



American Model United Nations

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

Report to the The General Assembly on Nuclear Energy and the Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle

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47 **Executive Summary**

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49 This complex issue requires our cautious consideration to ensure all of the associated
50 technical, legal, economic, and political aspects are thoroughly addressed and taken into
51 account before any decisions are made. As a body we encourage any future decision in
52 this regard be taken by consensus, taking into account the views and concerns of all
53 Member States.

54

55 Following the impact of the global energy crisis throughout the world, this body
56 recognizes nuclear power as an emerging primary energy resource. Because some claim
57 that the rising demand for nuclear energy could also bring a proliferation risk any
58 proposal should not hinder any states' ability to develop all aspects of nuclear science and
59 technologies for peaceful purposes.

60

61 Recommendations to create an international fuel bank and database overseeing all
62 nuclear-related transactions in an effort to guarantee a nuclear energy supply to all
63 Member States were made. The Body also discussed the criterion that governs the choice
64 of permanent members must be reevaluated to more accurately represent the needs and
65 interests of developing states. Discussions included but were not limited to the pursuit of
66 equality and fairness, that there should be an increase in the number of permanent
67 members.

68

69 The issue of safe transportation of radioactive material was also considered. The IAEA
70 has maintained a good record of civilian safety in the past and we thus believe these
71 standards must continue to be endorsed. Furthermore, in order to ensure the maintenance
72 of these safety standards, the creation of a transportation system under IAEA control and
73 financing was proposed as a discussion topic.

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93 **Chapter I**

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95 **A. Draft resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly**

96

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

97 *Affirming* the right of all states under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
98 to possess nuclear technology for peaceful energy and scientific purposes,

99

100 *Noting* the inherent instability associated with the present state of the global nuclear fuel
101 cycle,

102

103 *Further Noting* the disproportionate distribution of nuclear fissile material for the
104 purposes of fuel for peaceful nuclear energy as well as expertise in the application of
105 peaceful nuclear technology,

106

107 *Reaffirming* the Universal Extraction Process (UNEX), as a safer and cheaper method of
108 reprocessing nuclear waste,

109

110 *Recognizing* the increased need for the furthering of regulation concerning the storage of
111 spent nuclear fuel to increase regional and global security and environmental
112 accountability,

113

114 *Concerned* by states unable to obtain peaceful nuclear technology due to lack of fair and
115 equitable access to nuclear fuel,

116

117 *Further concerned* that Member States possessing peaceful nuclear technology oppose
118 other Member States pursuing their legal right to obtain peaceful nuclear technology as
119 guaranteed in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

121 *1. Urges Member States who have not done so, to adopt and ratify the Nuclear Non-*
122 *Proliferation Treaty;*

123

124 *2. Directs Member States to continue the peaceful acquisition of nuclear fuel, technology*
125 *and expertise in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under the*
126 *supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency;*

127

128 *3. Applauds the purpose behind the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to*
129 *monitor states utilizing nuclear technology;*

130

131 *4. Encourages advanced nuclear member states to invest in Member States pursuing*
132 *nuclear technology for the establishment of local environmentally sustainable nuclear*
133 *power regimes for the safe disposal of nuclear waste;*

134

135 *5. Establishes an ad-hoc subcommittee within the IAEA to discuss and establish a safe,*
136 *fair, and equitable method for the secure and environmentally accountable containment*

137 *of nuclear waste either between or within states that does not exploit the wealth gap*
138 *between developed and developing member states;*
139
140 *6. Calls for a summit to be held concerning the most appropriate method for fair and*
141 *equitable storage and distribution of spent nuclear fuels known as the “back end” of the*
142 *nuclear fuel cycle;*
143
144 *7. Designates the International Atomic Energy Agency to establish criteria for access to*
145 *nuclear technology fuel, and expertise for peaceful purposes including but not limited to:*
146 *(a.) The freedom from political stipulations for states subject to the Nuclear Non-*
147 *Proliferation Treaty;*
148 *(b.) The sale at fair market prices equitable to all member states subject to the Nuclear*
149 *Non-Proliferation Treaty;*
150 *(c.) The freedom to determine the source of nuclear fuel, technology and expertise and*
151 *how said resources will be obtained;*

Passed, Yes: 34 / No: 19 / Abstain: 11

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

152 *Recognizing* the continued globalization of the international political community
153 has caused a shift towards the continued sharing of information, technology, and other
154 aspects of fuel processing,
155

156 *Believing* the multilateral aspects of the fuel process have become mutually
157 beneficial to all sovereign states involved,
158

159 *Accepting* that the continued globalization of nuclear technology requires
160 increased cooperation between states for secure transport and storage of nuclear waste,
161

162 *Understanding* the importance of continued multilateral cooperation until self-
163 sustainability is a more feasible option, which is the overall goal of the IAEA and the
164 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
165

166 *Convinced* that education is key to the implementation of any multilateral
167 endeavor,
168

169 *Applauding* the efforts and findings of the “Expert Group Report on the
170 Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,”
171

172 *Observing* the potential risks that nuclear waste storage could place on the
173 infrastructure and environment of underdeveloped and developing states,
174

175 *Recognizing* that spent uranium can be reprocessed into a usable nuclear fuel,
176

177 *Further recognizing* that the reprocessed nuclear fuel can be enriched into

178 weapons grade uranium,

179

180 1. *Recommends* the appropriate implementation of the recommendations of the
181 “Expert Group Report on the Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle;”

182

183 2. *Calls upon* states with nuclear capabilities to implement measures to reduce
184 proliferation at the back end of the fuel cycle through means that include but are
185 not limited to:

186 (a) Using fissionable materials such as thorium, which is much more abundant and
187 efficient and that present less of a proliferation risk in the nuclear fuel cycle;

188 (b) Encouraging the growth of sustainable energy technologies such as wind and
189 solar power recognizing the limited amount of fissionable material globally
190 available;

191

192 3. *Invites* voluntary conversion of national reprocessing facilities into
193 multinational facilities through the brokering of an international consortium under IAEA
194 auspices;

195

196 4. *Requests* the Security Council and the IAEA make recommendation regarding
197 the security of the above;

198

199 5. *Endorses* the coordination of safe and relevant transfer of waste storage
200 technology with respect to relevant recommendations of the International Project on
201 Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO);

202

203 6. *Affirms* that safe storage of nuclear waste should be the responsibility of
204 individual states and that relevant UN organizations such as the United Nations
205 Environmental Program (UNEP) continue to provide appropriate data to assure the safety
206 of storage;

207

208 7. *Expresses* its hope that an international exchange of ideas and proper techniques
209 in regards to nuclear reprocessing as well as the transportation thereof will occur;

210

211 8. *Welcomes* training programs that emphasize the necessity of proper storage of
212 nuclear fuel and waste, taking into account the level of waste in each individual case.

Passed, Yes: 36 / No: 22 / Abstain: 19

213 **B. Other recommendations to the General Assembly**

214

215 This complex issue requires our cautious consideration to ensure all of the associated
216 technical, legal, economic, and political aspects are thoroughly addressed and taken into
217 account before any decisions are made. Any future decision in this regard has to be taken
218 by consensus, taking into account the views and concerns of all Member States.

219 The environment must be considered when dealing with the issues of nuclear energy. The
220 environment will be directly affected by the location of the nuclear material.

221 This body recognizes that not all countries have natural supplies of Uranium and other
222 nuclear materials; the nuclear materials would have to be procured from the countries that
223 have them available. We must insist, however, that national sovereignty be protected at
224 all costs. Countries that supply the nuclear materials are just as important as the countries
225 that process, transport, and store the nuclear materials.
226

227 We recommend creating an international fuel bank and database overseeing all nuclear-
228 related transactions in an effort to guarantee a nuclear energy supply to all Member States.
229 The body recognizes storage of such a large amount of material containing a propensity
230 for great profit as well as destructive ability could potentially make the storage site a
231 target for hostile action of many varying degrees. The body recommends steps be taken to
232 address this concern. In order to ensure the maintenance of these safety standards, we
233 recommend the creation of a transportation system. In order to ensure that there is no
234 inflation of prices by states who provide uranium that goes beyond the actual demand, we
235 suggest some measure for ensuring the free trade of uranium.
236

237 **Chapter II**

238

239 **A. Deliberations**

240

241 Following the impact of the global energy crisis throughout the world nuclear power is
242 emerging as one of the primary energy resources. Because some claim that the rising
243 demand for nuclear energy could also bring a proliferation risk any proposal should not
244 hinder any states' ability to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technologies for
245 peaceful purposes. This body feels that this complex issue requires our cautious
246 consideration to ensure all of the associated technical, legal, economic, and political
247 aspects are thoroughly addressed and taken into account before any decisions are made.
248 Any future decision in this regard has to be taken by consensus, taking into account the
249 views and concerns of all Member States.
250

251 This Body wishes to point out the initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2007 that
252 would create the Uranium Enrichment Consortium (UEC), which was an effort by Middle
253 Eastern countries to create neutral nuclear facilities in a neutral state. In this case, the
254 state was the Russian Federation. This will guarantee that all members of the UEC can
255 get access to nuclear fuel, but not the enrichment technology that could be used to create
256 nuclear weapons. We recommend the IAEA should promote the idea because it will
257 create regional consensus and mitigate the risks that come from nuclear energy.

258 This body would also like to add that these optional regional organizations would support
259 transparency and further development in less developed/interested states. For these
260 reasons many states would be more inclined to join in the regional organizations. These
261 organizations would report to the IAEA.
262

263 With the interests of general concerns of developing states in mind when it comes to
264 nuclear power there is concern in regards to waste disposal within developing states who
265 simply have no funds to construct a site within which to store the refuse. Our second
266 point is that we believe that we, being a third world state, will receive no support from the

267 international community to fund research for nuclear power. This body is concerned that
268 with the increase in atomic energy research that the developing states will be greatly
269 affected on the back end of the cycle.

270
271 This body has long supported the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a result of
272 that commitment to the NPT, the IAEA strongly emphasizes clauses two and three of
273 article three which call upon states with well developed nuclear facilities not to provide
274 nuclear material to states that show contempt for international law and treaties such as the
275 NPT. IAEA strongly discourages the use of nuclear energy to create weapons.
276 Furthermore, the IAEA strongly emphasizes the protection of existent enriched uranium
277 and other radioactive materials so that those materials cannot be used for the creation of
278 further nuclear weapons. the IAEA also stresses that nuclear waste be placed in secure
279 locations where said material cannot cause harm to the environment, animal life, and
280 humanity.

281
282 The body is in support of the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project. This project
283 would give the IAEA authority over a special territory in which it would exercise
284 sovereign responsibilities, in particular, in the areas of export control and nuclear
285 regulatory oversight. Within this territory a group of interested Member States and private
286 companies could construct and commercially operate a uranium enrichment plant. The
287 plant would operate on the market as an additional supplier of enriched uranium.
288 However, it would not fall under the control of an individual state and would thus not be
289 subject to outside political influence. In addition, it would be an optional project, and
290 would seek to broaden the availability of nuclear energy to Member States.

291
292 India and Nicaragua remain skeptical that a regional fuel bank is an effective method to
293 ensure that all states have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Adding
294 non-national bureaucratic oversight to the process of exchange of nuclear technology will
295 only hinder the flow of nuclear material and deprive developing states of nuclear
296 technology that they desperately need for research and energy. Furthermore the creation of
297 regional fuel banks will further aggravate regional tensions, not lessen them. Controversy
298 over how these fuel banks will be run could become a flash point in already stressed
299 regions. Instead of an international database India and Nicaragua instead strongly
300 encourage all states to create their own thorough import-export monitoring system for the
301 purpose of overseeing the exchange of nuclear material and nuclear technology. Do to the
302 importance and controversy revolving around nuclear technology India fears that fuel
303 banks will act as a hindrance towards allowing developing states' access to nuclear
304 energy.

305
306 Kazakhstan, currently the world's largest producer of uranium, has proposed to the IAEA
307 that a second be built within Kazakhstan itself. This has enormous potential not only for
308 Kazakhstan, but for all members of the IAEA, which would have access to this large
309 supply of fuel.

310
311 The African block is deeply concerned with the under representation of developing states
312 in the IAEA. Furthermore, they are deeply distressed by the current state of affairs in the

313 Board of Governors. We believe that the criterion that governs the choice of permanent
314 members must be reevaluated to more accurately represent the needs and interests of
315 developing States. We also believe that in the pursuit of equality and fairness, that there
316 should be an increase in the number of permanent members.

317
318 This body believes that the German Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) is
319 the most practical, tentative step toward placing an existing national enrichment facility
320 in a nuclear weapon state under some form of multilateral control. We recommend the
321 MESP be taken under consideration by the General Assembly so that a future multilateral
322 fuel cycle facility can be created in an international territory under IAEA jurisdiction. We
323 recommend an already established facility would be better to fulfill this purpose. The
324 IAEA will be in charge of controlling the materials whereas the state formerly in control
325 of the territory will cede to the administration and certain sovereign rights of that area to
326 the IAEA.

327
328 The body favors the fostering of economic relations between states in the trade of nuclear
329 materials. It is the position of Azerbaijan that such an economic system would favor
330 development of traditionally poorer parts of the world, preserve state sovereignty as well
331 as the right of any States to pursue a peaceful nuclear program and allow for increased
332 transparency.

333
334 This economic system involves transactions between states, for the transfer of nuclear
335 material, to be done on an open market system. Transactions would take place between
336 national banks of states thereby allowing the cataloging of transaction data between states
337 concerning the trade of nuclear materials. By compounding this data, and comparing it
338 with IAEA inspection data, we can ensure that any traded nuclear material is not being
339 diverted, while allowing for economic relations between states to prosper.

340
341 The issue of safe transportation of radioactive material is an important one to consider.
342 The IAEA has maintained a good record of civilian safety in the past and we thus believe
343 these standards must continue to be endorsed. As the facilities will be under IAEA
344 control, these regulations will be maintained, but we do acknowledge the concerns of
345 smaller states. We encourage improving communication to increase security, using
346 innovative ways to implement new technologies, and general cooperation between all
347 parties involved.

348
349 This body suggests that fuel banks would provide secure transportation to different areas
350 of the international community. These would include Southeast Asia, Middle East/Africa,
351 the Americas, and Eurasia. The storage site, preferably underground for security purposes,
352 will be developed in order to facilitate a means of transfer, testing, and long term storage
353 for nuclear fuel materials.

354
355 Luxembourg disagrees with the use of multiple fuel banks. Instead, Luxembourg
356 expresses the need for multiple transport sites. However, there should only be one fuel
357 bank, administered by the IAEA, for storage of enriched uranium and nuclear wastes. The
358 transport sites serve as checking centers to ensure that traded enriched uranium is not

359 enriched above 20%, and that the uranium will be reported for being traded between
360 states. The fuel bank, in contrast, will serve as a pure storage facility.

361
362 Iran would like to ensure that all states have the right to the development of nuclear
363 weapons as a prerogative that has to be pursued to the fullest extent. Iran completely
364 rejects the notion that some states pursuing the development of nuclear technology should
365 be hindered or subject to the inspection of other states. Iran respects every states'
366 sovereignty in all aspects of energy development in relation to unhindered development
367 of nuclear technology.

368
369 This body recognizes that there is no ideal method for permanent disposal of nuclear
370 material. We suggest that the goals dealing with waste split into two categories, short
371 term and long-term goals. In the short term we propose that the back end products be
372 stored in secured underground locations; this will prevent exposure above the radiation
373 levels deemed acceptable under current IAEA standards. Our long –term goals include
374 continued research on reprocessing and reintroducing nuclear material into the fuel cycle.
375 This body is completely supportive of research and implementation of new technology
376 that will create a more ideal solution for nuclear waste.

377
378 The environment must be considered when dealing with the issues of nuclear energy. The
379 environment will be directly affected by the location of stored nuclear materials. A lack of
380 diligence regarding the environmental aspects could be devastating for the ecosystem,
381 water and food supplies, along with other areas; the effect of radiation is not new to the
382 international community. Therefore, the IAEA must insist that every measure be taken to
383 secure the safety of the environment, and also ensure proper disposal of nuclear waste.

384
385 The Czech Republic and Luxembourg believe that resolution IAEA/II/5 should be
386 reevaluated with greater scrutiny. We believe “Non Aligned Movement and other states”
387 infers that the IAEA is endorsing NAM over another Member States. The addition of
388 “other states” makes any changes irrelevant in our opinion. Because of the inclusive
389 nature of the language used, any changes that are intended to alter the representation
390 structure would in fact affect the body as a whole.

391
392 **B. Recommendations for action by the IAEA**

393
394 The IAEA has an important role to play in assisting all Member States to safely and
395 effectively pursue nuclear energy programs. This report would like to see an increased
396 effort by the organization to support these programs as well as to encourage the peaceful
397 development of nuclear energy through the Technical Cooperation Program (TCP). As
398 more states seek to include nuclear energy as a component of a sustainable means of
399 domestic energy production the imperative for such cooperative efforts will only continue
400 to grow. As such the need has arisen for this program to receive increased attention in the
401 IAEA budget characterized by both a marked increase in available resources and a shift in
402 priority from contributions on a voluntary basis to permanent and mandatory inclusion in
403 the IAEA budget process. States with advanced capabilities should endeavor to work
404 with states developing nuclear programs to lend their information and expertise through

405 forms of direct consultation and technical exchanges. These measures will work to
406 promote safety and security among burgeoning nuclear powers. Such cooperation will
407 also promote trust and good faith between developed nuclear powers and their emerging
408 nuclear states. This is not meant to inhibit states' rights to individual development of
409 nuclear technology. States looking for financial and/or educational assistance may still
410 seek help from the IAEA. However, we encourage states to pursue regional cooperatives.

411
412 Additionally, these centers will work to ensure that beneficiaries have developed
413 sufficient capability and infrastructure to handle nuclear material. These facilities will
414 work under the supervision of the IAEA. Member States who receive the benefit of such
415 facilities will be asked voluntarily accept full compliance of the IAEA safeguards and the
416 additional protocols as a condition of their inclusion in regional cooperative initiatives.
417 The operation and management of facilities will be divided among each of the beneficiary
418 states. Assurances of supply will be maintained for all states regardless of individual
419 political disputes. In addition, this report looks to establish a central international fuel
420 storage bank for raw uranium to be supervised by the IAEA. States rich in uranium will
421 be able to sell raw materials to this bank, and regions lacking natural resources will be
422 able to purchase raw uranium from this bank, to be enriched in their own regional center.
423 A goal of this system is to decrease the amount of transportation between Member States.
424 IAEA regulation of this proposed bank is necessary to prevent the monopolization of
425 uranium trade. Possible storage methods for spent nuclear material will include
426 incineration of low-level radioactive waste, dry cask storage for moderate-level
427 radioactive waste, both of which Sweden has already implemented. Research of
428 reprocessing methods will be a priority, and the controversial topic of deep geological
429 storage of high-level radioactive waste will be open to examination by the Board of
430 Governors, in light of further research. The purpose of these centers is stressed in
431 cooperation. It is the goal of this report to have three different facilities in each region:
432 one to enrich resources, one to handle waste, and one resource storage base.

433
434 This body suggests provide a framework for the safe transportation of enriched uranium
435 and spent nuclear materials between Member States. It is necessary that Member States
436 meet the requirements stated in this framework in order to participate in regional trade. In
437 addition, the body recommends IAEA provide financial assistance to Member States.

438
439 In the interest of maintaining international peace and security, we suggest that a criterion
440 be established for the construction of regional facilities in states that have exhibited and
441 enduring political stability and which are in good standing among countries within the
442 specific region to be considered by the international community at large. Knowing that
443 not all Member States possess sufficient capabilities to handle these dangerous substances
444 due attention must be given to ensuring that all participants in regional centers,
445 particularly the host state of such a center meets minimum standards of domestic stability
446 and security. Areas of concern include those states which are experiencing large scale
447 internal conflict or recent human rights transgressions that are considered particularly
448 egregious.

449
450 An important question lies in how these regional centers are to be effective in

451 accomplishing the goals stated above. It is this report's opinion that the Board of
452 Governors should ultimately decide the location of these regional centers. This report
453 seeks to accomplish this end goal by certain processes, the first is an IAEA commission to
454 determine suitable geopolitical boundaries to define a jurisdiction of a regional center.
455 These regions, determined by said commission, would then propose a voluntary host state
456 within each region for a location of several regional centers, subject to the approval of the
457 Board of Governors. Secondly, each State seeking nuclear energy has the right to do so
458 and will also apply to the discretion of the Board of Governors for candidacy to develop a
459 plant to produce electricity. This measure is intended to begin the process of IAEA
460 involvement with future states utilizing nuclear energy. States will work with the
461 voluntary centers to transport resources from center to plant and back again, and to and
462 from the appropriate centers. While these facilities are being established, this report
463 advocates that IAEA officials are present to guide the voluntary host states of these
464 centers.

465
466 The IAEA would like to restate the finding of the Report of the Expert Group:
467 "Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" commissioned by the IAEA in 2005.
468 These approaches will address front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, fuel
469 reprocessing, disposal and storage of spent fuel and combinations thereof. To summarize
470 there were five key points this Expert Group was able to reach a consensus on from 26
471 Member States they include: Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a
472 case-by-case basis through long-term contracts and transparent supplier's arrangements
473 with government backing. Examples include fuel leasing, fuel take-back offers, etc.
474 Creating additional international fuel bank and database overseeing all nuclear-related
475 transactions in an effort to guarantee nuclear energy supply to all Member States. This is
476 to be administered by the IAEA which will guarantee confidentiality of any state specific
477 information from other Member States. Promoting conversion of existing facilities to
478 multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA) and pursuing them as confidence-building
479 measures, with the participation of all Member States, NPT or otherwise Creating MNAs
480 for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-fuel reprocessing,
481 disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof) like integrated nuclear
482 power parks. Stronger multilateral arrangements by region or continent as opposed to an
483 individual state basis.

484
485 Furthermore, in order to ensure the maintenance of these safety standards, we propose the
486 creation of a transportation system under IAEA control and financing. This system would
487 both ensure safety protocols and allow the participation of states who would otherwise be
488 excluded due to the inability to afford transportation.

Chapter III

Resolutions passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

489 *Affirming* a commitment to proper, peaceful nuclear energy proliferation and the
490 goals of the IAEA,

491

492 *Endorsing* the partnership between the IAEA and the Non Aligned Movement in
493 regards to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, peaceful nuclear energy
494 applications, and sustainable economic development globally,

495

496 *Bearing in mind* an increased possibility of nuclear energy proliferation stemming
497 from renewed interest in peaceful nuclear energy by states,

498

499 *Recalling* that the IAEA's safeguards system is vital to peaceful nuclear energy
500 proliferation as it is the only internationally recognized instrument capable of determining
501 the nature of a state's nuclear program and the possible diversion of nuclear material,
502 declared and undeclared,

503

504 *Emphasizing* the importance of proper nuclear energy development for states
505 regarding sustainable economic development and meeting the standards required in the
506 Millennium Development Goals,

507

508 *Alarmed* by the under-representation of Non Aligned Movement member states
509 and other states on the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors,

510

511 *Further Alarmed* by the resulting negative effects on the Non Aligned Movement
512 member states and the world's ability to gain equal access to peaceful nuclear energy
513 development,

514

515 1. *Affirms* the extremely important role the IAEA has in assisting Non Aligned
516 Movement member states, other states, nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapons
517 states in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;

518

519 2. *Urges* the Board of Governors to incorporate factors such as population levels
520 and participation of States and states affiliated with the Non Aligned Movement within
521 the International Atomic Energy Agency;

522

523 3. *Proposes* the IAEA increase the number of seats available on the Board of
524 Governors to more accurately represent the interests of the Non Aligned Movement and
525 other states;

526

527 4. *Encourages* the IAEA to further research methodologies for the safe storage,
528 disposal and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

529 Passed, Yes: 41 / No: 17 / Abstain: 6

The body adopted this report by consensus to be considered by the General Assembly.