

## CHAPTER III.

# THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL - 1993

### STATE MEMBERS

Brazil	Hungary	Russian Federation
Cape Verde	Japan	Spain
China	Morocco	United Kingdom
Djibouti	New Zealand	United States
France	Pakistan	Venezuela

The 2004 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 23 May 1993. The events of 1993 demonstrated the compelling urgency for the United Nations (UN) to promote three underlying goals of its efforts: peace, development and democracy. In the words of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, “these goals must be interlocking and mutually reinforcing.”

During the early months of 1993, UN peace operations in the field, most prominently in Cambodia, El Salvador, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, ranged beyond the traditional notion and definition of peace-keeping, as they took on political, social, humanitarian, and environmental dimensions. The concept of development also adopted an integrated approach; it was no longer merely a matter of economic policy and resources. Development meant social and cultural nation-building and took into account educational and environmental imperatives.

**AMUN’s HSC is unique not only in its topics, but also in its treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC’s media and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council’s simulation begins. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.**

Effective role-playing for an HSC member-state will be not just a rote replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1993. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations, and reevaluations, of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government made in 1993 was necessarily the wisest. While rote replays must by definition be in character, it is not a sure thing that given a second opportunity to look at events, any given national government would do things exactly the same way. History is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pining for “second chances.” It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country’s national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues, which may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation. While national governments often did not want international ‘meddling’ in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in solving crises. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the member states’ national characters.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. One major factor in whether or not to be actively involved or to be a bystander which representatives must consider is the costs of peacekeeping with the deployment of regional missions. The increase in costs often caused the Security Council to reprioritize their peacekeeping efforts.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through 23 May 1993, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The changes of the past 11 years will not be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should pursue periodicals from late 1992 through May of 1993 to most accurately reflect the world view at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the New York Times Index, should provide a much better ‘historical perspective’ and ‘feel for the times’ than later historical texts, which can also be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives’ policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible.

In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation’s Representative to the UN. This person may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy decisions of their country, or they may be relatively “in the dark” on their countries moment-to-moment actions in the world. In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation’s spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make.



Representatives must, however, always consult with the simulation staff before making ANY operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the U.N. In these cases, the simulation staff would be equated with the actual 'home office' of the involved nation(s).

## **OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES**

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee/Council, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee/Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

## **BACKGROUND RESEARCH**

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 23 May 1993. The prominent events of early 1993 are discussed, as well as some questions which may face the Security Council through mid 1993. This research is intended merely as a starting point for Representatives continued exploration of the topics.

### **THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA**

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) came ashore on the beaches of Mogadishu without opposition on 9 December 1992, in an effort to stem the violence resulting from clan conflicts which essentially caused the downfall of the nation. On 13 December, US forces secured the airfield at Baledogle, and by the 16th they seized Baidoa. US Central Command was following a four-phase programme in an attempt to secure key installations and food distribution points, and provide open, free, and secure passage of relief supplies. Approximately 28,000 US forces were expected, augmented by 17,000 UNITAF troops from over 20 countries.

The Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in Resolution 814 (26 March 1993) and it took over for UNITAF early this May. A military component of 20,000 troops to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel for logistic support was required, along with a civilian staff of approximately 2,800. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the commitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. Additionally, all States were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under Resolution 733 (23 Jan 1992).

In other provisions of the resolution, the Council requested humanitarian aid and other assistance including economic relief and rehabilitation of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, mine-clearance and public information activities in support of UN activities in Somalia.

To achieve these objectives, the UN put together a new Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for the war and drought ravaged country which was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. Some 190 Somali representatives, as well as senior representatives of donor Governments, international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs attended the Conference. The Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. On 27 March 1993, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements

signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia; the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants.

The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. In late March 1993, the international operation simultaneously went through an organizational and leadership transition. UNITAF, the operation under the military command of US Marine Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnson and the diplomatic leadership of US Envoy Robert Oakley, began to wind down after successful completion of its mandate to deliver humanitarian aid. UNSOM II, a more internationalized force commanded by Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir and led politically by UN Special Representative Jonathon Howe, moved into its place. On 4 May 1993, UNSOM II took over responsibility for Kismayo. In mid-May, tensions rose as implementation of the agreements stalled and militia leaders began to move unilaterally to increase their power and maneuver for position. Currently the US is maintaining a minor strike force within the country; however, violence continues to erupt in areas where US troops were formerly stationed.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Are your nation's national interests affected by the presence of UNOSOM II? If so, do you feel that your nation should support this mission?
- How should the Security Council best deal with the issues of transferring command to UNSOM II and what new challenges does this bring up?

### **THE SITUATION IN RWANDA**

The majority of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are Tutsi, and the Hutu government has identified Tutsi within Rwanda as RPF 'accomplices' providing 'cover' for invaders. Using this excuse, the government killed approximately 2,000 Tutsi and arrested or detained about 10,000 others between 1990 and 1992.

In early 1993, there was a threefold increase in the number of displaced persons. Rwanda continued to accuse Uganda of supporting the RPF; Uganda has denied the allegations.

In a 5 February letter to the Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, President Habyarimana argued that the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi was the inevitable result of the RPF invasion: Hutus naturally saw Tutsis as enemies and would continue to do so until the war ended. On 8 February, the RPF violated the July 1992 cease-fire and drove Rwandan troops south. Subsequently, Rwandan soldiers took vengeance on Tutsi civilians and opponents of the regime. They killed at least 147 persons and beat, tortured and raped many more. They burned and looted hundreds of homes and businesses. In some communities, the military even distributed arms to groups of civilians who supported the President. Approximately 350,000 displaced Rwandans were being fed and sheltered in camps in the northern part of the country.

After hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February, the number of displaced persons escalated to nearly one million. Calculating the need for 13,000 tons of food a month, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a warning of a major catastrophe and increased its budget for Rwanda eightfold. On 22 February, Uganda and Rwanda sent separate letters to the President of the UN Security Council asking for the deployment of UN military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, specifically arms transportation. In response, the SG sent a goodwill mission from 4 to 18 March.

Meanwhile, efforts by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania led to a meeting between the warring factions from 5 to 7 March in Dar es Salaam. In a joint communiqué, the two sides agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and to resume peace talks in Arusha. On 12 March the Security Council in Resolution 812 called on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to respect the renewed ceasefire and requested the SG to examine the requests of Rwanda and Uganda for the deployment of observers. A technical mission was dispatched to the border area of Uganda and Rwanda. The mission reported that it would be possible to deploy UN military observers to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided, however observers would be limited to the Ugandan side of the border.

The Arusha talks convened on 16 March. As the result of a request by the President of Rwanda, the UN launched an inter-agency appeal on 15 April for international assistance to Rwanda for \$78 million to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people, approximately 13% of the population. An inter-agency mission was fielded between 18 and 25 March to prepare a consolidated appeal focusing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education. During April, the only public statements the Rwandan government made were to deny the existence of any "Death Squads," and deny that any of the massacres of February and March were planned. On 20 May, the SG formally recommended the establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

The SG has requested that the Security Council discuss the effect UNOMUR will have on other active UN peacekeeping missions.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Considering your nation's interest in the Rwandan conflict, what should be accomplished by the presence of UNOMUR in the region?

- Also what locations within Rwanda or Uganda would be best served by UN observer presence in their region?

## THE SITUATION IN HAITI

In March 1993, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) launched a consolidated appeal for a humanitarian plan of action designed to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the Haitian people. In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the SG recommended that the Assembly establish the UN component of the joint International Civilian Mission in Haiti. The UN component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component. The report also contained the proposals submitted by the team of three international human rights experts, which had visited Haiti from 15 to 22 February 1993, including its recommendations on the deployment of the Mission throughout Haiti, the modalities of its operation and its needs in terms of personnel and resources.

On 20 April 1993, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/20B approving the SG's report and authorizing the UN participation, jointly with OAS, in the International Civilian Mission to Haiti. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy with a view to resolving the political crisis in Haiti. It reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the de facto regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament in January 1993, was illegitimate.

In a push to finalize an agreement on deploying an international police force in Haiti, envoys of the Clinton Administration and the UN arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti for talks with the country's military leaders. For two weeks diplomats have described the planned deployment of about 500 foreign police officers in Haiti as a crucial final element to reaching a negotiated settlement to this country's political crisis, which began with a violent coup against the elected president, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in September 1991. The drive to deploy the police force, led by the UN mediator for Haiti, Dante Caputo, and President Clinton's special advisor on Haitian affairs, Lawrence A. Pezzullo, has been repeatedly delayed, however, by negotiations with Father Aristide, many of whose supporters are opposed to any armed international presence in Haiti.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Does your nation feel that deployment of a police force within Haiti would truly promote or hinder the resolution of Haiti's political crisis?
- What can the UN do to assist legitimate government and the people of Haiti?

## THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In June 1992, the UN recognized Croatia and Bosnia as independent states. The Security Council then extended the United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) mission to Bosnia, and over the past three years has mandated UNPROFOR to (1) facilitate and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid; (2) use necessary means, including air power from regional organizations, to deter attacks against six safe areas (i.e., areas such as



Sarajevo to be protected against armed attacks and any other hostile actions); and (3) other actions to support an environment leading to peace. Most of UNPROFOR's activities in Bosnia, such as deterring attacks on safe areas, were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows forceful means to carry out mandates.

On 16 March 1993, the SG reported that three aircraft dropped bombs three days prior on two villages east of Srebrenica, before leaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This was the first time since the Security Council had instituted the "no-fly zone" in Bosnia and Herzegovina that aircraft were used in combat activity in that country. UNPROFOR has not been able to determine to whom the aircraft belonged. On 24 March, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was asked to provide any information relevant to the incident. The only response was a statement by the Government declaring, "airplanes and helicopters of the Air Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have not violated the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly zone came into effect." Exactly one month later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 819 (16 April 1993), demanding all parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a "safe area" which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units from areas surrounding Srebrenica and the cessation of armed attacks against that town. The Council requested the SG take steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of a campaign to halt 'ethnic cleansing'. On 17 April, UNPROFOR's Force Commander, the Commander of the Serb forces and the Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces signed an agreement for the demilitarization of Srebrenica. In late April, UNPROFOR's Force Commander reported that 170 UNPROFOR troops, civilian police and military observers had been deployed in Srebrenica to collect weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies and that by noon on 21 April they had successfully demilitarized the town.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was further aggravated when, in the first week of May 1993, intense fighting between the Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces erupted in central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite calls by the Security Council, efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and UNPROFOR, hostilities between the two former allies have continued since. The fighting has intermittently blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and has further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNCHR in the area. Consequently, UNPROFOR and UNHCR initiated a humanitarian 'Operation Lifeline' to keep the main routes open to help ensure the survival of up to 2.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the winter.

In addition to monitoring the actions of UNPROFOR, since the passage of Resolution 808 (22 Feb 1993), the Council has been reviewing proposals for an ad hoc international tribunal in relation to events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Council is currently at work preparing a list of potential judges to be submitted to the General Assembly for review and approval. The Council will soon be responsible for electing a prosecutor of the tribunal.

A report coming out of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 22 May has led the SG to believe that President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia has tacitly withdrawn an offer to allow international monitors

along the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Milosevic and President Dobrica Cosic of Yugoslavia, now consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, told Russia's Foreign minister, Andrei V. Kozyrev on Tuesday that they would accept foreign monitors only if Croatia did too and also withdrew all its military forces from Bosnia. Mr. Cosic said in interviews on 21 May that UN monitors along the Serbian-Bosnia border would be unacceptable. Publicly, Mr Milosevic has not withdrawn the monitor offer or repudiated his delayed support for the Bosnia peace plan that was put forward.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Which individual countries or block of countries does your nation feel are most suited to collaborate on the creation of an international tribunal of the former Yugoslavia? And why are they suited for this job?
- What actions should the Security Council take to secure the safety of UNPROFOR personnel located on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

### THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Three peace keeping operations currently remain in place within the region: two peace-keeping forces, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

In August of 1992, Iraqi aggression had spiked, leading the coalition (without explicit Council approval) to institute a second no-fly zone to protect civilians and prevent further aggression, this time south of the 32nd parallel. For a time Iraqi aggression subsided however, during the latter months of 1992, aggression was renewed for a brief period; this included several small incursions by Iraqi troops into the demilitarized zone along the border with Kuwait. In January 1993, this led to a Security Council condemnation of Iraq, followed by a series of US, UK and French air raids in southern Iraq. Air raids continued through March of 1993, primarily by the US and UK. On 5 February 1993, the Security Council authorized the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), the peace keeping force along the border, to take direct physical action in response to any future violation of the demilitarized zone.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Does your nation feel that authorizing UNIKOM to take 'direct physical action' in response to violations of the demilitarized zone is warranted at this time?
- Does your nation support the second no-fly zone instituted by the coalition?

### TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL

The increase in violence in both the territories and Israel led Israeli authorities to impose complete closure of the territories on 31 March. The closure created unprecedented hardship to the population of the territories, the majority of whom already lived below the poverty line. It also deprived approximately 120,000 persons of their means of livelihood, as they were suddenly cut off from \$2.75 million per day in wages previously earned in Israel. Special permits were required for entry into Jerusalem and Israel as well as for travel between the West Bank and Gaza and within the West Bank itself, the measure had a seriously negative

impact on commerce, medical care, education and access to services, including those provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Restrictions regarding freedom of expression continued as the Israeli authorities, on 31 March closed the Hebron-based Al Zahra Press Service for six months on charges that seditious material had been found on its premises.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- How can the Security Council best influence the parties in the region to limit violence and move toward a peaceful resolution to the conflict?

## THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

On 13 October 1992, in Resolution 783 the Security Council officially expressed its support for elections in Cambodia held no later than May 1993. In March of 1993, the Council endorsed the proposed democratic election dates and expressed its readiness to support the constituent assembly to be elected. As the election process developed, violence escalated.

On 30 March, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) closed Site 2, the last and largest of nine refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. On 5 April, in a presidential statement, the Council strongly condemned attacks on personnel with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which resulted in the death of two Bangladeshis and three Bulgarians.

The electoral campaign began as scheduled on 7 April 1993. During the six week period, scores of political meetings and rallies attended by tens of thousands of people took place without major incident. UNTAC civilian police monitored these rallies, and also provided protection for political party offices considered most at risk. On 13 April, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) declared that it would not participate in the elections, closed its office in Phnom Penh and withdrew from the Capital.

The pre-election period saw an unfortunate amount of violence and intimidation. Cease fire violations included small scale clashes and exchanges of fire in the central and western parts of the country. Banditry increased, often committed by former soldiers. According to UNTAC investigations, between the beginning of April and the middle of May, 100 Cambodians were killed as a result of violence and a further 179 injured. By the end of April 1993, more than 21,000 ethnic Vietnamese, many of them second or third generation residents of Cambodia, fled their homes in search of safety.

On 15 May, in his final pre-election report to the Security Council, the SG outlined the security measures that were taken to protect the polling. By mid-May all necessary electoral equipment and supplies were delivered to Cambodia under heavy guard. Training was under way for some 900 International Polling Station Officers from 44 countries and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 130 more from the UN Secretariat and 370 more within UNTAC, as well as for more than 50,000 Cambodian electoral staff.

On 20 May 1993, in Resolution 820 (1993) the Security Council expressed its satisfaction with the arrangements made for the conduct of elections, deplored all acts of non-cooperation with the Paris Agreements and condemned all acts of violence committed on political and ethnic grounds, as well as intimidation of and attacks on UNTAC personnel. It expressed full support for the measures taken by UNTAC to protect the polls and reminded all Cambodian parties of their obligation to com-

ply fully with the election results. The Foreign Ministers of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a statement of support on 18 May. On 22 May, in an important act of support for the elections, Prince Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh from Beijing and urged Cambodians to vote for the parties of their choice.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Once the results of the elections are calculated, what support does your nation feel is necessary for UNTAC to provide the new government in taking power?

## OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS

### The Withdrawal of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The Security Council met on 11 May to discuss the DPRK's notice of withdrawal from the NPT. In a statement to the Council, the DPRK asserted that neither legal nor technical grounds existed for a Council discussion of the so-called nuclear problem. It reiterated its reasons for withdrawing from NPT: the increasing nuclear threats from the United States and its manipulation of IAEA to demand opening military bases of the DPRK in order to disarm it.

On 12 May, the DPRK characterized Resolution 825 (11 May 1993) as unreasonable and resolutely rejected it as interference in its internal affairs and a grave infringement of its sovereignty. An ultimate imposition of sanctions based on the resolution would be construed as a declaration of war against the DPRK.

### The UN Peacekeeping Budget

On 14 May, the UN announced to the world that peacekeeping costs were expected to rise by more than a third this year to \$3.7 billion, and the failure of member countries to pay their share is raising doubts about the organization's ability to finance future operations. Unpaid peacekeeping dues amounted to \$1.5 billion at the end of April. And that shortfall does not include another \$970 million in unpaid dues for the regular budget. The cash crisis has stirred doubt about the UN's ability to finance operations like the mission assembled in Somalia, which is expected to cost \$1.2 billion a year, or a new mission in Mozambique initially estimated to cost about \$264 million. If Serbs in Bosnia can be persuaded to accept an international peace plan for ending war there, the UN plans to deploy up to 70,000 troops to oversee it and disarm fighters. Such an effort could cost up to \$2 billion a year.

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 S/Res/821 (28 Apr 1993) - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
 S/Res/820 (17 Apr 1993) - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 S/Res/819 (16 Apr 1993) - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 S/Res/818 (14 Apr 1993) - Mozambique  
 S/Res/816 (31 Mar 1993) - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 S/Res/815 (31 Mar 1993) - Croatia  
 S/Res/814 (26 Mar 1993) - Somalia  
 S/Res/813 (26 Mar 1993) - Liberia  
 S/Res/812 (12 Mar 1993) - Rwanda  
 S/Res/810 (8 Mar 1993) - Cambodia  
 S/Res/809 (2 Mar 1993) - Western Sahara  
 S/Res/808 (22 Feb 1993) - Tribunal (Former Yugoslavia)  
 S/Res/807 (19 Feb 1993) - Croatia  
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 S/Res/794 (3 Dec 1992) - Somalia  
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 S/Res/775 (28 Aug 1992) - Somalia  
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 S/Res/751 (24 Apr 1992) - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 S/Res/746 (17 Mar 1992) - Somalia  
 S/Res/733 (23 Jan 1992) - Somalia  
 Presidential Statement, 16 Oct 1992.  
 S/25700 Report to the Security Council
- Any issue on the world scene in 1993 will be fair game for discussion in the Historical Security Council. Representatives should have broad historical knowledge of the world situation as it stood through 23 May 1993.*

