



American Model United Nations  
**Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**

OPCW/I/5

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Implementation of Article X: Assistance and protection against chemical weapons

SUBMITTED TO: The Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

*The Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

1 *Guided by* the principles of the United Nations Charter and the principle of state sovereignty expressed  
2 therein,

3 *Alarmed by* the rapid proliferation of chemical weapons,

4 *Recognizing* the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as independent from the  
5 United Nations,

6 *Deeply convinced* that the most effective method of preventing the acquisition and use of chemical weapons  
7 is the destruction of those weapons,

8 1. *Confirms* the need for the further regulation of chemicals that could potentially be weaponized for harmful  
9 purposes;

10 2. *Encourages* all the members party to the OPCW to submit regular declarations on the production,  
11 importation and exportation of certain dual-use chemicals including:

12 (a) Chemical transfers from one state to another at least 30 days before from the transfer;

13 (b) Quantities of each chemical produced and processed;

14 (c) High-risk areas include but not limited to the Middle East and Africa;

15 3. *Further requests* that United Nations agencies promote values of disarmament in volatile regions of the  
16 world through education programs;

17 4. *Acknowledges* the danger of Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) weaponized by non-state actors;

18 5. *Defines* toxic chemicals as any chemical element, mixture or compound that can cause health complications  
19 or physical damage, which can include, but is not limited to: chloride, ammonia, carbon monoxide and sulfuric acid;

20 6. *Calls for* the implementation of security measures to escort the transportation of the chemicals listed  
21 above when leaving industrial facilities for the commercialization of such chemicals. These security measurements  
22 would be as follows:

23 (a) The implementation of escorts of chemicals being transported within and among countries;

24 (b) The increase of security within chemical-producing facilities to prevent the interception of chem-  
25 icals by non-state actors;

26 7. *Defines* physical damage as damage that can be caused by corrosive properties, explosions, flammable  
27 properties and reactive properties relative to other chemicals or water;

28 8. *Further defines* health complications as measurable, scientifically proven damage or complications to  
29 an individual's health on an acute or chronic level. These health complications can include, but are not limited  
30 to: reproductive damage, birth defects, cancer, sensory and/or neurological damage, respiratory irritation and/or  
31 damage, cardiovascular damage, gastrointestinal damage and damage to the immune system;

32 9. *Recognizes* physical threats from the application of toxic chemicals, which can include:

33 (a) Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from flammable materials and compressed gasses;

- 34 (b) IEDs used in conjunction with chemical agents (CH-IEDs) and biological agents (B-IEDs);
- 35 (c) Contamination of water supplies using accesible TICs;

36 10. *Recommends* states create a chemical agent database to ensure the chemical agents are properly traced  
37 and monitored to prevent non-state actor attacks;

38 11. *Supports* the construction of chemical waste disposal plants closer to the current high-risk areas. These  
39 plants will be used to safely dispose of any excess chemicals that are obtained or confiscated from state or non-state  
40 actors:

- 41 (a) High-risk areas include but not limited to the Middle East and Africa;
- 42 (b) Construction of these plants will be overseen strictly by professional engineers and scientists  
43 from developed countries;
- 44 (i) Background checks will be implemented for these people to make sure they come from notable  
45 recognized companies;
- 46 (c) Construction of these plants will be done by locals to produce new jobs;
- 47 (d) These chemical plants will reduce the current cost of sending chemical weapons to Europe to get  
48 dismantled;

49 12. *Calls for* the implementation of medical shelters in high-risk regions to reduce the death and suffering  
50 of affected victims and exposed individuals by accomplishing the following:

- 51 (a) Identifying high-risk regions with strong likelihood of chemical attacks through the use of the  
52 Scheduled Chemical Database and reports by individuals, state officials and/or non-governmental organisations  
53 (NGOs);
- 54 (b) Utilizing NGOs committed to mitigating the consequences of chemical attacks, such as, the  
55 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Organisation for Defending the Victims of Chemical Weapons  
56 (ODVCW) and Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS), by providing them with the resources  
57 necessary for providing direct aid in the event of an attack;
- 58 (c) Creating a voluntary fund for the contribution of financial, human and medical resources by  
59 Member States;

60 13. *Implores* the allocation of additional resources and support for the Scheduled Chemical Database, as a  
61 way to enact the following:

- 62 (a) Increase awareness throughout the international community of the development of chemicals and  
63 potential chemical weapons;
- 64 (b) Assist prevention and mitigation measures such as the establishment of medical shelters;
- 65 (c) Reduce tensions in high-risk areas by promoting openness and collaboration between Member  
66 States;

67 14. *Promotes* the establishment of chemical weapon disarmament facilities closer to areas known to be in  
68 possession of chemical weapons to reduce risk of chemical weapon acquisition by non-state actors by enacting the  
69 following:

- 70 (a) Recognizing efficient and quick transport routes that will reduce the time chemical weapons are  
71 not secured in official disarmament facilities;
- 72 (b) Recommending states assist other nations in securing the transportation of chemicals and chem-  
73 ical weapons particularly in underdeveloped nations lacking proper security measures;

74 15. *Endorses* Member States to increase their contributions to the International Support Network for Victims  
75 as a way to improve assistance to defend affected individuals;

76 16. *Further encourages* the creation and distribution of easy-to-understand materials which can prepare  
77 citizens to ensure their own safety in the event of a chemical attack, with the goals of:

- 78 (a) Minimizing casualties in a chemical attack by enabling citizens to recognize the signs of chemical  
79 attacks as well as identify safe distances and evacuation procedures;

80 (b) Allowing ordinary citizens on the ground to serve as informants on the ground of violations  
81 through their chemical weapons recognition education;

82 (c) Causing a decrease in the effectiveness and number of casualties in chemical attacks through the  
83 comparatively small cost of producing basic educational materials.

Passed, Yes: 27 / No: 26 / Abstain: 9