

CHAPTER III.

THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL - 1990

STATE MEMBERS

| | | |
|---------------|----------|----------------|
| Canada | Ethiopia | U.S.S.R. |
| China | Finland | United Kingdom |
| Colombia | France | United States |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Malaysia | Yemen |
| Cuba | Romania | Zaire |

ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL

This year, AMUN's Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 26 February 1990. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolve around the situations in Central America, including the beginnings of the peace process in El Salvador and Nicaragua; Southern Africa, including Apartheid, Namibia, Angola and the Front-Line States; Indochina, particularly in Cambodia; and the Middle East, including the aftermath of the Iran/Iraq war and continued Arab/Israeli tensions. The liberalization of Soviet politics under Gorbachev is also a constant undercurrent in the changing world of international politics in 1990.

AMUN's HSC is unique not only in its topics, but also in its treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation is assigned to begin. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role-playing for an HSC member-state will be not just a rote replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1990. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this itself will force active evaluations -- and reevaluations -- of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government made in 1990 was necessarily the most wise. While rote replays must by definition be in character, it is not a sure thing that -- given a second opportunity to look at events -- any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice in a row. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for "second chances."

It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN itself has often been but a bystander to regional or international conflict. This inability or unwillingness to actively work toward solutions of crises was rarely more evident than during the late years of colonialism and early years of the Cold War. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues.

While national governments often did not want international "meddling" in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis resolution. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the member states' national characters. This year's simulation will have the dichotomy of many regional crises being treated as "internal" by the superpowers, and other crises which are so global in nature that the UN must become involved.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of 1989, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world was changing dramatically in the early 1990s, and has changed even more over the past 10 years, but none of the later changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should pursue periodicals from mid to late 1989 to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the New York Times Index, should provide a much better "historical perspective" and "feel for the times" than later historical texts, which can also be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation's Representative to the UN. This person may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their country, or they may be relatively "in the dark" on their countries moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Home Government organization will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any



comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make.

Representatives must, however, always consult with the Home Government organization before making ANY operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, Home Government would be equated with the actual "home office" of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee/Council, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee/Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

Some of the delegations which may be called before the HSC during the 1990 time frame include: Iraq, Iran, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Angola, Namibia (SWAPO), Mozambique, Kampuchea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 26 February 1990. The prominent events of late 1989 are discussed, as well as some questions which may face the Security Council in early 1990. This research is intended merely as a focal point for Representatives' continued exploration of the topics.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1989 was somewhat of a transitional year for the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq war had just ended and the Palestinian intifadah against Israel was growing stronger. Superpower intervention in the region was becoming one-sided as the United States continued to protect Israeli interests, despite the Soviet Union's retrenchment to its internal problems. The Security Council watched the entire Middle East very closely, but three conflicts came to the foreground: Israel-Palestinian relations, Lebanon and Iran-Iraq.

The Situation with the Arab/Israeli Conflict

After over two years of the intifadah, over 700 people are dead and thousands injured from both sides as a result of the fighting. Despite what appeared to be a softening in Prime Minister Shamir's personal position in negotiations on the Occupied Territories, the new Likud-Labor coalition government seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. In July 1989, Likud's Central Committee forced Shamir to agree to a list of promises in his efforts to end the hostilities. These included a promise not to negotiate with the PLO, not to surrender any of the Occupied Territories, and not to agree to a Palestinian state. Terrorism and violence in the region picked up as a result of this stiffening in the Israeli position. In November, the US offered a plan for peace talks which was accepted by both Egypt and Israel. The PLO accepted the plan contingent upon their direct representation at the talks. Israel did not accept this and the stalemate has continued.

The Situation in Lebanon

Gen. Aoun, president of a Christian-led government, asserted that his was the only legitimate government in Lebanon and the Syrians must be removed from Lebanese soil. The bloody fighting that had plagued Lebanon for so long returned to the battered country in April 1989 as Syria rebuffed Gen. Michael Aoun's attempt to prove the legitimacy of his government. In September

1989, the Arab League got the parties to agree to a cease fire for the purpose of letting the surviving members of the old Lebanese Parliament work on a new constitutional government. Their proposal, called the Taif Agreement, was rejected by many of the actors, including Gen. Aoun. Since Aoun retained the loyalty of the Army, he was able to thwart the factions that were supportive of the government which the Taif Agreement was trying to create. By the end of 1989, a stalemate existed between Gen. Aoun and President Hrawi, the most recent President created by the supporters of the Taif Agreement. This is a dangerous stalemate with bloody possibilities. In fact, on February 19, 1990, United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon came under fire, resulting in two Nepalese fatalities and six woundings.

The Situation in Iran and Iraq

The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988 when Security Council Resolution 598 was finally accepted by Iran and the cease fire it called for was initiated. However, the tension and instability in this region was far from over. The Ayatollah Khomeini died in June, and in July Hashemi Rafsanjani succeeded him as president, unsettling the political situation in Iran. Both sides accused the other of violating the cease fire in numerous ways, including Iraq's flooding of an area of land occupied by a large majority of Shiites in Southern Iran. The peace talks continued but they were far from being a success yet, as both sides continue to politically spar with each other. This was again demonstrated in mid-December as Iraq announced the successful completion of tests on new missile technology.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on these issues include:

- How can the Israeli/Palestinian peace process best be facilitated by the Security Council? How can Israel be encouraged to comply with the relevant UN resolutions dealing with the occupied territories? What can the UN do to discourage further violence in the area while the peace process continues?
- What actions can the Council take to assist a peaceful settle-



ment of the internal and external disputes involving Lebanon? How can the cease fire be bolstered and moved into a peace process?

- What role can the UN play in assuring that hostilities do not resume between Iran and Iraq? How can the UN move the peace process forward?

Bibliography:

Blue Helmets, New York: United Nations, 1990.

Bo, Gao, "Prospects for the Middle East," *Beijing Review*, 32, 5 June 1989, pp 15-17.

"Christian-led strike paralyzes East Beirut," *Chicago Tribune*, 7 November 1989, p. 3.

Gottlieb, Gidon, "Israel and the Palestinians," *Foreign Affairs*, 68, no. 4, 1989.

Hamilton, Lee H., "Challenges for United States Policy in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal*, 43, Winter 1989, pp 7-15.

Kemp, Geoffrey, "Middle East Opportunities," *Foreign Affairs*, 68, no. 1, 1989, pp 139-58.

Mackey, Sandra, *Lebanon: Death of Nation*, Corydon & Weed, 1989. *The Middle East*. Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1991.

"New leader chosen for Lebanon," *Chicago Tribune*, 6 November 89, p. 1.

Reich, Bernard, "Israel at Forty," *Current History*, Feb 1988, pp 61-4, 86.

Saivet, Carol R. "Islam and Gorbachev's Policy in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs*, 42, Spring 1989, pp 435-44.

Shoumikhin, Andrey U., "Soviet Perceptions of US Middle East Policy," *The Middle East Journal*, 43, Winter 1989, pp 16-19.

Strategic Survey 1989-1990, London: Brassey's, 1990.

UN Documents:

A/Res/44/40: Palestine

S/Res/242 (1967): Arab-Israeli

S/Res/338 (1973): Arab-Israeli

S/Res/631 (1989): Iran-Iraq

S/Res/633 (1989): Israel-Syria

S/Res/636 (1989): Territories Occupied by Israel

S/Res/639 (1989): Israel-Lebanon (31 Jul)

S/Res/641 (1989): Territories Occupied by Israel

S/Res/642 (1989): Iran-Iraq

S/Res/645 (1989): Israel-Syria

S/17191: SG's report on Iraq chemical weapons

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The international community looks upon the region of Southern Africa with cautious optimism. The Security Council is once again focused on four major problems in this area: Apartheid in South Africa, Namibian Independence, Angolan civil war and the effect of South Africa's "Front-Line" policy.

The Situation in South Africa

As the grips of international sanctions continued to take hold in South Africa, political change marked 1989 with hope for progress in the struggle to end Apartheid. In early 1989, P.W. Botha was forced to resign his position as National Party Chairman to F.W. de Klerk. In a constitutional crisis later in the year, Botha was also forced to resign as President and de Klerk was elected President. De Klerk's election sent mixed signals to the international community. Those seeing his election as a posi-

tive change looked to his ostracization of the hard-line Afrikaners and his repealing of the law prohibiting peaceful demonstration by blacks. Critics of de Klerk, however, pointed to his demand for "racially defined groups" in government as a sign that Apartheid was not about to be dismantled without a fight. In December, 1989, a special session of the General Assembly passed the "Declaration on Apartheid and Its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa" as a guide to dealing with Apartheid in the new decade. Positive steps have recently been made: on 2 February 1990, de Klerk announced the legalization of the African National Congress, and on the 11th, Nelson Mandela was released from prison.

The Situation in Namibia

1989 was a dramatic year for Namibia as well, as it approached its first elections and its independence. The UN deployed the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to Namibia in April, 1989 to aid in the registration of voters, to oversee the upcoming election, and to monitor the cease fire between SWAPO and South African backed forces. Despite some bloody fighting in the late spring and summer of 1989, the election preparation proceeded as planned. Between 7 and 11 November, 96% of those registered to vote did so with SWAPO winning the majority seats in the new Assembly, and the South African supported DTA finishing with the second most seats. On February 9, 1990, the Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution, but there is still a potential for violence.

The Situation in Angola

On 22 December 1988, South Africa, the MPLA government of Angola, and Cuba signed the Angola Namibia Accords at the UN in New York. These Accords were to be a framework for Cuban and South African troop withdrawal from the conflict and for an end to the civil war between the MPLA and UNITA. In early 1989, UNITA, not being a party to the accords, was nervous about its potential political losses and relied heavily on US assurances of support within the peace process. Fighting eventually ended the cease fire, however, and the civil war raged again by mid-1989. Despite diplomatic efforts from all sides the war continued to rage throughout the second half of 1989. A step toward another cease fire came late in 1989, when South Africa honored its end of the agreement and withdrew its troops from Namibia. UNITA has continued to attack Cuban and MPLA forces, however. This caused a temporary suspension of Cuban withdrawal, starting on 21 January. Unfortunately, the potential of future violence continues to throw a shadow over the peace process.

The Situation in Southern Africa - Front-Line Policy

In 1977, South Africa started a policy of regional destabilization and dependence creation called the "Front-Line" policy. This policy sought to insure the perpetuation of Apartheid by insuring that South Africa's neighbors were either too dependent on it or too unstable to do anything about Apartheid. This policy, as last addressed by A/Res/44/27/A-L, has had and continues to have lasting repercussions in the region. Accompanying the political changes in South Africa, de Klerk announced in November 1989 that the policy of destabilization was ending and that the South African Defense Forces would no longer make raids into the front-line states. This is probably most important to Mozambique which has been fighting a civil war with the South



African backed RENAMO rebels. Despite South Africa's new proclamations, this policy has had lasting effects that will need to be dealt with by this body for some time to come.

Questions to consider from your country's perspective on these issues include:

- What can be done to encourage the democratic process and bring an end to the Apartheid policies of South Africa?
- What can the Security Council do to assist in the stabilization of Namibia as it moves toward independence?
- With the apparent end of South Africa's destabilization policies and the continuing withdrawal of Cuban troops, what can be done to encourage the peace process in Angola?

Bibliography:

- Anglin, Douglas G., "S. Africa Under Siege: Options for the Frontline States," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26, Dec 1988, pp 549-65.
- Blue Helmets*, New York: United Nations, 1990.
- Crocker, Chester A., "South Africa: Eight Years Later," *Foreign Affairs*, 68, Summer 1989, pp. 126-41.
- Fituni, Leonid L., "A New Era: Soviet Policy in Southern Africa," *Africa Report*, 34, Jul/Aug 1989, pp 63-65.
- Freeman, Charles W. Jr., "The Angola/Namibia Accords," *Foreign Affairs*, 68, Summer 1989, pp 126-41.
- Griffiths, Ieuan Li, "The Quest for Independent Access to the Sea in Southern Africa," *The Geographical Journal*, 155, Nov 1989, pp. 378-91.
- "How Do South African Sanctions Work?" *Economist*, 313, no. 7624, 14 September 1989, pp 45-6.
- Marcum, John A., "Africa: A Continent Adrift," *Foreign Affairs*, 68, no. 1, 1989, pp 159-79.
- "Mozambique: Peace Perhaps," *Economist*, 313, no. 7635, 23 December 1989, pp 66-7.
- "Namibia: A Historical Brief," *UN Chronicle*, June 1990, p. 11.
- "Namibia: Only Just," *Economist*, 313, no. 7629, 18 Nov 1989, pp. 46-7.
- "Namibia: Just a Little Local Difficulty," *Economist*, 313, no. 7627, 4 November 1989, p. 53.
- "Namibia: The Making of a New Nation," *UN Chronicle*, 26, March 1989, pp. 34-38.
- Nelan, Bruce, "Changes in South Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, 69, no. 1, 1990, pp 135-51.
- Robert, Alun R., "The South African Strategy," *Africa Report*, 34, Jan/Feb 1989, pp. 28-30.

UN Documents:

- A/Res/44/27 A-L: Front-line states
- A/Res/44/27K: SG's report on Front-line states
- A/Res/44/150: Angola
- A/Res/44/191: Namibia
- A/Res/44/408: Apartheid
- S/Res/615 (1988): South Africa (17 Jun)
- S/Res/623 (1988): South Africa (23 Nov)
- S/Res/626 (1989): Angola
- S/Res/628 (1989): Angola (16 Jan)
- S/Res/629 (1989): Namibia (16 Jan)
- S/Res/632 (1989): Namibia (16 Feb)
- S/Res/640 (1989): Namibia (29 Aug)
- S/Res/643 (1989): Namibia (31 Oct)

THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

Discussions began in 1989 among the Permanent Members and various parties to the dispute on the formation of a United

Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia (UNTAC). The purpose of this group would be to assist the people of Kampuchea/ Cambodia in a transition to a peaceful, democratic form of government. Continued strong disagreements on all sides, however, have led to a very slow process toward agreement.

The Cambodian situation is complicated due to the number of parties involved and their basic disputes over the future of the country. There are four main parties: the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which in April of 1989 changed its name to the State of Cambodia (although this change has not yet been recognized by the UN); the Khmer Rouge, who are currently the representatives in the Kampuchean UN seat; the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), led by Prince Sinanouk; and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by former Prime Minister Son Sann. The latter three groups have joined to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The PRK is supported by Vietnam and the USSR. The CGDK is supported by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, and the US, among others.

The key component of current discussions came after the Paris Conference on Cambodia, held in July and August of 1989. This conference began the process of discussion on several key points, including: the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces; a cease fire; the beginnings of a blueprint for the territorial integrity of Cambodia; the repatriation of refugees and most importantly the beginnings of discussions on government building in post-war Cambodia.

In September, Vietnam completed its withdrawal of troops, but following increased CGDK military activity, 2000+ Vietnamese troops were reintegrated into Cambodia in late 1989. Military activities continue from both sides.

The situation in early 1990 is more hopeful than in the past, due mainly to the new willingness of all sides to come to the negotiation table. The year could see increased political action toward a lasting solution to the crisis.

Questions to consider from your country's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the Security Council best facilitate the political process and allow all parties a voice in future negotiations? How can the Council further encourage all parties to attend? Is the situation in Cambodia at such a point that UNTAC can be finalized and given an official mandate?
- What actions can the Council take to assist in a cessation of hostilities in Cambodia? How can a complete withdrawal of all foreign troops be best accomplished?

Bibliography:

- Brecker, Elizabeth, "The U.S. Finally Got It Right on Cambodia," *Washington Post*, 30 January 1989, sec. A, p9.
- "Cambodia Agrees to U.N.-Controlled Election," *New York Times*, 14 December 1989, sec.A, p.21.
- Erlanger, Steven, "Fear of Khmer Rouge Success Appears on Rise," *New York Times*, 15 November 1989, sec.A, p.8.
- Feldmann, Linda, "Paris Talks Show Positive Signs," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 August 1989, p.8.
- Holley, David, "Cambodia Resistance Asks U.N. Role in Peace Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 February 1989, sec.I, p.15.
- Lewis, Paul, "U.N. Backs Measure on Cambodia That Allows Khmer Rouge a Role," *New York Times*, 17 Nov 1989, sec.A, p.17.
- Luck, Edward C. and Fromuth, Peter, "A Risky Role for U.N. in Cambodia," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 August 1989, sec.II, p.5.
- McManus, Doyle, "US, Soviets Endorse Plan for U.N. Role in



Cambodia," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 Dec 1989, sec.A, p.21.
 Morrison, James, "Spurning Glastnost, Cuba Accuses US of Aggression," *Washington Times*, 28 Sept 1989, sec.A, p.9.
 Scott, David Clark, "Australia Calls for UN Transitional Team for Cambodia," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Dec 1989, p.4.
 WuDunn, Sheryl, "Sihanouk Backs a U.N. Trusteeship for Cambodia," *New York Times*, 3 December 1989, sec.I, p.20.

UN Documents:

A/RES/44/22 (1989): Promotes national reconciliation
 CPC/89/C.1/COM/2-6 (1989): Paris Conference on Cambodia

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

With the Guatemala City agreements, made between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in August of 1987, the Central American situation began to move toward reform and a lasting peace. This process was abetted in January 1988 and again in February 1989, with two Joint Declarations made by the Presidents of these nations to continue to push forward and expand the peace and reform process.

1989 was a pivotal year for the region and for international action. A key breakthrough in the US and Soviet positions on El Salvador and Nicaragua came with discussions of halting outside military aid to the para-military forces in the region. The US first showed its good faith on this in March by converting \$45 million in aid to the Contras into strictly humanitarian aid. In July of 1989, the Security Council voted to halt all outside military aid to the para-military groups in the region, and to pledge the support of the UN to the ongoing peace process.

The Situation in Nicaragua

Security Council actions were driven even more by a pledge from Nicaragua to move its democratic elections up ten months. This was hailed as a positive move by Ortega's government, and was supported even more when Nicaragua officially requested that the Secretary-General provide UN Observers for the elections (A/44/375). This was the first time that the UN would serve in this capacity anywhere. On 25 February, the elections were won by the candidate of the United Nicaraguan Opposition, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, with 54.77% of the vote.

The election observer force, named ONUVEN (United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua), began its pre-election duties in August 1989, with additional participation from the OAS and with former US Deputy Secretary of State Elliott Richardson in charge of the operation. Initial accounts are that the election met ONUVEN's standards.

In November, the Security Council approved a resolution sponsored by the United States for an additional observer group, ONUCA (United Nations Observer Group in Central America), to assist in the peace process. International verification was seen as the key to the peace process, and this observer force had a multi-part mission, including: ensuring the non-use of territory to support destabilization; confirming free and fair elections; and facilitating the voluntary demobilization, repatriation, and/or relocation of irregular forces. This resolution was another significant breakthrough, in that it was the first time the US acknowledged the credibility of any international organization to assist in solving problems in the Western hemisphere.

Even while the peace process was proceeding, the Nicaraguan backed Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was

continuing its military activities in El Salvador. Following a major October bombing, the FMLN significantly stepped up their fighting through October and November.

The Situation in El Salvador

While El Salvador also participated in and benefited from the peace discussions which occurred in 1989, violence escalated with the increased FMLN activity toward the end of 1989. In November, a growing number of murders were reported, perpetrated both by the left wing and by the government. On 11 November, the FMLN launched a major attack in San Salvador, inflicting many casualties. In response, the government declared a state of seige, which included the launching of numerous helicopter and aircraft attacks on rebel-held areas. It is in this heightened state of military anxiety that the country entered 1990. The Secretary-General announced in January that he would act as an intermediary in the Salvadoran peace talks.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on these issues include:

- With the improving regional situation, how can the UN best exert influence on both Nicaragua and El Salvador to continue their efforts toward a more stable, democratic environment?
- What further efforts can the UN make to limit cross-border insurgency by para-military units in the region?

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- "Contras Agree to Nicaraguan Talks at U.N., *New York Times*, 7 November 1989, sec.AA, p.10.
 Dewar, Helen, "Senate Votes More Military Aid to El Salvador," *Washington Post*, 21 September 1989, sec.A, p.15.
 Gannon, J.D., "Nicaragua Economy: Fom Tailspin to Nose-Dive," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 November 1989, p.4.
 Lewis, Paul, "New Contra Chiefs Say Disarming Before Election Would Be Foolish," *New York Times*, 11 Nov 1989, sec.A, p.4.
 Lewis, Paul, "U.N. and O.A.S. Form Panel to Help the Contras Disband," *New York Times*, 26 August 1989, sec.A, p.3.
 Lewis, Paul, "Contras Said to Sell Arms to Salvador Rebels," *New York Times*, 15 October 1989, sec.1, p.22.
 "Peace Prospects Set Back in Nicaragua, El Salvador," *Chicago Tribune*, 3 November 1989, p.1,2.
 Rosen, Jane, "UN Peace Force for Central America," *Guardian*, 8 November 1989, p.24.
 Schwartz, Ethan, "El Salvador's Rights Picture Growing Worse, U.N. Says," *Washington Post*, 18 November 1989, sec.A, p.19
 Uhlig, Mark A., "Disarming of Contras: Procedures Set," *New York Times*, 11 May 1989, sec.A, p.3.

UN Documents:

- A/44/375 (Jul 1989): Nicaraguan request for observers
 A/44/620 (Nov 1989): GA response to El Salvador hostilities
 S/RES/644 (7 Nov 1989): Creation of UN observer group
 S/RES/637 (27 July 1989): Guatemala Agreement
 S/20699: Secretary-General's Report
 S/20895: Secretary-General's Report
 SG/SM/4365: SG's report on El Salvador hostilities
 SC/1549 (Nov 1989): Security Council statement on the state of siege in El Salvador

