


American Model United Nations



**Historical Commission of Inquiry:
Non-Aligned States in Cold War
Context**

**Report to the Historical Commission of Inquiry:
Non-Aligned States in Cold War Context on
Commission of Inquiry under resolution 496
(1981) in connection with the Republic of the
Seychelles**

Contents

1 In accordance with Draft resolution S/14793, this Commission of Inquiry was formed to investigate the events
2 surrounding the attempted coup d'etat on the Republic of Seychelles at the Seychelles International Airport on the
3 25th of November, 1981. The Commission has reached out to various international leaders, representatives of involved
4 parties, and governmental officials to discover the origin, details, motives, and funding of the attempted coup. The
5 Commission has also reported on the estimated cost of the damage suffered by Seychelles. The Commission would
6 like to note the cooperation and hospitality of the governments of Seychelles and South Africa. This report would
7 not have been possible without their contributions. Furthermore, the Commission greatly appreciates the knowledge
8 obtained from all participating individuals, governments, and agencies. **USSR, United States of America, and**
9 **the United Kingdom:** The Commission requested information from each of the aforementioned countries due to
10 allegations of connections to the mercenaries who attempted the coup in Seychelles. The United Kingdom responded
11 to the request, and while they affirmed that two of the mercenaries were citizens of their country, they had no
12 involvement in the attempted coup, and the men did not reside in the United Kingdom. The United States affirmed
13 they had no involvement in the attempted coup; however, they didn't agree with the exile of the former President,
14 James Mancham. The USSR also maintained that they had no involvement in the plot, and they supported the Ren
15 Presidency and emphasized Seychelle's right to self-determination. **Republic of Seychelles:**

16 1. Seychelles International Airport, Pointe LaRue, Seychelles:

17 (a) On the 21st of January 1982, our Commission arrived at the Seychelles International Airport in the
18 Republic of Seychelles. We were greeted by Giovinnella Gonthier, the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent
19 Representative of Seychelles to the UN. While at the airport, our Commission was able to witness the
20 extensive damage suffered by their airport. The Royal Swazi plane, the plane which the mercenaries
21 arrived on, was destroyed; there was a sizable hole in the front windshield, intense shrapnel damage across
22 the exterior of the plane, and the inside was entirely shredded. The nearby control tower's windows were
23 almost completely shattered, and the inside was severely damaged. Almost all of the airport's technological
24 equipment, in particular its meteorological equipment, had been destroyed, and thus flights to Seychelles
25 right now are severely risky. Most of the roofs of the airport buildings were damaged in the gunfight.
26 The damaged roofs exposed the electrical equipment inside to the heavy rains of this time, and thus most
27 electronic devices are now destroyed. Additionally, it must be noted that a large number of tourists were
28 stranded in Seychelles and at the airport during and after the attack. The government of Seychelles had
29 to take rapid action to ensure that the foreign individuals were able to return to their countries of origin
30 after the end of their visit.

31 (b) After the attack on the 25th of November, Seychelles has done as much rapid repair work as possible to
32 their airport; the cost incurred is approximately \$17.6 million. The airport staff stressed that the previous
33 figure represented only the quantifiable amount of damage done during the attack, and does not accurately
34 represent all damage suffered by the small island country. An example of the unquantifiable damage caused
35 by the attack is an unwillingness in other countries to invest in Seychelles for business-related purposes
36 due to fear of an attack like this.

37 (c) The damage of the airport is particularly devastating to Seychelles, as this airport is their only major
38 place in which they can interact with the outside world. The nation relies heavily on tourism, and the
39 closure of the airport not only prevents people from coming in but also trapped people in Seychelles for
40 a significant amount of time. Many supplies come through the airport as well, such as food, goods, and
41 medicine. Since this is the only international airport on the isolated island, the effects of its closure are
42 felt far and wide across the nation.

43 2. President France Albert Ren:

44 (a) On the 22nd of January, 1982, our Commission met with the current President of the Republic of Sey-
45 chelles, France Albert Ren. He reiterated the country's full support of our mandate and will do everything
46 in his power to assure that we have access to all of the information we need. President Ren emphasized
47 that the damage done to the country's airport was close to 18 million dollars, not including lost future
48 revenue. Seychelles believes that South Africa is responsible due to the nationality of the mercenaries and
49 because of South Africa's history of interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

50 3. List of names and country of origin of mercenaries involved in the attack on November 25th, 1981, as reported
51 by the Republic of Seychelles:

52 (a) Advance Party:

- 53 i. Robert Sims (brother-in-law of Michael Hoare), Republic of South Africa (RSA)
- 54 ii. Susan Ingle (common-law wife of Robert Sims), United Kingdom (UK)
- 55 iii. Martin Dolinschek, alias Anton Lubic (Intelligence), RSA
- 56 iv. Bernard Carey (Group Leader), UK
- 57 v. Aubrey Brooks, Zimbabwe
- 58 vi. Kenneth Dalglish (Group Leader), Britain
- 59 vii. Des Botes, RSA
- 60 viii. Roger England, Zimbabwe
- 61 ix. Charles Dukes, United States of America (USA)

62 (b) Main Body:

- 63 i. Thomas Michael Hoare, alias Thomas Boarel (Commander), Ireland
- 64 ii. Andrew Standish-White, Ireland
- 65 iii. Peter Duffy (Second-in-command), UK
- 66 iv. Richard Stannard, UK
- 67 v. Robert Jones-Davies, UK
- 68 vi. Kenneth Barnes, UK
- 69 vii. Nicholas Wilson, UK
- 70 viii. John Mackay, UK
- 71 ix. Donald Kenny, UK
- 72 x. Michael Webb (Group Leader), UK
- 73 xi. Simon Willar, UK
- 74 xii. Devet Shyn, RSA
- 75 xiii. Janolot Sydow, RSA
- 76 xiv. Patrick Henrick, RSA
- 77 xv. Jeremiah Puren, RSA
- 78 xvi. Johan Fritz (killed), RSA
- 79 xvii. Theodours van Hursteen, RSA
- 80 xviii. Trevor Beck, RSA
- 81 xix. B. de Vos, RSA
- 82 xx. Desmond Walker, RSA
- 83 xxi. Christo Hillesbran, RSA
- 84 xxii. Louis, Boucher, RSA
- 85 xxiii. William Paul, RSA
- 86 xxiv. Tulio Moneta, RSA
- 87 xxv. Pieter Doorewaaro, RSA
- 88 xxvi. Johannes de Beer, RSA
- 89 xxvii. Jechemns Dekker, RSA
- 90 xxviii. Frederick Gouws, RSA

- 91 xxix. Patrick Furelle, RSA
92 xxx. Alan Mann, RSA
93 xxxi. Ernest Deetlees, RSA
94 xxxii. Keita Maclood, RSA
95 xxxiii. Alex Deacon, RSA
96 xxxiv. Peter Hean, RSA
97 xxxv. Charles Goatley, Zimbabwe
98 xxxvi. Vernon Prinsloo, Zimbabwe
99 xxxvii. Stephen Biblecomber, Zimbabwe
100 xxxviii. Jacob Dutoit, Zimbabwe
101 xxxix. David Greenhaugh, Zimbabwe
102 xl. Peter Rohwein, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
103 xli. Kunt Priefert, FRG
104 xlii. Seven Forsell, Austria
105 xliii. Kenneth Kelly, Australia
106 xliv. Barry Gribein, USA

107 (c) Summary: The majority of involved mercenaries are either from South Africa or from the United Kingdom.
108 Those remaining are from Zimbabwe, Germany, Austria, Australia, the USA, and Ireland.

109 4. Summary of the Report of the Police Commissioner of the Republic of Seychelles on the Mercenary aggression
110 of 25 November 1981 against Seychelles:

111 (a) Planning: Seychelles determined that the plan to stage a coup d'etat in Seychelles was originally hatched
112 in the middle of September 1981, approximately 2 months before the attack took place. Mr. Robert
113 Charles Sims, a South African, and his wife, Mrs. Susan Josephine Ingles, traveled to Hilton and Howick,
114 South Africa, respectively. In Hilton, Mr. Sims met with Michael Hoare (his brother-in-law), in which
115 they discussed their action plan. Sims, following Hoare's instruction, worked from a safe house in Mah,
116 Seychelles, where he and Mrs. Ingle would pass out money to Hoare's recruited men. Hoare instructed
117 Sims and Ingle to each open a bank account with \$10,000 at two different banks. Hoare told Sims that
118 they would be joined by Barney Carey and Martin Dolinschek (alias - Anton Lubic) in Seychelles.

119 (b) Dolinschek and the National Intelligence Services (NIS) (South Africa connection): Seychelles reported
120 that Dolinschek was a senior intelligence officer from Durban, South Africa. Hoare supposedly had been to
121 see ex-president James Mancham in England, and that Hoare intended to stage a coup d'etat in Seychelles
122 aimed at overthrowing the present Government and installing Mr. Mancham in power. Dolinschek also
123 reported to the Seychelles government that Hoare also reported that a man named Gerard would become
124 Vice-President of the new government, and a Seychelles judge living in Australia would become the Prime
125 Minister. Hoare also allegedly told Dolinschek that the Kenyan government was involved, and they would
126 be flying troops and police to Seychelles to aid in the aftermath of the coup. Hoare described the current
127 regime of Seychelles, that of President Ren, was oppressive, and the Soviet Union, Libya, and the Palestine
128 Liberation Organization all had a presence there.

129 (c) Arms: The mercenaries were provided with 80 total AK-47s, 3 boxes of RPGs, and a few hand grenades,
130 acquired from a Saudi Arabian arms dealer.

131 5. Minister of Foreign Affairs - Jacque Hodoul

132 (a) On the 29th of January, 1982, the Commission had the pleasure of talking to the Seychelles Minister of
133 Foreign Affairs, Jacque Hodoul. When asked about how the attempted coup has affected their foreign
134 relations, Minister Hodoul stated that despite everything that has occurred, Seychelles' diplomatic rela-
135 tions have remained strong. When asked why the Republic of Seychelles believes that South Africa may
136 have played a key role in the incident, Hodoul shared similar sentiments with the President, saying that

137 South Africa has had past aggressions with those who have different/independent governing styles from
138 themselves. Hodoul considers the relations between the two countries to be relatively hostile and states
139 that past restrictions on trade and tourism have caused an upset between both the Republic of Seychelles
140 and South Africa. When asked about Seychelles' current relationship with Kenya, Hodoul declared that
141 the two countries hold a cordial relationship and that the Republic of Seychelles does not believe that
142 Kenya played any role in the attempted coup.

143 **Republic of South Africa:**

144 1. Mike Hoare

145 (a) The Commission was interested in meeting with Mike Hoare as he is stated in multiple reports to be the
146 leader of the operation. His testimony is necessary to ensure this report is fully accurate regarding the
147 coup in Seychelles. But, the South African government stated we are not allowed to speak or interview
148 him, therefore we are missing crucial information.

149 2. Interview with Mr. Roelof F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa

150 (a) On February 4th, 1982, our Commission met with Mr. Botha in Capetown, South Africa. During this
151 interview, Mr. Botha reiterated that the Prime Minister of South Africa had stated that his government did
152 not know of, nor had they ever, in any capacity, supported the mercenaries in their attempted coup. Mr.
153 Botha directed our questions regarding the prosecution of the mercenaries to the Office of the Attorney
154 General. While the South African government admits to having been approached by several dissident
155 groups in the country asking for support with whatever goals they had, South Africa categorically told
156 each group that supporting them ran contrary to the policies and belief of the South African government,
157 who would never involve themselves with dissident groups. Mr. Botha could not state if South Africa had
158 been approached by the dissident group involved with the mercenary aggression in Seychelles, but rather
159 clarified that all he meant was that in the past South Africa had been approached by dissident groups
160 as all governments have. He further clarified that South Africa responded, in the same way, each time.
161 South Africa hopes to restore ties with Seychelles because it is important to have access to travel through
162 the region. Finally, Mr. Botha stated that there are a large number of individuals living in South Africa,
163 whose actions the government cannot be held responsible for.

164 3. Letter from the Attorney-General of Natal for South Africa, Mr. Cecil Rees:

165 (a) Mr. Rees reported to our Commission that South Africa originally only charged specific members of
166 the group with kidnapping; their officers have reassessed the situation and since charged all 45 of the
167 mercenaries with hijacking, under Civil Aviation Offence Act No. 10 of 1972. In response to our inquiry
168 as to why South Africa chose to prosecute the mercenaries in their country while disregarding the pleas
169 of the Seychelles government to return them for them to stand trial in front of an international tribunal
170 overseen by the UN, he responded that the reason was due to specifics of the South African legal system.
171 Jurisdiction of the courts is based on territoriality, and consequently, concerning offenses that involve civil
172 aircraft, the jurisdiction has been enlarged to acknowledge the pertinent international conventions. Thus,
173 as Attorney General, Mr. Rees was within his jurisdiction, concomitant with that of the Supreme Burt
174 of Natal, in their process prosecuting the hijacked Air India aircraft. In his prosecution, he is primarily
175 concerned with proving the elements he is required to meet under the Civil Aviation Offence Act. He
176 has to first prove that the 45 accused mercenaries were the individuals who hijacked the plane and that
177 they pursued this action intentionally and unlawfully. The 45 mercenaries charged are subject to the
178 accusatorial system, ensuring them a fair trial, and requiring the prosecution to act within the law. He
179 told us that the weapons used in the coup were from different sources, some from the security forces of
180 Seychelles. The weapons are in the possession of the South African police, and they include 38 AR-47
181 assault rifles, 2,435 rounds of live ammunition, and three active stick hand grenades, but they have been
182 destroyed due to the danger they present. Mr. Rees, as of yet, did not have any information regarding
183 the possible finances of the coup. He hopes to interview the crew members of the Air India aircraft in
184 person; to attain their testimony for his case.

185 4. Letter from General P. van der Westhuizen, Head of Military Intelligence for South Africa

186 (a) Our Commission received a letter from Mr. Westhuizen on March 1st, 1982. In this letter, he reported
187 that unfortunately Mr. Constand Viljoen, the Head of the South African Defense Forces, was not able to
188 meet with our Commission, but this letter contained his testimony in response to our lines of investigation.

189 (b) Mr. Viljoen wrote that though some members of the group of mercenaries involved in the attack on Sey-
190 chelles had military connections to South Africa, nearly every South African will have military connections
191 due to their national service requirements. None of the involved mercenaries are serving in the Permanent
192 Defense Force. Because of this, the investigation is being handled by the civilian judiciary authorities, as
193 the individuals involved are considered civilians as they are not in service at this time.

194 (c) They could provide no further explanations for why the mercenary attack occurred nor why the mercenaries
195 chose to commandeer the Air India flight and reroute it to Durban, South Africa.

196 **Mercenaries:**In our continuing investigation of the events that transpired in Seychelles, we received interviews of a
197 few of the captured mercenaries. The mercenaries interviewed were Jeremiah Cornelius Puren, Martin Dolinschek,
198 Robert Charles Sims, Susan Josephine Ingle, Roger England, Aubrey Frank Vincent Brooks, and Bernard Stanley
199 Carey. These interviews brought forth new information and questions needed to continue our investigation. Infor-
200 mation presented led to the discovery that at least three groups were involved in the failed coup. These groups were
201 the mercenaries under Mike Hoare, a group of South African men, and another group of Ex-Rhodesians. Mercenaries
202 have noted that the potential coup was originally planned to be violence-free and bloodless. Many have stated that
203 Mr. James Mancham funded the potential coup and played a large role in its proceeding, even though he was not
204 present in Seychelles at the time. Furthermore, many mercenaries mentioned that forces from the Republic of Kenya
205 had the potential to be called upon if this mission went well, or from the view of other mercenaries, not well. It is
206 important to mention that many of the mercenaries were forthcoming with information, but the personal testimonies
207 are up for interpretation and may not be completely accurate or trustworthy. There remain discrepancies between
208 the information presented in the interviews on topics such as who was involved in the coup attempt and monetary
209 transactions. **Former President Mancham:**According to the Mercenary Reports, Mancham is claimed to have
210 financially supported the group. The Commission deemed it necessary to talk to Mancham since he was seemingly
211 implicated in the plot. Unfortunately, the Commission was unable to meet with President Mancham in person and
212 therefore he has provided a statement. In this, he mentions how he has had people reach out to him in exile seeking
213 financial assistance for a coup. He said that he is not willing to support any action that would result in bloodshed like
214 what happened during the attempted coup. One person who he did not name, met with Mancham in the Churchill
215 Hotel in London. The plan cost an estimated \$3.5 million. But he said he did not support the group financially due
216 to their plans. He recorded a taped message by telephone, however, which he believes was used as a way to show his
217 support for a new government in Seychelles, even though he stated he was not interested in violence. Unfortunately,
218 he had little information about the tape. He also claims no other government has been involved in this plot. The only
219 government he is in contact with is that of the United Kingdom since they are allowing him to live a non-political
220 life there. **Conclusion and Suggestions:**After reviewing the evidence collected during our two-month investigation,
221 the Commission has decided that at this time, we are unable to determine if any Member State, outside organization,
222 or outside person was responsible for the coup attempt in the Republic of Seychelles on the 25th of November, 1981.
223 However, the Commission believes that there is vast potential for further evidence to be uncovered that may indicate
224 a guilty party. We have several lines of inquiry that we wish to pursue further; these are outlined in detail in the
225 following section. Our Commission refrains from declaring involvement by another Member State, due to the severe
226 effects such an implication would have and lack of applicable evidence. Any future Commission must recognize the
227 severity of falsely accusing a state and implores them to gather as much information as possible before concluding
228 their investigation. The Republic of Seychelles is, without question, facing economic difficulties currently that will
229 likely continue due to the damage as a result of the attempted coup. The economy has suffered due to the large
230 decrease in investments and the decline in tourism. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following actions to
231 the Security Council:

232 1. Suggestion for restitution

233 (a) The Commission has determined that the Seychellois Government requires financial assistance to rebuild
234 their international airport, their main point of interaction with the global community. As noted in the
235 UN's Secretary General's Report on Assistance to Seychelles to the General Assembly at its 33rd session,
236 it reports on Seychelles' intense dependence on tourism and imports for their economy, and thus it is of
237 utmost importance to repair the Seychelles International Airport as quickly as possible. The Secretary
238 General's report already outlines a list of projects to strengthen the social and economic infrastructure
239 of the country, with an expected total cost of \$13,646,000. This Commission recommends to the Security
240 Council to add the reconstruction of the Seychelles International Airport to the current list of 27 projects
241 requiring UN aid. As reported to our Commission by Seychelles representatives during our tour of the
242 airport, the expected cost of this project is approximately \$18 million.

243 (b) If further investigations reveal a Member State to have been responsible for the planning or implementation
244 of the attempted coup, the Commission recommends that the guilty party be required to pay reparations
245 to the State of Seychelles as well as a reimbursement of funds allotted for the damage that incurred.

246 2. Further lines of investigation

247 (a) The Commission has found brief mentions of the possible involvement of the government of Kenya. The
248 Commission recommends that this possible connection is investigated as the Commission was unable to
249 do so.

250 (b) Mike Hoare has been identified as a vital player in the attempted coup. The Commission is sure that
251 much information can be gathered from an interview with Hoare. The Commission was unable to make
252 contact with Hoare due to the regulations of the Republic of South Africa and therefore recommends that
253 the Security Council delegates a task force to obtain information from Hoare.

254 i. The Commission drafted initial questions to ask of Hoare. This list is not complete.

255 A. How involved were you in the planning of the attempted coup?

256 B. What form of payment were you and the other participants offered?

257 C. Do you know the amounts promised and how it was to be arranged?

258 D. Do you have any information on the tapes the group was instructed to play after the successful
259 coup?

260 E. Do you know anyone under the name of Tom Boarel?

261 F. Have you faced deportation or any other formal repercussions from the government of South
262 Africa?

263 G. An individual involved in the attempted coup claimed you made a statement that if South Africa
264 became knowledgeable about your involvement you would be deported. Can you confirm or deny
265 that allegation?

266 H. If that statement is true, why do you think that they would have deported you?

267 I. Why do you think you have not been deported?

268 J. Did you have any contact with Mr. James Mancham?

269 (c) Air India Flight Crew:

270 i. The Commission believes that the crew of the hijacked Air India flight holds pertinent information
271 about the hijacking. Due to the time constraints, the Commission is not able to meet with the crew
272 and recommends a future Commission of Inquiry meet and gather information about what happened
273 that day.

274 (d) Other airport staff/civilians:

275 i. It would be helpful to interview many other people who were present at the airport at the time of the
276 attempted coup, to get a more thorough understanding of the event.

277 1. Weaknesses in investigation

278 (a) Financial Source

279 i. The Commission was unable to determine if there was financial backing from any foreign governments
280 or organizations due to the Commission not being allowed to interview key members involved in the
281 coup attempt.

282 (b) Mercenary Testimony

283 i. The Commission was unable to verify statements made by mercenaries and were not allowed access
284 to in-person interviews with those involved.

285 ii. Issues that were noted by the Commission were the possible involvement of the Republic of Kenya
286 and the source of weaponry. The testimonies also provided doubt as to the involvement or role of
287 James Mancham in the attempted coup.