must again take up the crises of the 1961 time period for this simulation. The Council’s ability to act, and the efficacy of such action, could be predicated on overall UN activity, and on the actions of its Member States relating to this activity.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- How can your country help counteract the negative effects that the Cold War mentality is having in the Council?
- Where does your country stand in the ideological war between the Soviets and the West?

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Throughout the year 1960, *The New York Times* is an excellent reference source for information on internal UN politics and activities.



# CHAPTER FOUR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND COMMITTEES

## Introduction

The General Assembly is the main deliberative policy-making body of the United Nations (UN) and is empowered to address all international issues covered by the Charter. In many ways, it acts as the central hub of the United Nations. Many UN bodies report to the General Assembly, but not all of these bodies are subsidiary to the GA. For example, the Security Council constantly updates the General Assembly on its work, but it is an independent body; its work does not require the General Assembly's independent approval. In contrast, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and is governed by General Assembly mandates. Other subsidiary bodies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), also have direct reporting relationships with the General Assembly.

The UN Charter assigns each of the main Committees of the General Assembly specific tasks and topics to discuss during each session. Because every Member State has a seat in every Committee, it is important to note that the points of discussion do not overlap; that is, even if two or more Committees are discussing a general topic area, each Committee is responsible for discussing a very specific point or aspect of that topic. For example, the Fourth Committee may discuss the Israeli-Palestine conflict with regard to its political components. However, issues concerning the legal, social, or economic components of the Israeli-Palestine conflict are left to other Committees, the General Assembly Plenary, or the Security Council. Therefore, Representatives in each Committee should take care not to expand the discussion of any topic beyond the limitations set by

their Committee's mandate and into another Committee's area of discussion. This is known as the Committee's purview.

A note concerning funding: The Fifth Committee makes financing decisions concerning only the UN's regular, annual budget, not those decisions dealing with voluntary contributions or new outlays. Even though AMUN will not be simulating the Fifth Committee, other Committees generally do not act unless sufficient funds are available for their proposals, thus financial questions should still be considered during the other Committees' deliberations. Therefore, if a Committee creates a new program or initiative, that Committee should specify how the program can or will be funded, and if the program falls within the UN's regular annual budget, that resolution should defer to the Fifth Committee to establish funding.

The purpose of the Combined Plenary session on the final day is to ratify the resolutions which passed in the four Main GA Committees and build consensus. While a small amount of additional debate is typical, it is expected that the work done by each Committee over the first three days of the Conference will be respected. It would thus be rare for significant changes to be made, or for a resolution to fail in the Plenary session after passing in Committee.

The following are brief descriptions of each Committee simulated at AMUN, along with the Committee's agenda, a brief purview of each committee, a brief background and research guide for each agenda topic and the Committee's website address. Representatives should use this information as the first step in their research on the powers and limitations of their particular Committee in relation to the agenda topics.

## THE CONCURRENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY

**Purview of the Simulation:** The General Assembly Plenary typically considers issues that several Committees would have the power to discuss, but which would best be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Likewise, the General Assembly Plenary is also responsible for coordinating work between the many different bodies of the United Nations. For example, the 60th General Assembly recently established a Peacebuilding Commission that will oversee the United Nations' peacebuilding processes and

coordinate the work of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General, and Member States emerging from conflict situations. Note that if the Security Council, which is given the primary task of ensuring peace and security by the Charter, is discussing a particular issue, the General Assembly (Plenary) will cease its own deliberations and defer to the Security Council.

**Website:** <http://www.un.org/ga/>

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD OF NATURAL DISASTERS, FROM RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT

Every year, more than 200 million people are affected by natural disasters. Increased population densities, environmental degradation, and global warming have compounded the effects of poverty, making the impacts of natural hazards increasingly more severe. A natural disaster is the effect of a natural hazard (e.g., flood, volcanic eruption, earthquake, or landslide) that overwhelms local capacity and necessitates a request to the national or international level for ex-

ternal humanitarian assistance. From tsunamis, droughts, floods, and cyclones, to earthquakes, droughts and biological epidemics, there has been a drastic rise in the number and severity of natural disasters in recent decades. From 1994 to 2005, approximately 7,100 disasters occurred which killed over 300,000 people worldwide. During 2007, 414 disasters associated with natural hazards were recorded, taking more than 16,800 lives, affecting over 211 million people, and causing more than \$74.9 billion in economic damage. It is estimated that almost 80% of these disasters were caused by climate-related hazard events. The increasing prevalence and severity of natural disasters requires increased cooperation in channeling humanitarian assistance to disaster-affected areas.

The UN has been responsive not only in efforts to respond to disaster occurrences, but also in efforts to reduce disaster impact. The General Assembly declared the 1990s the International Decade for Disaster Reduction. It also established the International Framework of Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, which defined guiding principles for preparedness, humanitarian relief, and rehabilitation of areas affected by natural disasters. In 1994, the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World represented the first comprehensive document to address the need for multilateral, coordinated cooperation on disaster reduction and response. It marked a paradigmatic shift in the international community by emphasizing the need for proactive disaster preparation over reactive disaster response.

The Yokohama Strategy remained the leading framework until 2005, when the World Conference on Disaster Reduction took place in Hyogo, Japan. The Conference built upon the work of the Yokohama strategy and attempted to address continuing gaps in disaster preparedness in the formulation of the Hyogo Framework for Action: 2005-2015 (HFA). Its over-arching objective is to build resilience of nations and communities to disasters by significantly reducing disaster losses measured in lives and in the social, economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries. The Framework identifies priorities for action, guiding principles, and practical means for achieving disaster resilience for vulnerable communities in the context of sustainable development. As the guiding document in natural disaster management, the HFA also reaffirms international consensus that disaster reduction is the priority focus of disaster management.

Since the adoption of the HFA, many global, regional, national and local efforts have also attempted to address disaster risk reduction more systematically. Many regional bodies have formulated strategies at regional scale for disaster risk reduction in line with the HFA. In addition to calling for the implementation of the HFA, the General Assembly has encouraged Member States to establish multi-sectoral national platforms to coordinate disaster risk reduction in countries. While progress has been made in the formulation of such plans, much work remains to be done in terms of implementation.

A recent breakthrough in on-the-ground coordination of disaster responses occurred in 2005, when the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations came into force. The Tampere Convention makes it easier for humanitarian organizations to set up communications equipment without interference from local regulations, which facilitates faster, more coordinated, and more accountable disaster response activities.

Despite such progress, the international community continues to encounter coordination challenges that hinder efficient distribution of humanitarian assistance in response to disasters. Several organizations exist, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, which aim to help facilitate assistance, but most organizations' efforts emphasize disaster reduction. To address UN inter-agency cooperation, in 2000 the Economic and Social Council launched the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction to improve cross-agency coordination. After natural disasters, several organizations within the United Nations structure perform recovery and rehabilitation, and many run their own efforts for funding and assistance. Coordination is at times confusing and difficult because the lead organization

can differ based upon the type of event and location. Moreover, the lead agency is reliant on the international community for financial, technical and labor support. In an effort to alleviate coordination challenges, in 2008 the General Assembly appointed the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat as the focal point within the overall United Nations system. However, further improvement in cross-agency coordination is still needed to ensure continuity, timeliness, and predictability in the response by relevant United Nations humanitarian and development organizations in the event of disaster.

Natural disasters and sustainable development are inextricably linked for many developing countries. While effective disaster-preparation and disaster-response policies are essential in order to safeguard communities' well-being and livelihoods, economic growth and sustainable development are equally integral to the improvement of states' capacities to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. In March 2009, the General Assembly recognized that reducing vulnerability to natural disasters was a key component of poverty eradication, sustainable development strategies, and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The Assembly's emphasis on the role of development organizations in disaster response promotes a holistic perspective that broadly addresses the relationships between environmental degradation, sustainable development, humanitarian aid, and natural disaster mitigation. Amidst efforts to improve aid coordination, further discussion and commitments are still necessary to ensure that future implementation encompasses the complex inter-relationships between these subjects.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Given the link between sustainable development and disaster reduction and relief, in what ways can the General Assembly promote a more comprehensive approach to natural disaster response?
- How can further coordination and cooperation be encouraged between UN agencies and NGOs?
- What steps can be taken now to prepare for the increase of natural disasters due to climate change?

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A/RES/62/92  
A/RES/61/131  
A/RES/60/125  
A/RES/59/212  
A/RES/45/100  
A/RES/44/236  
A/63/351  
A/63/277  
A/62/323  
A/61/314  
A/60/227  
A/59/374

Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action

Common statement of the Special Session on the Indian Ocean

Disaster: risk reduction for a safer future

Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015

The Tampere Convention

## Additional Web Resources:

[www.ochaonline.un.org](http://www.ochaonline.un.org) -United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org) - International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

[www.unisdr.org](http://www.unisdr.org) - International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

[www.gdacs.org](http://www.gdacs.org) - Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System

## PEACE, SECURITY AND REUNIFICATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The Korean question” was brought before the United Nations General Assembly, and the goals of free elections and reunification of the peninsula were established without support from the Soviet bloc. In the fall of 1948, both the Republic of Korea (RoK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were formally established under leaders whose stated goals included reunification of the peninsula. After two years of border skirmishes and raids, the DPRK launched a full scale invasion of the South on 25 June 1950. Hostilities on the peninsula continued, with significant involvement from the UN, the United States, and China, until an armistice agreement was reached on 27 July 1953.

Secretive North-South talks regarding unification began in the 1970s, and momentum for constructive dialogue between the two countries accelerated with the end of the Cold War. In 1991, both the DPRK and the RoK joined the United Nations. For much of the 1990s, talks centered around the DPRK’s nuclear-related activities, which have at times posed considerable challenges to reunification dialogue. Though both countries signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, it and subsequent international agreements such as the Agreed Framework, were seriously hindered by challenges in their implementation.

Recurring famines in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the subsequent humanitarian assistance by the international commu-

nity have also been a key area of bilateral and multilateral relations in recent years. In both 1996 and 1998, severe famine occurred in the DPRK following widespread floods, and in 2001, severe drought again threatened the country’s food security. The international community’s response has been complicated by political tensions that have limited humanitarian access at times. However, the World Food Programme estimates that emergency operations between 1995 and 2005 directly supported one third of the country’s population. Since 2007, gains in food security have been reversed, and the DPRK’s reliance on external food aid has been increasing.

Bilateral relations improved at the beginning of the decade, resulting in a historic inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang on 13-15 June 2000. The result was the South-North Declaration, signed by former Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 15 June 2000. The Declaration consisted of five points, promoting cooperation through the resolution of humanitarian issues by integrating the economy and cultural aspects of civil society. In response, the UN General Assembly adopted A/RES/55/11 on 31 October 2000, which welcomed and supported the developments arising from the inter-Korean summit, calling it a “major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations and in realizing eventual peaceful reunification.”

In recent years, a number of programs have aimed to expand bilateral functional cooperation. Both governments worked together in repairing the Gaeseong-Pyongyang highway and in completing the Gaesong-Sinuju railroad; in May 2007, passenger trains crossed the North-South border for the first time in 56 years. In addition, joint educational programs have been undertaken to educate the youth of Korea on reconciliation and reunification. The UN has encouraged ongoing efforts to initiate and sustain a constructive dialogue, but reunification efforts have been overshadowed by the international community’s concern for the nuclear-related activities by the DPRK. In August 2003, the Six Party Talks began between the United States, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan, with discussions centered around the DPRK’s nuclear-related activities. Although efforts were initially hampered when the DPRK announced in 2003 its intentions to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an agreement was reached in September 2005 between the six countries in which the DPRK agreed to stop its nuclear testing.

However, on 9 October 2006 the DPRK announced its nuclear weapons capability with a successful underground test. In response, the UN Security Council adopted S/RES/1718, which called for the suspension of the DPRK’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons activities. On 2-4 October 2007, a second inter-Korean summit took place in Pyongyang. The summit resulted in the Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity, which aims to bolster economic cooperation and promote regional peace and security. At the summit, the DPRK agreed to begin the disarmament process in exchange for aid and diplomatic concessions. On 16 November 2007, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 62/5, which celebrated the summit and affirmed that inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation were essential for consolidating peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The General Assembly called on Member States to “continue supporting the inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation, and reunification,” and encouraged both governments to implement the Declaration “fully and in good faith” in an effort to develop a sound foundation for peaceful reunification efforts in the future.

The GA's recent discussions have also focused on human rights issues in the DPRK. In 2008, the GA called attention to the lack of freedom of thought or movement in the country, the trafficking of women, violations of worker's rights, and the relation between human rights violations and the country's widespread malnutrition. While expressing serious concern at the continued reports of systematic and widespread violations of civil, economic, and social rights, the Assembly recognized the potential of the inter-Korean dialogue to help improve the human rights and humanitarian situation in the DPRK.

Despite the progress indicated by the most recent inter-Korean summit, tensions on the divided peninsula have increased markedly. During 2008, the DPRK began the process of dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility in agreement with the second summit conditions, but progress stalled when disarmament talks broke down in December 2008. The following month, the DPRK announced its intent to cancel all military and political deals with the Republic of Korea and accused Seoul of "hostile intent." In April and May of 2009, the DPRK engaged in a series of missile launches and underground nuclear tests. In response, the Security Council unanimously condemned the missile testing as a violation of S/RES/1718 and imposed tougher sanctions. In the wake of criticism from the international community, the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the Six Party Talks, its intention to restart its nuclear facilities, and its position that the DPRK was no longer bound by the 1953 armistice.

In its work, the General Assembly has typically avoided in-depth discussions of the DPRK's nuclear program, leaving consideration of that topic to the relevant UN bodies and agencies. However, Member States have encouraged the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks and continue the denuclearization process, and the UN has expressed its hope that talks will soon resume. In light of the ongoing developments and tense atmosphere, the General Assembly must consider how its discussions and recommendations can best support efforts to achieve peace and reunification in the Korean peninsula.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What role can functional development and cooperation play in the reunification process?
- How has food security situation in the DPRK impacted reunification efforts? In what ways can the international community assist?
- Which past measures have been most supportive of reunification goals, and how can past lessons inform future actions?
- Given the ability of the General Assembly to discuss and issue recommendations, what current course of action should the Assembly take?

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A/62/264  
A/62/L.4  
A/55/L.14  
S/RES/1718  
S/RES/825  
A/HRC/7/20  
CRC/C/OPAC/KOR/Q/1/Add.1  
CRC/C/PRK/4  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

## Additional Web Resources:

- [www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org) - Amnesty International  
[www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea](http://www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea) - Human Rights Watch  
[www.koreanunification.net](http://www.koreanunification.net) - Korean Unification Studies (*Note: While this is a blog, it contains excellent source material and resource links*)



# THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE: DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

**Purview of the Simulation:** The General Assembly First Committee addresses the disarmament of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and related international security questions. The First Committee makes recommendations on the regulations of these weapons as they relate to international peace and security. The First Committee does not address legal issues

surrounding weapons possession or control complex peace and security issues addressed by the Security Council. For more information concerning the purview of the UN's General Assembly as a whole, see page 17.

**Website:** <http://www.un.org/ga/first/index.shtml>

## THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

The illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) fuels civil wars, increases urban crime rates and arms the world's terrorists. Today, there are approximately 600 million SALW in circulation, with an additional eight million new weapons entering the market each year. These weapons are estimated to contribute to 500,000 deaths each year, including 300,000 that result from armed conflict. Easy and increased access to small arms and light weapons provides sufficient power to destabilize entire regions, as well as increase the longevity of conflicts. The illicit trade of small arms has ramifications beyond violent conflict and crime. SALW also increase the perception of insecurity, which interferes with the daily routines of many people. The perception of insecurity disrupts access to basic needs and health care, while hampering humanitarian relief efforts and displacing populations. Illicit trade of SALW also represents a major risk to humanitarian and development priorities.

Small arms control and reduction measures have typically been more comprehensive and extensive at the regional level. While there are a number of efforts at the regional level to control the trade of SALW, the UN is the primary actor at the international level. Some countries have argued that regionalized efforts should trump a coordinated international effort. Currently, two approaches have been taken to address the issue of SALW proliferation. The "supply-side" method concentrates on increasing accountability and government regulation of SALW in their production, transfer, and sale. Because most countries affected by small arms violence are not producers, emphasis has been placed on the supply end of trade in small arms. The second method concentrates on the "demand-side" that recognizes that in some countries, amounts of small arms that are already available through illegal channels will not be affected by supply-side strategies. This method looks to curb the use of weapons already out on the market by using peacekeeping operations to improve security within Member States, while developing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to reduce the amount of the small arms and light weapons that are already available.

The supplies of SALW tend to come from unsecured government stockpiles. Therefore, stockpile management and security are also an important control in combating the illicit trade of SALW. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, SALW have legitimate military, law enforcement, sporting, and recreational uses, which makes controlling their transfer more difficult. Improving international transfer controls is also a vital step toward curbing the illicit trade of SALW. Finally, marking, record keeping, and tracing are often identified as effective measures to preventing SALW from being diverted to those who would use them for illicit purposes.

In response to this growing problem, in July 2001 the UN convened the Conference on Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All of its Aspects. The conference resulted in the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA). The PoA calls on Member States to make the production and possession of SALW a criminal offense, identify and destroy stockpiles, keep track of officially-held guns, issue end-user certificates for exports/transit, and notify the original supplier nation of re-export. States are also encouraged to support regional agreements, increase information exchange, and work to ensure better enforcement of arms embargoes.

The first review of the PoA occurred during the summer of 2006 at the UN Small Arms Review Conference, but the conference was unable to reach consensus on a clear framework for Member States to enact the protocols called for in the PoA. In July 2008, the Biennial Meeting of States convened to address the illicit trade of SALW in three specific areas: increased international cooperation and capacity building assistance, stockpile management and surplus disposal, and the current status of the illicit trade of SALW. The meeting established standards for managing stockpiles and destroying surplus weapons, and also reviewed progress made on the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, the ITI calls for Member States to mark existing stocks of SALW held by government security forces, in order to reduce the likelihood of illicit transit to war zones.

In its efforts to combat the illicit trade in SALW, the General Assembly's work has focused primarily on the implementation of the Programme of Action. Major obstacles to its implementation include Member States who refuse to support the PoA or assist in curbing the use of SALW. The 2008 report from the Third Biennial Meeting on Small Arms proposes certain steps to be taken to resolve these issues. Actions under consideration are the continued inclusion of SALW in embargoes imposed during times of conflict and the inclusion of DDR programs in peace settlements and peacekeeping operations.

Future efforts will likely focus on the creation of a legally binding instrument that will create standards for export, import, and re-export of SALW. Also, additional efforts are needed to reach consensus on an internationally agreed-upon definition of what constitutes SALW. Successful consensus-building amongst Member States will be the first step towards addressing the pervasive violence and destabilization caused by SALW.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How does the illicit trade in SALW impose costs in humanitarian, development, and economic terms?
- What is the best way to create import and export controls while protecting the rights of end-users and not overburdening the legitimate transfer of SALW?



• How can the General Assembly best support the efforts of other UN bodies that address SALW, and how can coordination be further improved?

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A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3  
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Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all Its Aspects

## Additional Web Resources:

[www.un.org/disarmament](http://www.un.org/disarmament) - United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs  
[www.poa-iss.org](http://www.poa-iss.org) - United Nations Program of Action, Implementation Support System  
[www.smallarmssurvey.org](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org) – Small Arms Survey  
[www.iansa.org](http://www.iansa.org) - International Action Network on Small Arms  
[www.genevadeclaration.org](http://www.genevadeclaration.org) - Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development

## PREVENTING THE ACQUISITION BY TERRORISTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AND SOURCES

In the past decade, preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources has been of increasing concern for the UN. Until recently, radioactive materials were most frequently discussed in the context of overshadowing nuclear issues. While a rogue nuclear weapon represents the pinnacle of terrorism fears, terrorists can utilize radioactive sources to create weapons to achieve results that even conventional, biological, or chemical weapons cannot. Though radioactive materials are not capable of creating a nuclear explosion, radiological weapons may be fashioned in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or a radiation emission device. Owing to the relative accessibility of materials and attention an attack would bring, these devices are widely speculated to be a more likely weapon than a conventional nuclear weapon in possible terror scenarios.

In spite of their association with nuclear material and devices, radioactive materials and sources are not regarded as weapons of mass destruction on the basis that a radiological weapon would not inflict massive casualties. Rather, the damage caused would stem from extensive environmental cleanup, disruption of society, great economic costs, and public fear. Thus, radiological weapons are more often referred to as weapons of mass disruption. This term refers to the fact that radioactive weapons such as “dirty bombs,” which are a specific type of RDD that makes use of conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials, are more likely to incite panic and disrupt society than inflict casualties on a large scale.

In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in response to the fears and intimidation from nuclear energy. The IAEA takes on the role of acting as the world’s nuclear authority and watchdog organization. The international community’s concerns were heightened as more states began to acquire and master nuclear technology. Combined with alarm over the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, these concerns resulted in the creation of the more comprehensive, legally-binding Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). States party to the treaty are obligated to forgo the utilization of nuclear technology for the creation of weapons, excluding the five Member States that were already declared nuclear weapon states. While the NPT achieved near-universal acceptance, its promulgation was unable to stem the advancement of nuclear technology. As nuclear technology proliferated among states, concerns spread regarding the safeguarding of nuclear material, precipitating the enactment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 8 February 1987.

In more recent years, the focal point of concern has shifted from the usage of nuclear weapons by Member States to the threat that terrorists might acquire unsecured or orphaned radioactive materials and sources. In 2003, the IAEA approved revisions to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) which called for every Member State to adhere to prescribed measures of securing and monitoring radioactive sources. While the Code of Conduct is not a legally binding document, as of February 2009, 94 countries had expressed their support for it. Also in 2003, the IAEA organized the International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources to highlight radiological security and response measures, address orphaned radiological sources, and stress the importance of the Code of Conduct.

A follow-up conference to the International Conference took place in 2005 to discuss the creation of regulatory controls, how to combat the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and emergency response measures to a RDD attack. The Group of Eight (G8) has also commit-

ted to prioritizing pressing provisions of the Code of Conduct including national regulations, disposal options, penalties for theft or misuse, and recovery of orphaned sources. The 2006 annual G8 summit announced the creation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, aimed at improving radioactive and nuclear material security and to prevent illicit-trafficking. As of July 2009, 75 nations have become partners in the Initiative.

The international community has recognized that the prevention of acquisition of radiological materials and sources by terrorists is of paramount importance to international peace and security. In April 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which called upon Member States to pursue multilateral compliance with non-proliferation and prevention of illicit-trafficking of materials and sources. On 8 July 2005, Amendments to the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material were also adopted. The Amendments strengthen requirements in the Convention for domestic protection of nuclear material while also extending protection to include nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport.

The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, entered into force by the General Assembly in July 2007, bolsters the objectives of past treaties by requiring Member States to create, define, and enforce criminal laws, establish jurisdiction, and increase cooperation in efforts to safeguard radioactive material. Also in 2007, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 62/46, calling for increased international cooperation, strengthening national measures and capacities, and ratifying past items concerning this issue. Member States were urged to adhere to the guidance set forth in the IAEA's Code of Conduct, especially with regard to guidelines addressing import and export of radioactive sources. The Assembly welcomed and encouraged efforts by Member States to locate and secure orphaned radioactive sources.

The success of these efforts will depend on each Member States' dedication and ability to implement national measures to combat illicit trafficking, monitor sources, recover orphaned sources, and aid other nations in equal endeavors. While the United Nations has made significant progress in the past decade towards recognizing and addressing the uniqueness of radioactive concerns, greater collaborative efforts are needed to achieve unified policies.

The General Assembly's role in the discussion of nuclear issues is contextualized within the comprehensive UN framework. As a coordinating body that works in concert with the Security Council and IAEA on this topic, the General Assembly's function is to discuss, debate, and issue recommendations. It can also request the IAEA or Security Council, as appropriate, to consider specific questions. The IAEA, as an independent international organization related to the UN system, reports annually to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, as needed. The Security Council remains the appropriate forum for the international community to reach binding decisions regarding nuclear proliferation. Bearing these roles in mind, the First Committee should discuss ways in which the GA can best encourage greater cooperative efforts between both relevant UN bodies and Member States.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring radioactive materials or sources have been successful?
- Are existing recommendations and measures readily applicable by all states? How might states aid each other in preventing terrorists from acquiring radioactive materials?
- What further measures could encourage greater coordination of efforts to secure stockpiles of radiological sources?

- What measures can the General Assembly take to best support the efforts of other UN bodies that address this topic? How can coordination and cooperation be improved?

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism  
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

## Additional Web Resources:

- [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org) - International Atomic Energy Agency  
[www.nti.org/h\\_learnmore/radtutorial/index.html](http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/index.html) - Radiological Terrorism Tutorial





# THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

**Purview of the Simulation:** The Second Committee makes recommendations on means to improve the economic development of Member States and maintain the stability of the international financial and trade network. The economic issues considered by the Second Committee are distinguished from those considered by the Fifth Committee in that this Committee deals solely with financing the economic assistance to Member States, whereas the Fifth

Committee addresses the budgetary issues within the UN System. The Second Committee does not address social issues that impact development; such issues are considered by the Third Committee. For more information concerning the purview of the UN's General Assembly as a whole, see page 17.

**Website:** <http://www.un.org/ga/second/index.shtml>

## PREVENTING AND COMBATING CORRUPT PRACTICES AND TRANSFER OF ASSETS OF ILLICIT ORIGIN AND RETURNING SUCH ASSETS, IN PARTICULAR TO THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

Globalization and the growth of social and economic international relations have led to the expansion of international markets, cultural exchanges, and the mutual understanding of shared social commonalities. However, an undesired by-product of increased global economic interaction has been the rise in corrupt financial practices. The globalization of financing has facilitated near-instant electronic transfers of illicit assets through so-called 'megabyte money transactions', which in turn sustain criminal enterprises around the world. This growth of transnational organized-crime networks has bolstered such illicit activities as illegal-weapons transfers, drug and human trafficking, terrorism, governmental corruption and corporate malfeasance, damaging the economies of both developed and developing countries. Estimates of the total monetary impact of illicit asset transfers are difficult to ascertain, but UN estimates range from \$800 billion to \$2 trillion, or 2 to 5% of global GDP. Alarming, corrupt money associated with bribes received by public officials from developing countries is estimated at \$20 billion to \$40 billion per year, which roughly equals 20 to 40% of flows of official development assistance (ODA). In response to the situation, the UN has resolved to aggressively prevent, detect, and deter these corrupt practices.

The various UN conventions on corruption, transnational organized crime, drugs, and the transfer of illicit assets reflect an evolution of responsive strategies. In 1998, the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances emerged as the first international legal instrument to criminalise the transfer of illicit assets. In 2003, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defined and addressed the transnational nature of criminal networks, and their ability to circumvent domestic law by unrestricted international movement of financial assets. Perhaps the most significant agreement has been the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force on 14 December 2005. The Convention's 71 articles provide common standards for national policies and practices while also requiring greater international cooperation to address cross-border crime. It also obligates states party to the Convention to assist each others' efforts to combat corruption through technical assistance. By 2009, 140 Member States had signed the Convention. The Conference of State Parties to UNCAC has convened twice since the agreement entered into force, with a third session scheduled to take in late 2009.

The lead implementation agency for UNCAC is the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC's Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism acts as an anti-corruption resource for States implementing the provisions of the Convention against Corruption. The UNODC prioritizes the coordination of technical assistance, including model legislation, legal advice, site visits from anti-corruption experts, and development of an action plan for implementation of the Convention.

In cooperation with the UNODC, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations have coordinated anti-corruption efforts. The International Money Laundering Information Network (IMOLIN) acts as an information library on transnational crime and money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that proposes ethical financial standards, suggests policy adjustments, and promotes recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Proposed countermeasures include customer-identification and due-diligence requirements, supported by domestic financial intelligence units that review suspicious transaction reports and notify the appropriate law enforcement agencies to initiate seizing and freezing mechanisms. Known as the FATF 40 plus 9 recommendations, they have been endorsed and accepted as the financial standard by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In recent years, the Security Council and General Assembly encouraged Member States to implement the FATF 40 plus 9 recommendations.

In 2007, the UNODC, in partnership with the World Bank Group, launched the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR Initiative) to help developing countries recover assets and invest them in effective development programs. While emphasizing the joint responsibility of developing and developed countries to tackle corruption, the StAR Initiative outlines an action plan for assisting developing countries in the recovery of assets by reducing barriers to recovery in developed countries and strengthening the capacity of developing countries to pursue such assets. The StAR program also requires developing countries to strengthen public institutions and enhance public accountability and transparency. In May 2009, the StAR Initiative published a guide to assist States in the recovery of assets in the absence of a criminal conviction. Non-conviction based asset forfeiture is a legal regime that allows for the recovery of proceeds from serious crime, including corruption, without the need for a criminal conviction. It is often the only option available for governments when perpetrators are unavailable to be prosecuted. An increasing number of States have established systems to permit non-conviction based asset forfeiture, as recommended by the UNCAC.

While the StAR Initiative demonstrates increased international cooperation, greater coordination of efforts is still needed to develop an effective and comprehensive response to corrupt practices. In 2008, the General Assembly stressed the need for mutual legal assistance



from Member States to effectively combat corruption in all its forms. The GA also urged all Member States who have not yet done so to require domestic financial institutions to fully implement comprehensive due diligence and vigilance programs. These actions would achieve measures of accountability and regulation, all of which would substantially disrupt and hinder corrupt practices.

In A/63/88, the Secretary-General noted several priority action areas for the General Assembly. Presently, the primary challenges in implementing the UNCAC are a lack of agreement on a review mechanism and the lack of legal framework to address corruption. Reaching agreement on a mechanism for reviewing the implementation of the Convention will be difficult, and further commitment by Member States is still needed particularly in the area of technical assistance. The Secretary-General's report also underscored the significance of the review mechanism, noting that its promulgation will lead to "a high volume of new and complex tasks" to be performed by the Secretariat. The report warned that this will not be possible at present resource levels, urging the General Assembly to give appropriate consideration to the resource needs of the UNODC. In its work, the General Assembly will need to discuss the best approaches to addressing and resolving the aforementioned challenges.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What additional steps can the UN and Member States take to stem the cycle of transnational organized crime?
- How can illicit money transfers to secret banking havens be policed? When non-identifiable source criminal assets are seized, how should they be utilized?
- What, if any, steps might the UN take once a Member State has been informed of corrupt practices within its borders, but takes no effective action?

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A/RES/61/209

A/RES/60/288

A/RES/60/207

A/63/416/Add.4

A/63/88

CAC/COSP/2008/15

CAC/COSP/2008/5

CAC/COSP/2008/4

CAC/COSP/2008/3

Convention Against Corruption

Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, Drugs, and Psychotropic Substances

Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

## Additional Web Resources:

[www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org) - Transparency International

[www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org) - UN Office on Drugs and Crime

[www.imolin.org](http://www.imolin.org) - International Money Laundering Information Network

[www.fatf-gafi.org](http://www.fatf-gafi.org) - Financial Action Task Force

## CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

The preservation of biological diversity and the pursuit of sustainable development are issues that become more pressing with each year due to humanity's increasing demands on the planet. The world population has doubled since 1950; it reached six billion in 1999 and is predicted to be nine billion by 2050. Today, the global market consumes natural resources at a rate that is growing five times more rapidly than the world population; over 60% of the world's ecosystems have been degraded or are being used in an unsustainable manner. This unprecedented rate of extraction puts a tremendous strain on the delicate balance of biodiversity that has evolved for billions of years between the species and ecosystems that comprise life on Earth. Due to the infinite complexities that characterize these relationships, the consequences of specific human actions are difficult to predict.

Member States acknowledged the gravity of these environmental threats in the creation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, also known as the Earth Summit. Ratified by 189 Member States and one regional economic integration organization, the CBD today remains the key international instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources.

The Convention's three main goals are to conserve biodiversity, use it in a sustainable fashion, and share the benefits of such use fairly and equitably. Acting on the national, regional and international level, it stresses the common interest vested in these goals and promotes their adherence through sustainable economic and social development. The CBD also emphasizes the pursuit of poverty alleviation through natural conservation and sharing of knowledge and technology. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which entered into force on 29 January 2000, further addresses concerns relating to the protection

of natural biodiversity from the potential threat posed by genetically modified organisms. The Protocol establishes procedures to ensure that states receive information necessary to make informed decisions before importing genetically modified organisms. The Protocol also reaffirms the precautionary approach cited in the Rio Declaration.

Different UN agencies have underscored the cross-cutting impact of biodiversity loss and the urgent need to reverse it. The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment found that the degradation of ecosystems and loss of biodiversity resources are a barrier to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The assessment concluded that sufficient efforts to reverse the damage are not yet underway, though if substantial actions were undertaken, improvements may occur within the next 50 years. In 2007, the 2010 biodiversity target set forth in the CBD was fully incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals, and 2010 was declared the International Year of Biological Diversity. In 2008, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) called urgent attention to the impact of the global decline in biological diversity on the world food supply. The FAO estimated that the genetic diversity of agricultural crops has declined by 75% over the last century, which poses a serious threat to future agricultural production.

In response, the General Assembly reaffirmed in 2007 the UN's commitment to reducing the global degradation of biological diversity. It urged greater technological assistance to developing countries in order to achieve sustainable economic development that does not degrade the state's biodiversity. The GA also reminded Member States of previous commitments to prevent the loss of biodiversity through greater scientific and technical collaboration. The Second Committee addressed the potential of partnerships with the private sector to work in concert with Member States' national legislation and existing conventions. The Committee urged that new and additional financial and technical resources be provided to developing countries, and suggested that the Global Environment Facility be used to channel appropriate resources.

The ninth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity convened in Bonn, Germany, from 19 to 30 May 2008. Though the CBD previously recognized the sovereignty of nations over their natural resources, conference negotiations achieved a major breakthrough with the finalization of plans to introduce in 2010 an international regime on access to genetic resources and the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use. Also discussed were the problem of invasive alien species, loss of rainforest biodiversity, degradation of marine ecosystems and genetically modified trees. States further acknowledged that efforts to reduce emissions caused by deforestation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change were a potential effective avenue of slowing the current rate of loss of forest biodiversity. Conference delegates recognized that biodiversity objectives, including climate change policy and alternative biofuels, are important to reducing rural poverty and achieving sustainable economic development.

Despite progress, with more than 12% of land now in protected areas, the speed of the international community's response has not kept pace with the scale of environmental degradation. While the topic of biodiversity has garnered significant attention and discussion in recent years, decisive new actions are needed to reverse the continuing degradation. To achieve the goals set for the 2010 International Year of Biodiversity, extraordinary commitments will be necessary from all Member States. Prospects for success face even greater obstacles in light of the global recession, as the economic downturn incentivizes the depletion of natural resources for profit. The Second Committee will need to discuss how financial and technical assistance can achieve solutions that are both economically and ecologically viable for Member States. While considering the ramifications of biodiversity on global trade and investment, as well as Member States'

national economic development, the Committee will need to focus on the economic costs of biodiversity loss as well as the financial benefits from conservation.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Bearing in mind the financial and technical focus of the Second Committee as well as the roles played by other relevant UN agencies that address environmental issues, what is the role of the General Assembly in addressing biodiversity?
- How can biodiversity conservation efforts be implemented to also benefit the human population of fragile ecological areas, economically and otherwise?
- How does biological diversity relate to larger issues of economic and social development? How can Member States be encouraged to make biological conservation a useful and productive part of their own national development plans and legislation?

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A/63/294  
A/62/419/Add.6  
A/C.2/62/L.45  
A/C.2/62/L.15  
TD/L.410  
UNEP/GC/22/INF/16  
Rio Declaration  
Convention on Biological Diversity  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

## Additional Web Resources:

- [www.cbd.int](http://www.cbd.int) – Convention on Biological Diversity  
[www.unep.org](http://www.unep.org) – United Nations Environment Programme  
[www.millenniumassessment.org](http://www.millenniumassessment.org) – Millennium Ecosystem Assessment  
[www.countdown2010.net](http://www.countdown2010.net) – Countdown 2010: Save Biodiversity





# THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE: SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN, AND CULTURAL

Purview of the Simulation: While the Committee's areas of concern and its work often overlap with other United Nations organs, the Third Committee focuses its discussions on social, humanitarian and cultural concerns that arise in the General Assembly. The Third Committee discusses with, recognizes reports of, and submits recommendations to the General Assembly in coordination with

other United Nations organs, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For more information concerning the purview of the UN's General Assembly as a whole, see page 17.

**Website:** <http://www.un.org/ga/third/index.shtml>

## RIGHTS OF PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Self-determination is the right of a people to have freedom from external rule, to have the independence to choose their own form of government, and the liberties necessary to be an autonomous political entity. The principle of the right of peoples to self-determination was first recognized as a fundamental human right by the Atlantic Charter in 1941. Moreover, the Charter of the United Nations declares self-determination to be one of its most integral ideals. However, the UN's steadfast recognition of self-determination as a fundamental right has not translated into state actions in which such claims are universally recognized. Despite the principle's significance, no proper mechanism has ever been agreed upon for enforcement. The concept of self-determination frequently challenges the fundamental international norm of state sovereignty, making international consensus difficult to reach.

In addition to the Charter's declaration, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was one of the first international human rights documents to acknowledge the rights of all humans to political and social freedom. In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights more thoroughly elaborated the rights of citizens to amnesty, self-determination of liberty and rule of law, and freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and slavery. In the same year, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirmed the right of all peoples to self-determination while requiring Member States to promote respect for and realization of that right. Subsequently, Security Council resolutions addressing various regional and intra-state conflicts also repeatedly underscored the right to self-determination.

In recent years, discussions have focused largely on violations of the right to self-determination and other human rights abuses resulting from the role played by mercenaries and private military contractors in foreign military intervention, aggression, and occupation. The General Assembly at its sixtieth session requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare a report on the violation of human rights, with particular attention paid to violations of the right to self-determination resulting from foreign military action. A Working Group was established on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-determination. In March 2008, the Human Rights Council (HRC) extended the mandate of the Working Group, requesting them to elaborate on and present proposals on how to further protect human rights, in particular the right to self-determination, when they are under threat by mercenaries or mercenary-related activities. To accomplish this goal, the Working Group was instructed to seek input from governments, intergovernmental organizations

and non-governmental organizations. The Working Group was asked to study the traits of mercenaries and mercenary-related activities and monitor the effects of those groups on the enjoyment of human rights, with emphasis on the right to self-determination.

While the Working Group is engaged in creating newly proposed legal instruments to regulate private militaries and security companies, it has urged Member States that have not yet acceded to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries to do so, noting that although the instrument has a number of loopholes, it is presently the only tool available at the international level that may be able to impact the outsourcing of functions involving the use of violence, which have been considered the monopoly of the state for centuries.

Rather than addressing only one region or area, the Sixth Committee typically takes a comprehensive approach in discussing the subject of self-determination. Although resolutions in recent years have centered around the impact of modern-day mercenaries, past resolutions on this subject have also acknowledged and discussed the claims of self-determination made by peoples living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as self-determination claims made in the course of recent conflicts in Chile and Sudan. Special attention has increasingly been paid to the abilities of indigenous peoples to exercise their right to self-determination. The Declaration on the Rights to Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 2007, called upon Member States to recognize that communities of indigenous peoples have the right to express their unique origins and identity.

In December 2008, the General Assembly reaffirmed the fundamental condition of self-determination as a necessity for the observation, preservation, and promotion of human rights. The resolution further identified the primary opponent of the right to self-determination as foreign military intervention, as these acts of aggression have frequently led to repression, discrimination, exploitation and maltreatment. The General Assembly renewed its call for attention to the obstacles faced by refugees and displaced persons and asked that they be given the right to return to their homes. Though the resolution's adoption reaffirmed Member States' commitment to the right of peoples to self-determination, achieving universal realization of that right will require further concrete actions by the international community.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How has the increased role played by private military and security firms impacted the exercise of self-determination?



- Are current resolutions and committees effective in increasing the rights of all people to self-determination? What further actions could be taken by the international community to strengthen the ability of peoples to exercise their right to self-determination?
- How can Member States strike a balance between principles of sovereignty and self-determination?

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 A/62/438  
 A/62/301  
 A/62/184  
 A/61/341  
 A/HRC/7/7  
 E/CN.4/2006/11  
 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1  
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

### **Additional Web Resources:**

- [www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org) - Amnesty International  
[www.hrw.com](http://www.hrw.com) - Human Rights Watch  
[www.ohchr.org](http://www.ohchr.org) - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

## **THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN RURAL AREAS**

Gender equality has always been a major area of concern for the UN. Of particular concern is the situation of rural women, who comprise the majority of the more than one billion people living in abject poverty and who also encounter some of the most egregious and entrenched inequality. The plight of women in rural areas also merits special consideration in light of the widespread effects of the global economic recession. Adverse economic conditions in many developing countries have had a disproportionately negative impact on rural women who often suffer the greatest burden of poverty.

A history of discrimination and unequal access to health care, education, technology, capital and land remain prime causes of the feminization of poverty. To provide for their families, women often must choose either dangerous, exploitative working conditions or unemployment and worsening hardship. Land is the primary form of wealth and collateral in many areas, which can make it more difficult for women to obtain loans and take advantage of other economic growth opportunities. Additional social barriers prevent many girls from attending school or women from obtaining health care, both which compound and perpetuate the cycle of poverty.

In 1975, the UN established the International Women's Year to highlight issues of gender inequality. The subsequent Decade for Women (1976-1985) sought to remedy past shortcomings in development philosophies that had economically marginalized women and increased their dependence on men. It also emphasized the need to bring women into decision-making at all levels. Accordingly, several funds and organizations including the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) were created to improve the situation of women. At the conclusion of the Decade, the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women were adopted, which concretized measures to achieve goals and objectives for the advancement of women.

The situation of rural women has been recognized and addressed in several UN conventions and conferences. Article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women specifically calls for the elimination of discrimination against rural women. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action drafted in 1995 specifically emphasized the need to improve the situation of women in rural areas by increasing their incomes and providing food security. In 2000, the Beijing +5 conference titled Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century called for equal access to economic, educational, and health care resources. The conference also advocated for the continuation of microcredit ventures to help alleviate poverty for women in rural areas.

In recent years, specific efforts to address and to improve the situation of rural women have often worked in concert with Member States' efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). For instance, the goal of achieving gender equality focuses on expanding access to education by addressing circumstances preventing women and girls from attending school. School access for girls can be hindered by a lack of school sanitation facilities or a lack of access to water, which can necessitate girls' household labor. Simi-

larly, efforts to eliminate poverty and hunger include reducing the number of people earning less than \$1 per day and working toward full and productive employment for all, which includes rural women.

The UN has also taken steps to raise awareness and establish the situation of rural women as a more specific priority. The first International Day of Rural Women, established by the General Assembly in 2007, was observed in October 2008 and celebrates the role and contributions of rural women in promoting development, ensuring food security, eradicating rural poverty, and sustaining their families and communities. In support of the 2008 International Day of Rural Women, which coincided with the food production-focused World Rural Women's Day, the Secretary-General urged countries to make rural women's needs a top priority at the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus. During the December 2008 conference the body touched on the fact that the global economic crisis has had a grave effect on rural women. It called for increased attention to basic economic and social infrastructure and inclusive social services. The conference also identified economic empowerment of women as essential to a sustainable vibrant economy.

Despite these efforts to increase awareness regarding the situation of rural women, discrimination in access to education, health care, and economic means persists in many rural areas. Addressing these issues will require increased consultation with rural women in implementing future programs, as well as improved access to transportation and information and communication technology. It is possible that Member States with existing programs to further the cause of women's equality will be scaled back in the face of the continuing global economic crisis. Yet financial resources and support for governments striving to meet the MDG targets will need to be increased if efforts to improve the situation of rural women will be successful. At the same time, increased support will also be needed from Member States to provide microcredit and other direct financial assistance services to more women in rural areas in order to promote their economic empowerment.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How do cultural considerations affect programs aimed at the improvement of the situation of women in rural areas?
- In what ways can developed countries help developing countries ensure equal access to education and health care for women in rural areas?
- How can countries with large rural populations be encouraged to better integrate women into mainstream society and include the concerns and issues of rural women in state development programs?
- What actions or mechanisms could the General Assembly recommend to ensure that increased development financing is applied in ways that best address the needs of rural women?

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A/RES/62/136

A/RES/61/145

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A/RES/56/128

A/63/425

A/63/403

A/62/433

A/62/202

A/62/187

A/60/165

A/60/138

A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women

## Additional Web Resources:

[www.gender-budgets.org](http://www.gender-budgets.org) – Gender Responsive Budgeting

[www.rural-womens-day.org](http://www.rural-womens-day.org) - World Rural Women's Day

[www.unifem.org](http://www.unifem.org) - UN Development Fund for Women

[www.un.org/womenwatch](http://www.un.org/womenwatch) - UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality

[www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender) - Millennium Development Goals Related to Gender [www.ifad.org/gender](http://www.ifad.org/gender) - International Fund for Agricultural Development

[www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5.htm](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5.htm) - Five-year Review of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing +5)

[www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/) - Ten-year Review of the Beijing Declaration (Beijing +10)



# THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTH COMMITTEE: LEGAL

**Purview of the Simulation:** The General Assembly Sixth Committee addresses issues relating to international law. The Committee not only drafts new international law, but also offers interpretations of existing international law as well as recommendations for members to implement international regulations through national law. The Committee also considers legal issues which affect the United Nations Secretariat and

operations. The Sixth Committee does not resolve legal disputes; that is the responsibility of the International Court of Justice. For more information concerning the purview of the UN's General Assembly as a whole, see page 17.

**Website:** <http://www.un.org/ga/sixth/index.shtml>

## CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS ON MISSION

Recently, criminal accusations have been made against United Nations officials and experts on mission, particularly in the area of sex crimes, in the Member States where they have been assigned. These include recent reports of atrocities committed by UN peacekeepers operating in Haiti, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The prosecution of such crimes has been hindered by the problem of jurisdictional gaps. Often, both the host State in which crimes have allegedly been committed by foreign nationals, as well as the State whose nationals have been accused of committing a crime, lack the jurisdiction to prosecute such allegations. Moreover, the United Nations' Secretariat cannot hold accused persons criminally accountable, nor is the Secretariat permitted to conduct an investigation or enforce the extradition of accused offenders.

In light of the damaging impact on the reputation and credibility of the United Nations, Member States have acknowledged the need to demonstrate zero tolerance for criminal activities committed by UN officials. The Secretariat is committed to facilitating international cooperation between all Member States to prosecute offenders. However, matters are complicated by the absence of an international statute or code identifying which crimes are punishable. Additionally, alleged offenses often occur in conflict or post-conflict environments, where the criminal justice system may be impaired or non-existent. Further, Member States have varying definitions of procedural due process, and there is disagreement between States as to what penalties for criminals are just.

One area of deep concern pertains to allegations of sexual crimes. The Secretariat has sought to address this, in part, through data collection to establish the extent of the problem. As reported to the General Assembly in 2007, in the calendar year 2006 a total of 357 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were reported to the Office of Internal Oversight Services. The Secretary-General has been requested to bring credible criminal allegations to the attention of the Member States against whose nationals such allegations were made. However, sexual crimes are widely underreported for a variety of reasons, including stigmatization and fear on the part of victims.

In response to continued reports of criminal acts committed by UN officials and experts on mission, the Secretary-General assembled a Group of Legal Experts (Group) for a report on the situation. Since then, a variety of proposals to strengthen the accountability of UN officials and experts on mission have been discussed.

However, consensus has not yet been reached on a wide range of details. For instance, there is debate over whether the Secretariat should attempt to define crimes or criminal activity for the sake of uniformity, and if so, what such guidelines should be. Another unsettled question is which avenue Member States should take to gain jurisdiction over criminals (i.e., legislatively by code or statute, amendment to the constitution, etc.). Additional issues include whether the UN or Member States would finance the investigations, trials, and imprisonment of offenders, and what defenses ought to be available for alleged criminals who are nationals of other States;

Similarly, the international community must decide if Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions provides any sort of jurisdiction or benefits for civilian victims in regard to protecting them from UN representatives. Member States must also determine if the UN ought to provide for an appellate court of review, and if so, whether such a court would be based on common law or civil law, and finally, whether Member States would bear responsibility for appeals in their State.

The Secretary-General has indicated a desire to avoid specifying offenses and appropriate punishments, instead preferring to find avenues for States to exercise jurisdiction. While the United Nations has expressed a preference that the host State be responsible for investigating, trying, and prosecuting alleged crimes by UN officials and experts on mission, it has offered to incorporate the United Nations Police (UNP) to facilitate trials in the host State. Operating in an ancillary capacity, the UNP would provide assistance to the host State in all stages of investigation.

Significant concerns have been expressed by Member States over the idea of an executive mandate issued by the Secretariat, and so other proposals have centered on either the modification of Member States' jurisdictional boundaries in order to share exercise of jurisdiction, or the creation of a hybrid tribunal to adjudicate crimes. It has been proposed that hybrid tribunals, similar to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, may be more likely to meet international standards of human rights and to promote confidence in the potential legal system. However, these tribunals are also resource-intensive and would require the consent of the host State.

The international community has acknowledged the need to establish procedures by which UN officials and experts on mission may be held liable for their actions in the field. While the goals have been identified, the means and ways have yet to be decided. Further discussions are required amongst Member States to establish consensus on what steps may be taken next.



Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How are principles of diplomatic immunity and the responsibility to protect impacted by criminal behavior by UN officials and experts on mission?
- How can Member States hold peacekeepers liable for their actions?
- What form should a tribunal or court with jurisdiction over these proceedings take, and what avenues of appeal will be available for the accused?
- Should the Secretariat be responsible for defining criminal activity? How will jurisdiction be gained by Member States? Who will finance investigations and oversee appellate courts of review? Finally, does Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions provide any guidance in this matter?

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[www.un.org/law/criminalaccountability](http://www.un.org/law/criminalaccountability) - Ad Hoc Committee  
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[www.unicri.it](http://www.unicri.it) - United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

## **STATUS OF THE PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS**

The relationship between the international community and the Geneva Conventions is structurally fundamental to the universal adherence to international humanitarian law. Prompted by the aftermath of World War II, the Convention and its protocols were formed as an initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to supplement definitive rules for limiting the barbarity of war and protecting the individual from it.

A cornerstone of international humanitarian law, the Convention consists mainly of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 1977. The four core Conventions specifically address wounded soldiers on the battlefield (First Convention), the wounded and shipwrecked at sea (Second Convention), prisoners of war (Third Convention), and civilians and prisoners of war under enemy control (Fourth Convention). With the recent accession of Montenegro and Nauru, the Conventions have achieved universal recognition.

Since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, additional Protocols have been implemented to fully establish and provide international law within the scope of the UN. Protocol I develops the rules of the First and Second Conventions, dealing with the wounded, shipwrecked, sick, missing and dead, but extending protection to civilian medical workers. Protocol I also provides a more detailed definition of "combatants" and their expected conduct and also discusses civil defense and relief as matters directly related to human rights. Additionally Protocol II provides major improvements in extending special protection to those who take no part in hostilities (including medical and religious personnel, units displaying the red cross or red crescent, cultural objects, and places of worship). In this respect, Protocol II was a groundbreaking accomplishment for protecting relief work which is of a strictly neutral and humanitarian nature.

In December 2005, the ICRC called the attention of the international community to the new problems with the global recognition of the customary emblems of humanitarian aid. Article 38 of the First Convention confirmed the establishment that the red cross or red crescent mounted on a white background signifies neutrality and humanitarian aid. However, these emblems are often perceived as having political and religious connotations, which has the potential to compromise the respect, efficiency and safety of those involved in the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. This confusion has also led some states and relief movements to refuse to adopt these emblems, compromising the universality of the relief organization. To correct this, the states party to the Geneva Conventions adopted a third protocol additional to the Conventions in 2005. This Protocol, relating to the adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, establishes the red crystal as an image devoid of any political, religious or any other connotation that could

be efficiently used in humanitarian efforts world-wide. The Additional Protocol III calls for the red crystal to be recognized as a substitute for the red cross or red crescent and serves to prevent the future proliferation of other emblems.

While the Additional Protocols have become the accepted form of international law related to armed conflicts and their subsequent victims, the Protocols lack actual enforcement and discretionary power, while concerns over sovereignty hinder the enforcement of international law. At times, Member States have disregarded the Protocols. In 2008, the General Assembly expressed its concern over the increasing numbers of civilians being targeted in armed conflicts and emphasized the urgent need to apply international humanitarian law.

In response to the Secretary-General's 2008 report on the status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Member States also stressed the need for those States that have not already done so to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other relevant legal instruments. Member States who had not yet done so were similarly urged to adopt the Additional Protocols and to make use of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, where appropriate. Also discussed was the development of the 2008 Montreux Document, which reaffirmed the obligation of States to ensure that private military and security companies operating in armed conflicts do so in compliance with international humanitarian law. The document lists over 70 recommendations for Member States with regard to best practices concerning oversight and regulation of private security companies. It also calls for greater accountability, calling upon Member States to take concrete steps to ensure the prosecution of private military and security company personnel when serious breaches of law occur.

The relevance of the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols has also taken on renewed prominence in light of the global war on terrorism. Human rights observers have criticized the practice of "extraordinary rendition" tactics on suspected terrorists, and some states have issued arrest warrants for agents who are suspected of engaging in these proceedings. Many states party to the Geneva Convention have expressed significant concern over the treatment of individuals being held at the detention centers at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The discussion raises questions about the Protocols' efficacy and relevance to global terrorism.

Changes in the shape and context of modern warfare have presented new challenges for international humanitarian law. A thorough examination of the existing sources of international humanitarian law is required to regulate the international law of war and protect the innocent affected by armed conflict. The Sixth Committee, with jurisdiction in issues relating to international law through the interpretation of existing international law, as well as the implementation of international regulations and norms through national law, must discuss ways of clearly defining implementation and enforcement standards within the Protocols.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Have the current mechanisms to regulate the international law of war been sufficient? Have they been successful?
- What steps can the international community take to further enforce the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols?
- Are there more effective or efficient ways to protect civilians during armed conflict than the Protocols already in place?

- What is the scope with which the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention can actually be applied within governments? International Legal Personalities? The UN as a whole?

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A/C.6/63/SR.13, 14, and 26  
A/C.6/63/L.15  
A/C.6/59/L.1  
Montreux Document  
Rome Statute  
Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols

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- [www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org) - International Red Cross and Red Crescent  
[www.unhchr.ch](http://www.unhchr.ch) - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  
[www.icc-cpi.int](http://www.icc-cpi.int) - International Criminal Court



# CHAPTER FIVE

## THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)

### Members of the Economic and Social Council:

Algeria	Indonesia	Poland
Barbados	Iraq	Portugal
Belarus	Japan	Republic of Korea
Bolivia	Kazakhstan	Republic of
Brazil	Liechtenstein	Moldova
Cameroon	Luxembourg	Romania
Canada	Malawi	Russian Federation
Cape Verde	Malaysia	Saint Kitts & Nevis
China	Mauritius	Saint Lucia
Congo	Morocco	Saudi Arabia
Cote d'Ivoire	Mozambique	Somalia
El Salvador	Namibia	Sudan
Estonia	Netherlands	Sweden
France	New Zealand	United Kingdom
Germany	Niger	United States
Greece	Norway	Uruguay
Guatemala	Pakistan	Venezuela
Guinea-Bissau	Peru	
India	Philippines	

### Purview of the Simulation:

The Economic and Social Council is the principal UN organ responsible for coordinating economic, social and related works of 14 specialized agencies, 10 functional commissions, and five regional commissions. ECOSOC accepts reports and recommendations from other UN bodies, including the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). Along with its coordinating role, ECOSOC gathers information and advises Member States on economic, social, humanitarian and human rights programs. ECOSOC also coordinates and collaborates with autonomous specialized agencies that work closely with the United Nations. These include multilateral financial and trade institutions, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

**Website:** [www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/](http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/)

### SITUATION OF AND ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN WOMEN

The ongoing tensions and conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people have had particularly severe consequences for Palestinian women. The situation of women throughout the world has been an important topic for the UN, which recognizes that in many countries and regions women are not afforded the same human rights or status as men. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women specifically address these problems in the form of international instruments. Even when not focused specifically on women, the treaties which make up the international framework on human rights have included provisions designed to protect, assist, and empower women. As a response to the interrelation of women's rights with other human rights and development goals, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) created the Commission on the Status of Women, which focuses on the situation of and assistance to women in various geographical regions, including the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), the Gaza Strip, and West Jerusalem.

In addition to ECOSOC and its programs, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has established the Economic Security and Rights Programme and SABAYA, Women's Community-Based Empowerment located in Palestine. These agencies work on achieving gender equality in democratic governance, reducing feminized poverty, and combating exclusion through the realization of women's human rights and human security. SABAYA oversees the development and operation of eighteen women's centers in the OPT, through funding by the United Nations

Development Programme, UNIFEM, and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security funding.

Since 2000, the conflict between Israel and Palestine has changed drastically with far-reaching consequences for all Palestinians, but especially women. Violence between Israel and Palestine, the harsh economic situation, and other deteriorating conditions are resulting in injury and loss of life to Palestinian women and families. Women have suffered the most during this conflict due to their lower income level, declining living conditions, social exclusions, deteriorating social networks, and undeveloped capabilities. The conflict has exacerbated these latent challenges by imposing additional food security issues, blockages and closures, as well as limited and restricted access to medical care, productive resources, and education services. Many women have also suffered psychological trauma.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), which conducted census reports in 1997 and 2007, is responsible for monitoring the rates of education, employment, domestic violence, participation in public development and access to medical care. The PCBS notes that 14.1% of Palestinian women are illiterate. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process has deployed a Gender Adviser to support the work of the United Nations Country Team, identifying gaps in current programmes/activities, assessing the quality and effectiveness of the existing gender equality programs, identifying deficiencies in these programs, and identifying strategies to overcome these deficiencies. Unfortunately, many of the gaps in current efforts are a result of the ongoing violence in the region. Increased restrictions on movement prevent women from accessing resources that are available. A comprehensive approach is needed that can operate within the security and economic constraints imposed by Israel, while still



providing meaningful assistance to Palestinian women within the OPT. Additionally, all initiatives must be developed and implemented in a culturally sensitive way, by affirming women's rights without provoking conflict by contradicting social values.

Several initiatives are currently being considered for future actions to address the condition of women in Palestine, such as the systematic and effective utilization of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to improve the status of Palestinian women. In furtherance of this goal, increased support is needed from Member States, United Nations entities, and NGOs to provide financial and technical assistance to Palestinian women. Similarly, assistance focused on the empowerment of women, particularly in the areas of education, health, social welfare, employment, and economic development would act to alleviate the lower social status and income level that women face. Although some improvements have been made toward gender equality, such as the fact that five out of twenty-two Palestinian government ministries are run by women, much work must still be done.

ECOSOC has emphasized the importance of the continued presence and operation of United Nations entities in the OPT and refugee camps. Support from the international community is crucial in a variety of areas, such as providing emergency assistance to relieve the pressures of limited resources and declining food security. The General Assembly recently recommitted itself to continued and renewed efforts to end violent confrontations in OPT; this would ideally include full involvement of women in conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives in the region. Protecting and enhancing the rights of Palestinian women will require full Israeli compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to protect the rights of Palestinian women and return refugees and displaced women and children to their homes. This in turn will depend on continued review by the Secretary-General and support by the international community.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the United Nations and its entities implement the changes on a level that will impact and ultimately improve the situation of Palestinian women?
- What are the problems created by the Israeli occupation in 1961, and how does this occupation directly affect the Palestinian women?
- How can the human rights declarations be better implemented to reduce violence and increase access to resources, including prenatal and ante-natal care, education, food, and employment, in a zone of conflict and occupation?

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[www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw) - United Nations Commission on the Status of Women  
[www.arableagueonline.org](http://www.arableagueonline.org) - League of Arab States  
[www.iwc-peace.org](http://www.iwc-peace.org) - International Women's Commission  
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## **MAINSTREAMING DISABILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA**

It has been estimated that 650 million people, or roughly 10% of the world's population, suffer from some form of disability. Disability crosses all age, gender and racial categories and has been a topic discussed in the United Nations for over forty years. What seems to have escaped the discussion in the past is the relationship between recognizing disability and promoting successful development. Persons with disabilities make up 20% of those living on less than \$1 per day; 80% of disabled people live in the developing world. These statistics underscore the importance of including disability in any development efforts. Full inclusion of persons with disabilities is essential to successfully achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

Early UN action to establish and mainstream disability rights in development was confined to two key instruments. Prior to the

United Nations Decade of Disabled Persons (1983-1992), many Member States were of the position that persons with disabilities were protected by previous documents including the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Social Development and the Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons and therefore, specific documents connecting disability and development were unnecessary. The first UN instrument to link disability to social and economic development was the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons. The Programme of Action identified goals of full equality for and participation of disabled persons in social and development areas.

In 1990, ECOSOC passed Resolution 1990/26 which requested the Commission on Social Development to establish a working group to develop standard rules for the equalization of persons with disabilities. The resulting document, Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, became the second instrument within the UN development framework to help promote the inclusiveness of persons with disabilities in development. The document is composed of 22 rules designed to incorporate persons with disabilities into all facets and stages of development, from education to healthcare and employment. While not legally binding, the rules served as the foundation for including the disabled in development strategies for over a decade. The rules also established a Special Rapporteur beginning in 1994 and currently mandated through 2011 to promote the enforcement of the rules.

In more recent years, UN action on mainstreaming disability in the development agenda has taken large advancements. The Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons was adopted on 13 December 2006 and entered into force on 3 May 2008. The quick negotiation, record-breaking first-day signatures, and rapid-effective date display the true paradigm shift which is taking place. The convention shifts from treating persons with disabilities as objects to be included in development planning and implementation to integrating them at all levels of development as subjects with rights and responsibilities. This is the first legally binding treaty specifically concerning persons with disabilities and their development rights. As such, it represents both a human rights treaty and a development instrument.

In keeping with this ground-breaking treaty, the World Bank, International Labour Organization (ILO) and other leading development players have begun to further promote the complete integration of persons with disabilities. The ILO has published a series of papers on including disabled persons in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as the preferred method for combating poverty in the developing world. As the ILO takes a larger role in development, ensuring the inclusion of persons with disabilities is gaining momentum within the organization and its development efforts. ECOSOC has welcomed the help of these organizations, recognizing that mainstreaming disability is a goal that cannot be accomplished without the support of the international community. However, ECOSOC has noted that unfortunately policy is often disconnected from practice.

ECOSOC has specifically urged all UN entities, NGOs and Member States to include persons with disabilities in decision-making processes and policy planning for the future, and stressed that decision-makers must be held accountable for the inclusion

of persons with disabilities. In order for disabilities to be truly mainstreamed, Member States and agencies must allocate resources for education and technical assistance. Furthermore, ECOSOC has encouraged all actors to promote employment opportunities for persons with disabilities by providing access to education and training, developing microcredit programs which specifically target persons with disabilities, and fostering inclusive employment and human resource practices.

The UN must also make changes if it is to lead by example. Efforts are currently under way to include the rights of persons with disabilities and related concerns explicitly within all UN guidelines, and at all stages of processes including engagement, country analysis, strategic planning, and monitoring and evaluation in keeping with the Convention. General Assembly Resolution 61/106 urges the Secretary-General to promote the accessibility and services of the UN to persons with disabilities. This includes physical changes to UN property for better access, recruitment and training of persons with disabilities to serve as members of UN staff, and improvement of knowledge and information about disabilities.

Despite the advances of the past decade, persons with disabilities continue to be marginalized in parts of the world. With 80-90% of disabled persons in developing countries unemployed, there is still much work left to be done. With a legally binding treaty finally in place and with the 2015 target for the Millennium Development Goals fast approaching, the stage has been set to integrate persons with disabilities in all aspects of development. Pursuant to the treaty, Member States and UN entities alike are bound to promote the full inclusion of persons with disabilities in all aspects of society. Two of the most important areas requiring action are employment and education. Future actions will have to focus on both planning and actual implementation. One potential difficulty is the lack of a universally accepted definition of "mainstreaming disability." While the framework is in place, the information about disabilities is still difficult to access in many areas of the world; this information must be made available if true mainstreaming is to occur.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Is it necessary to define "mainstreaming disability" and if so, how should it be defined?
- Is there a centralized organization which can take the lead in coordinating efforts on this issue, or is the current structure sufficient to be successful?
- To what extent are persons with disabilities currently being fully included in development efforts?
- Should mainstreaming efforts be focused on particular aspects of development, such as education or employment? If so, which are the most important aspects?

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[www.worldbank.org/disability](http://www.worldbank.org/disability) - World Bank: Disability

[www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org) - International Labour Organization

## ANNUAL MINISTERIAL REVIEW: IMPLEMENTING THE INTERNATIONALLY AGREED GOALS AND COMMITMENTS IN REGARD TO GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

The purpose of the Annual Ministerial Review (AMR) is to “scale-up and speed-up” implementation by allowing stakeholders to engage in discussion about development goals and learn from each other. The AMR was created following the 2005 World Summit, at which the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was charged with guaranteeing that the agreements reached in major United Nations conferences and summits were honored. The mandate, detailed in paragraph 155 of the World Summit Outcome Document, also requires ECOSOC to hold annual ministerial-level substantive

reviews (AMRs) to assess progress by drawing on its functional and regional commissions and other international institutions, in accordance with their respective mandates.

The General Assembly responded to the World Summit by adopting Resolution 61/16, which further defined the role of AMRs. The Assembly’s enumerations included expectations that AMRs be part of the ECOSOC’s high-level segment, that they focus on goals common amongst UN conferences, summits, the MDGs and other IADGs, review progress made in the implementation of those goals, and finally, assess the impact of the conferences and summits on the aforementioned goals. The General Assembly’s intent was to allow for a yearly high-level assessment of various governments, commissions, and organizations’ progress towards the completion of the MDGs and other goals and targets agreed on at the major UN conferences and summits conducted over the past 15 years. The voluntary presentations give nations the opportunity to share their experiences with regard to implementing development policy, particularly the policies, initiatives and successes that might be sustained, expanded and emulated by other nations.

Each AMR is guided by a central theme. The 2009 theme is “implementing the internationally agreed goals and commitments in regard to global public health.” Eight countries volunteered to present at the 2008 ministerial review: Bolivia, China, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Japan, Mali, Sri Lanka and Sudan. The 2009 AMR took place 6-9 July 2009 during the high-level segment of the annual session of the Economic and Social Council at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. The Economic and Social Council is expected to adopt a ministerial declaration at the end of the high-level segment. The major UN commitments to public health include Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4: Reduce Child Mortality, 5: Improve Maternal Health, and 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases. The AMR will discuss the successes and challenges encountered in working toward these goals.

In preparation for the AMR, an e-discussion on achieving sustainable development was jointly organized by the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It took place from 29 January to 26 February 2009. The e-discussion served as a means to engage experts, practitioners, and policy-makers from various regions and stakeholder groups in a transnational dialog on specific aspects of the implementation of the internationally agreed upon goals and commitments in regard to public health. The e-discussion was organized into two parts; Part I addressed strengthening health systems, and Part II considered emerging and future health care challenges.

After the e-discussion, a preparatory meeting was held in March. At that meeting the discussion centered on three elements: where the international community stands on achieving public health goals; how the global economic crisis will impact implementation of those goals; and health challenges particular to post-crisis situations. At that meeting the body recognized the intersection of health issues with each of the MDGs, and highlighted the need for improved data and reporting, especially in light of the current financial crisis and lower aid levels. Various experts discussed the direct relationship between income and health, and urged low-income countries to devote 15% of their budgets to the provision of basic health services.



ECOSOC also held two special events in preparation for the AMR. On 12 February 2009 a meeting was held to discuss the “Contribution of Traditional Medicine to the Realization of International Development Objectives related to Global Public Health.” Panelists discussed the ways in which traditional medicine can contribute to the achievement of public health goals, and also noted the importance of developing a policy framework in this area. The second event took place on 23 February 2009, and focused on “Philanthropy and the Global Public Health Agenda.” At this meeting executives and philanthropists met with ECOSOC members to discuss raising the profile of tropical diseases which have been largely neglected, building effective public-private partnerships, and improving health outcomes for women and girls.

The AMR is a unique intergovernmental, multi-stakeholder platform for the assessment of public health goals and challenges with the ultimate objective of providing a direct link between policy and action. It acts as a tool for ECOSOC to better assess the successes and roadblocks faced by developing nations in efforts to achieve sustainability. The review gives the global community an opportunity to reaffirm their international commitments to global public health, including achieving the health-related MDGs. In order to meet the collective public health goals, both individual and collective action will need to be coordinated across a range of stakeholders to ensure progress is maintained. ECOSOC’s role is to encourage the international community to implement the findings and conclusions of the AMR, and identify ways of meeting the challenges identified by the AMR.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- How can the international community ensure that public health goals are met universally?
- Should public health issues be approached from a global, regional, or national level?
- How can ECOSOC provide leadership toward continued support of health issues in the face of declining aid commitments?
- What role should the United Nations play in developing strategies to coordinate potentially overlapping efforts toward achieving the MDGs and AMRs?

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 A/RES/61/264  
 A/RES/61/16  
 A/RES/61/10  
 A/RES/60/35  
 A/RES/60/1  
 A/RES/59/27  
 A/RES/58/173  
 A/RES/56/128 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

## Additional Web Resources:

- [www.globalhealth.org](http://www.globalhealth.org) - Global Health Council  
[www.un.org/millenniumgoals](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals) - Millennium Development Goals  
[www.un.org/ecosoc/newfunct/amr2009.shtml](http://www.un.org/ecosoc/newfunct/amr2009.shtml) - 2009 Annual Ministerial Review

## REPORTS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (ECA) AND THE COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS (CND)

In addition to the three main topics on ECOSOC’s agenda, the Council will also receive reports on the final day from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). As functional and regional commissions established by ECOSOC, the ECA and CND are required to make annual reports on their activities to the members of ECOSOC. While these reports are generally accepted pro forma, ECOSOC may also choose to take some action on the recommendations contained in the report. These bodies may also present their recommendations in resolution format, allowing ECOSOC the chance to review and formally pass the proposals.

To facilitate this process, the final day will culminate in a joint session at which the reports and recommendations will be made to ECOSOC. Following each presentation, it will be up to the joint session to take further action. Please be aware that, as commissions of ECOSOC, these bodies have been given significant responsibilities to study, review, debate and decide on recommended actions within specific topical areas that ECOSOC felt should be dealt with in greater detail than could be addressed by the main body. It is recommended that all Representatives assigned to ECOSOC also review the background section on the ECA (Chapter VI) and CND (Chapter VII); Representatives may also choose to do some additional research on these topics in preparation.



# CHAPTER SIX

## ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (ECA)

### Members of the Economic Commission for Africa

Algeria	Eritrea	Niger
Angola	Ethiopia	Nigeria
Benin	Gabon	Rwanda
Botswana	Gambia	Saudi Arabia
Burkina Faso	Ghana	Senegal
Burundi	Guinea	Seychelles
Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone
Cape Verde	Kenya	South Africa
Central African Republic	Lesotho	Sudan
Chad	Liberia	Swaziland
Comoros	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Togo
Congo	Madagascar	Tunisia
Cote d'Ivoire	Malawi	Uganda
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mali	United Republic of Tanzania
Djibouti	Mauritania	Zambia
Egypt	Mauritius	Zimbabwe
Equatorial Guinea	Morocco	
	Mozambique	
	Namibia	

This year's simulation will include one the Economic and Social Commission's regional commissions, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Participation in ECA includes one or two representatives for the countries that are currently represented on

the Commission (see list above). ECA will meet all four days of the Conference, and will report to a combined ECOSOC plenary session on Tuesday afternoon.

### About the ECA

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is one of five regional ECOSOC commissions. The ECA, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, works to promote both economic and social development in the region. Much of the ECA's work is focused on the review and analysis of its member's development processes and progress that includes the formulation, follow-up and evaluation of policies and technical support as needed.

### Purview of the Simulation

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is one of five regional commissions of the Economic and Social Council. UNECA is responsible for promoting social and economic development in the region. The work programme has focused on meeting Africa's unique needs and emerging global challenges in development, as well as regional integration. UNECA considers issues of capacity building, technical assistance, and means of implementing the development agenda at a sub-regional level. UNECA reports to ECOSOC on Africa's economic challenges, progress, and proposals for the future.

Website: [www.uneca.org/](http://www.uneca.org/)

## AID FOR TRADE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR AFRICA

According to statistics from the World Trade Organization (WTO), world trade increased 61% between 2000 and 2005. During that same period, Africa increased its trade exports by 16% on average annually. However, when these statistics are broken down regionally, a high concentration of export growth is concentrated in oil-exporting countries such as Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. Export performance in non-oil exporting countries is closer to an average annual growth rate of 11%. More troubling than the trade variance between oil and non-oil exporting countries is that Africa's share of global exports of goods in 2005 was only 2.85%, less than half its peak value in 1980 of 5.97%. This is particularly inconsistent with the fact that Africa accounts for 14% of world population. Despite the vast economic potential in the latent sectors of many of Africa's countries, much of the continent still lacks the basic infrastructure and training necessary to enter an increasingly open and integrated global economy.

These troubling numbers, coupled with the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration's mandate to make technical assistance and capacity building a key component of development, have prompted a new approach to the problem. In response to these concerns, the WTO

during its Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005 included in its final Declaration a call for the creation of a Task Force on Aid for Trade (AFT). This task force would provide recommendations on how to implement an Aid for Trade initiative, and how such an approach could help achieve the goals of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). To this end, a broad spectrum of countries have pledged over \$50 billion by 2010 to aid in this initiative, although the pledges have largely remained unrealized. This money is made available to lesser developed countries (LDCs) through the WTO's Enhanced Integrated Framework Trust Fund.

The WTO has been working in conjunction with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a monitoring and evaluating agency for the AFT initiatives. However, it still maintains its primary mission of setting trade rules that ensure countries can effectively participate and benefit from world trade. The WTO monitors overall Aid for Trade flow, the commitment of individual donors to provide additional funds, and the needs of developing countries for additional Aid for Trade funds. The ECA, along with the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, has been involved in the Aid for Trade initiative to strengthen the technical potential of trade infrastructure, help recipient nations become more active within the WTO, and open more areas of trade relations.

The AFT program aims to build the trade capacity and infrastructure required by any nation for achieving the benefits from the trade openings created by globalization. It is an integral part of the overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) grants and concessional loans revolving around tariff reductions and improving the capacity and extent of trade. Just as trade is a broad and complex concept, AFT is broad and not easily defined. AFT encompasses technical assistance, infrastructure improvements, supply-side production capacity building and adjustment assistance in an effort to aid countries in their efforts to liberalize trade, utilize their unique comparative advantage, and take advantage of global trade opportunities.

In October 2007 the ECA, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the WTO jointly organized a regional review meeting on “Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus Africa” in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with the intentions of bringing together trade and finance ministries, donor agencies, international finance institutions, multilateral and regional organizations, and the private sector. The primary goal of the conference was to move from policy debate to implementation and from needs assessments to deliverable plans. A paper on “Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus Africa” was subsequently prepared and presented by the ECA, the AfDB, and the WTO which summarized the meeting as well as made several recommendations for future actions. These recommendations included increasing awareness and understanding of AFT, identifying trade priorities, encouraging countries to develop AFT action plans as well as tasking the ECA with creating an African AFT network, and gathering and publishing data for regular progress reports.

While AFT has been lauded as one of the most successful outcomes of the DDA, major hurdles still exist if Africa is to successfully and forcibly enter the global economic market. The lack of a cohesive modern infrastructure remains one of the largest of these challenges. Continued development and success of AFT initiatives will require adequate and dependable international funding, well-trained and supported government trade ministers, and political leadership and commitment. Beyond these institutional needs, the ultimate success of AFT depends on the cooperation of the private sector ultimately responsible for producing goods and services, services liberalization, and product diversification. The recently released roadmap for the 2009 AFT program outlines essential objectives, emphasizing the need to maintain the current momentum of AFT during the economic downturn. The roadmap also noted the importance of moving from commitment to implementation, and of finalizing the indicators for progress and self evaluation that were initially discussed in the 2008 symposium on Aid for Trade.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- What should be the main objectives of an ECA-established Aid for Trade Network?
- How can the ECA aid in the development of regional and community Aid for Trade action plans?
- How can African countries provide support for AFT programs in other African countries?
- What measures would help sustain the growth already achieved through AFT programs in light of current economic conditions?

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## **Additional Web Resources:**

[www.uneca.org](http://www.uneca.org) - United Nations Economic Commission On Africa  
[www.uneca.org/aidfortrade/media.htm](http://www.uneca.org/aidfortrade/media.htm) - ECA Aid for Trade  
[www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org) - World Trade Organization



## ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN AFRICA

The 2008 report to the General Assembly on the progress of the MDGs showed that at the halfway point to the 2015 deadline there had been substantial achievements, but many serious impediments still exist. Each goal has specific problems that are unique to every region. As such, many regional initiatives have been advanced to help ensure the completion of the MDGs. For the purposes of the MDGs, Africa is divided into two regions, sub-Saharan Africa and Northern Africa. Achieving the 2015 benchmarks appears most difficult for the sub-Saharan region, which is especially troubling because many of the MDGs were formulated with sub-Saharan Africa in mind.

The goal to Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger has an overarching objective of reducing absolute poverty, or those people living on less than one dollar a day. Based on current data, however, the population of sub-Saharan Africa living in absolute poverty is not likely to be halved by 2015. The sectors furthest from achieving the MDGs poverty reduction goals are refugees and rural African communities, which need to focus on repairing massive neglect of the local agriculture. This need plays directly into the MDG concerning environmental sustainability, a multi-faceted goal where Africa has experienced both success, as in reversing depletion of natural resources, and failure, as in efforts to improve the lives of the millions of people living in slums. Achieving environmental sustainability and eliminating poverty are in turn directly related to the goal of establishing a global partnership for development. Unfortunately this goal, which had been experiencing consistent progress, is now facing significant setbacks as a result of the current global economic recession. However, the percentage of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries has been consistently growing along with the percentage of debt in developing regions. Thus decrease in debt is crucial to continued success in achieving all the MDGs.

The goal to Achieve Universal Primary Education has enjoyed success in most regions, reaching a 90% enrollment rate for primary education. However sub-Saharan Africa remains at 71% enrollment. This is a tremendous improvement from its 54% enrollment rating in 1991 and even its 58% enrollment rating in 2000. The largest contributing factor for sub-par enrollment numbers is the current poverty levels. This is another example of the interaction between different MDGs. Just as alleviating extreme poverty is key to providing universal primary education, the availability of primary education to both genders equally is key to promoting gender equality. The efforts to Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women have been met with tenuous but growing success. In the area of education, Northern Africa has shown consistent and remarkable improvement with an enrollment ratio of ninety-nine girls for every one hundred boys in secondary education as of 2006. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa is tied for the lowest enrollment ratio in primary education and holds the lowest enrollment ratio in secondary education. Efforts are also needed in the realm of mainstreaming women in political office. The percentage of women holding political office tripled in Northern Africa, and both African regions showed improvement in promoting women between 2000 and 2008. In sub-Saharan Africa the numbers nearly doubled from 9.1% women in political office to 17.3%, showing that both regions have made slow but promising improvement in this area.

The goal to Reduce Child Mortality aims to reduce by two-thirds the deaths of children under five by 2015. Some progress has been achieved, but the numbers are still strikingly high. Measured at deaths per one thousand births, the current sub-Saharan child mortality rate of 157 deaths per thousand is the highest globally by a wide margin; overall, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for nearly half of the five and under child deaths in the developing world. The Northern Africa region, however, has shown remarkable improvement, going from 82 deaths per thousand in 1990 to 35 deaths per thousand in 2006. While life-saving vaccinations have become more readily available, many children under five remain severely malnourished; nearly a third of all five and under child deaths are attributed to undernutrition. Inextricably tied to the goal of reducing child mortality is the MDG to Improve Maternal Health, an area which has also shown an alarmingly low level of improvement. In sub-Saharan Africa, only statistically marginal improvements have been made to maternal mortality rates. However, Northern Africa has shown a 40% reduction in its maternal deaths, placing the region on track to attain its 2015 target. Improvements in family planning, availability of trained health workers, and many other areas such as reducing poverty will require significant scale-up to lower the maternal mortality rate in Africa.

Efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases have achieved mixed results in sub-Saharan Africa. The vast majority of all people living with HIV/AIDS, estimated at 37 million as of 2007, live within sub-Saharan Africa. Most are without access to necessary antiretroviral therapy. Most sub-Saharan African nations lack both drug supplies as well as the necessary infrastructure to distribute them. Despite the lack of progress in combating HIV/AIDS, significant work has been achieved in combating malaria, mainly thanks to increased availability of insecticide treated mosquito nets. Though malaria prevention efforts have improved greatly, significant barriers remain in providing malaria treatment. Despite efforts, tuberculosis cases are on the rise in the region. Without serious and substantial assistance from the international community, targets outlined for this MDG are unlikely to be met.

In most areas Africa has been showing consistent, if laborious, improvement, but a significant amount of work still needs to be done in Africa in order to achieve the MDGs. An integrated approach is needed which recognizes the codependency of the goals. As the half way point to the 2015 target has passed, it is imperative that efforts be redoubled in working toward meeting these goals. The ECA has a crucial role to play in this process by assisting African states with monitoring progress, developing poverty reduction strategies, and coordinating sub-regional efforts. By supporting peer learning and knowledge sharing, the ECA can help African states develop context-specific and culturally sensitive approaches to achieving the MDGs.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What are the models for success in achieving the MDGs, and what role do Millennium Promise and MDG Progress play into that success? How does good governance affect progress on the MDGs?
- How can the international community assist Africa in reaching the Millennium Development Goals? Specifically, what forms of aid could be given to sub-Saharan Africa in light of its poor track record of meeting the MDG target milestones?

- What impact does the destabilization of one country play on the region's ability to accomplish the MDG? How can the international community help mitigate this impact?
- What effect, if any, has the current global economic situation had on Africa's likelihood of accomplishing the MDGs? How can the ECA prioritize allocation of scarce resources?

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## Additional Web Resources:

- [www.un.org/millenniumgoals](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals) - Millennium Development Goals  
[www.uneca.org/mdg](http://www.uneca.org/mdg) - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
[www.mdgafrica.org](http://www.mdgafrica.org) - MDG Africa Steering Group



# CHAPTER SEVEN

## THE COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS (CND)

### Members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs:

Argentina	Israel	Spain
Australia	Italy	Sudan
Austria	Jamaica	Switzerland
Belgium	Japan	Tajikistan
Bolivia	Kazakhstan	Thailand
Botswana	Lithuania	Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon	Mexico	Turkey
Canada	Moldova	Uganda
China	Morocco	Ukraine
Colombia	Namibia	United Arab Emirates
Cuba	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Czech Republic	Niger	United States
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Nigeria	Uruguay
El Salvador	Pakistan	Venezuela
Ethiopia	Peru	Yemen
Finland	Poland	
Germany	Republic of Korea	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Russian Federation	
	Saudi Arabia	
	Senegal	

This year, AMUN's simulation will include the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Participation on the Commission is open to two members from any country currently represented on the CND (see list above). The CND will meet all four days of the Conference, and will report to a combined ECOSOC plenary session on Tuesday afternoon.

### About the CND

The Commission is a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council and was established in 1946 to be the United Nations' primary policy-making body on drug related issues. In 1991 the General Assembly expanded the CND's mandate to serve as the governing body of the Fund of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). The CND assists ECOSOC in supervising the application of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs, and advises the Council on all matters pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs. The CND is based in Vienna and meets on an annual basis.

### Purview of the Committee

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is the central policy-making body of the United Nations on drug-related matters. As a functional Commission of the Economic and Social Council, the CND monitors the implementation of the three international drug control conventions and is empowered to consider all matters pertaining to the aim of the conventions, including the scheduling of substances to be brought under international control. It also advises on all matters pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors. The CND submits reports to ECOSOC on its proposals to strengthen the international drug control system.

**Website:** <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/index.html>

## EXPANDING THE CAPACITY OF COMMUNITIES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION, TREATMENT, HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL SERVICES TO PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS AND OTHER BLOOD-BORNE DISEASES IN THE CONTEXT OF DRUG ABUSE AND STRENGTHENING MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING SYSTEMS

HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases are not exclusive to one group, country, or region of the world, though the diseases are more prevalent in some areas than others. Between 30.3 million and 36.1 million people are infected with AIDS, a number which is steadily increasing. The populations most at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS are those intravenous drug users, emergency affected populations, and sex workers. The provision of information, treatment, health care, and social services to those living with HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases is a growing concern within the United Nations global development agenda. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is

concerned exclusively with the transmission, care, and social services provided to persons with HIV/AIDS in the context of drug abuse.

Drug use increases the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, especially when the drug use involves needles which are not sterilized correctly. According to UNODC information from 2006, there are 13 million people using cocaine, 16 million using opiates, and 35 million using amphetamines throughout the world. These individuals are at high risk for contracting HIV/AIDS. The infection rate rises between those that share drug equipment. Many drug users are ignorant of the increased risks that come with sharing needles, a problem compounded by the fact that the act of sharing in some cultures is seen as a relational experience and may also be a cost-saving measure. Once the disease is contracted within a drug using community, it can spread rapidly, affecting up to 90% of the entire community. Sex workers are statistically more likely to abuse drugs, and emergency affected populations may use or traffic drugs as a means of survival. Because in emergency situations women are often the most vulnerable, the proportion of women infected is slightly higher than men. These are complicated and interrelated issues which contribute to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, requiring a comprehensive response from the international community.



The General Assembly addressed the provision of information, treatment, health care and social services to those living with HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases in the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000. In the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, the UN stated that the effort to control the spread of HIV/AIDS would be multinational and further recognized that the disease presents a serious obstacle to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The General Assembly identified sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe as the areas most affected by HIV/AIDS, while noting that the threat is not limited to these regions. Both Declarations include goals of maintaining or reversing transmission trends and improvements to health care, education, and social services related to the treatment of HIV/AIDS.

The Declaration of Commitment has furthered efforts in each region to increase prevention, education, care, treatment, and focus on communities and families in the fight against HIV/AIDS. A vital aspect of such plans is the emphasis on human rights, with efforts particularly focused on assisting vulnerable populations, and reducing the stigma for those living with HIV/AIDS. Most often, drug abusers who contract HIV/AIDS are faced with double the stigma, and may be particularly vulnerable or unable to seek social services. The transmission of HIV/AIDS in the context of drug abuse is an issue which has often been marginalized, but it must be addressed in order to combat the diseases effectively.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs recently reaffirmed its commitment to working with the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). In its 2009 report, the CND recognized the importance of access to prevention programs, treatment, health care, and other social support services. The HIV/AIDS pandemic cannot be stopped without a comprehensive approach that takes into account the implications of drug use. While the ultimate aim of the CND and UNODC is to prevent and eradicate drug abuse in all forms, it is also important to ensure that the decision to use drugs is not a de facto decision to expose oneself to HIV/AIDS. The CND has been confronted with the difficult challenge of addressing illegal drug use within the parameters of all relevant national and international law, while also attempting to curtail high-risk behavior such as needle sharing.

In recent years, a number of Member States have experimented with programs to reduce risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS in the context of drug abuse. One approach that has been used in a variety of contexts allows drug users to exchange used or “dirty” needles for clean, sterile ones. Other Member States have chosen to prosecute possession and use of illegal narcotics less aggressively in favor of a public-health approach to the problem. While some data exists to support the efficacy of such programs in reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS, more studies are needed to modify the approach for other regions and cultures.

ECOSOC and the CND are attempting to approach the problem of HIV/AIDS from all social, legal, and health perspectives with the help of the UNAIDS Joint Programme. ECOSOC has called to increase funding to further efforts to provide education and medical assistance, address the gender disparities in those affected with HIV/AIDS, and develop strategies to help drug users reduce or eliminate exposure to HIV/AIDS. A solution to the HIV/AIDS pandemic will

not be possible without addressing the various impetuses that lead to high-risk behavior. One of the ongoing challenges for the international community is striking a balance between enforcement of criminal drug laws and the treatment for drug abusers suffering from HIV/AIDS. Prevention strategies must take a multi-faceted approach that acknowledges these competing interests. Furthermore, any programs will have to be accompanied by strategies to overcome the social and cultural stigmas associated with discussing HIV/AIDS as well as drug abuse.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- What steps can be taken by the international community to support UNAIDS and ECOSOC to make sure international aid is used effectively in the fight of drug-related transmission of HIV/AIDS?
- How do differences of cultural views regarding gender impact the efforts to reduce risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS in the context of drug use?
- What initiatives have succeeded in the past to lower the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS in the context of drug abuse? Can these initiatives be adapted for use in other nations? What monitoring information is necessary to further expand these initiatives?
- How can the UNAIDS Joint Programme and the CND help governments to more effectively use assistance to target the interrelation between drug use and HIV/AIDS?

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[www.unaids.org/en](http://www.unaids.org/en)- Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS  
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## **THE NEED FOR A BALANCE BETWEEN DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF OPIATES USED TO MEET MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC NEEDS**

The demand for and supply of opiates used to meet medical and scientific needs deals with two issues of great importance to the United Nations. First, there are serious implications for health care, specifically regarding the reduction in pain and suffering of peoples, as the World Health Organization (WHO) has concluded that opiates are indispensable to the alleviation of pain. Second, this topic is concerned with the illicit drug trade, specifically the illicit trade of opium. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) has struggled to find a balance between these two issues, ensuring that supplies are sufficient to allow for the needs of medical and scientific purposes, while preventing over-production of opium so as to discourage illicit trade.

With the passage of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961 and its 1972 amendment, this issue was brought into greater focus. The Convention served to combine previously existing treaties dealing with drug control, while extending coverage systems to the plants which were actually the root source of narcotic drugs. As such, the objectives of the Convention exist to limit the possession, use, trade in, distribution of, importation, exportation, manufacture, and production of drugs to strictly medical and scientific purposes while relying on international cooperation to deter drug trafficking. Finally, the Convention establishes the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to serve as an independent and quasi-judicial control to monitor implementation of the Convention.

The INCB bears the responsibility for ensuring the availability of opiates for medical and scientific purposes, while discouraging over-production to prevent illicit trade. Upon request of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the board has reported upon the status of

opiate availability around the globe. The board draws these conclusions by asking Member States which are party to the Convention to estimate their need for opiates in the upcoming year, and then comparing those figures to estimates of opiates produced legally for medical and scientific purposes.

The UN has praised the work of the INCB in numerous resolutions. In these resolutions the UN not only commended the work of the board, but encouraged Member States to report their opiate needs to the board so that accurate demand counts could be maintained. Furthermore, ECOSOC and the CND have called upon Member States to engage in cooperation to limit the production of opiates to only those for approved medical and scientific uses, and has requested those countries which have previously not engaged in the cultivation of opium poppy for the production of opiates to continue to refrain from such production.

Even with these mechanisms in place, maintaining the delicate balance between the supply and demand of opiates has proven to be difficult. While 2004 and 2005 figures show a small surplus of opium, demand was larger than supply in 2006 through 2008. Supplies of opium rich in morphine were able to only meet 80% of the demand in 2006 and 60% in 2007. However, current estimates for 2009 show that the supply will once again be larger than the demand.

Striking this delicate balance is also impacted by recent medical advances. While the need for opiates for the alleviation of pain remains indisputable, the reliance upon the opium poppy plant for the production of opiates may be shrinking. Synthetically produced opiates, often called opioids, have recently grown in popularity and do not require production of the opium poppy plant. It should be noted, however, that the opium poppy plant is still necessary for the production of both morphine and codeine, the two most commonly used opiates. The CND has urged producing Member States to plan carefully based on the licit consumption estimates of consumer nations, and in turn has urged consumer Member States to track the licit use and demand of opiates and derive a realistic estimate for producing states.

The two goals of medical pain treatment and eradicating illicit drug production must be continually weighed against one another in light of supply and demand, the possible licit and illicit uses, and the economic effects of increasing the production of opioids. Finding a balance in the supply of and the demand for opiates used for medical and scientific needs will require intense cooperation from Member States, particularly in the realm of recording and reporting demand for and actual production of opiates. One of the many uncertainties in this process involves developing nations which may not individually import medical opiates in high amount, but in the aggregate compose a significant portion of the market. These nations often do not have the necessary infrastructure to track and report on demand and usage. Another challenge is ensuring that the imported opiate products do not come from confiscated illicit drugs, as such trade skews the data on production and demand. Furthermore, the CND must be aware that some groups have advocated the legalization of opium cultivation and production in nations such as Afghanistan, where the illicit production and trade is a serious concern.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can current supply and demand reporting techniques be improved?

- Is it possible to improve the cultivation of opium poppy to ensure global stocks meet demands?
- What measures can be taken to ensure remaining stocks of opium poppy are not used for illicit purposes?
- Is moving forward with only synthetic production of opiates a viable option? What costs and benefits come with this plan of action?

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- [www.incb.org](http://www.incb.org) - International Narcotics Commission Board  
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# CHAPTER EIGHT

## WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)

Along with simulating the General Assembly Plenary and its First, Second, Third and Sixth Committee, AMUN will also be simulating the World Food Programme (WFP). WFP will meet all four days of the Conference, and will report on its findings to the Combined General Assembly Plenary on Tuesday afternoon. WFP's membership is open to all member-states, and as such, participation is open to one member from each delegation represented at the Conference. Requests for a second seat on this simulation should be directed to the AMUN Executive Office.

### About the WFP

The United Nations World Food Programme was created in 1962 to be the food aid arm of the United Nations and to provide leadership for global efforts to provide food assistance. The WFP works in cooperation with its sister agencies the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). While the WFP is primarily involved in responding to emergencies, it is also committed to preparing for

emergencies, preventing food insecurity, and reducing chronic hunger and malnutrition. The WFP is based in Rome and reports annually to the General Assembly.

### Purview of this Simulation

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the United Nations agency responsible for humanitarian aid in the context of world hunger. The WFP is primarily involved in the areas of food assistance in emergencies, reducing chronic world hunger, and helping countries plan for food security in the future. The WFP works closely with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and other organs of the UN, as well as various non-governmental organizations, to provide aid directly and to work toward incorporating food security into the development agenda. The WFP submits annual reports to the General Assembly on the initiatives in place to confront the problems of food security and hunger.

Website: <http://www.wfp.org/>

## FOOD PROCUREMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Today, 850 million people, or 13% of the world population, cannot afford their most basic food needs. The human right to food is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC). At the World Summit in 1996 and later at the UN Millennium Summits in 2000 and 2005, governments made pledges to reduce world hunger by half. However, between 1996 and 2006, the number of chronically hungry people in poor countries increased by over 20 million. The WFP outlined a new three-year plan in 2008, focusing more on reducing dependency and to supporting governmental and global efforts to ensure long-term solutions to the hunger challenge.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) called for action in the areas of creating jobs and improving rural and agricultural development during its 2008 session. Discussions revolved around a broad, multi-sectoral plan of action focusing on reducing poverty, ensuring medium- and longer-term sustainability, and having the WFP adapt its assessment programmes and existing technical and programmatic support to Governments to meet the needs of urban populations. It had also promoted a "Purchase for Progress" approach, which aimed to optimize the impact of WFP local food purchases to support local agricultural development while completing the WFP's mission of feeding the hungry.

Purchase for Progress (P4P) builds upon the long-standing WFP policy of purchasing food in countries where the WFP has operations, but takes it a step further by enabling smallholder and low-income farmers to supply food to the WFP's global operations. Its goals are to create incentives for farmers to develop their crop management skills and produce quality foods, create a market for surplus crops of

locally processed foods, and realign the way the WFP buys food to better address the root causes of hunger. Past models have focused on improving food security and procuring food for the hungry as two separate issues; however, importing the foods to meet the needs of the hungry did nothing to create sustainable food systems. The P4P approach recognizes that the cycle of hunger cannot be broken unless a meaningful connection is made between food production and food distribution.

The WFP selected 21 countries for five-year P4P pilot programs: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Liberia, Laos, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Within the first year the WFP estimates 40,000 tons of food will be bought, with 350,000 smallholder farmers to benefit, at a cost of \$76 million in funding. The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), UN agencies, the World Bank Group and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners will work with farming communities to enhance crop management capacities and marketing skills. Under the pilot programs host governments are responsible for developing the overall strategy for the agricultural sector, as well as for investing in improved production and rural infrastructure.

The P4P plans focus on two of the five goals of the WFP's Strategic Plan for 2008-2011: strengthening the capacities of countries to reduce hunger and rebuilding lives in post-conflict or transition situations. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) had estimated that the hunger crisis now threatens to push at least 100 million people below the poverty line, joining nearly one billion more already struggling to survive.

P4P presents a positive long-term solution to relieve the stresses of poverty and hunger. Looking forward, WFP will need to consider

how best to encourage and develop the work of P4P so that opportunities for food procurement are fully realized and implemented in other countries. Unfortunately, there has been very little published about implemented policies or program results. Better data and improved reporting mechanisms will be needed to measure the ultimate efficacy of these programs. The WFP will also need to continue to encourage and foster cooperation between governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector toward developing new and more secure purchasing systems. Toward this end, the WFP must consider how other actors can help provide education and training, as well as what role the private sector can play in facilitating market access to smallholder farmers.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What steps can the international community take to promote sustainable methods of food procurement?
- What other opportunities for partnerships with the private sector exist for promoting food procurement?
- What can be learned from the causes of the present global hunger situation? How can these lessons be used to guide P4P toward its goals?

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## **HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**

The United Nations defines humanitarian access as "the free and unimpeded movement of humanitarian personnel to deliver relief services, or the free and safe movement of humanitarian agencies to reach civilians who are trapped, unable to move or detained because of armed conflict, natural disasters or other difficult situations." International humanitarian assistance occurs within a framework established by the international community. Unobstructed access is a necessary precondition for the World Food Programme (WFP) to be able to provide emergency food aid during times of crisis. However, securing this access is one of the biggest challenges that the UN in general and the WFP in particular faces in providing emergency relief services. Humanitarian access can be denied for political reasons or because the nature of the emergency itself prevents relief workers from delivering aid. Regardless of the cause, lack of access has profound negative consequences on populations impacted by the crisis. In 2004, the Secretary-General estimated that over 10 million people worldwide were blocked from emergency relief services.

The Geneva Convention and its Protocols state that free access to food and other essential services should be granted if conflict blocks a civilian's ability to obtain these resources. The General Assembly, in 1990, passed the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Principles to direct the international humanitarian work. The basic principles outlined in this document are that "humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality and that sovereignty, territorial integrity," and that "national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." The WFP Executive Board has also adopted the core principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality as the framework for its humanitarian operations.

To provide emergency food aid in a timely manner, the WFP needs safe and unrestricted access to at-risk populations. Providing food aid, in contrast to other humanitarian services, has several unique challenges that make regular, unobstructed access essential. Food aid is challenging because: 1) food aid is life-saving, perishable and easily marketable; 2) food assistance deliveries must take place regularly, whereas non-food items are often delivered on an ad-hoc or one-off basis and; 3) timing of food distribution is crucial, especially in order to hit lean seasons and for programmes aimed at enhancing self-sufficiency by distributing food in support of agricultural activities. The limited shelf-life and bulk of food aid create additional logistical requirements. Food aid also carries additional security concerns, as it can be used to gain political leverage. The politically-charged nature of food aid also adds a level of complexity to negotiations for access.

Humanitarian access can be blocked for a variety of reasons. Active fighting or the inability to secure the safety of relief workers, deliberate denial by the state or other political actors, physical blockages such as road blocks or flooding, and logistical challenges are all factors that can prevent the WFP from delivering aid. The most significant effect of blocked access is the inability to deliver a sufficient amount of food aid, which impacts the nutritional status of targeted groups. Other consequences of blocked or delayed access include incomplete needs assessments, failure to fully monitor and evaluate the status of the crisis, and higher operational costs.

The international community lacks a standard set of procedures for negotiating access. Multiple UN agencies, members of the international community and NGOs, such as UNICEF, UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross, can participate in negotiating rights to humanitarian access. The WFP's role in these negotiations varies depending on the level of food insecurity in the crisis. Within the UN, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) typically guide the negotiations. The WFP is responsible for advising both the ERC and the HC throughout the negotiations on estimates for required food aid, its operational requirements for delivering and distributing the food aid, and potential options for gaining access to affected civilians. Negotiations often include obtaining permission for transport operations across national borders or cross-line operations in areas where there is still open conflict. Regardless of the WFP's level of involvement in the negotiations, it always remains an impartial and neutral party to the proceedings.

Several high profile emergencies in recent years have highlighted the significance of humanitarian access. In May 2008 after Cyclone Nargis, relief workers were hampered by limited access to affected populations. After several weeks of intense negotiation between multiple parties, the Myanmar government lifted restrictions on the movement of relief workers in the country. The WFP has made repeated calls for increased access to citizens in Darfur. Other access issues in recent history include restrictions to aid agencies during the Israeli-Lebanon war in 2006, and a call to quell violence in Mogadishu, Somalia to allow humanitarian aid in 2007.

Providing humanitarian assistance is a complex process with many different interested parties. Gaining access to citizens impacted by crisis situations is a crucial step in providing humanitarian aid. The WFP plays an important role in providing humanitarian assistance. Because food aid requires special considerations, the WFP has a vested interest in addressing the challenges of securing access, and when access is limited, developing innovative and creative solutions to the problems posed by limited access.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the World Food Programme improve its operational model to better serve areas where humanitarian access has become limited?
- What can other bodies, both within and outside the United Nations, do to improve the accessibility of regions where humanitarian access has been problematic?

- What alternate approaches can the World Food Programme take to provide assistance in areas that are hindered by a lack of humanitarian access?
- Is it possible to develop an international framework or instrument to govern food delivery in emergency circumstances? How might the WFP take the lead in such an effort?

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# CHAPTER NINE

## THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ)

**The Purview of the Simulation:** The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal international judicial body of the United Nations. The two major roles of the ICJ include developing advisory opinions on matters of international law referred to it by specialized agencies and presiding over legal disputes submitted to the court by Member States. Only Member States may submit cases to the

court, and the court is only considered competent to preside over a case if both States have accepted the jurisdiction of the court over the dispute. The ICJ does not preside over legal disputes between individuals, the public, or private organizations.

**Website:** [www.icj-cij.org](http://www.icj-cij.org)

### NICARAGUA V. COLOMBIA, TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME DISPUTE

On 6 December 2001, Nicaragua filed an application requesting that the ICJ resolve a maritime and territorial dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. At issue is the right of title to a collection of islands and the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Caribbean Ocean. Nicaragua asked the ICJ to review the right to title of the Archipelago of San Andres and to establish a maritime boundary. Nicaragua has claimed the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty of 1928 was invalid, thus making the Treaty an inappropriate means of exacting right to title. Colombia has patrolled the waters in and around the disputed territory, particularly stopping vessels licensed in Nicaragua and escorting them to a controlled port on San Andres Island. Nicaragua holds that this alleged illegal assertion of the right to title and control of the maritime area has impacted its citizens on the Caribbean coast and also their maritime economy.

Colombia, for its part, argues that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application because the issues have been previously resolved. With no jurisdiction, there is no dispute and the territorial and boundary issue would be settled. The basis for the argument rests on the agreement between both parties by ratifying the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty in 1930. The Treaty resolved, among other things, a territorial dispute over the San Andres islands with both parties agreeing that the islands belonged to Colombia and also set the maritime limitation between Nicaragua and Colombia. Colombia's second objection to jurisdiction cites the 1988 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), claiming that a similar issue has already been solved in the ICJ and therefore prohibits jurisdiction. Colombia argues that the reasons for granting jurisdiction as put forth by Nicaragua are a misapplication of the 1948 Pact of Bogotá.

The Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty stated that the Archipelago of San Andres would fall under Colombian title, and also that Nicaragua had no claim, or interest of claim to the Archipelago's Roncador, Quitasueno and Serrana. Included, but less relevant, was the recognition by Colombia of Nicaragua's sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and over the Islas Mangles, two islands that are part of the San Andres Archipelago. Finally, it was established that the 82 West Meridian would serve as the maritime limit between both countries.

In 1969, Nicaragua began issuing licenses for exploration and commercial use of the waters west of the 82 West Meridian. By 1980, Nicaragua began disclaiming the validity of the 1928 Treaty altogether, on the grounds that it had been signed under military occupation by the United States, and thus did not represent a sovereign decision. Colombia, in response, would detain any boats with Nicaraguan licenses or flying the Nicaraguan flag and would escort them to San Andres or back over the 82 West Meridian. Claims by Nicaragua also include pursuit by Colombian vessels over and west of the Meridian line solely to intimidate Nicaraguan vessels. The number of incidents listed in the Nicaraguan application is five between 1993 and 2001.

**In this simulation, the ICJ will preempt history from the time when the Court's simulation begins. History will be as it was written until the moment the Court convenes on 12 February 2007. From that moment on, however, ICJ participants exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and the confines of available law.**

Questions to consider on this issue include:

- Does a treaty that was signed while a party was influenced or still under colonial rule have legal standing?
- Does more recent international law carry more weight than previously signed treaties when considering precedents and/or the outcome of a dispute?
- When considering a dispute that involves maritime economic/territorial boundaries, how much significance should be placed on agreements enacted prior to the establishment of the UN over internationally recognized rule of law?
- How do previous cases involving maritime disputes impact the outcome of the current case with respect to maritime boundaries?

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## BOTSWANA V. NAMIBIA, KASIKILI/SEDUDU ISLAND (HISTORICAL, 1999)

This boundary dispute case concerns the northeastern border between Namibia and Botswana along the Chobe River. The river's status as the border is not contested. However, exactly where the border lines are drawn within the river is important, as a sizeable island lies approximately 20 km upstream from the Chobe River's confluence with the Zambezi River. Namibia knows this island as Kasikili, while Botswana calls it Sedudu. The island is a popular tourist attraction. Due to ambiguities in the treaty that created the border, the ownership of the island is unclear. Each country claims that the island is within its territory.

On 1 July 1890, the colonial powers Great Britain and Germany signed the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty, which divided the colonies of the two countries. The treaty officially determined the border between the colonial holdings of the two countries, parts of which would later become Botswana and Namibia. According to the treaty, the exact border line through the Chobe River is along the "centre of the main channel" of the river. However, the treaty does not define exactly what this term means. Namibia claims that the Chobe River's main channel runs south of the island, while Botswana claims the main channel runs north of the island.

It is a widely accepted principle of international law that whenever possible, the meaning of a treaty must be determined solely according to the text of the treaty. When the meaning is ambiguous, however, recourse to alternative methods of definition may be used. Conflicting historical evidence indicates that the main channel could be defined as the channel that carries the most water, the deepest channel, or the most navigable channel. Determining the main channel by a simple measurement of flow rates is not helpful due to contested scientific evidence and the fact that the island is submerged for several months every year. To further complicate matters, the German text of the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty refers to the "thalweg" of the main channel. Although similar, the meaning of the terms "thalweg" and "centre" are not identical. They may have also had different respective meanings in 1890 than they have now.

Although the dispute over the ownership of the island has been ongoing for more than a century, the need to determine the border with finality became especially apparent in 1984, when Botswanan troops fired on a South African boat patrol in the southern channel

of the Chobe River. At the time, South African forces were in control of Namibia, which was then known officially as South West Africa. Each side's maps showed the island as within their own territory. When Namibia gained its independence in 1990, it continued the boundary dispute, this time through newly available avenues open to Namibia as a member of the United Nations.

In 1992, Botswana and Namibia jointly appointed a team of technical experts to determine the proper location of the boundary. This team was unable to reach a conclusion and recommended referral to the ICJ. The case is before the Court pursuant to a Special Agreement signed by the two countries in 1996, which asked the Court to "determine, on the basis of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890 and the rules and principles of international law, the boundary between Namibia and Botswana around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the legal status of the island."

Both countries cite voluminous scientific reports as well as colonial-era maps to support their positions. Evidence of the familiarity of the colonial powers with the characteristics of the river is also important. Namibia additionally argues that regardless of the proper location of the border as determined by the treaty, Namibia has an ownership interest in the island pursuant to its long-standing seasonal occupation of the island. According to Namibia, the British colonists' failure to object to Namibian presence on the island indicates that the British believed the island belonged to the colonial territories that would later form Namibia. This claim is similar to the legal doctrine of adverse possession in common law jurisdictions, which grants a non-owner property rights after the land has been occupied or used in a way that conflicts with the true owner's rights for a certain period of time. The year is 1999, and the Court must now determine which country owns the island.

In this simulation, the ICJ will preempt history from the time when the Court's simulation begins. History will be as it was written until the moment the Court convenes on 15 February 1999. From that moment on, however, ICJ participants exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and the confines of available law.

Questions to consider on this issue include:

- What intentions did the colonial powers have in mind when they wrote the terminology concerning the "thalweg of the main channel" into the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty?
- What are the relative roles of scientific measurements and historical maps in determining the outcome of this dispute?
- Is Namibia's seasonal occupation of the island enough to justify granting Namibia legal title over the island?
- Considering that waterways constitute a great many international borders, how should the Court go about making a decision that will provide useful guidance in future disputes of a similar nature?

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## UN Documents:

A/RES/31/150

A/RES/35/227H

ICJ Press Release 1996/19

ICJ Press Release 1999/10

Statute of the International Court of Justice

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

## Additional Web Resources:

[www.icj-cij.org](http://www.icj-cij.org) - International Court of Justice

## ADVISORY OPINION: LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

In 2002, Israel approved a plan for the construction of a wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory. On 8 December 2003, an emergency session of the General Assembly (GA) adopted resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 in which it requested the ICJ to "urgently render" an advisory opinion on the following question:

What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the Wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and GA resolutions?

Due to overwhelming amicus curiae in this matter, participation will be limited to Israel, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine.

After World War I, the League of Nations issued a Mandate that recognized the Palestinian existence and saw a formulation of territorial boundaries for the land then under British control. When the United Kingdom announced its intention to leave Palestine, the GA adopted the Plan of Partition, which called for two independent states, one Arab, the other Jewish, and for Jerusalem to be a special international regime. The Arab population in Palestine rejected the resolution as unbalanced, and in 1948 Israel proclaimed its independence and armed conflict ensued. In 1949 a general armistice agreement was reached between Israel and neighboring states, including a provision for what was to become the "Green Line." In the Six Day War of 1967 Israel greatly expanded its territory beyond the Green Line, and continues to occupy territory outside of the Green Line to date.

In 1993 Israel and Palestine signed the first, face-to-face agreement between the parties in the Oslo Accords, which provided, among other things, for the Palestinian mandates and borders. These borders

were based on the facts as they existed in 1993, including then-existing Israeli settlements. Citing ongoing terrorist attacks and regional tensions, in 2002 Israel announced its plan to construct a wall. While roughly conforming to the Green Line, the Wall's route deviates to encompass Israeli settlements outside of its boundaries and the borders established in the Oslo Accords.

Under customary international law, the territories outside the Green Line, i.e., those acquired in the 1967 War, are occupied territories and Israel is the Occupying Power. Much of the proposed route for the Wall lies within this area; construction continues, with some areas completed. Opponents of the Wall claim that Israel is expanding its territory and disregarding the rights of the Palestinian people. Arab Member States and the Palestinian Authority have urged international action, claiming that the Wall is not needed for security, violates essential rights, and is being used to annex territory. The Secretary-General's Report in November 2003 described the Wall as separating communities from health services, schools, primary water sources, and electricity networks. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food of the UNHCR noted that the Wall annexes aquifers which provided 51% of the West Bank's water resources.

The Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction. The language of the GA's request encompasses an inquiry into whether the construction breaches international law, and if so, what are the legal consequences. The scope of the question is limited to the portions of the Wall "in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem." The existence of "Palestinian people" and their legitimate rights are to be recognized and not at issue; they are accepted both by international law and all parties before the Court.

Under Article 96 of the UN Charter the GA may request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on "any legal question." The jurisdiction of the GA to make recommendations is limited by Article 12, which gives the Security Council exclusive authority over any issue before it. Moreover, the question before the Court must be of a "legal" nature appropriate for the Court's consideration, as opposed to political or hypothetical questions. Finally, the Tenth Emergency Special Session, which drafted ES 10/14, can only convene and act if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility and the situation is one accompanied by a threat to peace. If these conditions were not met, ES 10/14 would not be a legitimate request to the Court.

Although Article 65 of the ICJ Statute provides that the Court "may" give an advisory opinion, as the principal judicial organ of the UN the Court should not decline to issue an advisory opinion without a compelling reason. However, Israel has not consented to this specific exercise of jurisdiction and describes the dispute as a bilateral matter. While a fundamental principle of the ICJ is that a State is not obliged to submit its disputes to judicial settlement without its consent, this is not a request for judicial settlement, but rather a request by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion under Article 65. The Court should consider these factors in its jurisdictional analysis.

Beyond the question of jurisdiction, a number of rules and principles of international law are implicated by this question, including the UN Charter and Resolution 2625 (XXV), international humanitarian law, and human rights law. One of the issues implicated is the need to reconcile the right to political independence and sovereignty versus the prohibition on territorial acquisition by means of force. The fact



that the Palestinian people do not have an internationally recognized state also raises questions about the applicability of international conventions such as the Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Although Israel is not a party to the Hague Convention, an argument could be made that it has become part of customary international law.

Israel has ratified treaties on human rights, but argues that humanitarian law applies in conflict situations and that human rights treaties were intended to protect citizens from their own Governments in times of peace. By extension, it holds that those human rights treaties do not apply to this situation. It is a generally accepted tenet of customary international law that the protections of human rights obligations do not cease during times of conflict except where they are derogated by the treaty itself. Furthermore, the Court should consider to what extent Israel is bound by the Oslo Accords, which were ratified and adopted by both parties.

Should the Court find a breach of any of the above international laws, it must next determine the legal consequences that flow from the breach. While advisory opinions are not legally binding they do carry great legal weight and moral authority. Generally, the consequence for a state responsible for the breaching act is an obligation to put an end to that act. Any legislation causing or empowering the illegal action must therefore be repealed or voided. Reparation is guided by what the situation would have been had there been no illegal act. Consequences can extend beyond the breaching state. Certain international rights are erga omnes, or owed to all, and as such these rights are the concern of all States. Some humanitarian rights and the right to self-determination fall under this category. Additionally, legal consequences may attach to other states, including obligations to recognize the illegality of action or to not aid and abet the breaching action. In addressing the issue before the Court, all justices and advocates should keep in mind that the function of an advisory opinion is to “identify the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them...thus offering a reply to the question based on law.”

Questions to consider on this issue include:

- Does the ICJ have jurisdiction? If so, is there a compelling reason why the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion?
- Was the GA acting within its authority when it passed A/RES/ES-10/14?
- Which rules and principles of international law apply? Of the applicable rules and principles, which, if any, are in violation?
- What are the legal consequences to the parties involved? Are any of the violations to rights of erga omnes character?

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S/2003/947  
S/RES 465  
Statute of the International Court of Justice  
United Nations Charter  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

## **Additional Web Resources:**

[www.icj-cij.org](http://www.icj-cij.org) - International Court of Justice

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