



American Model United Nations

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

**Report to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on
Report of the secretariat on the world situation
regarding drug trafficking**

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1 Executive Summary

2 At its 2015 session, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs deliberated upon the following topics (including but
3 not limited to): state sovereignty, money laundering, regionalization, decriminalization, business aspects, security
4 implications, responsibilities of state bodies and international bodies, supply and demand of narcotic drugs and
5 socioeconomic aspects of drug trafficking.

6 In response to these issues, the body proposed a number of comprehensive resources to aid in the eradication
7 of drug trafficking. In order to effectively reach these solutions the body was split into three sub-committees:
8 security, social/demand and supply. Each sub-committee was responsible for addressing all pertinent aspects of the
9 international issue of drug trafficking within the purview of that sub-committee.

10 The details on the work of each subcommittee are included in Chapter 3 of this report. The security
11 sub-committee focused largely on border control, policing, maritime law and regional oversight pertaining to the
12 trafficking of narcotic drugs. The social and demand sub-committee was concerned with social damage, impact, and
13 implications of the global illicit drug trade and trafficking. The supply sub-committee addressed concerns of the
14 body regarding the reduction of the global supply of narcotic drugs and expressed concern for the resurfacing of
15 narcotic drugs.

16 Actions taken by the commission can be found in Chapter Three. Actions include the formation of sub-
17 committees and voting records on relevant draft resolutions that have been deliberated by the Commission on Narcotic
18 Drugs.

19 Details regarding the adoption of this report can be found in Chapter Four.

20 **2 Matters calling for action**

21 **2.1 Draft Resolution I/1**

22 *Bearing in mind* the successes and failures of previous development programs,

23 *Recognizing* United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolutions 2006/33, 2007/12, and
24 2008/26, which all call for the support and creation of alternative development programs for the purposes of under-
25 mining drug economies,

26 *Understanding* the complexity of drug trafficking makes it a difficult issue to eliminate completely,

27 *Believing* the trafficking economy can be weakened and its potential redirected into helping local economies,

28 *Aware* of the reality that eliminating drug supply is a key component of the solution to stopping drug
29 trafficking and consumption,

30 *Deeply concerned* that private research organizations have shown many alternative development programs
31 to be ineffective,

32 *Cognizant* that recommendations from aforementioned organizations for fixing current alternative develop-
33 ment programs have in many cases gone unheeded,

34 1. *Calls upon* ECOSOC, in preparation for the regular 2016-2017 budget review, to specifically examine
35 the financial health of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) Fund and focus especially on providing
36 recommendations and commentary on the validity and effectiveness of the alternative development programs financed
37 through said fund, and pending the confirmation of aforementioned private reports proclaiming the ineffectiveness
38 of currently funded alternative development programs;

39 2. *Invites* ECOSOC to investigate the creation of an alternative development program which will:

40 (a) Network with government and nongovernmental organizations to promote the building up of
41 local infrastructure and economies to establish licit economies which will allow producers of illicit drug crops to
42 transition to jobs within newly created licit economic systems; such regional development programs and initiatives
43 may include but not be limited to;

44 (i) Improvement of local road systems to allow furthered access to markets and businesses;

45 (ii) Provision of resources to local licit and transparent business enterprises;

46 (iii) Providing economic support for transitions from narcotic production into legal agricultural
47 production via crop subsidies;

48 (iv) Establishing microfinance programs through stable local businesses to allow secure passage of
49 economic resources to developing businesses;

50 (v) Increasing competition in local economies by fostering the creation of small businesses using
51 microloan programs that promote this alternative livelihood;

52 (vi) Further developing drug treatment and education programs to promote health awareness and
53 increased understanding of harmful effects of illicit drugs;

54 3. *Advises* ECOSOC to concentrate its efforts in regions most directly affected by existing cultivation of
55 illicit substances and violence, especially those whose existing infrastructure will be inhibitory to enacting the goals
56 of the committee but whose security is not compromised by outside forces;

57 4. *Calls upon* ECOSOC to review the progress and effectiveness of the program annually to ensure that
58 up-to-date and effective alternative development measures are being implemented.

59 **2.2 Draft Resolution I/2**

60 *Recognizing* the success of anti-trafficking efforts by pre-existing police forces such as INTERPOL, the Latin
61 American and Caribbean Community of Policy Intelligence (CLACIP), and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF),

62 *Aware* that most of the underlying issues regarding drug trafficking are often regionally specific,
63 *Recognizing* the importance of strengthening police and military forces across borders in order to improve
64 the global situation on drug trafficking,
65 *Acknowledging* that many localized efforts to combat drugs are largely ineffective, wherein the violation of
66 national sovereignty is a particular concern,
67 *Reaffirming* the need for standardized maritime laws across each region,
68 *Further reaffirming* the sentiments of the Global Container Program in enforcing anti-trafficking measures
69 along common maritime routes,
70 1. *Calls upon* Member States to cooperate in the form of regional bodies to increase law enforcement
71 intelligence sharing and cooperation of enforcement activities, by:
72 (a) Recommending that Member States set up a similar system of intelligence sharing and cooper-
73 ation of enforcement activities using existing police forces where applicable, such as CLACIP and INTERPOL, and
74 giving authority to the CMF as well;
75 (b) Where necessary, encouraging Member States to invite national governments or regional bodies
76 to offer leadership, equipment, and training such as;
77 (i) Providing resources and funding for regional law enforcement training on the most effective
78 anti-narcotics trafficking practices;
79 (ii) Encouraging the promotion of information sharing regarding training mechanics for law enforce-
80 ment personnel tasked with combating drug trafficking;
81 2. *Proposes* that regional bodies submit progress reports to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
82 every three months detailing the current state of drug trafficking in their region;
83 3. *Encourages* the creation of cooperative regional training centers as a part of these regional bodies where
84 law enforcement throughout the region can be sent to train and become more effective at combating drug trafficking
85 by:
86 (a) Recommending that these bodies be modeled after the Turkish International Academy Against
87 Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC) with emphasis on respecting human rights, a unique multinational cooperative
88 organization that currently receives funding from a variety of nations and trains military and police forces from around
89 the world on the most effective and up-to-date anti-trafficking practices;
90 (b) Suggesting that these bodies be designed so that they serve as regional cooperative centers in
91 anti-trafficking efforts, including the sharing of intelligence and methods to combat the illicit drug trade;
92 (c) Encouraging that the leaders of these bodies be chosen from states with experience and leadership
93 in combatting drug trafficking to ensure proper information sharing and communication;
94 4. *Suggests* that each regional body consider a set of maritime laws applicable to each specific region to
95 ensure that drug trafficking efforts extend into international waters;
96 5. *Recommends* regions to take initiative in the prosecution of those accused of drug trafficking in interna-
97 tional waters through the enforcement by regional law enforcement cooperation;
98 6. *Requests* that regions make their own prosecution agreements, or resort to a framework for prosecution,
99 detailed as:
100 (a) Recommends that regions take custody of drug traffickers found in international waters and use
101 the prosecuting abilities of the state of origin of the drug trafficker as a default method to effectively punish criminal
102 drug trafficking if no other regional agreement for extradition and prosecution exists.

103 **3 Consideration of the status**

104 **3.1 Deliberations Introduction**

105 At its 2015 meeting, the Commission of Narcotic Drugs (CND) deliberated upon the issue of drug
106 trafficking in the international community and would like to stress the importance of this issue. In session, the
107 committee's deliberation included but was not limited to:

108 - State sovereignty in relation to the control of drug trafficking.
109 - Exploration of money laundering as a consequence of the trafficking of narcotic drugs
110 - Use of regionalization and/or the scheduling of substances as strategies to limit narcotic drug
111 trafficking

112 - The consideration of drug trafficking from a business aspect, and the potential success to be found
113 in targeting the profit areas of narcotic drug trafficking organizations. In addition, the body discussed the implications
114 of cartel violence and malicious intent regarding the trafficking of narcotic drugs.

115 - Extensive discussion on the benefits and consequences on the consideration of decriminalization of
116 illicit drugs as a potential solution to the drug trafficking problem that the international community faces at this
117 time. The potential for legalization was also extensively discussed in this body. A majority of the body believes that
118 decriminalization and legalization should be considered a decision to be made by the nation itself, and cannot be
119 forced upon a nation.

120 - The consideration of security implications and the use of both internal and external security
121 resources as an outlet for the control of drug trafficking.

122 Global southern nations worked to reframe the perspective through which the council approached
123 topics discussed within the commission by bringing attention to the supply/demand aspects of capitalism as they
124 correlate to the supply/demand aspects of narcotic drug trafficking.

125 In order to further address this international issue of drug trafficking, this commission has decided
126 it best to divide into subcommittees to further discuss the issues most pertinent to each nation. The subcommittees
127 consist of security, social and demand issues, and supply.

128 The commission has agreed on the general need to discuss security implications for nations in order
129 to eradicate drug trafficking paying mind to social and demand aspects of solving this pressing issue, and addressing
130 the supply portion that has played a role in deliberations.

131 **3.2 Security**

132 **Security**

133 The security subcommittee focused largely on border control, as various nations have found success
134 in this area. Through educating police and military forces in strengthening border control, this would easily assist in
135 keeping drug exports from making their way into countries. Emphasis on a strong border control would not threaten
136 national sovereignty, as each nation is in control of how they regulate their borders. The implementation of a Global
137 Container System would be recommended in order to easily solve this issue.

138 This subcommittee has also placed substantial emphasis on maritime laws, and how to successfully
139 prosecute international drug crimes in international waters. A majority of the CND feels that the issue of drug
140 traffickers being prosecuted in international waters should fall under the prosecution of the region they are found,
141 and as a default, the country of origin that the drug trafficker is from. The committee has decided that regions
142 possess a strong understanding of how to correctly and appropriately tackle prosecution of drug traffickers. If this
143 fails, the country of origin may be responsible for prosecuting the individual. The same would apply to air territory.

144 Regional oversight was also discussed in this committee, regarding decriminalization and the legal-
145 ization of drugs such as marijuana. Various nations believe that certain drugs should be legalized, because it has
146 worked for their nations, while other nations are strongly against decriminalization due to the common belief that

147 decriminalization is not the most effective or efficient solution to the current issues in correlation to the trafficking
148 of narcotic drugs.

149 **3.3 Social and Demand Issues**

150 The Commission on Narcotic Drug's Subcommittee on Social Issues and Demand is deeply concerned
151 about the social damage, impact, and implications of the global illicit drug trade and trafficking. In particular, we
152 have identified four areas that need to be addressed: education, poverty, demand, and human rights. This committee
153 has found a lack of investment in relevant academia relating to the combating of drug trafficking. We are alarmed by
154 the lack of education in areas that frequently see drug trafficking. We are deeply disturbed with the lack of education
155 found in law enforcement with regards to combatting the illicit drug trade. Furthermore we are also deeply concerned
156 with the need to properly educate governments in trafficking zones with how to properly and humanely combat and
157 address the illicit drug trade. With regards to poverty, we are concerned about the concentration of the illicit drug
158 trade in agrarian and rural areas. The drug trade causes a destabilization of the economy in such areas by replacing
159 the staple crops of the region with illicit narcotics or their ingredients. The introduction or persistence of the drug
160 trade in poverty stricken areas frequently leads to violence as traffickers use their increasingly militarized arsenals
161 against rival traffickers or the civilian population. These trends limit the ability of the people in these situations
162 to live in an environment free of fear and also constrains their economic mobility. We find both of these to be
163 unacceptable. The demand for these drugs comes primarily from more developed countries and the drug culture in
164 these states ultimately needs to be addressed in order to ensure that the less developed countries supplying these
165 illicit substances can better their own domestic issues regarding illicit trade and trafficking. We are also increasingly
166 concerned with the violations of human rights that are found in the current enforcement of drug trafficking laws.
167 Several states violate bodily integrity through requiring those accused of being under the influence of illicit substances
168 to be subjected to invasive medical procedures such as having blood drawn. The committee stresses the importance
169 of respecting human rights in the attempt to stop illicit trafficking and trade. Furthermore, some states execute
170 or torture suspected or convicted traffickers. We strongly disagree with these deplorable actions. Enforcement of
171 anti-drug trafficking laws also see the disproportionate prosecution and conviction of minority populations. The
172 committee finds this to be especially disturbing as the disproportional mass incarceration of minority populations
173 has incredibly detrimental effects on the socio-economic situation of those groups.

174 The systemic value of the production of narcotic drug crops within civilian populations has been
175 recognized. By addressing issues of deeply ingrained economic systems, often decades old, the Economic and Social
176 Council can take steps inclusive to states in which individuals may engage in criminal activity or terrorist organiza-
177 tions rather than surrender perceived livelihood. Further, a view was expressed in which decriminalization and the
178 transition of illicit drug crops to legal alternatives was a highly divisive issue contested by issues of sovereignty and
179 culture.

180 **3.4 Supply**

181 Reducing the global supply of illicit substances will require coordinated action on behalf of the
182 international community. Existing efforts to curb the production and supply of illicit substances, including national
183 eradication and interdiction initiatives, have proven costly and ineffective. When alternative opportunities for off-
184 farm, wage rate labour are not created, eradication of illicit crops exacerbates poverty, diminishes human security
185 and increases the influence of criminal organizations. Therefore, eradication policies should only be pursued in areas
186 where basic human security has been achieved and reliable access to alternative crops and off-farm opportunities
187 established.

188 Sources of illicit substances introduced for sale on the global market are detailed as follows: Roughly
189 90% of non-pharmaceutical opiates entering the global market originate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's poppy fields
190 expanded 13% from 2012 to 2013, and globally, more acres are used today for opium production than at any point
191 since estimates first became available in 1998. Although large-scale eradication projects reduced coca cultivation
192 in Colombia (which lead global coca production throughout the 1990s) by 58% between 2000 and 2009, production
193 increased by 38% in Peru and more than doubled in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (+112%) during the same
194 time period.

195 Drug control authorities have attempted to disrupt illicit drug flows by eradicating the raw material
196 of illegal drugs through systematic means of manually or chemically destroying source plants. Targeting the crops

197 of international suppliers of illegal drugs, forced eradication is carried out by cutting and pulling, burning, spraying
198 manually or aerially, or by biological means. Cost benefit analyses of these eradication programs suggest gross
199 unsustainability and limited effectiveness.

200 A pertinent example is the U.S. eradication program in Colombia, employed from 1992 to 1998.
201 Studies revealed that during this period, it cost approximately \$4,661,452 USD to eradicate one hectare of coca.
202 In spite of eradicating between 33.5 and 52.8 percent of Colombia's coca fields in a few years, coca cultivation still
203 increased 250% from 1992 to 1998, suggesting that nearly a decade of funding was insufficient to achieve the stated
204 objectives. The findings of a similar study conducted in 1994 by the Rand Corporation concluded that eradication
205 was 23 times more expensive than drug treatment programs. Subsequent eradication programs in South America
206 have been discontinued.

207 Furthermore, evidence suggests that opium and coca production disrupted by eradication efforts
208 often resurfaces in neighboring regions. In Colombia, illicit farming operations easily emigrated through the
209 region's porous borders into Ecuador and Peru, threatening regional stability and frustrating efforts to locate and
210 destroy production areas. In many cases the new production areas are less accessible and more difficult to monitor
211 than those areas originally targeted by eradication efforts, contributing to program expense and increasing risks to
212 law enforcement personnel.

213 Interdiction efforts have proven incredibly costly and ineffective at curbing the influence of crimi-
214 nal/terrorist organizations. Past efforts have failed to significantly derail criminal supply networks, and demand for
215 illicit substances remains high. The ongoing drawdown of North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in South Cen-
216 tral Asia will further complicate national interdiction programs in that region. National and local law enforcement
217 agencies in the region do not currently possess the manpower, intelligence capabilities and communication networks
218 necessary to sustain large scale interdiction programs.

219 Supply reduction can only be achieved within a comprehensive framework for economic development
220 and human security. Illicit economies emerge in the absence of viable economic arrangements. An approach must be
221 developed which combats illicit crop production within a framework that acknowledges and addresses systemic causes
222 of poverty and deprivation. Frontline efforts must be made in cooperation with national law enforcement agencies
223 to mitigate the influence of criminal and/or terrorist organizations. In less developed regions, criminal organizations
224 force local populations to participate in illicit crop production through harassment and intimidation. Only when
225 basic security has been established can the foundations of licit economy activity take hold.

226 Supply-reduction strategy should include initiatives that improve access to credit through microfi-
227 nance programs, foster the growth of local business, and expand the availability of off-farm, wage rate opportunities.
228 In particular, many farmers are forced to resort to growing drugs because that is the only crop that they have access
229 to. Microfinance lending can allow farmers to purchase other crops, particularly foods native to that particular coun-
230 try, as many countries that are major producers of drugs also struggle with food security. In addition, since many of
231 the major drug-producing countries are relatively impoverished, microfinance could also encourage the livelihood of
232 small farmers, pulling them out of poverty through selling of surplus food crops.

233 **3.5 Actions Taken by the Commission**

234 The Commission on Narcotic Drugs decided as a body to divide the vast topic of international
235 drug trafficking into three comprehensive sub-committees. These sub-committees included: security, social/demand,
236 and supply. Each sub-committee was responsible for addressing the pressing issues of narcotic drug trafficking and
237 remaining within the decided purview of that sub-committee.

238 The voting record for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs is as follows:

239 Draft resolution I-1 was sponsored by Turkey, Poland, Peru. Before it was passed, the resolution
240 was amended by amendments A and B. The final resolution passed with a vote of 23 in favor, 11 in opposition, and
241 7 abstentions.

242 Draft resolution I-2 was sponsored by Peru, China, Turkey, Poland, Australia, and Mexico. Before
243 it was passed, there was a friendly amendment adopted into this resolution. The final resolution passed with a vote
244 of 29 in favor, 3 in opposition, and 8 abstentions.

245 **4 Adoption of the Report**

246 At its meeting on 24 November 2015, the draft report of the Commission was made available for
247 consideration by the body. The Commission considered the report, and with no amendments was adopted the report
248 by consensus. Two Member States abstained from consensus, Afghanistan and Indonesia.

Passed by consensus, with 2 abstentions