



American Model United Nations
**Economic and Social Commission for Western
Asia**

Report to the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on War on Gaza: tenets and essential elements for sustainable recovery

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1 Executive Summary

2 The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia is pleased to present its final report to
3 the Economic and Social Council on the topic of the War on Gaza: tenets and essential elements for
4 sustainable recovery. The report covers a variety of subtopics, including pathways towards achieving
5 immediate humanitarian assistance, necessary commitments for widespread compliance and en-
6 forcement of the recommendations, and damage assessment projects.

7 In the first session, held on 22 November 2025, the committee reached a consensus in favor of
8 Palestinian statehood, a pathway towards immediate recovery for the region, and calls for an imme-
9 diate permanent ceasefire.

10 The first chapter of the report includes three resolutions and additional recommendations made
11 by the body for the Economic and Social Council to consider. Resolution 1/1 affirms prior attempts to
12 deliver aid and expresses the need to continue providing aid to the Gaza Strip. The resolution also
13 highlights prior manners of funding methods and expresses the need to continue funding aid efforts
14 for Occupied Palestine. Resolution 1/2 emphasizes the need for compliance from Israel regarding a
15 permanent ceasefire. This resolution also recognizes the limitations of member states' abilities to en-
16 force compliance. Resolution 1/3 addresses the potential reconstruction that will need to occur after
17 the cessation of military activities in Gaza. The resolution specifically covers rebuilding vital infrastruc-
18 ture such as hospitals and schools, as well infrastructure related to agriculture and water. In addition,
19 the resolution emphasizes the necessity of a Palestinian-led damage assessment coordinating with
20 international organizations.

21 The second chapter of the report includes the deliberations by the Economic and Social Com-
22 mission for Western Asia regarding the aforementioned subtopics. These deliberations broached a
23 wide range of subjects. Ultimately, these discussions emphasize the similar stances Member States of
24 this body hold on Palestinian Statehood, the need for a permanent ceasefire, humanitarian assistance,
25 and a sustainable recovery plan enabling Palestinian self-determination.

26 **2 Matters calling for action**

27 **2.1 ESCWA I/1**

28 *Affirming* prior attempts to deliver aid to the Gaza Strip by the United Nations Relief and Works
29 Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other United Nations bodies,

30 *Recalling* the debilitating conditions that Palestinians have been facing since October 2023 due
31 to a lack of aid, an absence of healthcare services, and unsafe living conditions,

32 *Expressing* its appreciation of the efforts made by non-governmental organizations, standalone
33 humanitarian committees, and member-states who have contributed significantly to humanitarian
34 aid efforts in the Gaza Strip, as well as the previous funding initiative efforts put forth by the UNRWA and
35 other organizations providing humanitarian aid,

36 *Appreciating* member nations and other relief organizations that improve commitment and
37 efficiency for the humanitarian assistance of affected populations,

38 1. *Strongly encourages* the continuation of humanitarian aid endeavors in the Gaza Strip and
39 doing so in the most effective manner:

40 (a) Encourages delivery by trucks due to the method being proven as the most effective
41 way to deliver humanitarian aid;

42 (i) Affirms this method because of the successful delivery of humanitarian aid from 400
43 trucks that successfully entered the Occupied Palestinian Territory after the establish-
44 ment of the October 2025 ceasefire;

45 (b) Encourages the delivery of humanitarian aid via non-governmental organizations
46 (NGOs) to ensure necessary aid is delivered;

47 (c) Discourages the delivery of humanitarian aid via other means, such as air, due to
48 the dangers and lack of cost-effectiveness;

49 (d) Reaffirms the need for all states to facilitate humanitarian aid, specifically in refer-
50 ence to the Rafah border crossing;

51 2. *Urges* that various types of humanitarian aid be delivered to Gaza:

52 (a) Advises that distributing food packages is essential for recovery;

53 (i) Encourages the distribution of water supplies, which are essential for the recovery of
54 famine-stricken populations;

55 A. Taking note of the 70,000 tons of waste and toxic chemicals have been dumped into
56 Palestinian water sources and soil, making clean water and food scarce in the region;

57 (ii) Notes that more than 80 percent of Gaza's farmland has been damaged or de-
58 stroyed, which further exacerbates the growing famine and malnutrition in Gaza, making
59 food aid crucial to distribute;

60 (b) Seeks temporary and long-term shelter equipment;

61 (i) Recommends supplies such as cots, tents, and storage should be distributed in or-
62 der to protect people and items from damage from surrounding weather and ongoing
63 conflict;

64 (c) Invites the continuation of health services and supplies;

65 (i) Calls for the continuation and expansion of first aid, emergency surgical needs, the
66 distribution of medications, and hygienic products such as soap and detergent;

67 3. *Requests* that the existing humanitarian aid programs continue to receive funding:

68 (a) Recommends the continuation and expansion of the United Nations Office for the
69 Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) aid program;

- (i) Continuing to provide essential humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip and other Occupied Palestinian Territories;
- (b) Urges member states to continue funding NGOs;
- (i) Emphasizes *that* the assistance of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is an integral source for distributing and providing aid;
- A. Notes that the World Central Kitchen (WCK) has served more than 145 million meals to people in Gaza, with an ideal 200,000 meals being provided daily when feasible and unhindered by outside forces;
- B. Reaffirms the Global Empowerment Mission (GEM) mobilizing aid by securing monthly deliveries of 10 million nutrient-dense humane meals designed specifically for the recovery of famine victims;
- (ii) Notes the transition of how aid is delivered into the hands of Palestinians is crucial to consider, given the commitment of the Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia (ESCWA) to the recognition of the State of Palestine and its sovereignty;

4. *Supports* organizations or states furthering humanitarian aid efforts in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:

- (a) Recognizes the efforts of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF);
- (i) Commends that CERF has given a total of \$20 million in aid to the Gaza Strip to meet urgent needs and plans to use this funding to expand humanitarian efforts and support the immediate scale-up of aid operations: food, water, healthcare, and shelter for civilians;
- (b) Affirms the efforts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory Humanitarian Fund (OPT HF);
- (i) Endorses their management of a total of 135 ongoing projects such as education, food security, protection, as well as a variety of other programs;
- (ii) Approves of its pledge of \$77.7 million in funding to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with the West Bank receiving \$10.4 million and the Gaza Strip receiving \$67.3 million.

2.2 ESCWA I/2

Acknowledging the work of Member States, the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council in working toward peace in Gaza,,

Emphasizing the unanimous recognition in this Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia of Palestine's right to recovery, their right to sovereignty and that an immediate ceasefire must be implemented,,

Recognizing the regional role the League of Arab States can play in the enforcement of this resolution,

Remaining cautious of corporations within United Nations Member States privately investing in perpetuating the destabilization of the Gaza region,

Noting that Member States have certain energy requirements that only other Member States can currently fulfill and acknowledging that this prevents those countries from immediately stopping trade,

Highlighting that due to the severity of international aid crises within other United Nations Member States, some Member States experiencing current humanitarian crises should not be expected to divert any aid towards Gaza,,

1. *Encourages* the body to maintain current trade partnerships, but to not engage in any new trade deliberations and agreements that conflict with United Nations peace efforts in the Gaza region and a lasting ceasefire;

115 2. Urges the United Nations to uphold existing sanctions towards Israel to enforce the recom-
116 mendations proposed in this report.

117 **2.3 ESCWA I/3**

118 *Reaffirming resolution 2803 (2025) of 17 November 2025,*

119 *Recognizing* the longstanding desire for an independent, prosperous Palestinian State which
120 reaffirms the right of Palestinian people to self-determination,

121 *Affirming* a secure and prosperous Arab region can not exist without addressing the roots of
122 conflict and instability in the region,

123 *Further recognizing* the lack of resources which have led to a massive injury crises, disease
124 outbreaks, and health crises,

125 1. *Emphasizes* the need for a rapid rubble clearance under United Nations Development Pro-
126 gramme (UNDP), as the rubble impedes essential access to areas of Gaza;

127 2. *Stresses* the desperate need for immediate and prompt rebuilding of infrastructure, once
128 again referring to 2803 (2025) of 17 November 2025:

129 (a) Educational Institutions with public access to internet;

130 (b) Safe access to transportation and rebuilding of an accessible airport;

131 (c) Agriculture and water infrastructure, including rain water harvesting, wells, desali-
132 nation plants hydroponics, circular agriculture, and crop rotation;

133 (d) Hospitals and adequate healthcare infrastructure;

134 3. *Suggests* funding for the Coastal Municipal Water Utility (CMWU);

135 4. *Further suggests* collaboration with the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON)
136 in matching the form of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);

137 5. *Requests* emergency response materials in the forms of generators to provide the facilities
138 with power to operate medical supplies;

139 6. *Urges* the Economic and Social Committee of Western Asia (ESCWA) secretariat to establish a
140 Palestinian Damage Assessment Task Force (PDATF) once a permanent ceasefire has been established
141 to:

142 (a) Assess damages based on Palestinian citizens perspectives through existing gov-
143 ernment institutions and NGOs;

144 7. *Provides* resources from relevant United Nations agencies:

145 (a) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);

146 (b) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);

147 (c) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);

148 (d) Other relevant specialized agencies under the Economic and Social Commission's
149 (ECOSOC) oversight;

150 8. *Further urges* the Arab Nations to coordinate relevant regional organizations, such as the
151 League of Arab States, in working toward a complete economic recovery with international stakehold-
152 ers:

153 (a) *Establishes* development councils with international and voluntary regional experts
154 to assist in damage assessment;

155 (i) Specifically in regard to education and technical assistance;

156 (b) Does so in coordination with the UNDP, OCHA, other relevant United Nations and in-
157 ternational institutions, and the relevant government institutions within Gaza.

158 **2.4 Current Refuge Issue**

159 The Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia is aware of the mass displace-
160 ment that has occurred in Gaza. This body reaffirms the need for stability in the region. Recognizing
161 that United Nations oversight is crucial to a lasting peace in the region and acknowledging the perva-
162 sive and non-sustainable issues with the current state of the administration of Gaza and the need for
163 efficient distribution of resources to the Palestinian people, the body encourages the approval of the
164 creation of a five mile zone with United Nations oversight on the border between Gaza and Egypt by 4
165 July 2026. This zone will be the cornerstone of efforts to rebuild Gaza and serve as a staging plan for
166 international cooperation.

167 Egypt acknowledges its role as a main conduit for the transportation of aid into Gaza.
168 The body recommends increased human aid and security by creating a special five mile partner-
169 ship zone that allows for greater cooperation between Egypt and the United Nations. By promoting a
170 consistent circulation of humanitarian aid, the region's reliance would subside and proceed towards
171 reconstruction initiatives. In an attempt to alleviate Israel's fears that aid may contain items with mili-
172 tary applications, this council encourages further exploration of third party inspections of aid trucks in
173 order to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza.

174 **2.5 Plan for Future Development**

175 This plan will take place over the course of two segments. The Economic and Social
176 Commission of Western Asia recommends the first segment of this plan to last five years and con-
177 sist of a cooperative management of the zone by the Palestinian Liberation Organization and United
178 Nations. The body believes in the crucial role of the United Nations in supporting the Palestinian Liber-
179 ation Organization as they develop the infrastructure and institutions deemed beneficial for Palestine.
180 Current estimates state that 83% of aid intended for Gaza has not reached its destination, thus show-
181 ing the importance of developing new aid distribution systems in the region. This segment will focus
182 on distributing aid, covering basic needs and beginning the process of rebuilding infrastructure. The
183 Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia recommends this segment of the plan take an ad-
184 ditional five years and involve the United Nations representatives that were working in the region under
185 the prior segment of the plan transitioning to a purely advisory role. The body recommends that the
186 Palestinian Liberation Organization continues and expand on rebuilding efforts in the region. The Eco-
187 nomic and Social Commission of Western Asia believes that it is important that United Nations over-
188 sight is not indefinite and that Palestinian Institutions regain autonomy in an expedient, yet practical
189 manner.

190 3 Consideration of the status

191 The delegations have unanimously agreed that the following are both relevant and nec-
192 essary to a sustainable recovery from the War on Gaza: An immediate, indefinite ceasefire; the imme-
193 diate implementation of humanitarian aid in a safe and efficient manner; and the inherent right of the
194 State of Palestine to exist.

195 3.1 Immediate Humanitarian Assistance

196 Representatives noted that aid delivery in the current state of the Gaza Strip and other
197 regions of the Occupied Palestinian Territory are incredibly dangerous. The United Nations has reported
198 that 88% of aid trucks are looted en route to recipients in the Gaza Strip, and it has been found that
199 1 in 50 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) staff members have been killed since the
200 commencement of the most recent war, beginning on 7 October 2023. Representatives also noted
201 that following the events of the most recent ceasefire on 10 October 2025, aid delivered by trucks has
202 proven to be more physically and fiscally effective in ensuring aid successfully reaches recipients in
203 comparison to other methods, e.g., aid delivered by air or boat with a total of 400 aid trucks successfully
204 entering the Occupied Palestinian Territory in that time.

205 Representatives agreed that the transition of how aid is delivered into the hands of
206 Palestinians is crucial to consider, given the Economic Social Council for Western Asia's commitment
207 to the recognition of the State of Palestine and its sovereignty. Palestine's access to regular, nutrient-
208 dense meals, clean drinking water, safe shelter, as well as hygienic and timely health services are
209 inherently necessary to the survival and prosperity of their population in Gaza. Representatives de-
210 liberated on the assistance of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). They agreed that NGOs are
211 an essential resource for the manpower and financing necessary to execute these goals and ensure
212 their success. Since October 2023, 2.1 million tons of aid have been delivered by NGOs partnered with
213 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) such as
214 the World Central Kitchen (WCK) and Global Empowerment Mission (GEM) alongside others in the form
215 of necessary health aid, social support, and relief services in order to best ensure Palestinian success.
216 GEM and the WCK have successfully mobilized aid by securing monthly deliveries of 10 million nutrient-
217 dense humane meals designed specifically for the recovery of famine victims, and have served meals
218 to more than 145 million people in Gaza, with an ideal 200,000 meals being provided daily when feasible
219 and unhindered by outside forces.

220 Additionally, representatives highlighted that the United Nations Office for the Coordi-
221 nation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) financial tracking service on humanitarian aid contributions
222 recognizes funding contributors to the Occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). OCHA notes the main state
223 donors are the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America, and Qatar. The United Arab Emirates
224 allocates a total of \$1,307,954,797 USD, which accounts for about 90.8% of the United Arab Emirates'
225 funding to affected countries.

226 Representatives also spoke about the contributions from Central Emergency Response
227 Fund (CERF), totaling \$20 million USD in aid to the Gaza Strip to meet urgent needs. The Emergency
228 Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, has announced plans to use this funding to expand humanitarian ef-
229 forts and support the immediate scale-up of aid operations: food, water, healthcare, and shelter for
230 civilians. Additionally, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
231 reports the Occupied Palestinian Territory Humanitarian Fund (OPT HF) has managed a total of 135 on-
232 going projects. OCHA pledges \$77.7 million USD in funding to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with the
233 West Bank receiving \$10.4 million USD and the Gaza Strip receiving \$67.3 million USD. Of these projects,
234 63 are being adopted by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), 56 by national NGOs,
235 and 16 by United Nations agencies. Representatives noted that all of these tenets are a crucial part of
236 providing humanitarian aid to critical areas affected in Gaza.

237 The delegations from Morocco and Yemen in collaboration with Saudi Arabia and the
238 Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA) body outlined procedures necessary for
239 compliance and enforcement of sustainable recovery in the Gaza region. The delegations proposed
240 that creating and achieving consensus on these suggestions for procedures will aid further initiatives

241 in stabilizing the consequences of the current devastation within Gaza.

242 The ESCWA committee convened on 22 November 2025, and all representatives agreed
243 on the body's recognition of Palestinian statehood in an effort to achieve a foundational shared princi-
244 ple to begin initiatives towards sustainable recovery for the Gaza region and an immediate, permanent
245 ceasefire. The body recognizes that there have been multiple violations of the ceasefire, and that it is
246 necessary to outline measures to pressure Israel and Palestine's compliance towards a ceasefire and
247 United Nations enforcement of recovery efforts in the Gaza region.

248 The delegation of Yemen argued in favor of increased sanctions on Israel to deter fur-
249 ther destabilization of the Gaza region. The delegation of Morocco actively supports aid initiatives for
250 Palestine, while maintaining an economic alliance with Israel after the Tripartite Agreement was signed
251 into effect on 22 December 2020 where economic bilateral cooperation between Morocco, Israel, and
252 the United States of America was agreed upon. In recognition of these opposing ideals, the delegations
253 of Yemen and Morocco agree that the ESCWA should recommend that Member States that currently
254 enforce economic pressures towards Israel maintain those pressures. However, no further sanctions
255 should be implemented to not cause further global disarray. Both delegations agreed that ESCWA
256 member states not engage in forming new trade agreements with Israel until peace is achieved in the
257 region. The delegation of Morocco and Yemen communicated with the body and reached a consensus
258 in support of this recommendation.

259 The delegation of Egypt mentioned experiencing consistent population growth due to
260 their efforts towards accepting Palestinian refugees. The delegation from Egypt agreed on the pro-
261 posed approach towards trade, but suggested that amendments should be included to outline an
262 exception for them. With Egypt's concern in mind, necessary growth of infrastructure that is reliant on
263 Israeli resources should be permitted, but alternative resources should be developed and extended to
264 Member States committed to Gaza's recovery.

265 The Republic of Sudan supports this recommendation, but due to the ongoing Sudanese
266 Civil War believes that in order to achieve sustained compliance within Member States, it is necessary
267 to clarify that Member States facing humanitarian crises do not face international pressure to provide
268 aid to the region.

269 In discussions with the delegation of Oman, Oman advocated in favor of acknowledg-
270 ing the recent Security Council resolution 2803 (2025) of 17 November 2025 in report recommendations.
271 Member States maintain that this is a separate resolution meant to provide relevant regional perspec-
272 tives on achieving compliance and enforcement of sustainable recovery for the Gaza region, beyond
273 relevant Member States' efforts within the security council.

274 **3.2 Damage Assessment and Reconstruction**

275 The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) welcomes the recog-
276 nition of a pathway toward a viable Palestinian State in the recent United States-led peace plan. How-
277 ever, through discussions, this commission looks into forming a long-term humanitarian recovery and
278 development plan in line with ECOSOC's goals, beyond the general points outlined in the current peace
279 plan.

280 The members of ESCWA discussed the idea that immediate and prompt rebuilding of
281 infrastructure is desperately needed to give Gaza a sustainable recovery, as recognized in point two of
282 the Twenty-Point Peace Plan adopted by the Security Council on 17 November 2025 in resolution 2803
283 (2025). This body discussed these reconstruction efforts, as to be predominantly led by the Pales-
284 tinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Member States argued this should echo the Security Council,
285 specifically point nine of the Twenty Point Peace Plan endorsed in resolution 2803 (2025) adopted 17
286 November 2025.

287 The member states within ESCWA believe that the data currently available does not re-
288 flect the extent of the damages in Gaza, discussing the possibility for the establishment of a Palestinian-
289 led collaborative task force to assess the damage in Gaza as the International Stabilization Force (ISF)
290 established in resolution 2803 (2025) of November 17 2025 begins to stabilize and enforce the current
291 ceasefire.

292 Several Member States emphasized the current devastation in Gaza. Namely, delegates
293 referenced *Gaza War: Expected Socioeconomic Impacts on the State of Palestine*, a United Nations De-
294 velopment Programme (UNDP) and ESCWA 2024 report. In this report, it was noted the GDP in the State
295 of Palestine contracted by 35.1%, along with unemployment reaching approximately 50%. Delegates
296 discussed the impact that this unemployment rate has had on the Gaza region and subsequent im-
297 pact of the economy of the Arab Region. Representatives discussed methods of reconstruction to aid
298 with lowering the unemployment rate in Gaza.

299 Furthermore, the report noted that 60% of buildings in Gaza, and 57% of its agricultural
300 lands, have been decimated. The estimated cost of rebuilding in Gaza as of the 2024 report is \$18.5
301 billion, nearly equivalent to the West Bank's and Gaza's GDP combined. The discussion revolved around
302 these statistics and how Gaza could be expected to rebuild without outside support. Member States
303 then began debating how funding should occur for various initiatives needed to address the various
304 challenges of reconstruction and a complete recovery.

305 The UNDP already has a comprehensive plan for rubble clearance alongside decades
306 of experience in Gaza. Representatives discussed that the infrastructure that needs immediate as-
307 sistance includes educational institutions with public access to the internet, access to transportation,
308 rebuilding of an airport and emergency generators to be used in healthcare. Devastation has followed
309 due to the destruction of roads and critical transportation infrastructure causing fuel shortages and
310 dangerous travel conditions. With the established ceasefire, roads can be repaved and fuel shortages
311 can be alleviated, allowing for ease of transportation, even by animal powered transportation.

312 The delegates of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia discussed issues pertaining to water and
313 agriculture infrastructure in Gaza. Noting the destruction of vital water infrastructure, representatives
314 discussed the necessary steps to repair damaged wells and desalination plants through additional
315 funding for the Coastal Municipal Water Utility (CMWU). Representatives discussed the transferring of
316 water rights in Palestine from Israel to Palestine, further noting the role of the Israeli Water Authority
317 (IWA) in disparities in water usage. Representatives discussed the impact of water pollution on agricul-
318 ture in Gaza, noting the specific role of instruments of war in this pollution. Representatives discussed
319 the steps necessary for the bioremediation of soil in Gaza.

320 Furthermore, the sustainable recovery of Gaza and the eventual transition into a single,
321 indivisible state seems best informed by a Palestinian-led damage assessment in coordination with
322 relevant United Nations agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), relevant international or-
323 ganizations and other willing neutral stakeholders. Representatives discussed whether the PLO should
324 be the sole sovereign authority in a future Palestinian State. Representatives further debated whether
325 to work with Palestinians in Gaza through the existing institutions such as the Palestinian Ministry of
326 Health in Gaza. However, the body noted that any work with government institutions in Gaza should be
327 subject to United Nations agency oversight such as oversight by the United Nations Relief and Works
328 Agency (UNRWA), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World
329 Health Organization, international, regional and Palestinian Authority oversight during this transitional
330 phase. Representatives further discussed the League of Arab States involvement as regional stake-
331 holders in this process in order to establish an independent Palestinian economy.

332 Understanding concern over financial responsibilities, member states have voiced their
333 full support in backing the funding. The estimated cost of rebuilding in Gaza as of the 2024 ESCWA and
334 UNDP report is \$18.5 billion, nearly equivalent to the West Bank's and Gaza's Gross Domestic Product
335 combined. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are strong supporters of this plan and have shared their willing-
336 ness to fund the sustainable reconstruction of Gaza. Angel investors and Foreign Direct Investment,
337 through the United Nations capital development funds, would be beneficial to relieve a portion of the
338 financial burden. This investment is intended to initiate the reconstruction of critical infrastructure and
339 economically stabilize Gaza. Representatives believe this will keep critical infrastructure regional and
340 diversify the economy to prevent the continuation of neo-colonial dynamics and dependence on Is-
341 rael.

342 **3.3 Current Refugee Issue**

343 Gaza's dependence on external humanitarian aid is a concern for territorial sovereignty.
344 ESCWA is aware of the displacement that has occurred in Gaza. This body reaffirms the need for sta-
345 bility in the region. ESCWA believes that United Nations oversight is crucial to a lasting peace in the
346 region. Acknowledging the pervasive issues with the current state of the administration of Gaza and
347 the need for efficient distribution of resources to the Palestinian people.

Passed by consensus, with 0 abstention