



American Model United Nations
General Assembly First Committee

GA First/II/4

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Nuclear disarmament

SUBMITTED TO: The General Assembly First Committee

The General Assembly First Committee,

1 *Understanding* the vast strides made by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
2 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water, aka the Partial
3 Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition
4 of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear weapon proliferation,

5 *Noting* the security concerns raised by Member States who have not yet signed or ratified treaties such as
6 the NPT, PTBT, CTBT, and the TPNW,

7 *Providing* a distinction between low-enrichment fuel-grade uranium and high-enrichment weapons-grade
8 uranium which are generally defined as having less than twenty percent Uranium-235 content and more than twenty
9 percent Uranium-235 content respectively,

10 *Recognizing* the circumstances preventing denuclearization differ across Member States and that we must
11 address the needs of each nuclear state,

12 *Stressing* the importance of inspections of States' initial stockpile of nuclear arms, by the United Nations
13 Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), to set reasonable goals for disarmament,

14 1. *Calls* for the creation of conditions under which nuclear powers will feel confident enough to reduce their
15 stockpiles of nuclear weapons and move towards denuclearization through:

16 (a) Expanding opportunities for diplomacy between rival Member States through the use of a neutral
17 panel composed of non-nuclear capable states as mediators through the United Nations;

18 (b) A state may only be used as a mediator if all parties involved view the state as unbiased;

19 (c) Sets specific goals for gradual nuclear disarmament;

20 2. *Further calls* for both confirmed and suspected nuclear Member States to subscribe to both a preliminary
21 international inspection, and public triennial inspections to discern the size of nuclear stockpiles, in conjunction with
22 an annual self report. This would be to determine the rate at which nations will disarm over the fifty-one year
23 disarmament period and done simultaneously so all denuclearizing states can maintain faith in their security;

24 3. *Encourages* the reduction of the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium, because nuclear weapons
25 contain twenty percent highly enriched uranium and the production of this material is rising at a rate of twenty percent
26 every year;

27 4. *Strives* for a system to track the transfer of nuclear material from extraction and construction to usage
28 as to prevent it from falling into possession of nonstate actors;

29 5. *Acknowledges* that such a system would:

30 (a) Create a record keeping system such that all nuclear material will be tracked by a new subcom-
31 mittee created to watch over this data to be named Committee on Tracking of Nuclear Material (CTNM);

32 (b) Call on Member States in which nuclear material fails to reach its legal destination to investigate
33 using United Nations resources as to what happened to the material;

34 (c) If there is a failure to transport and all or some of the material has been lost, the subcommittee
35 shall inform the Member States who house the buyer and seller and encourage them to investigate using whatever
36 data the subcommittee has pertaining to the shipment and to ask for funding from the subcommittee if there is a
37 need;

38 6. *Additionally calls* upon UNODA to establish an international standard for the safe and responsible
39 disposal and storage of nuclear material and waste:

40 (a) Such disposal practices should be based on the use of the Swedish KBS-3 disposal method to
41 ensure safe and efficient disposal;

42 (b) The disposal of these wastes is encouraged to be facilitated in compounds similar to the Finnish
43 Onkalo spent nuclear fuel repository;

44 7. *Urges* that all Member States to cease creation and construction of nuclear weapons as well as enrichment
45 of nuclear fissile material, however does not require Member States to remove current nuclear weapons manufacturing
46 infrastructure in case of an infringement upon the agreement;

47 8. *Empowers* Member States to temporarily cease denuclearization process in the case of a discrepancy
48 between the annual reports and the triennial inspections, until the discrepancy is resolved;

49 9. *Suggests* that nuclear-armed adopt nuclear safer alert measures through multilateral treaties, by:

50 (a) Placing large, visible barriers on top of missile silo lids which would be difficult to rapidly remove
51 and could be easily monitored by on-site observers or national technical means;

52 (b) Removing or altering firing switches of missiles to prevent rapid launch;

53 (c) Removing batteries, gyroscopes or any guidance mechanisms from missiles or re-entry vehicles;

54 (d) Removing warheads from missiles and storing them in a separate, monitored location except
55 submarines;

56 (e) Researching technical means that could be engineered to provide frequent checks that nuclear
57 missiles posed no immediate threat.

Passed, Yes: 33 / No: 29 / Abstain: 4