



American Model United Nations
International Atomic Energy Agency

IAEA/1/2

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Nuclear security

SUBMITTED TO: The International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1 *Declaring* the importance of preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of non-
2 state actors and Member States not currently armed with nuclear weapons but seeking to develop
3 such,

4 *Confirming* that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by States violates existing United Nations
5 Treaties, including the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

6 *Recognizing* existing and growing instability in Member States around the globe due to inter-
7 state conflict, civil war, terrorism, violent extremism, and climate change,

8 *Emphasizing* the importance of transparency, openness, and accountability in conflict areas to
9 prevent nuclear disasters and ensure the continued efficacy, safety, and security of nuclear sites,

10 *Aware of* the immediate and international danger posed by State and non-state actors, should
11 they gain control of nuclear waste, material, byproduct, and/or sites,

12 *Alarmed by* the information gap in nuclear capabilities that prevents inter-state cooperation
13 from seeing greater success, as seen in the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Report
14 on Weapons of Mass Destruction,

15 *Fully believing in* the success of statewide and regional non-proliferation agreements, such as
16 the Regional Cooperation Agreement (1972), the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996), the Strategic Trade Man-
17 agement Act (2015), the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 8 July
18 2005 amendment, and the 2003 Megaports Initiative focusing on improving the implementation of nu-
19 clear material detection technology through the education and training of operators of this technology,

20 *Celebrating* the success of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and insure safe man-
21 agement and expansion of nuclear capabilities of Member States in cooperation with the International
22 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

23 *Fully aware* of the further myriad, international, and lingering dangers present in the nuclear
24 industry from illicit trafficking networks and cyberwarfare, to mundane safety standards, safe (short
25 and long term) waste storage, transport, and containment,

26 *Aware* that the myriad threats facing the nuclear sector, ranging from illicit trafficking networks
27 to cyberwarfare to waste storage, transport, and containment, carries international consequences,

28 1. *Urges* Member States to participate in international transparency in order to maintain the
29 nuclear peace and mitigate tensions between Member States by:

30 (a) Encouraging Member States to engage in greater cooperation with each other par-
31 ticularly as it relates to the relationship between established nuclear powers and those developing
32 their nuclear capabilities for civilian energy production;

33 (b) Recommending the monitoring and integration of IAEA's Incident and Trafficking
34 Database (ITDB) with the law enforcement systems of the Member States by;

35 (c) Implementing specialized training courses in radiation safety and Emergency Pre-
36 paredness and Response (EPR) framework as per the IAEA standards to provide means to Member

37 State stability in nuclear aspects including regular multi-agency tabletop and field exercises to ensure
38 coordinated response capabilities;

39 (d) Conducting training courses and safety courses in participating Member States at
40 appropriate IAEA-approved locations;

41 (e) Developing standardized information-sharing protocols between Member States and
42 international nuclear authorities and law enforcement to improve rapid reporting, threat flagging and
43 cross-border tracking of illicit nuclear activities;

44 (f) Urging the expansion of capacity-building programs for developing States to im-
45 prove cyber-nuclear security, border detection technology proficiency, and incident-response pre-
46 paredness;

47 (g) Advocating for transparency regarding enrichment levels and methods of enrich-
48 ment, setting limits on amount and efficiency of gas centrifuges and types of water type reactor sys-
49 tems;

50 (h) Establishing uniform safeguard procedures as mentioned in IAEA RES 1/1 for monitor-
51 ing heavy-water production, storage, and transfer between facilities to ensure that materials cannot
52 be diverted for unauthorized enrichment activities;

53 (i) Enhancing testing requirements for civilian enrichment facilities, particularly those
54 capable of producing enriched uranium suitable for medical, industrial, or research purposes, to ensure
55 that enrichment levels remain within declared civilian thresholds;

56 (j) Expanding routine IAEA checks on safeguards and production of fissile materials to
57 ensure that no Member State produces nuclear weapons secretly or at all, and requires States to share
58 with the IAEA occasions when uranium is mined or civilian uranium processing enterprises are ex-
59 panded;

60 2. *Calls* Member States to promote nuclear security through regional cooperation, by:

61 (a) Calling upon International United Nations organizations as outlined in Clause 3b to
62 complete comprehensive testing, maintenance, and use protocols under fair and impartial bodies;

63 (b) Member States found to not be in accordance with these guidelines will face censure
64 by those bodies within discretion and purview, able to restrict funding and bring other critique until such
65 a time where guidelines are followed;

66 (i) If external factors determined not to be the fault of the Member State are discovered,
67 it is recommended that adequate resources and assistance are delegated to resolve
68 any standing issues;

69 (c) Insisting Member States further engage with and strengthen regional and global
70 agreements such as existing treaties and programs including the United Nations Scientific Commit-
71 tee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), United Nations Panel of External Auditors (UNPEA),
72 United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (UNJIU), and the Treaty of Tlatelolco for ensuring the efficacy and
73 transparency of funds;

74 (i) Establishing the standards based on development, transparency, stability for States
75 to receive funding for nuclear energy;

76 (ii) Regulates the necessary training for safe nuclear procedures, providing assistance
77 for their facilitation;

78 (iii) Calls for the establishment of transparent multilateral oversight mechanisms that
79 prevent any single country from exerting disproportionate control over nuclear tech-
80 nologies, decision making processes, or resource distribution;

81 (d) Encouraging bilateral and multilateral exercises between Member States to promote
82 readiness and establish contingencies against the danger of civilian or military nuclear incidents;

(i) Endorses the fair oversight, organization, and review of exercises by international bodies like the IAEA, following the Emergency Preparedness Exercises for Nuclear Facilities: Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation;

(ii) Authorizes the public release of exercise results to be shared with other Member States and international organizations, to be appreciated and used to further nuclear safety;

(e) Urging the creation of Regional Nuclear Security Networks to enhance security especially with the increasing rapid developments upcoming in such States, developments that should not be overlooked;

(i) Ensuring the swift detection of incidents and recovery at nuclear sites via the above;

(ii) Approving the regional handling of safe nuclear waste storage between Member States along lines of handshake beneficiality for the purposes of reprocessing, recycling, decommission and storage;

(iii) Lines include economic/trade agreements, geographic boundaries, and development balance/inbalance;

(iv) Encourages the use of TRACE, FINAS, M-INSN, and other mechanisms in order to bolster security in the transit of fissile materials and monitor the movement of these materials;

(f) Further recommending technology transfer with regard to the infrastructure and education required for creation and maintenance of nuclear material detection technology;

3. *Calls upon* all Member States to expand usage and strength of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements between Member States and the IAEA and other non-proliferation treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, and encourages a mandate for their universal usage by:

(a) Facilitating IAEA task forces to assist Member States in clean up or containment efforts under the purview of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements;

(b) Encouraging Member States within the confines of Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements to allow staffing of Nuclear Power Plants at risk of meltdown or within active conflict between State and non-state actors;

(c) Urging Member States to establish procedures and means to mitigate and respond to civilian accidents or sabotage in Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements;

4. *Urges* all Member States to establish national protocols and practices in order ensure transparency with the international community and compliance with the IAEA by:

(a) Requesting that all Member States implement policies similar to the Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA) to regulate the trade of fissile materials;

(b) Urging further development of the Nuclear Security Series' guidance on implementation of measures on combatting cyberwarfare and uncrewed vehicles;

(c) Expanding the development of Nuclear Security Series' like Nuclear Security Implications of Uncrewed Aerial, Ground, and Maritime Systems (J02018) to continuously update the IAEA's ability to combat the development of Artificial Intelligence and other technologies that are used in cyberwarfare.

Passed, Yes: 50 / No: 5 / Abstain: 9