

Report to the The General Assembly on Nuclear Power and Iran

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Executive Summary

At its twenty-first session, held on 20 to 23 November 2010, the International Atomic Energy Agency considered "Nuclear Power in Iran" for the 2010 – 2011 review cycle, and the review of relevant United Nations plans and programmes of action pertaining to the situation of nuclear energy and development in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The body held a meeting elaborating on the need for a solution to the increasingly hostile situation that many nations perceived between Iran, the IAEA, and some other Member States.

The first chapter of this report outlines the actions that the IAEA suggests for the General Assembly to take. It recommended that the General Assembly reinforce the importance of all states to possess the right to peaceful nuclear development for energy, research, medical, and other purposes.

The second chapter details the discussions throughout the body on the varying aspects of the topic area. The body discussed the intricacies of the issues surrounding nuclear power in Iran, specifically the manner in which Iran is to be treated in relation to other states, and whether Iran posed a potential threat to other states. While many states did express support for the actions outlined in resolutions and chapter one, several states did express dissenting opinions on the manner in which the mediating body and inspections were formulated.

The third chapter offers the Agency's designations for its own actions, including making recommendations that the IAEA establish mediating bodies. It continued to outline a new system to evaluate inspections and inspectors that would evaluate the nuclear program and facilities within Iran.

The last chapter details the acceptance of this report for the Council's consideration.

61 Chapter I

A. Draft resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Affirming the authority of the IAEA, and strongly support the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commends the IAEA for its efforts,

Recalling previous relevant resolutions 1929, 1696, 1737, and 1747 and the ramifications of these resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

Taking into consideration Japan as the only nation to have ever suffered from a nuclear attack,

Recognizing the importance of maintaining and strengthening the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime based on the NPT,

Encourages Iran to have a greater amount of transparency in its nuclear programme,

Bearing in mind the sovereignty of the Government of Iran and reaffirming its right to develop its nuclear program peacefully,

Emphasizes the crucial need for the IAEA to strengthen the measures employed by its safeguards system and Additional Protocol in order to prevent the potential spread of nuclear proliferation,

Urging Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA and to comply with all of the agreements set forth,

1. *Reaffirms* that Iran must provide the Agency with all relevant information concerning nuclear material during a one-and-a-half year period of additional protocol:

91 (a) Iran must report and document all materials, equipment, and technology 92 utilized in the development of nuclear power;

2. *Expresses its hope* that Iran adheres to the requirements of the additional protocol period:

 (a) The IAEA will designate inspectors to conduct routine and unfettered investigations during this period of Iran's nuclear facilities and nuclear research programs;

3. *Affirms* that if Iran complies with the requirements of the additional protocols successfully, Iran will be able to transition into the establishment of its own inspection committee that will be composed of Iranian and Swiss inspectors who are appointed and trained by the IAEA in conjunction with the Iranian Government:

- (a) During the period of additional protocol, an elections committee composed of senior IAEA officials and senior Iranian government officials will be established. This elections committee will select candidates for consideration as Iran's official inspectors dependent upon full compliance with the additional protocol period;
- (b) These candidates will be trained during the time that the additional protocol is enforced in order to transition Iran efficiently into a less invasive inspections programme:
 - (i) This training will take the form of candidates shadowing IAEA inspectors as they investigate Iran's nuclear facilities according to the requirements of additional protocol;
- 4. *Recognizes* that upon successful compliance with the additional protocol period, the elections committee will officially appoint the best and most qualified candidates from the training program:
 - (a) This inspection committee will conduct quarterly investigations;
- (b) This committee will assume the responsibilities of the IAEA inspection committee and act as a central mechanism to ensure transparency in regards to nuclear power in Iran;
- 5. *Emphasizes* that if it is evident that the reports conducted by Iran's officially appointed committee of inspectors are insufficient or seem to contain false information, the IAEA will send inspectors to investigate and clarify the discrepancies.
- This resolution passed with 21 in favor, 17 opposed and 10 abstentions.

B. Other recommendations

- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends that General Assembly continue its support of Iran in continuing development of peaceful nuclear energy in order to meet their energy demands and mitigate climate change. This complex issue requires cautious consideration to ensure that all the associated technical, legal, economic and political aspects are thoroughly addressed and taken into account before binding decisions are made. Any future decisions in this regard has to be taken cautiously; taking into account the views and concerns of all Member States affected.
- We also strongly suggest that the General Assembly be aware of any implications specifically concerning precedent be taken into account. We recommend that the General Assembly always bear in mind that Iran's sovereignty should be respected just as any other Member States. In line with the customary principles of the General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the distribution of nuclear resources and reactors should be considered with the intent that all can accordingly work together to produce new ventures and possible productions of nuclear energy.

150 Chapter II

151 Consideration Of Nuclear Power in Iran

153 A. Deliberations

The IAEA recognizes the importance of relevant resolutions 1929, 1737, and 1747 and the ramifications for the Islamic Republic of Iran. While they recognize Iran's sovereign right to develop nuclear energy peacefully, the body urges Iran to fully cooperate with additional protocol measures implemented by the IAEA.

A large portion of the body feels that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful, and as a faithful adherent to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has every right to pursue such a program. Therefore, placing sanctions on Iran, or asking Iran to suspend its nuclear energy program, is not justifiable. These measures would only lead to increased tensions, and hinder the development of possible cooperative solutions. Full support is needed for a comprehensive resolution to maintain Iran's national sovereignty, further the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and increase transparency to put the world's unease to rest.

The representatives from Japan express their hope that a dual Iranian/Swiss force, as trained by the IAEA, would conduct investigations into the Iranian nuclear program. The Russian Federation is concerned that permanent Member States would not be directly involved in the selection process; however, the Russian Federation is willing to discuss the potential for selection of a representative state. The Russian Federation favors veto power for the selected teams: one for Iran and one for the Arab League. However, the Russian Federation made no agreements to any of the suggested proposals and has said that they will not agree to any one proposal until they have heard all proposals.

A large portion of the body specifically cited the need for non- preferential treatment of states and equal subjectivity to inspections by the IAEA.

Spain and Indonesia believe that placing sanctions on Iran is an undesirable action as sanctions will spark dissonance within the world community. Spain does wish to promote alternative methods to produce energy as there are several renewable resources which can be used in place of nuclear facilities. The burden that may come to future generations with excessive nuclear waste is not desired. It is recommended that technology be shared in order to promote the use of clean, efficient means of renewable energy and increase transparency.

South America held varying views on the methods in which to approach the Iranian situation. Costa Rica is in favor of nuclear free zones around the globe.

The central Asian block would like to emphasize the need for cooperation within the Arab League to provide appropriate incentives for Iran to work with existing standards under the NPT and support further international engagement. The Arab League strongly believes that all Member States need to sign the NPT and have the same standards applied to 196 every state.

The European Union promotes continued dialogue between Iran and other states. The EU recommends transparency among all states in all matters concerning nuclear power is a priority, this will increase confidence among states and decrease tensions in the international community. Though the EU understands that sanctions could have some negative effects, it supports this as a method to curb potentially dangerous activities Member States in direct violation of the NPT.

There are dissenting opinions, including those of Luxembourg and Sweden, who do not support sanctions.

The United States of America recognizes the proposal for possible cooperation with Iran included along with Security Council Resolution 1929 and presented to Iran in June 2008 it is important for all bodies to consider areas of possible civil cooperation with a peacefully implemented Iranian nuclear energy program. In addition support for Light Water Reactors (LWR) technologies and spent fuel cooperation could be negotiated. We urge the IAEA as well as other bodies to consider detailed proposals in these areas to be presented for Iran's consideration.

While Canada and the Republic of Rwanda, are in support of the pursuit of nuclear power by all states, but cannot support Iran's pursuit of nuclear power until it abides by the rules and regulations of the NPT and actively creates closer ties and open cooperation with the IAEA. Because of Iran's failure to comply with the obligations set forth by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, and 1803, Canada, the United States of America, the Republic of Rwanda, Argentina and Egypt, would like to see the suspension of all of Iran's nuclear activities until it acts in accordance with the above stated requirements.

Israel is convinced that a nuclear Iran will bring grave consequences to all states. Iran has violated various United Nations resolutions and it is imperative that the international community take action against Iran's disregard for the authority of the IAEA, the UN Security Council and the NPT. Israel discourages states from continuing comprehensive relations with Iran until perceived threats are rescinded. Israel supports harsher sanctions against Iran until it agrees to comply IAEA standards and the standards of the international community. Israel demands that Iran end all nuclear activity until it has proven to be a peaceful, non-nuclear state.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would like to reaffirm their invitation to act as a primary source of low-enriched uranium to Iran in an effort to mediate between the UN and Iran.

Clearly stating its stance, political objectives and opinions, especially in relation to international matters, the representative of Egypt genuinely elaborated that the approval of resolutions supporting IAEA oversight on nuclear activities of its member states would be aiding the efforts of Egypt, the Arab group, Arab League of Nations and members of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) towards establishing a region free of

abusive use of nuclear resources, and evidently energy.

B. Recommendations for action by the International Atomic Energy Agency

One of the key factors that needs to be addressed in regards to Iranian nuclear development is the fairness and procedure for inspections into nuclear facilities. Fairness in this system is an essential component of any investigation, as it brings legitimacy and credibility to the investigation and the process of selecting said inspectors.

The body recommends that the IAEA establish mediating bodies determined by Iran and the IAEA. Iran would choose two of the four mediating bodies, and the IAEA would choose the others. This body suggests that the best course of action for the IAEA to take in regards to the inspection process is a dual veto system.

Chapter III

288 289 290 291 This report was adopted by the body with a vote of 37 in favor, 3 opposed and 4

abstentions.