



Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

ARGUED: 19 November 2017

DECIDED: 19 November 2017

1 The Dissenting opinion was signed by and agreed to by Justice Dolan, Justice Kennedy, Justice Caine,
2 Justice Eness, Justice Pederson, and Justice Fuller.

3 The petitioner and the respondent have demonstrated conclusive evidence that the issues surrounding the
4 maritime border dispute are sufficiently complex and cannot be resolved by negotiations between the two countries,
5 and therefore yield jurisdiction to the ICJ.

6 The Court was asked to examine the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
7 (UNCLOS) in respect to establishing the maritime border between Somalia and the Republic of Kenya based on the
8 principles outlined in Part II Section II Article 15. We have concluded that the evidence presented by Kenya regarding
9 the claim of historical title over the maritime territory in question is insufficient to justify Kenyan sovereignty over
10 it, and therefore merits a reconsideration of the Kenya-Somalia maritime border based on equitable principles of
11 maritime border delimitation with regard to territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf as per
12 Articles 15, 74, and 83 of the UNCLOS.

13 The opinion and explanation of reasons of the minority is as follows:

14 The historical claim argument presented by the delegation of Kenya does not hold when examining the
15 inconsistent and vacillating definitions of the maritime border between Kenya and Somalia historically. The Republic
16 of Kenya argued that the disputed territorial waters have historically been under their jurisdiction. Kenya, however,
17 has changed their maritime boundary with Somalia four times. The first was with the 1972 Territorial Waters
18 Act, which followed the principle of equidistance outlined in Article 15 of the UNCLOS. The second occurred in
19 February 1979 when the President of Kenya then issued a Presidential Proclamation that changed the boundary to
20 a straight line following the latitudinal measure of 1 degree 38'. Kenya changed the boundary for a third time in
21 1989 with the 1989 Maritime Zones Act which returned the maritime boundary to that which was established by the
22 1972 Territorial Waters Act. Seventeen years later, Kenya changed the border for the fourth time in a Presidential
23 Proclamation issued on 9 June 2005, which established the contested boundary line in the present case. Additionally,
24 the Somali Maritime Law of 1988 which establishes the maritime boundary with Kenya based on the equidistance
25 principle directly contradicts the historical claims made by Kenya over the disputed maritime territory. Therefore,
26 the historical claim over the territory in question by Kenya is no more legitimate than that of Somalia.

27 The inconsistency of Kenya's historic claims to the maritime territory in question invalidates the claim that
28 Kenya has historical title over this territory. Furthermore, no evidence was presented by the respondent suggesting
29 the physical presence of sovereign Kenyan citizens or capital in this territory, which further invalidates the historical
30 title argument especially with regard to the idea of adverse acquisition.

31 In the previous rulings of the ICJ on the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (*Romania v. Ukraine*)
32 in 2009, Romania laid claim to oil and gas deposits in the Black Sea and prior to 2001 never protested Ukraine's
33 activities in the areas claimed by Romania. The Court ruled that the principle of equidistance should be applied,
34 giving us precedent to rule in favor of Somalia in today's case.

35 Therefore the minority recommends the following:

36 First, in order to achieve the most equitable solution the International Court of Justice sides with the state
37 of Somalia. The standing law of international delimitation of territorial seas, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ),

38 and the continental shelf is set forth in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through
39 the "Equidistance Principle." The "Equidistance Principle" would be defined as a straight line into the sea from
40 the existing land boundary made of latitudinal and longitudinal points that are proportionately distant from the
41 coastline of each state. The claim by the majority opinion is in consideration of Article 15 of the UNCLOS that
42 states as an exception to the "Equidistance Formula"

43 The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other
44 special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
45 therewithin

46 The reference here is made to territorial seas, but can be applied broadly to all determinations of delimitation.
47 As explained earlier this claim is made on insufficient grounds and should therefore only be applied in the dispute
48 of delimiting territorial waters. The minority of the Court is persuaded that this does hold merit in the fact that it
49 would be "necessary" to maintain forms of national sovereignty such as state security, regulation of commerce, etc.
50 Therefore for territorial waters should extend straight south 12 nautical miles as currently internationally accepted.

51 Secondly, that the current boundary is clearly disproportionate. Due to the evidence of equivocation on the
52 positioning of the borders by Kenya the Court cannot say that the equidistance principle doesn't apply because of
53 a historic title belonging to Kenya. Therefore, the border is in violation of CLOS, as the conditions under article 15
54 to activate a historical argument do not apply. SomaliaOs charge that the border is grossly disproportionate is duly
55 noted. However, Somalia's sovereign rights were not found to be violated as Somalia never asserted a direct claim
56 against Kenyan takings in the disputed areas until the current case. Chapter XV of the CLOS establishes that the
57 ICJ can mediate between parties having disputes, and Kenya acknowledged its willingness to defer to the Court, and
58 therefore made no clear attempt to detract from Somalia's sovereignty. The Court's decision establishes whether or
59 not there is a clear sovereign right to the disputed territory.

60 Thirdly, the economic development that occurred in the disputed area should rightfully belong to Somalia.
61 Somalia brought the argument that all economic development of the disputed area should be considered illegal, as
62 it was done in violation of CLOS. The minority concurs with this charge. However, as Kenya has demonstrated
63 goodwill throughout argument, it is recommended that Somalia negotiate with Kenya to establish a repayment plan
64 that reimburses the value that Kenya initially invested in the area. Regardless, Somalia has a sole claim in the
65 disputed EEZ and territorial sea and may proceed in whatever manner they see fit.

66 Finally, we do not recommend deference to the CLCS's decision if it does not support the equidistance
67 principle. The legality of the equidistance principle in this case is clear, and Kenya has no legitimate claim to the
68 disputed territory. Any Somali concession of its rightful sea territory should be disregarded. However, to address
69 the grievances that would arise from a new delimitation of the border, the Court encourages Somalia and Kenya to
70 negotiate potential swaps of maritime territory as both parties see fit. Such collaboration would ameliorate remaining
71 contentions regarding a finalized border, and would be highly endorsed by this Court.

Signed By

Justice Pederson

Justice Dolan

Justice Kennedy

Justice Eness

Justice Fuller

Justice Caine