



American Model United Nations
Commission of Inquiry of 1948

1 Final Report on the Situation in Indonesia, 27 May 1948

2 Overview

3 The Commission sought testimony from the Republic of Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Premier
4 Malewa of the State of East Indonesia, and the Indonesian Consular Commission to discuss the allegations made
5 by all parties and discern negotiable terms. The body recorded all notable events that transpired over time, and it
6 oversaw the negotiations between the Republican and Dutch parties.

7 Witness Testimonies

8 The Commission heard the representative of the Republic of Indonesia on 23 January 1948. Speaking in
9 favor of adhering to the Renville Agreement, he initially expressed outrage at Dutch violations thereof, including
10 drawing the Van Mook Line generously in the Netherlands' favor and not aligning with Dutch-occupied territory in
11 reality; establishing semi-autonomous states with administrations favoring Dutch colonial rule; using the Agreement
12 as a front to prepare for potential offenses similar to those on 11 November 1947; and maintaining the blockade
13 on the Republic's territory, thereby depriving Indonesia of civilian assistance and economic aid. Nevertheless, the
14 representative assured the Commission that the Republic was still fully committed both to adhering to the Linggadjadi
15 and Renville Agreements and to negotiating with the Dutch for a mutually-satisfactory resolution to the conflict. The
16 representative rebuffed claims that the Republic was supporting guerrilla forces operating in Dutch territory behind
17 the Line, stating that any guerrilla forces represented the widely popular opposition to Dutch colonial presence.

18 Next the Commission listened to Premier Malewa of the State of East Indonesia. The Premier expressed
19 East Indonesia's "willingness to work with the Dutch to create a federal system," the ultimate goal of which would
20 be to ensure equal sovereignty among all the participatory states and subject peoples of Indonesia. He expressed in
21 particular East Indonesia's willingness to cooperate with the Republic to guarantee the establishment of a federal
22 system per the Linggadjadi Agreement; East Indonesia desired becoming a sovereign state within the Indonesian
23 union equal in status with the Republic and the Dutch autonomous states. Finally, he disagreed with the Republic's
24 claim that the Dutch semi-autonomous states, his included, were proxy states with puppet governments; at the same
25 time, he maintained first that his government had no difficulty working with the Republic and second that he did
26 not believe the Republic was inciting guerrilla forces.

27 The Commission received a representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 23 February 1948. The
28 representative refuted Indonesian claims that Dutch forces never crossed the Van Mook Line; pressed on that com-
29 ment, he amended to specify that any such actions were retaliatory, taken in response to guerrilla forces retreating
30 beyond the Line; thus the Netherlands was acting "in a legal way," specifically in East Madura where the presence
31 of Dutch forces was confirmed beyond reasonable doubt. On the enduring blockade of Republican territory, the
32 representative insisted the Netherlands was acting within the confines of international law and that the consequences
33 felt by Indonesian citizens were unfortunate yet exceptional circumstances given the nature of the conflict. The
34 representative also reaffirmed Dutch commitment to the Renville Agreement, specifically its obligation to "promote
35 government development," which it was facilitating through the creation of semi-autonomous states from East Indies
36 territories. The representative restated his government's claims that the Republic was supporting guerrilla forces
37 behind the Line, claiming they had "too much coordination, too much targeting, and too many arms for them to be
38 acting independently" and that they have "other motives than just being separatist groups."

39 On 5 March, the Commission heard the testimony of Lonnie Moore, a representative of the Chairman of the
40 Security Council's Consular Commission in Batavia, who expressed there may have been "confusion about where
41 the [Van Mook Lines] were" and because of "how the lines were drawn...there might have been some disagreement
42 about the validity of those Lines." He clarified that the presently-drawn Lines were not representative of Dutch
43 control at the time, reflecting instead the furthest advances made by the Dutch prior to the 1 August ceasefire.
44 Because of this discrepancy, Republican forces had ended up behind the Line well into Dutch territory despite the
45 Dutch not having the capacity to hold that territory; initial violations of the ceasefire were therefore considered by
46 the Dutch forces "mopping up operations," which they did not consider in violation of the Linggadjadi Agreements.
47 Later violations, said the representative, were related to the Dutch government's perception of Republican support
48 for the guerrillas, insisting "that security must be maintained." He maintained that there was no credible evidence
49 to support the claim of Republican guerrilla support of any kind: the guerrillas were nationalist groups whose

50 actions were representative of the Indonesian popular will toward independence and sovereignty, though he also
51 described their actions as "banditry." As a final statement, Moore told the body, "Both sides have an interest in
52 being transparent and putting all of the information on the table."

53 Events

54 Several major events occurred as the Commission was researching the Indonesian question.

55 On 23 January, the Dutch government initiated a plebiscite in Madura. The result was a vote in favor
56 of creating the State of Madura, independent of the Republic and the Dutch, which was established the following
57 month. The Indonesians accused the plebiscite of not being held in good faith under the Linggadjati and Renville
58 Agreements.

59 On 23 February, the 3rd West Java Conference was held to determine the fate of West Java. The result of this
60 conference was the formation of the State of West Java, alternately known as Pasundan. However, the Conference
61 seemingly intentionally excluded representatives from both the Republic of Indonesia and the Commission. Further,
62 the Dutch formally established the State of East Sumatra.

63 On 26 February, the Republic notified the Commission that it had upheld its part of the Agreements by
64 completely withdrawing all of its forces that were still stationed on the Dutch side of the Van Mook Line. However,
65 they noted that the decision was not welcomed by some Indonesian commanders and that it was likely some Indonesian
66 forces chose not to leave the territory; as such, they were considered no longer supported by Indonesian authority.

67 On 10 March, the Netherlands created a provisional federal government composed of the Dutch East Indies
68 and the newly created autonomous states; the Republic understood this as a "colonial government in a new dress,"
69 viewing it as "a violation of the terms of the Renville Agreement." The Republic recognized the territories of Java,
70 Sumatra, and Madura as being its sovereign territory. Additionally, the Commission received copies of Resolutions 40
71 and 41, which were passed by the Council the previous day, which assisted the body in furthering its investigations.

72 On 16 March, the Commission received reports that the Republic filed a complaint to the Council regarding
73 the Netherlands, stating, "The Netherlands are acting contrary to the Renville Agreement."

74 On 15 April, the State of Madura held its first election, resulting in 31 out of 40 parliamentary seats being
75 filled by pro-Republic representatives. The Commission received reports that the Council had passed Resolution 43
76 on 1 April. The body also received written communication from the office of Mohammad Hatta, Vice President of the
77 Republic, in which he informed the body that the Dutch Foreign Minister, following the aforementioned Resolution,
78 expressed their willingness to commit to further negotiations. "While the Dutch Foreign Minister suggested that
79 these negotiations be directly between the Government of the Netherlands and [the Republic], we would prefer that
80 any negotiations be conducted through the Committee of Good Offices." As a result, the Commission saw fit to
81 invite the Foreign Ministers of the Netherlands and the Republic to a negotiating session overseen by the body.

82 On 27 May, the Republic informed the Commission that guerrilla forces had attacked a Dutch convoy in the
83 state of Pasundan, carried out by "Islamist fighters from the Hizbullah and Sabilillah militia," contingents of the
84 forces that had not withdrawn as directed by the Republic in February.

85 Negotiations with the Republic, the Kingdom, and the Commission

86 On 27 May, the Commission observed and moderated negotiations between representatives of the Republic
87 of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

88 Concerns

89 The Indonesians expected the Dutch to withdraw from illegally occupied territory, allow the Republic to
90 work on the formation of the United States of Indonesia as an equal partner, and ensure every plebiscite - past and
91 pending - be monitored by the United Nations.

92 The Dutch insisted once more that they were following the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements and that
93 the Indonesians had not. Further, they stressed that both the Dutch and the Indonesians should cooperate on the
94 formation of the United States of Indonesia.

95 Inflexible Concerns

96 The Dutch stated they absolutely refuse to withdraw from the contested territory beyond the Van Mook
97 Line. Further, they demanded the Indonesians acknowledge and respect the autonomous states formed by the Dutch
98 government.

99 The Indonesians demanded the Dutch withdraw from those same territories and include the Republic in the
100 development of the United States of Indonesia in a leadership capacity. Finally, they wanted to ensure all referendums
101 taken were monitored by the United Nations.

102 Compromises

103 The Indonesians agreed to compromise on "already agreed-upon international ideals" in reference to the Van
104 Mook Line. They reiterated their support for a peaceful resolution, insisting they would not end discussion until
105 such a resolution was established.

106 The Dutch were willing to lessen "heavy customs enforcement" and include the Republic into the provisional
107 government as an equal partner so long as the Republic acknowledged the autonomous states already created. They
108 insisted once again, however, that they would not withdraw.

109 Moderated Discussions

110 Negotiations proceeded with moderation from the Committee.* The Republic emphasized that the blockade
111 was cutting it off from "integral resources and integral seaports." The Dutch expressed the possibility of "dimming
112 down customs" if the Republic would acknowledge the already-created autonomous states.* The Republic agreed to
113 acknowledge those states if there were "free, fair, and internationally-monitored referendums." The Dutch replied
114 that they would agree to allow a UN observer body to monitor the referendums, later clarifying that said body
115 would not be allowed to conduct them. The Republic would accept this compromise but expressed preference
116 for fully UN-administered referendums.* In regards to possible amendments to the Van Mook Line, both parties
117 expressed willingness to re-evaluate the position of the Line by committee so long as the committee contained direct
118 representatives from the Republic and the Kingdom. The Dutch insisted, however, that the Line would have to either
119 stay in place or move further in their favor. The Republic stated that the Dutch "deserved less territory" than they
120 already had and the Netherlands "has a duty, as a developed Western power...to withdraw from that territory."* The
121 Republic insisted that it could not guarantee an end to guerrilla insurgents but stated its willingness to coordinate
122 with the Dutch to bring an end to the insurgents so long as resulting operations did not affect Indonesians "clamoring
123 for their rights" and constitute "inappropriate and [disproportionate] responses [by the Dutch] to limited guerrilla
124 attacks." The Dutch also expressed willingness to cooperate with the Republic and the UN in this endeavor.

125 Analysis

126 In the interest of time, the Commission shall only analyze content since 15 April in this section; prior analyses
127 will remain in the interim reports under "Appendices."

128 On the Madura Plebiscite

129 The Commission believes the Dutch government's conduct in administering the Madura Plebiscite is in
130 violation of the Renville Agreement because it was held during a "state of war and siege." Further, the results of the
131 15 April parliamentary elections demonstrated overwhelming popular support for the Republic.

132 On Vice President Hatta's Missive

133 The Commission believes Vice President Hatta's message expressed the Republic's commitment to cooperate
134 with the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to efficiently and peaceably reach a resolution to the
135 current conflict in line with previous agreements.

136 However, Hatta's statement indicated that the Dutch were attempting to bypass the authority of the United
137 Nations in contravention of the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements.

138 On the Negotiations

139 The Commission, reviewing the extensive discussions between the Republican and Dutch Foreign Ministers,
140 finds that both parties are genuinely willing and open to continuing dialogue and swiftly resolving the conflict
141 diplomatically. However, each party presented inflexible concerns that contradict each other, on which they will not
142 presently compromise. The Commission therefore believes that negotiations will be difficult, but not impossible, due
143 to their diplomatic spirits.

144 Recommendations

145 The Commission recommends the following action on the part of the Security Council:* Expand the Security
146 Council observation mission with new bodies for the purposes of: o Monitoring regional plebiscites, o Monitoring
147 guerrilla warfare in conjunction with the Republic and the Kingdom, and o Facilitating discussions on the re-evaluation

148 of the Van Mook Line, provided that direct representatives from both the Republic and the Kingdom be appointed to
149 the body.* Continue the mission of the Committee of Good Offices for the purpose of facilitating further negotiations.*
150 Refer to the analyses and recommendations made in previous interim reports and take into consideration the contents
151 of the mediations held between the Republic and the Kingdom.

152 Appendices

153 Appendix 1: Interim Report of 31 January 1948

154 Overview

155 The Commission continued its investigation into the situation present in the Dutch East Indies by questioning
156 a representative of the Republic of Indonesia and Premier Malewa of the State of East Indonesia. The body is also
157 awaiting testimony from representatives of the Five Consuls as requested by the Security Council on 25 August 1947;
158 the President of East Indonesia; and the Kingdom of the Netherlands with further inquiries directed at the Dutch
159 colonial government.

160 The representative from the Republic of Indonesia encouraged adhering to the Renville Agreement and
161 expressed outrage at Dutch violations thereof. They accused the Dutch of using the Agreement as a front to
162 strengthen their position for possible future offensives, citing the 11 November offensive as justification. They have
163 harshly condemned the Dutch blockade of Indonesia, which they declare is hindering Indonesia's economic standing
164 and ability to function as a state. They were receptive to negotiations on the condition that the Dutch withdraw
165 to "the original lines...then start working from there," referring to the Van Mook Line as drawn on 5 August 1947.
166 The body presented to the representative the Dutch allegations of Republican support to guerrilla forces behind
167 Dutch lines; the representative denied these claims, stating that they "had not provided any support" and that any
168 and all guerrilla action was a result of popular opposition to continued Dutch presence. They have not directed any
169 statements toward guerrilla forces to cease activities.

170 Premier Malewa of the State of East Indonesia was asked several questions to which he replied that he
171 did not have the appropriate knowledge or capacity to comment. He did reiterate East Indonesia's "willingness to
172 work with the Dutch to create a federal system," the ultimate goal of which would be to ensure "sovereignty be
173 equal" between the different peoples of Indonesia. When asked to comment on the sentiments of different Indonesian
174 national minorities regarding a unitary or federal state, the Premier declined to comment. He did state, however,
175 that East Indonesia was willing to cooperate with the Republican government to ensure the establishment of a federal
176 system, East Indonesia's ultimate goal being greater sovereignty within an Indonesian union. He claimed he did not
177 have any difficulty working with the Republican government and did not believe the Republic was inciting guerrilla
178 forces. He rejected the allegations raised by the Republican government that the autonomous states established by
179 the Dutch, including his own, were "puppet governments."

180 Analysis

181 At this time, it is unclear if the Premier declined to answer some of the Commission's questions due to
182 genuine lack of knowledge or due to political interest. The body hopes that future testimony from representatives of
183 Dutch-established autonomous states and the President of East Indonesia will clarify these questions. The Premier's
184 comments on East Indonesia's commitment to the Renville agreement are reassuring, and indicate a Pan-Indonesian
185 commitment to a mediated resolution to the conflict.

186 Regarding Dutch allegations of Republican support for guerrilla forces, the Commission's current findings
187 indicate there is no definitive evidence to support these claims. The body's findings independent of testimony,
188 however, largely pertain to areas well behind Dutch lines and cannot speak to the situation closer to the front.

189 Appendix 2: Interim Report of 23 February 1948

190 The Commission questioned a representative of the Kingdom of Netherlands to receive official statements
191 on policy in Indonesia. Initially, he insisted that Dutch forces never crossed the Van Mook Line, amending his
192 statement when pressed that, if Dutch forces had ever done so, they had been retaliating against guerrilla forces
193 "in a legal way." This did not amount to a persistent Dutch presence on the eastern half of Madura, which reports
194 independently verified as being present therein. The representative repeatedly invoked "international law" with
195 no further specification and stated that any impediment of the transitive civilian goods was an unfortunate but
196 exceptional circumstance amid the ongoing conflict; independent reports point toward a systemic, comprehensive
197 blockade of Republican-held territories.

198 In regards to the Renville Agreement, the representative reaffirmed the Netherlands' commitment to its
199 obligations to "promote government development." This was facilitated by the creation of semi-autonomous states
200 from Dutch-held territories. However, the representative would not comment on the composition of these states, so
201 the body cannot determine whether they are, as the Republic claims, heavily Dutch-influenced proxy states.

202 Regarding guerrilla forces and the Netherlands' claims that the Republic was supporting the aforesaid, the
203 representative reaffirmed the claim but could not provide material evidence. Rather, he suggested the Commission
204 take up the issue directly with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. To support his allegations, he stated that the
205 guerrilla forces had "too much coordination, too much targeting, and too many arms for them to be acting indepen-
206 dently." He believes these forces have "other motives than just being separatist groups." This was consistent with
207 the representative's insistence that the guerrilla forces could be only against both the Republic and the Netherlands
208 or supported by the Republic against the Dutch, discounting the possibility of independent anti-Dutch action.

209 The Dutch have begun the 3rd West Java Conference, likely in preparation to establish another semi-
210 autonomous state from the region. Reports indicate the Commission and the Republic were not invited to the
211 conference. The Commission believes these omissions are in defiance of the spirit of the Renville Agreement and
212 recommends the Security Council acknowledge this situation as appropriate.

213 The Commission encourages the Security Council to not recognize the legitimacy of the Madura Plebiscite,
214 which was conducted under unusual circumstances that did not allow for unfettered political organization or expres-
215 sion. As such, the legitimacy of the vote must be called into question along with the formation and recognition of
216 the State of Madura.

217 The Dutch navy continues to blockade the Republic of Indonesia, depriving it of economic and civilian
218 goods. This, alongside Dutch offenses into East Madura, call into question the Netherlands' stated commitment to
219 the Renville Agreement.

220 Appendix 3: Interim Report of 16 March 1948

221 Overview

222 As of 26 February, the Commission had received communications from several sources within the Indonesian
223 government indicating that the Republic has completed its withdrawal of all forces behind the Van Mook Line. This
224 action was unpopular among Republican military commanders. Republican sources emphasized that there may still
225 be irregular forces refusing withdrawal, but that these forces are no longer acting under Republican authority, nor
226 are they receiving assistance.

227 On 5 March the Commission heard the testimony of Lonnie Moore, a representative of the Chairman of the
228 Security Council's Consular Commission in Batavia. According to Moore, there may have been some "confusion
229 about where the [Van Mook Lines] were," and because of "how the lines were drawn...there might have been some
230 disagreement about the validity of those lines." He also stated that the Van Mook Line was not representative of
231 Dutch control, as the Van Mook Line was drawn between the forward-most Dutch positions at the time of the ceasefire
232 on 1 August, 1947. This created the presence of areas behind the Van Mook Line where the Dutch had not been able
233 to advance and where Republican troops were present. As such, the establishment of the Van Mook Line did not
234 represent actual territorial control at the time of the ceasefire and some of the initial violations of the ceasefire after
235 this point consisted of what Dutch forces classified as "mopping up operations which were not in violation of the
236 ceasefire." This does not entirely encapsulate nor explain all violations committed since the ceasefire. The confusing
237 nature of the drawing of the Van Mook Line, there was some contestation between Indonesian commanders as to
238 what side of the Van Mook Line they were on, with some commanders choosing to base their decision upon their
239 actual control of the region. This could explain the initial presence of Indonesian forces behind the Van Mook Line
240 and some of the early fighting after the ceasefire. According to the aforementioned communications from sources in
241 the Republican government, these forces were largely irregular in nature.

242 The representative of the Consular Commission additionally stated that later violations of the ceasefire
243 "may be related to some perception [on the side of the Dutch government] of Republican support of guerrillas in the
244 sense that security must be maintained." In his perception, however, amongst UN observers there had "never been
245 much of a question" regarding Republican support of guerrillas, in that there was no Republican support. Guerrilla
246 activities were motivated not by ethnicity but by "secular political concerns." He made it clear that, while third
247 party armed forces did exist, guerilla activity was centered on nationalist groups and their politics, which was largely
248 representative of the popular will. He did, however, characterize much of this guerrilla activity as "banditry."

249 Finally, Moore stated that "both sides have an interest in being transparent and putting all of the information
250 on the table."

251 In regards to the March 10 establishment of an interim federal government, the Indonesian Republican
252 government views this action as a "cart-before-the-horse strategy to allow for further construction of pro-Netherlands
253 States that will outnumber the Republic in the United States of Indonesia, despite the legally recognized territory
254 of the Republic."

255 Analysis

256 Though the Netherlands alleged that the Republican government is providing support for guerrilla forces
257 behind the Van Mook Line, based on the aforementioned testimonies and communications, the Commission does
258 not find sufficient evidence to uphold this claim. The testimony of the Consular Commission's representative was
259 particularly weighty due to its basis in eye-witness reports collected from a variety of impartial observers.

260 In regards to the formal complaint lodged by the Indonesian Republican government on 16 March 1948,
261 while the Commission does not find the military actions of the Dutch and the perception of Republican support
262 to be willful misrepresentations or acts of bad faith, in light of the evidence collected by this body, any continued
263 allegations without considerable material evidence would be representative of the Dutch government acting against
264 the spirit of the Renville Agreement.

265 Pertaining to the continued Dutch blockade and unilateral action to establish autonomous states, particularly
266 the conduct of the plebiscite on Madura under highly unusual circumstances, may represent the Dutch government
267 acting in contravention to the spirit of the Renville Agreement. There were clear and direct violations of the specific
268 language of the Renville Agreement in the conduction of this plebiscite, these being in relation to political principles 2
269 and 3, as well as additional principle number 4 of the Agreement. The continuation of a blockade after the presentation
270 of the findings of this body, would constitute a blatant disregard for the spirit of the Renville Agreement.

271 Recommendations

272 Based on the above findings and analysis, the Commission recommends that the Security Council produce
273 further formal condemnations of Dutch actions, including but not limited to the following: the blockade of Indonesian
274 ports, the aforementioned plebiscites and establishments of autonomous states without proper Commission oversight,
275 and incursions into Republic-controlled territory. If any of these activities persist, the Commission would recommend
276 sanctions be placed on the Netherlands, in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. The Commission
277 would be comfortable with further action related to these offenses, at the discretion of the Security Council, should
278 the Dutch government continue its course of action after sanctions have been placed.