

American Model United Nations

Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OPCW/I/1

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Implem

Implementation of Article X: Assistance and protection against

chemical weapons

SUBMITTED TO:

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The Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

The Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recalling the provisions passed in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),

Recognizing the efforts of nations such as Qatar and Italy in the field of training medical professionals in the treatment of chemical weapons victims,

Noting the humanitarian aspects of this topic,

Aware of the danger brought to the public by the stockpiling and use of chemical weapons,

Deeply concerned with the lack of a unified international force with the sole purpose of providing aid, resources and training to those at risk of and those affected by chemical weapons attacks,

- 1. Recommends the creation of a risk categories approach to Schedule-1 chemical facilities. These categories would be detailed and considered for the purpose of reducing the number of inspections at facilities that are deemed a lower risk, while continuing to monitor all facilities through extensive and rigorous declaration regimens and data monitoring;
- 2. *Encourages* the creation of a universally recommended export and import regulation system for scheduled chemicals in order to prevent uneven implementation of the CWC:
 - (a) Advises that the mechanisms will consist of monitoring procedures including, but not limited to;
 - (i) Control Lists (precursors, equipment, agents and organisms);
 - (ii) Guidelines for the industry to assist in identifying potential chemical weapons equipment transactions:
 - (iii) Information sharing among Member States when suspicious inquiries are recieved, cases are denied or information suggests possible international procurement for non-peaceful purposes;
- 3. Further encourages the creation of a chemical database through the Nuclear Emergency Search/Support Team (NEST) and other trained chemical detection agents to ensure coordination and communication between agents in times of reaction and validate suspicion of chemical weapons:
- (a) Calls upon coordination with World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to strengthen and encourage the use of PATENTSCOPE, a chemical monitoring software, in order to ensure that no supply chain breaches occur:
- (b) Further requests special attention be paid to transportation records concerning mass quantities of potentially weaponized chemicals and used as an indicator for consideration of investigation;
- 4. *Urges* the development of a verification system sufficiently robust to assess capabilities of chemical plants and the risks they pose, in light of paradigm shifts in technology:
- (a) Further calls upon more extensive research by Member States and the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) into the development of new catalysts (both traditional and enzymes), due to the fact that these can have variant effects in how toxic chemicals are detected under current regulation processes;

DOCID: 47 Page 1

- 34 (b) Strongly advises the maintenance of a core group of highly experienced inspectors who possess 35 the capacity and experience to resolve problems in the field, confirming the seven-year tenure policy that aims to 36 ensure new development is regulated;
- 5. Strongly suggests that in the event that inspections are impeded cases be directly referred to the Security Council;
- 6. *Petitions* for the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to provide further support and assistance for mitigation and prevention:
- 41 (a) Calls upon the Technical Secretariat to provide transport for aid personnel that can operate in 42 high-risk areas;
- 43 (b) Requests medical professionals and chemical weapons experts be appointed by State Parties to 44 the CWC;
- 45 (c) Further recommends voluntary financial and material resources, as well as medical care, be 46 provided to victims of chemical weapons appointed by State Parties to the Convention;
 - (d) Urges that chemical weapons shelters would be created in states that request them;
 - (i) The shelters would only be erected with the approval of the local government, in coordination with regional and multilateral organizations;
 - (ii) The shelters would act as emergency shelters, medical centers and Forward Operating Bases (FOB) for cleanup operations.

Passed, Yes: 38 / No: 23 / Abstain: 22

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DOCID: 47 Page 2