

American Model United Nations

General Assembly First Committee

GA First/I/3

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION:

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and

on their destruction

SUBMITTED TO:

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The General Assembly First Committee

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1 Recognizing that biological weapons are defined as biological agents used to cause death or disease on a 2 target population,

Condemning the use of biological and toxin weapons for the purposes of causing death, disease, or war on a target population,

Deeply concerned with the ease at which bacteriological weapons can travel across international borders and affect the entire international community,

Keeping in mind the rapid advances that have transpired in regards to biological research and technology,

Recognizing with dissatisfaction the continued reluctance of some Member States to dismantle biological weapons programs,

Taking into consideration the presence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the fact that NAM makes up over half of the world population,

Emphasizing the role that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Implementation Support Unit have played in the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons, and on their destruction,

Deeply concerned that poorly funded security at research facilities has allowed non-state actors access to biological weapons that have allowed these weapons to be deployed,

Noting further that this decreases the international community's ability to control biological and toxin weapons,

Reaffirming our commitment to scientific growth and research,

Fully aware of the complexity of current reporting procedures,

Noting the importance of the body of scientific experts created under the Third Review Conference of 1991,

- 1. Requests the Secretary General form an ad hoc group of Member States for the purpose of creating a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention to be recommended to the States Parties of the convention;
- 25 2. Further Requests this ad hoc group of Member States work to create a three-tiered verification protocol framework:
- 3. Recommends that Tier III specify Member States in self-reported compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, such that:
- 29 (a) Each state will self-report the status of their research facilities and capabilities in compliance 30 with the rules set under the Biological Weapons Convention;
- 31 (b) Each state will self-report their current armament status, as well as their arms building and 32 trading status in compliance with the rules set under the Biological Weapons Convention;
- 33 (c) States complying with Tier III will be given a 'Partial Compliance' status in the yearly committee 34 update;

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- 4. Further recommends that Tier II specify Member States demonstrating affirmative actions towards compliance but not fully meeting all obligations specified by the Biological Weapons Convention:
- 37 (a) Urges that members who wish to comply but do not possess the means, receive the necessary 38 aid so that they may pursue compliance;
- 39 (b) States complying with Tier II will be given a 'Working towards Compliance' status in the yearly 40 committee update;
- 5. Encourages that Tier I status specify Member States in full, verified compliance with all articles of the Biological Weapons Convention, such that:
- 43 (a) Member States complying with random inspections of government research and development 44 sites, with regards to biological weapons, will be given access to the Open Assess—a database of peer-reviewed 45 biological research;
- 46 (b) Member States that comply will gain increased access to medical and scientific research for 47 benevolent non-weapons related purposes;
- 48 (c) Member States complying with Tier I will be given an 'In Compliance' status in the yearly 49 committee update;
 - 6. Requests the First Committee report the tier status of Member States on a yearly basis under the yearly report already in place to update the committee on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament:
 - (a) In the First Committee report, the degree to which Member States are working towards compliance will be measured with regards to the work of other bodies on this BWC agreement, and this degree of work will be the designator for which tiers are allotted;
 - 7. Recommends that in order to combat and reduce the presence of non-state actors, the establishment of a universal tracking system, which includes:
 - (a) A software that is synonymous with the existing model of the Strategic Arms Resolution Treaty, to record and compile all potentially hazardous biological and chemical components or potential precursors;
 - (b) This software includes a barcode system that includes an identification number, weight, and all other relevant details on all materials as listed above;
 - 8. Expresses its appreciation for the already existing training and capacity-building exercises conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and encourages the continuation of the same to meet and reflect modern standards;
 - 9. Urges Member States to make peer-reviewed biological research more available to nations in Tier I, full compliance of the Biological Weapons Convention;
 - 10. Additionally Urges the First Committee to form a non-partisan overview committee of experts to ascertain whether certain knowledge which is in the process of being published could lead to the development of biological weapons;
- 70 11. Request that the First Committee oversee the formation of a sub-committee to create international response protocols in the case of a biological attack:
- (a) Recommends that this sub-committee work to develop a set of policy recommendation for reporting any attack and response protocol to a biological weapons attack on these states parties to the convention;
 - (b) Further recommends that this counsel focus on humanitarian responses to these attacks;
- 75 (c) Suggests that this council create a standard application of assistance command and control 76 protocols and regulations on the handling of laboratory samples.

Passed, Yes: 68 / No: 13 / Abstain: 15

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