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SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction SUBMITTED TO: The First Committee SUBMITTED BY: Indonesia, Mauritania, Madagascar, Cameroon, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Malaysia, New Zealand The First Committee Reaffirming each Member State's right to national sovereignty as set out in Article 2, Section 1 of the United Nations Charter, Recalling the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition in the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, and other Gases and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC), and General Assembly Resolution 61/102 calling for the strengthening of the BTWC, Further Recalling resolution 44/561, which designates that the Secretary General shall receive and investigate reports of alleged bacteriological (biological) toxin weapons abuse, Concerned by the lack of enforcement and a verification regime in the BTWC, Seeking to achieve a more effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons. Applauding the efforts and achievements of the Australian Group (AG), who seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of biological weapons through the harmonization of export controls and licensing. *Recognizing* the accomplishments and efforts of the recently established Implemented Support Unit (ISU), which is designed specifically to help build confidence measures, verify compliance and increase transparency mechanisms.

Deeply Concerned with the growing threat and capability of non-State actors to

28 acquire and utilize biological toxins and weapons, 29 30 Alarmed by the lack of universality of the BTWC, 31 32 1. Requests all States who have not already done so to sign and ratify the BTWC 33 with urgency and expediency; 34 35 2. Recommends the next Review Conference of the BWC in 2011 discuss and 36 work towards the development of a formal verification regime, particularly an oversight 37 body similar to the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to: 38 (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures, in a form of a 39 League Of Verification and Execution (LOVE), to account for and secure biological and toxic materials as define in Article I, Section 1 of 40 41 the BTWC; 42 (b) Encourage the establishment of international standards and practices 43 for cataloging of biological toxins, agents and pathogens that may be acquired and developed by non-State actors: 44 45 (c) Verify the destruction of biological weapon stockpiles and facilitate the transformation of bio-weapon manufacturing facilities into civilian 46 47 medical infrastructure; 48 (d) Request State parties to enhance the control of transportation 49 methods of biological and toxic materials; 50 (e) Continue the destruction and disarmament of biological and toxic 51 weapon dispersal methods; 52 (f) Urge State parties to establish a code of conduct for scientists in the 53 field of biological and toxin weapons research; 54 55 3. Requests all State parties to harmonize their national legislation with the 56 BTWC and its obligations under that treaty in order to develop more effective regulations 57 to control and monitor transfers of relevant dual-use technologies of biological agents and 58 pathogens; 59 60 4. *Encourages* enhanced cooperation with Regional Rapid Response (RRR) 61 teams, fielded by non-governmental organizations, which currently provide medical aid 62 and supplies, such as vaccines, to those affected by biological outbreaks upon request of 63 Member States: 64 65 5. Urges all State parties to fully realize Article X of the BTWC in order to foster 66 transparency, confidence and promote the peaceful use of biological and toxic materials.