



*American Model United Nations*  
**General Assembly First Committee**

GA First/I/2

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

SUBMITTED TO: The General Assembly First Committee

*The General Assembly First Committee,*

1 *Reaffirming* United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2826 of December 16th, 1971, which opened for  
2 signature on April 10th, 1972 and entered into force on March 26th, 1975,

3 *Recalling* the principles agreed upon by all Member States in the United Nations Charter,

4 *Celebrating* the goals of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) while recognizing it is not as efficient and  
5 effective as is needed and has not seen the level of success desired,

6 *Recognizing* the danger the world faces from biological weapons,

7 *Further recognizing* the danger of bioterrorism, caused by the production and stockpiling of such weapons  
8 that fall into the wrong hands and are then misused,

9 *Acknowledging* that the argument against the destruction of biological and toxin weapons must take into  
10 account international imbalance in which States possess these types of weapons,

11 *Convinced* that the danger of a biological war is non-existent if biological weapons are absent in the inter-  
12 national community,,

13 1. *Suggests* the General Assembly create an independent autonomous organization within the United Nations  
14 family, comprised of scientists from across the globe to eliminate bias, called the International Biological Weapons  
15 Agency (IBWA), to oversee and conduct all United Nations tasks related to biological weapons and biological safety:

16 (a) Coordinate across the United Nations and international organizations, including the ISU, to  
17 assume primary responsibility for all biological weapons tasks and actions;

18 (b) Relies on the abilities of scientists from several different States, eliminating patriotic bias in their  
19 review projects, who will be subject to re-elections every 2 years;

20 (c) Conduct voluntary inspections of biological sites about Member States to ensure they are oper-  
21 ating only for peaceful purposes;

22 (d) Assist Member States in the process of biological weapons disarmament;

23 (e) Investigate all claims of biological weapons and provide its findings as to whether the claim is  
24 true or false to the United Nations within twelve months of the claim being made;

25 (f) Will receive funding from the General Assembly and voluntary contributions;

26 2. *Proposes* for research projects, overseen by the IBWA, about each Member State to collect data on which  
27 States are current holders of biological and toxin weapons, designed to:

28 (a) Encourage all holders of these weapons to sign a treaty on a review process to ultimately destroy  
29 their stockpiles by 2025;

30 (b) Foster international security through cooperation and mutual trust;

31 (c) Ensure that such destruction and dismantling of biological weaponry is done in a manner that  
32 does not cause unnecessary damage or harm to the environment;

33 (d) Ensure States feel safe to dispose of their weapons without having to worry about international  
34 imbalance;

35 (e) Encourage international cooperation and communication in this disarmament process;

36 (f) Ensure that research projects that utilize any such material that otherwise cannot be outright  
37 destroyed are, instead, strictly intended for their peaceful dual-use purposes such as the development of vaccines,  
38 cosmetics, and medical therapies;

39 3. *Requests* that the research body of the IBWA conduct a review process of Member States that are found  
40 to be holders of biological and toxin weapons, through the aforementioned research projects, and conclude their  
41 research and temporary presence by the end of 2025:

42 (a) Creates an agenda in which each participating Member State will be reevaluated every 2.5 years  
43 to ensure continued accountability;

44 (b) Under the circumstances that a Member State is found to fail the 2.5 year reevaluation, the  
45 participating Member States are encouraged to consider consequential actions;

46 (c) Any Member State who is under this agreement is encouraged to cooperate and discuss their  
47 grievances. If a State actively works towards disarmament, States who imposed consequences are strongly encouraged  
48 to lift them;

49 4. *Expresses* hope that the pursuance of the absence of biological and toxin weapons in the world will  
50 provide a sense of safety and security to holders of these weapons when deciding to destroy their weapons, assured  
51 that international imbalance will no longer be a threat;

52 5. *Accepts* that the knowledge of biological and toxin research for safe purposes, such as medicine-production,  
53 should be developed and shared among States of the international community;

54 6. *Affirms* that knowledge about Member States biological and toxin research should be openly available to  
55 all Member States in the interest of global scientific progress and human security cooperation;

56 7. *Establishes* regional bureaus, on every continent, in the IBWA 2.5 Year review group, one to overview  
57 the threats of biological and toxin weapons production, and the other to overview humanitarian causes regarding  
58 biological and toxin threats including climate change and global pandemics;

59 8. *Requests* the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) collaborate with the IBWA to  
60 continue its efforts in assisting Member States in implementing and fulfilling their obligations under the BWC,  
61 including through technical support, capacity-building initiatives, and facilitating international collaboration.

Passed, Yes: 34 / No: 27 / Abstain: 24