



THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1961

Members of the Historical Security Council of 1961:

Ceylon	Turkey
Chile	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
China	United Arab Republic
Ecuador	United Kingdom
France	United States of America
Liberia	

ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The 2009 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning in early 1961. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolve around the continuing hostilities between the United States and the USSR, the civil war in the Congo and the rise of hostilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Another key issue confronting the Security Council is the emerging role of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, whose actions challenged the authority of the Security Council on several occasions.

In 1961, John F. Kennedy was the US President and Nikita Khrushchev the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Shah's government was in power in Iran and the Republic of China (on Formosa/Taiwan), rather than the mainland Peoples Republic of China, was officially represented in the United Nations. Cold War tensions were progressively growing, and countries which had been colonies of the European powers were now gaining their independence and joining the United Nations.

AMUN's HSC is unique in its topics and in its treatment of those topics. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation is assigned to begin. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and within the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role playing for an HSC Member State will not just be a replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1961. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government chose in 1961 was necessarily the most wise. While role replays must, by definition, be in character, it is not a sure thing that, given a second opportunity to look at events, any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for "second chances." It will be the job of Council representatives to utilize their countries' national policies and capabilities to solve the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative in any situation.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. This inability or unwillingness to work actively toward solutions of crises was rarely more evident than during the late years of colonialism and early years of the Cold War. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues.

While national governments often did not want international "meddling" in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solution. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters. This year's simulation will have the dichotomy of many regional crises being treated as "internal" by the superpowers, and other crises which are so global in nature that the UN must become involved.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of 1960, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically in the past 40 years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, representatives should pursue periodicals from mid-to-late 1960 to reflect accurately the worldview at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature or *The New York Times* Index, should provide a much better "historical perspective" and "feel for the times" than later historical texts.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible timeline based on events as they occurred, modified by the representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible.

In maintaining realism, representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation's representative to the UN. This person may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their country, or they may be relatively "in the dark" on their country's moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Home Government organization will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements

would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make.

Representatives must, however, always consult with the Home Government organization before making any operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions, which would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, Home Government would be equated with the actual “home office” of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any

time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee or Council, preferably with a second representative who can cover that Committee or Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 1 January 1961. The prominent events of late 1960 are discussed, as well as some questions which may face the Security Council in early 1961. This research is intended merely as a starting point for representatives’ continued exploration of the topics.

THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

On 30 June 1960, the former territory of the Belgian Congo gained independence, marking the beginning of nearly four years of civil war and violence. Under the active guidance of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN was a very active player in the Congo during these years, embarking in ongoing attempts at peacekeeping in the region.

At the end of the colonial era, the Congo was ill-prepared for self-governance. Its great size, wealth of natural resources (mainly in the Katanga region), intense tribal loyalties and absolute dependence on the 10,000-strong Belgian colonial civil service placed the Congo in a precarious position. Although it had signed a Treaty of Independence and Cooperation with Belgium just prior to independence, this was never ratified, and was quickly disregarded.

The first government was a coalition, formed with two tribal leaders in key positions: Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. The provisional constitution called for a unitary system, joining the Congo provinces together in one government. However, another tribal leader, Moïse Tshombé, the President of the Katanga Province, believed in a federated system, and his disagreement quickly led to Katanga’s seceding from the rest of the Congo on 11 July.

Problems in the Congo began just five days after independence. From 5-9 July 1960 the Congolese army (renamed the Armée Nationale Congolese, or ANC) engaged in a series of rebellions and mutinies, aimed at eliminating their mostly European officer corps and installing Congo natives in command. The new, all-Congolese military created a frightening environment for the Europeans still living in and administering the Congo. On 10 July, Belgian troops unilaterally intervened in the situation, militarily reestablishing order in most of the cities. On 13 July, Belgian troops inhabited the capital city of Leopoldville.

Meanwhile, on 10 July the UN was formally brought into the situation for the first time. Ralph Bunche, the special envoy of the Secretary-General stationed in the Congo, had kept Hammarskjöld apprised of the situation as it progressed. On 10 July, the Congolese Cabinet formally requested UN help in the form of “technical assis-

tance in the military field.” The Congolese were very unfamiliar with the UN system, and while the wording for this request was suggested to them, it was the cause of many of the UN’s later problems in the region.

On 13 July, Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the Charter, requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation. A resolution, put forward by Tunisia and accepted, with abstentions by China, France and the UK, called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the establishment of UN “military assistance as necessary,” per the Congolese request (S/Res/143). On 18 July, the first 3,500 UN troops, composed mainly of African regiments, entered the Congo.

The first months of the Congo crisis saw many difficulties in connection with the UN forces. The original Security Council resolution had several problems: (1) it only made clear that the Secretary-General was to do something about the situation, not what specifically; (2) there was no timetable provided; (3) no description was given of the military assistance; (4) there was no mention of territorial integrity (the Katanga situation); and (5) UN troops were only to use weapons in self-defense and were not to become a party to any internal conflicts.

This period of time also saw intense arguments, both within the Congo and the UN, over the entry of UN troops into Katanga. These were only resolved by a personal visit from Hammarskjöld to Katanga on 12 August. Further, Lumumba grew extremely critical and distrustful of UN aid, making several ultimatums for the UN to do things his way or leave.

Hammarskjöld had taken very personal control of the entire Congo crisis, going back to the Security Council frequently for endorsement of his actions. On 8 August, the Council passed Resolution S/Res/146, backing Hammarskjöld’s plans and actions, specifying the territorial integrity issue, and again demanding the departure of Belgian troops. Although the first UN troops entered Katanga in mid-August, the Belgians did not leave completely until mid-October.

In early September, Kasa-Vubu dismissed Lumumba and declared a new government, with the support of the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Joseph Mobutu. Lumumba, in turn, announced that President

Kasa-Vubu was no longer Chief of State and called upon the people, the workers and the army to rise. The Council of Ministers published a communiqué declaring the Chief of State deprived of his functions, nullifying his ordinance, revoking the Government and accusing him of high treason. In votes by both houses of the Congolese parliament, Lumumba's claim to legitimacy was supported. With the opening of the General Assembly that fall, both factions vied for the Congo's GA seat. The Kasa-Vubu delegate was seated after a long, drawn out political battle.

One of the underlying factors in the Congo crisis was the interplay of Cold War politics, for which the Congo issue became a battleground. While the West mildly supported Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu, the Soviets and their allies supported the legitimacy of the Lumumba government and the Congolese Parliament and were providing military aid to several factions. Also, the Soviets used this crisis as an opportunity to attack Hammarskjöld. Khrushchev went so far as to attack Hammarskjöld specifically at the opening of the General Assembly in 1960. The Soviets did not appreciate the Secretary-General's "usurping" traditional Security Council authorities, and were determined not to allow him too much power or leeway.

The final major group of players in the Congo crisis was the other African states. 17 new African states were admitted to the GA in the fall 1960 session, and they immediately became an element in the negotiations and actions. While they joined the West in isolating the Soviet bloc, they were not united, and often disagreed with the West on specifics in the Congo. Three major African groups arose: those which backed Lumumba, those which backed the actions of the UN to date, and those which backed Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu.

Near the end of 1960, events once again moved toward an imminent crisis. On 28 November, Lumumba was arrested by forces loyal to Mobutu and jailed. He remained a captive at the end of the year. Katanga was still independent, with a strong Belgian infrastructure (if not troops) still in place. Finally, both the Belgians and Soviets were supplying various factions in bids to establish new independent territories.

In preparing for the situation in the Congo, representatives should become extremely familiar with the political and military climate surrounding both UN actions and actions in the Congo throughout 1960. This includes the UN and GA resolutions passed during the year. While it is inevitable that Representatives will have some idea of events in 1961, these should not form a basis for their deliberations, nor an expectation of what events might be to come.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the Security Council overcome its own infighting to improve the situation in the Congo?
- How can the Security Council overcome the mistrust of the UN held by the different Congolese factions?
- To what extent should the legacy of the UN and its effectiveness enter the decision making process?
- How can your country help counteract the negative effects that the proxy war mentality exhibited in the Council is having on the Congo Crisis?

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- S/Res/157 (17 Sep 1960).
- S/Res/146 (9 Aug 1960), Adds specific language about Katanga to previous resolutions
- S/Res/145 (22 Jul 1960), Requests for a speed up in the withdrawal
- S/Res/143 (13 Jul 1960), Requests withdrawal of Belgian troops and gives the Secretary-General oversight authority
- SG/933 (13 Jul 1960), Hammarskjöld's opening comments to the Security Council
- S/4482, Discussion of plan for funding Congo operations
- S/4426 (8 Aug 1960), Discussion of S/Res/146
- S/4405 (22 Jul 1960), Discussion of S/Res/145
- S/4383 (13 Jul 1960), Discussion of S/Res/143, submitted by Tunisia

THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Many Latin American and Caribbean countries were dealing with severe and mounting problems. The countries in this region faced the Herculean task of industrializing their economies, enacting effective land reform, and establishing civilian control over the military, all at the same time. The end results of the rapidly changing political and economic climate were political and social instability. After a short period of military rule, Argentina's newly elected government had to deal with general strikes in 1959 and massive inflation. Brazil, which was attempting "fifty years of economic improvement in five," was facing an imminent reckoning with foreign creditors and growing unrest in the military ranks. In addition, civil unrest was prevalent in El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Guatemala.

The deepening of mistrust between the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro and several other American states, most notably the United States, set the stage for heightened Cold War tensions. While Castro had not officially declared himself a Marxist, his populist policies, increasing reliance on the Communist Party for organizational support, and crackdown on anti-communist factions were more than enough to convince the US of Castro's intention to establish a Marxist regime in Cuba.

Moves by Cuba and the USSR to form stronger political, economic and military ties raised the possibility of a Communist military presence in the heart of the Americas, which would undermine the entire inter-American system of alliances, treaties, international organization and tacit understandings. Even without the establishment of bases by Communist powers, activities of Soviet bloc nations in supplying arms and military advice to an American state presented problems of hemispheric defense, and thus international politics.

The question of exactly what might constitute extra-hemispheric interference and aggression in the Americas again came to the fore. At a less apparent level, a government that specifically rejected the solutions of a capitalistic economic system, in favor of a massively socialized economic structure, posed an obvious problem in containment.

In turn, Cuba accused the US of promoting plans for intervention in Cuba, protecting Cuban war criminals, providing training facilities for counter-revolutionary elements, and multiple violations of Cuban air space. This situation was highlighted in the Council in July 1960, when the Cuban government requested a meeting to discuss what it termed “repeated threats, reprisals and aggressive acts” by the US against Cuba. The Council responded with Resolution 144 (19 July), which deferred the issue until a report was received from the Organization of American States, and called on all parties to reduce tensions in the region. While Cuba hoped for stronger language, the presence of a US veto precluded any more serious result.

Current issues facing the Council include the possibility of increased tension between Cuba and other states in the region and the likelihood of new political instability caused by political and economic development crises in the region.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- Where should the UN draw the line between threat and imminent threat when it comes to matters of international peace and security?
- How can the UN prevent ideological differences from becoming international security threats?
- How can the UN assist the transitioning nations in Central and South America to ensure that peace and security across the region is maintained?

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OTHER OPEN ISSUES

Any issue on the world scene in 1961 will be fair game for discussion in the Historical Security Council. Representatives should have broad historical knowledge of the world situation as it stood through 1 January 1961. The following are two general issues, which may continue to influence the work of the Council through 1961.

SECURITY COUNCIL / SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

During its early years, the UN was generally allowed only those duties the great powers were willing to cede to it. In that context the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General and his Secretariat was rarely acrimonious. The UN was rarely an active power broker in a crisis situation.

The relative lack of real international responsibility within the Secretariat quickly began to evaporate with Dag Hammarskjöld’s 1953 succession of Trygve Lie. Hammarskjöld’s perception of the ideals of the UN may not have been more expansive than those of his predecessor, but he was significantly more willing to take action. As Secretary-General he greatly extended the influence of the UN with his peacekeeping efforts, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.

Hammarskjöld took an activist view of the concept of “Good Offices.” Though rebuffed, he attempted to intercede during the Suez Crisis, and was constantly working to engage one Middle Eastern player or another. Hammarskjöld was most active, however, in the many African disputes of the era, especially in the later 1950s as decolonization reached its peak. Hammarskjöld regularly did more than just offer the Good Offices of the Secretariat. He was an active believer in the role of UN peace keeping forces.

Under Hammarskjöld, UN “Blue Helmet” forces were deployed to more areas of dispute and in greater numbers than at any time before or since. Given the level of interference often placed in the path of such operations, the troop levels deployed to the Congo were nothing short of staggering. Hammarskjöld’s activist view of the office of Secretary-General and the Secretariat often led to tensions, both within the UN bureaucracy and between the bureaucracy and Member States. Hammarskjöld was willing to take actions without having first gained what others accepted as “full approval” for those actions. The use of peace keeping forces, without specific Security Council resolutions allowing engagement of those forces, is but one example. Hammarskjöld often defended his actions on the general principles of working toward the maintenance of international peace and stability, or on expansive views of General Assembly actions and authority.

Regardless of where the authority for action derived, the activist nature in which the office of Secretary-General was viewed (both by the SG and by his Secretariat support staff) led to many internal UN disagreements. Several Member States publicly expressed disapproval with what they viewed as the Secretary-General’s meddling

in what were otherwise sovereign affairs or policies. It was, in fact, just this attitude that led to the Soviet attempt to have Hammarskjöld removed from the post of Secretary-General.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS

In 1960, Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR were reaching their highest levels. While many small events occurred during the year, a key political issue involved the shooting down of a US U-2 military plane by Soviet missiles as it flew over Soviet air space. This event, which took place during a Four Powers (France, USSR, UK and US) Summit in Paris on 1 May, significantly increased the already high levels of geo-political tension. The Security Council took up the discussion under the heading “The Question of Relations Between the Great Powers,” and discussions were held in several meetings from May through July 1960. A draft resolution concerning the violation of Soviet air space failed due to a lack of majority on 26 May, and this was followed with a more neutrally phrased resolution on 27 May (SC/Res/135). This resolution recommended the peaceful resolution of problems between states, appealed to UN members to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, called for continued disarmament talks between the major powers, especially on nuclear issues, and urged the Four Powers to continue discussions in order to reduce tensions. The USSR again complained to the Council of continuing aggressive acts by the US Air Force, and was met with repeated US denials. This led to three additional draft resolutions in July, but each failed due to negative votes by Permanent Members of the Council. It is in the context of these relationships that the Security Council must again take up the crises of the 1961 time period for this simulation. The Council’s ability to act, and the efficacy of such action, could be predicated on overall UN activity, and on the actions of its Member States relating to this activity.

Questions to consider from your government’s perspective on this issue include:

- How can your country help counteract the negative effects that the Cold War mentality is having in the Council?
- Where does your country stand in the ideological war between the Soviets and the West?

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Throughout the year 1960, *The New York Times* is an excellent reference source for information on internal UN politics and activities.