

American Model United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

### Report to the Economic and Social Council on The State of Governance in Africa: The Dimension of Illicit Financial Flows in Africa as a Governance Challenge

#### **Table of Contents**

Executive Summary	3
Matters calling for action by the Economic and Social Council	4
Draft resolutions for adoption by the Economic and Social Council	4
Draft resolution I/1	
Consideration of The State of Governance in Africa: The Dimension of Illicit Financial	
Flows as a Governance Challenge	7
Deliberations	7
Deliberations Subsection 1- Regional Cooperation	
Deliberations Subsection 2- Education	
Deliberations Subsection 3- Money Laundering.	8
Deliberations Subsection 4- Transfer Mis-Pricing and Multi-National Corporation	IS
	8
Deliberations Subsection 5- African Nation's Participation in International	
Institutions	9
Deliberations Subsection 6- Illegal Revenue Generated by Organized Crime	10
Deliberations Subsection 7- Data Collection	
Action taken by the Commission	10
Adoption of the Report	12

#### **Executive Summary**

1 The Economic Commission on Africa identified Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) as a major 2 inhibitor of development. In order to effectively manage the issue of illicit financial 3 flows, the Commission considered several avenues towards alleviating the stifling impact 4 of IFF by recognizing these following topics: regional cooperation, education, money 5 laundering, transfer mis-pricing and multinational corporations, African nations' in 6 participation in international financial institutions, illegal revenue generated by organized 7 crime, and data collection. 8 9 The Commission recognizes the importance of regional cooperation and discusses the 10 creation of a regional financial union. The Commission considers education as a possible way to tackle financial mismanagement and discusses possible educational programs. The 11 12 Commission discusses the problem of money laundering. The Economic Commission of 13 Africa is concerned with the lack of transparency in financial and governmental 14 institutions. 15 16 The Commission believes that multinational corporations and trade mis-pricing are major 17 contributors to the exacerbation of Illicit Financial Flows. To combat trade mis-pricing, 18 there was a proposed cooperation amongst African nations in establishing a price floor. 19 As another major contributor to lost revenue for African nations in unclear tax laws both 20 within Africa and abroad, the committee spoke of the need to emphasize clarity and 21 uniformity in tax laws. Significant time was spent discussing the need to ensure 22 Multinational Corporations adhere to international laws and are held accountable for their 23 actions. 24 25 The Commission emphasizes that previous legislation on organized crime has been 26 largely ineffective due to a lack of specificity and capacity of African nations to combat 27 organized crime. The Commission wishes for a more transparent and consistent means of

- 28 gathering data on illicit financial flows that does not infringe on national sovereignty.
- 29
- 30 After deliberating on these various topics, the Commission drafted and passed a
- 31 resolution which it solemnly believes will be effective in addressing the issue of illicit
- 32 financial flow. The resolution urged African Member States to ratify the United Nations
- 33 Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), as well as created an institutional framework
- 34 for global governance to coordinate cooperation between developed and developing
- 35 nations and increasing transparency and collection of data.

# Matters calling for action by the Economic and Social Council

### Draft resolutions for adoption by the Economic and Social Council

- 36 The Economic Commission for Africa recommends to the Economic and Social Council
- 37 (ECOSOC) the adoption of the following draft resolutions:

#### **Draft resolution I/1**

ECA/II/2-1

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION:The State of Governance in Africa: The Dimension<br/>of Illicit Financial Flows as a Governance Challenge

SUBMITTED TO:

The Economic Commission for

Africa

The Economic Commission for Africa,

38	Recalling its resolution 68/1 of 20 September 2013 and previous relevant
39	resolutions,
40	
41	Recognizing that without a stable governmental mechanism and adequate
42	assistance from Multinational Corporations (MNC) for the purpose of funneling
43	international private investment, funding fails to translate into public works,
44	
45	Emphasizing that the need for detailed regional programmatic guidelines on
46	relating to price transfers and taxation policies central to the future success and
47	implementation in developing countries on the African continent,
48	
49	Fully aware of the importance of detailed information concerning interstate trade
50	policy, the amount of revenue that can be feasibly reallocated for tax enforcement
51	measures and its financial context surrounding potential regional financial based
52	activities,
53	
54	<i>Recalling</i> the United Nations Model on Double Taxation between Developed and
55	Developing countries in which sustainable pricing benchmarks and MNC focus areas
56	were created to achieve gains in eliminating Western tax-havens,
57	
58	<i>Considering</i> that existing articles on double taxation established by the 2000
59	High-level panels on illicit financial trade are vague with regards to interstate pricing and
60	cooperation over areas relating to illicit financial transactions,
	DOC:337

61 62 *Noting* that countries differ significantly with regards to transparent economic 63 policy due to a host of intrastate factors, 64 65 1. Urges the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 66 (UNCAC) by all African States; 67 68 2. Endorses an institutional framework for global governance called the African 69 Coalition Against Illicit Financial Flows (ACAIFF), to work in collaboration with the 70 African Centre for Statistics, a subdivision of the Economic Commission for Africa, in 71 order to: 72 (a) Assist in implementation of the UNCAC in Member States; 73 (b) Coordinate transnational monitoring and data-collection regarding Illicit 74 Financial Flows (IFF) for Member States regarding relevant information to a particular 75 Member State: 76 (c) Coordinate cooperation between developed and developing States, as well as 77 with non-governmental international organizations, such as the International Monetary 78 Fund (IMF) and World Bank, over IFF; 79 (d) Assist in the establishment of appropriate and effective legal regimes against 80 IFF by providing tax and financial expertise including creating effective tax regimes to 81 halt the spread of IFF through monetary aid and information assistance; 82 (e) Provide a framework for returning assets lost through IFF or assets of 83 equivalent value to their rightful owner; 84 (f) Create an interstate price peg for the costs of goods to prevent exploitation of 85 member states; 86 (g) Require an annual transparency information report by each State in order to 87 receive benefits in a reciprocal manner under the newly formed economic cooperative 88 framework: 89 (h) Encourage good faith efforts toward providing information and reform 90 regarding IFF to continue to receive relevant benefits; 91 (i) Establish governmental transparency best-practices through cooperation 92 between international actors and Africa; 93 (i) Establish a five member leadership panel in the ACAIFF through a majority 94 vote by the body: 95 (k) Pressure offshore financial centers and tax havens to remove secrecy laws; 96 (1) Encourage a dialogue on the effective training and education of law 97 enforcement bodies dealing with illicit financial flows; 98 99 3. *Proposes* the implementation of the Financial Action Task Force on Money 100 Laundering's (FATF) recommendations by all Member States, with a special focus on: 101 (a) Independence of financial institutions; 102 (b) Confiscation and seizure rights of authorities; 103 (c) Reporting of financial transactions by NGOs; 104 (d) Secrecy laws and anonymous bank accounts; 105 (e) Wire transfers;

106	
107	4. Calls upon Member States to combat the problem of transfer mispricing with
108	the 'Arm's Length Principle' endorsed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
109	and Development (OECD) Transfer Pricing guidelines by implementing the methods
110	most suitable to their situation with technical assistance from the OECD, IMF and World
111	Bank:
112	(a) Establishing a cooperative price-signal floor for negotiation on the selling of
113	commodities in terms of exporting goods utilizing a fair market-based price;
114	
115	5. Further recommends for the purpose of greater transparency and understanding
116	with regard to transfer pricing:
117	(a) Timely audits of companies to obtain information on their activities;
118	(b) Signing Advance Pricing Agreements that specify appropriate Transfer Pricing
119	methodology;
120	
121	6. Requests the United Nations Model on Double Taxation Policy clarify language
122	present in Article Two relating to taxation enforcement so as to conform with interstate
123	agreements that are crafted during African Union (AU) based negotiations;
124	
125	7. Encourages the incorporation of anti-corruption lessons within African States'
126	national education programs, as well as collaboration with NGOs to accomplish these
127	goals;
128	
129	8. Further recommends the integration of appropriate record keeping and
130	accounting practices into the existing curriculum of national education programs;
131	
132	9. Suggests technical training of personnel working in financial institutions, with
133	expertise from organizations like the World Bank and IMF, in order to track illicit
134	financial flows.
	Passed, Yes: 25 / No: 3 / Abstain: 6

#### Consideration of The State of Governance in Africa: The Dimension of Illicit Financial Flows as a Governance Challenge

- 135 At its 2014 session, the Commission considered agenda item II, The State of Governance
- 136 in Africa: The Dimension of Illicit Financial Flows as Governance Challenge.

#### Deliberations

- 138 At its meeting on November 23, 2014, the Commission deliberated on the topic of Illicit
- 139 Financial Flows in Africa in order to solve the major economic and social issues caused
- 140 by this issue. To do this, we discussed:

#### **Deliberations Subsection 1- Regional Cooperation**

- 141 In general terms, the body as a whole agreed that regional financial cooperation is crucial
- to solving the issue of illicit financial flows in the continent. The most widely accepted
- 143 method of regional cooperation that the Commission discussed was the creation of a
- 144 regional financial union. This union would seek to increase the continental leverage that
- 145 Africa has when dealing with international financial institutions, and especially when
- 146 agreeing to the prices of commodities with MNCs. The particularities of a union of this
- 147 sort were enshrined in Draft Resolution 2.1. As the 2013 ECA Report suggested, the
- 148 Commission also stressed transparency and availability of data on money being
- 149 exchanged between national borders, which can be improved with increased cooperation
- among African Member States. Members of the Commission also emphasized that there
- 151 is no punishment or punitive measures for retreating from participation.

#### **Deliberations Subsection 2- Education**

- 152 At the end of the first session, the commission began considering the idea of utilizing
- education to tackle the issue of financial mismanagement. Some of the proposals
- 154 included enhancing technological literacy among citizens of the AU, and advising
- 155 members of the financial sector within AU Member States and younger AU citizens on
- 156 ethical financial practices. Certain representatives suggested that any education program
- 157 ought to include topics such as record keeping, accounting, and observing customer due
- 158 diligence. The representatives specified that the United Nations should be the body that
- 159 ultimately recommends who administers the education program on the ground. In
- addition, those representatives recommended that both non-governmental and
- 161 governmental financial advisers be included as part of the education program.
- 162
- 163 At the beginning, representatives shared concerns over who would benefit from these
- 164 education programs first. Representatives supported the notion that a basic technology
- 165 education program be created that functions on a tier system reflecting the knowledge,
- 166 skills, and expertise of prospective participants. Some representatives expressed interest DOC:337

in establishing a separate program that educates officials who will administer the
 transnational monitoring and data collection initiative under the African Coalition Against

169 Illicit Financial Flows (ACAIFF), as highlighted in a United Nations report, entitled,

170 "Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: track it, stop it, get it."The Representatives

171 suggested that this program be created by the United Nations Commission on Science

and Technology for Development and be administered per individual state approval.

173

174 At first, Members of the Commission decided that it would be appropriate to include

175 language regarding educating young people on anti-corruption tactics. As deliberations

176 continued, it was determined that the best way to educate young people on anti-

177 corruption would be through implementing a comprehensive ethics programs. The

178 purposes of the program, as suggested by several representatives, would be to implement

the practices and values set forth in the advisory description under the United Nations

180 Public Administration Programme, Division for Public Administration and Development

181 Management (DPADM). Representatives highlighted a few of the program's important

182 points, including one section which stipulates the creation of an "ethics infrastructure that

183 not only provides guidance for good conduct, but also administratively and legally

184 punishes misconduct." DPADM also explains that the "ethics infrastructure" includes

185 "measures to enhance and preserve organizational integrity, access to information that

186 promotes transparency and accountability, and oversight by independent institutions and

187 the public at large."

#### **Deliberations Subsection 3- Money Laundering**

189 The Commission discussed the issue of money laundering early on its deliberations.

190 Representatives expressed concern over lack of transparency in financial and

191 governmental institutions. By improving transparency measures through the submission

192 of financial transaction information to the African Statistics Board, the Commission is

193 trying to address issues related to improper governmental purchases. In the 2011 ECA

194 Report on financial transactions and purchasing, the issue of money laundering was

addressed, specifically discussing the laundering of money for the purchase of oil. By

196 providing a legal avenue of selling and purchasing various commodities, the Commission

197 wishes to show an alternative path for African countries wishing to turn a profit.

### Deliberations Subsection 4- Transfer Mis-Pricing and Multi National Corporations

200 Currently, countries are undervaluing their goods when selling on the open market to 201 MNCs, as there is no universal standard amongst the countries. This unfair price

signaling can be corrected, and the commission has discussed remedying this problem by

adopting a cooperative economic framework among African nations, as suggested in the
 2001 High Panel on Economic Cooperation. This framework, through the enabling of

- 205 information sharing, would give collective bargaining power over commodity pricing to
- 206 African governments rather than the corporations exploiting the continent--as suggested
- 207 in the 2012 Internal Tax Dialogue Conference.
- 208

- 209 Rather than imposing new restrictions on corporations which seek to develop African
- 210 countries, this helps governments negotiate trade terms in good faith. Taxation has also
- 211 been a problem plaguing many countries in Africa. The United Nations Model for Double
- 212 Taxation between Developed and Developing Countries includes numerous instances of
- 213 vague language. The Commission has worked to fix this imprecision by allowing
- 214 countries to discuss differences in state tax code. Reducing opacity relating to
- information on taxable goods is a way in which complications on double taxation can be resolved.
- 210
- 218 Representatives expressed concern over exploitation of Africa by Western-based MNCs.
- 219 As outlined in the article "Extractive Sectors and illicit financial flows: What role for
- 220 revenue governance initiatives?", these MNCs need to be responsible for their actions.
- 221 They must be held to the same standard of taxation and regulation as in the West. Only
- 222 when Africa achieves economic sovereignty and is empowered to control its abundant
- 223 resources can we curtail the illicit financial flows stemming from MNCs.

## Deliberations Subsection 5- African Nation's Participation in International Institutions

226 Early on, several delegates introduced the topic of Africa's participation in international

- 227 financial institutions, and its potential to solving the issue of illicit financial flows.
- 228 Generating a lot of controversy, the proposal resulted in a lengthy debate. In particular,
- some of the questions posed on the topic included how realistic increased participation
- would be, and how the number of seats given to Africa would be determined (especially,
- as was noted by the Commission, given the weighted voting systems of some
- 232 institutions). As well, the Commission discussed the ways in which such increased
- 233 participation would be useful in tackling the issue of IFFs, as well as which institutions
- would be subject to this change in representation. Among the proposals for the latter were
- the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with the rationales being that their
- immense influence across the world would help African economic development, as
- suggested in the report about 2000 high level panel on the establishment on the African
- 238 Cooperative Framework presented by ECOSOC. Moreover, the Commission discussed
- the alternative possibility of involving regional financial institutions in achieving the
- same goal. However, in later debate, the Commission came to the conclusion that this would be too difficult of an issue to approach at the moment, and considered other
- 242 possibilities.

### Deliberations Subsection 6- Illegal Revenue Generated by Organized Crime

245 While the delegates agree with the identification of key issues concerning corruption in

- regards to money laundering and organized crime, they condemn the failure of Resolution 54/128 in an formula the many set of the set of the
- 247 54/128 in enforcing its proposed solutions. The delegates implore the Economic and
- 248 Social Council to form a resolution that effectively enforces the proposed solutions. The
- delegates also expressed the lack of legislature and capacity to effectively deal with illicit
- 250 financial flows resulting from organized crime, as noted by Ambassador Segun Apata of

- 251 Nigeria from the High Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa in his interview with
- 252 Africa Renewal. Representatives have agreed that transnational crime is a major
- 253 contributor to illicit financial flows and inhibition of regional development, however
- there is no unanimity on methods to handle transnational crime. Somalia has suggested
- 255 the creation of an African Criminal Police Organization (AFROPOL), which is an
- 256 intelligence agency/communication network that ensures a steady stream of information
- 257 regarding Transnational Criminal Organization. Somalia stresses that the organization is
- 258 primarily an intelligence agency that is restricted from making arrests and prohibited.
- 259 Other delegations, such as Chad, have stressed that if such an agency comes to fruition, it
- should not become a regional police force given the numerous conflicts that have arisen
- 261 on the African continent from regional differences and conflicting jurisdictions.

#### 262 **Deliberations Subsection 7- Data Collection**

- 263 Representatives expressed concern over a lack of cohesive data collection capabilities.
- 264 There are not sufficient means to hold companies and businesses responsible without
- 265 infringing on state sovereignty or de-incentivizing investment in Africa. General concerns
- 266 in the body were the absence of transparency and uncertainty over how resources are
- 267 distributed. Representatives also expressed concern over whether a non-governmental
- 268 organization or a national government would provide the monetary resources to develop
- the appropriate technological infrastructure to ensure equitable data collection and
- 270 distribution. Representatives indicated that cooperation with NGOs that already engage in
- 271 data collection would circumvent the concerns regarding funding and technical expertise.
- 272 Therefore, the commission decided to adopt a provision within the resolution that
- essentially legitimized the aforementioned recommendation.

#### Action taken by the Commission

- At its meeting on November 23, 2014, the Commission approved for recommendation for
- adoption by the Encouragement of a mutually cooperative agreement on the
- establishment of price floors and the sharing of stable tax policy.
- 277
- 278 Dissenting Opinion Chad:
- 279 Operative clause 2, subsection (f), calls for an interstate price peg for commodities.
- 280 Without direct control of pricing we lose an important tool in protecting and growing
- 281 infant industries in our country. Infant industries can rarely be competitive without
- 282 protections. One method to combat this is price controls. Without the capacity to control
- 283 pricing, many infant industries will not grow in Chad, which may lead to further reliance
- on MNCs, potentially exacerbating Chad's IFF problems. While regionally this will
- 285 likely benefit the continent, it may come at the cost of developing industries in Chad.
- 286
- 287 Dissenting Opinion Zambia:
- 288 They undermined the impact of the O.C. activity and how it's 35% of the main issue area.
- Looks like it has been rephrased from our session in 2013. They brought in education
- 290 programs that targeted youth that had nothing to do with the overall objectives of
- 291 combating corruption and organized crime.

292

- 293 Dissenting Opinion- Ethiopia:
- 294 The delegation of Ethiopia opposed the resolution on the grounds that the delegation of
- 295 Mali was disingenuous in the preparation of Resolution 2.1, and used previously prepared
- working papers that copied and paraphrased United Nations Resolution (68/1) of
- 297 September 2013 as a political strategy, as well as similar methods with regards to Topic 1.
- 298 As such, the Ethiopian delegation vote against the resolution

299

- 300 Abstained Opinion- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- 301 The delegation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo did not see any additional
- 302 details or edits made to clarify the sections of the resolution.

#### Adoption of the Report

303 The Economic Commission for Africa adopted this report by consensus with no

304 abstentions.