



CHAPTER TWO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

AZERBAIJAN

CHINA

COLOMBIA

FRANCE

GERMANY

GUATEMALA

INDIA

MOROCCO

PAKISTAN

PORTUGAL

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SOUTH AFRICA

TOGO

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Representatives of the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional and represents a fraction of the issues the Security Council discusses. Any issue regarding international peace and security may be brought before the Council. Many topics listed in this guide will change significantly before the conference. Additional topics may be added as necessary or as the Council sees fit. For this reason it is highly advised that representatives have a broad knowledge base regarding current events in the international community. Periodicals are some of the best sources available for day-to-day updates. Recommended periodicals include, among others: The New York Times, UN Chronicle, The London Times, Foreign Policy, and The Economist. The UN Foundation's online daily newsletter, UN Wire, is also an excellent resource for timely information. Whenever possible it is also recommended that representatives familiarize themselves with the most recent report(s) published by the Security Council along with other UN documents. These can be found via the UN homepage under the Security Council section (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>). Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on UN sources with some news sources provided for background on certain aspects of topics.

Unlike many other simulations, Security Council members are able to make declarative statements and operational decisions which will change the course of the simulation. It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems throughout the simulation. While AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with SC members, representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulation Staff before making ANY operational decisions. Operational decisions would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions which would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the actual "home office" of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the Security Council. Delegations representing these countries, if present at AMUN, will be asked to participate in deliberations by the body, if they are not present or choose not to participate in deliberations an AMUN staff member will represent them as necessary. It is customary for the Council to request the presence of relevant

Member States during discussion of topics, however it is not required. Any nation mentioned in the following background research is a potential candidate for an outside participant in the Council as well as any related to any topic of current relevance to international peace and security.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council as of Spring 2012. It is recommended that representatives have a solid foundational knowledge of background of major international issues. The topics laid out in this handbook are provided as a starting point for further research.

ISSUES IN AFRICA

THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The Great Lakes region has seen nearly-perpetual violence from civil wars, ethnic conflicts and military interventions for nearly 20 years. Although the Second Congo War (1998-2003) ended almost a decade ago, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been particularly vulnerable to spill-over violence from neighboring states. In particular, ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi groups in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, along with military interventions intended to destroy rebel groups that sought refuge in eastern DRC, caused the death of millions as a result of war and humanitarian crisis.

During the Second Congo War, the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to monitor the cease-fire agreements between warring factions within the DRC. Even as foreign armies eventually left the DRC, ethnic violence increased as militant domestic factions evolved, merged and split over time, ultimately creating significant instability in the eastern provinces of Orientale, North Kivu, and South Kivu. The shifting security situation required greater peacekeeping forces over time, and the MONUC mandate shifted from monitoring ceasefires and the withdrawal of military forces to protecting civilians and monitoring human rights. Eventually, the mandate shifted further to include active pursuit of armed groups operating within DRC as well as supporting the Congolese army, Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC).

In July 2010 the United Nations Organization and Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) replaced MONUC. The change was largely symbolic and emphasized



the political aspects of the mandate. The change also reinforced the Mission's mandate to support the DRC government and its efforts to aid in the political stabilization and peace efforts in eastern DRC following normalization of relations with its neighbors.

While relations with neighboring states have improved, the situation within DRC is still volatile. To the extent possible, MONUSCO has attempted to protect civilians in areas where FARDC is not present due to re-deployments or incapable of doing so as a result of reorganization, chaos within the ranks and violence following the November 2011 elections.

Even given the cooperation between MONUSCO and FARDC, many militant groups continue to perpetrate violence in the eastern DRC. MONUSCO has worked with FARDC to combat militant groups including the Yakutumba Alliance, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Ugandan Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), several Mayi-Mayi factions, as well as splinter factions from several formerly integrated militant groups. Violence still remains especially high within South Kivu and Orientale provinces.

The African Union Peace and Security Council called for regional cooperation against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in November 2011. MONUSCO supported this action since the LRA is currently dispersed throughout portions of South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the DRC. The LRA is no longer considered a security risk to the DRC, but LRA attacks have exacted a high humanitarian cost in Orientale province. The number of active LRA members is estimated at 500; however LRA attacks and attacks by copycat groups are extremely high (254 attacks between January and August 2011). FARDC has also attempted to stabilize the security situation in the DRC by integrating members of militant groups into its ranks, but this inclusion has resulted in an undisciplined army responsible for numerous human rights abuses. In 2006, the International Criminal Court (ICC) called for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, the former head of the rebel group, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) for war crimes committed in the CNDP, including the use of child soldiers, during the Second Congo War. After the Second Congo War, Ntaganda had been serving as a general in FARDC. He defected following the call for his arrest, and a wave of other defections followed, with many of his troops taking up arms against FARDC. Joseph Kabila, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, has said that Ntaganda would be tried by a military tribunal instead of being turned over to the ICC.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- How can the international community further aid in the stabilization of the Democratic Republic of Congo?
- How can neighboring states help minimize the threat of militant groups without violating national sovereignty?
- Should MONUSCO be supporting FARDC? Are there changes that should be made to MONUSCO's mandate?

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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

For the past 25 years, the people of Somalia have been engaged in a civil war that has drawn international attention and spilled the blood of combatants and civilians of multiple nations. Recent events there have given rise to both hope and despair for the situation in Somalia: The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continues to face stiff opposition led by al-Shabaab, but has made gains by recapturing Mogadishu and improving governance. Furthermore, the drawn-out instability has facilitated increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which has adversely affected worldwide commerce.

The international community has authorized a number of missions in an attempt to provide peace and security for the people of Somalia. The current mission is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was originally chartered in 2007. Since late 2011, international support for AMISOM has increased. In November 2011, Kenyan troops, which had been operating independently inside Somalia, joined Ugandan and Burundian troops under the banner of AMISOM. Djibouti has also contributed troops to AMISOM, and Sierra Leone has announced its intent to assist, despite threats from al-Shabaab. AMISOM support for the TFG was critical in recapturing the capitol in February 2012.

In addition to the increased physical security provided by AMISOM support, internal political and regional stability is also on the rise. On 18 April 2012 the constitutional convention of Puntland successfully passed a 141-article constitution. Puntland president Abdirahman Mohamed Farole commented on this occasion by saying, "I can confidently say that Puntland is out of the transitional period that we were in for 14 years and we have progressed into democratic government, a step in the right direction."

Even as some improvements have been made, the main opposition group, al-Shabaab, has also been gaining strength. In February 2012,



al-Shabaab announced that it was joining the international group Al-Qaida. This follows al-Shabaab's attacks on Ugandan and Kenyan citizens in the past few years including a high profile attack in Kampala, Uganda that killed more than 70 people during the final match of the 2010 World Cup.

Pirates based in Somalia have taken thousands of people hostage, and the economic damage from piracy is estimated to be between five and seven billion U.S. dollars per year. The EU, Russia and China, among others, have contributed ships to protect their commercial assets as well as international humanitarian ships from pirates. The United States has used unmanned drones in a further attempt to provide safe passage for ships in the Horn of Africa region.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following::

- How can the international community further aid in assisting the development of a stable Somali state?
- How can nations help minimize the threat of al-Shabaab without violating national sovereignty?
- What actions can be taken by the international community to more effectively deal with piracy?

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ADDITIONAL WEB RESOURCES

amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/ - AMISOM Mandate

THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

The Sudanese Civil War, which left two million dead, four million internally displaced, and six hundred thousand refugees, ended in 2003, but hostilities between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army have continued. Since

2004, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan has been attempting to ease tensions in the region and deal with the aftermath of the war, including the situation in Darfur, which many Western nations labeled as genocide. South Sudan officially became independent on 9 July 2011; however, independence has done little to stabilize the situation in Sudan.

The ever-changing political and security situation has prompted the international community to continually update the extent and kind of assistance to Sudan and South Sudan. In March 2005, the first peacekeeping troops arrived with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was tasked to assist in maintaining North-South peace, protecting human rights, and protecting civilians from imminent threat of violence. UNMIS was unable to protect civilian populations in Darfur, however, during the emerging insurgency and counterinsurgency. This failure resulted in the establishment of a hybrid United Nations-African Union mission specifically aimed at addressing human rights and protecting humanitarian aid in Darfur (UNAMID). The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) followed the dismantling of UNMIS, as South Sudan gained independence and Sudan requested an end to the peacekeeping mission's presence in Sudan. As South Sudan gained independence the referendum in the state of Abyei was delayed and violence erupted, which led to the creation of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), a mission specifically aimed at stabilizing the disputed state.

Currently there are three peacekeeping missions in the Sudan: UNAMID, UNMISS, and UNISFA. The situation on the ground has improved in Darfur, which has led to a recommendation for a UNAMID troop reduction. The security situation in Abyei has also largely improved since the deployment of UNISFA. However, while the immediate security situation has stabilized within Abyei, both Sudan and South Sudan are in direct violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area and have failed to remove their armed forces from Abyei. No political progress has been made toward the resolution of the final status of Abyei. The security improvements in Darfur and Abyei, however, have come at a time of increased conflict along the North-South border.

Current conflicts center on the issues of oil revenue and transit fees as well as unrest in border states. The most recent fighting follows a shutdown of oil production in late January by South Sudan under the claim that Sudan was stealing its oil, thus cutting off revenues to Sudan from transit fees it collects from South Sudanese oil flowing through its pipelines. Sudan also faces rebel-group uprisings in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states; these rebel groups are predominantly African Christians affiliated with South Sudan, but whose lands remained in Sudan after the referendum. Additionally, movements of nomadic groups between Sudan and South Sudan have caused tension in border-states.

Sudanese armed forces have been repeatedly striking the border states of Kordofan and Blue Nile within Sudan and Unity State in South Sudan with air strikes and long range artillery since June 2011. Sudan has accused South Sudan of supporting the rebel group Sudanese People's Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N) and other rebels in the border states, while repeatedly denying the aerial attacks against



rebels within Sudan and South Sudan. In response to the aerial assaults, South Sudanese troops seized the oil production city of Heglig, Sudan on 10 April 2012. South Sudan withdrew its troops after two weeks of international pressure. Both sides blame the other for the recent military-to-military border clashes.

On 24 April 2012, the African Union issued a three-month deadline for resolving these long-standing disputes. Should the parties fail to reach an agreement the ultimatum dictates they will face binding international arbitration. Shortly following the ultimatum from the African Union, the Security Council took action on the issue reinforcing the African Union Peace and Security Council's roadmap for peace as well as demanding Sudan and South Sudan address key issues of dispute: oil revenues and transit fees, status of nationals living in the other country, resolution of disputed and claimed border areas and the final status of Abyei. These demands were given additional force with the threat of the use of Article 41 if the parties fail to comply.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following::

- How does the situation in Sudan affect regional stability?
- What changes can be made to current UN missions to better meet the needs of keeping peace along the North-South border while protecting civilians?
- How will sanctions affect Sudan and South Sudan?

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THE ISSUE IN NORTHERN AFRICA

THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

After the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, which was assisted by international forces sanctioned by the Security Council, the National Transitional Council (NTC) named an interim government on 22 November 2011 and issued a "Declaration of Liberation" the following day.

Even with the establishment of an interim government, concern grew within Libya and in the international community that the civil war could enter a second stage, with the new coalition facing old tribal tensions. The heavy presence of weapons exacerbated the lack of a central government and led to violence in several areas. In some southern cities, there were reports of as many as 150 deaths, yet because the NTC lacks a formal army it has found it difficult to intervene when tensions flare.

Security Council Resolution 2009 created the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL); Resolution 2040, in March 2012, extended the UNSMIL mandate for another year. Resolution 2040 also called for an end to the asset freeze that had previously been put in place and eased the arms embargo on Libya. The Council did express concern over the continued fighting and called for the Libyan government to prevent human rights violations such as "reprisals, arbitrary detentions without access to due process, wrongful imprisonment, mistreatment, torture and extrajudicial executions in Libya."

There are concerns that the eastern half of the nation, centered around Benghazi, might follow through on threats to cut off the flow of oil if it does not regain power it feels it did not possess during the Gadhafi reign. Previously a separate territory, eastern Libya contains the majority of Libyan oil. In spring 2012, citizens of Benghazi began to call for autonomy from the rest of the nation.

The NTC has had some recent positive developments. On 20 April 2012, the government took control of Tripoli International Airport from the militias that had been providing security in the aftermath of the fall of Moammar Gadhafi's government. The security force is largely made up of former rebels who participated in a government program in which they exchanged their weapons for jobs.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following::

- With elections coming in June, what role, if any should UNSMIL play going forward?
- What measures, especially in the realm of governance, might prevent the nation from falling into another civil war?
- What was your nation's relationship with the Gadhafi government? What is its current relationship with the NTC?
- Did your nation contribute to UNSMIL or the NATO operations?
- What are your nation's economic interests in Libya?

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ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

Unrest in the Syrian Arab Republic has continued for more than 13 months despite attempts by the international community to quell the violence and bring about a return to normalcy for the citizens of Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates that 11,000 people have died since tensions first began. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and is working to implement a six point peace plan originally agreed to in March 2012.

Though similar to previous plans between President Bashar al-Assad and the Arab League, the peace plan is based largely on creating an environment for the peaceful discussion of the issues raised by the opposition. A ceasefire was to have gone into effect 10 April 2012, but both sides have ignored the peace plan and continued attacks. United Nations Resolution 2043 established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) consisting of 300 unarmed military observers. Reports suggest that the Syrian government has been rejecting observers based purely on nationality.

Thus far, the opposition movements are splintered and have failed to establish unity of action, and have not been successful in attracting support from the ruling class. Syrian Deputy Oil Minister Abdo Husameldin is the highest ranked defector to the opposition movement. The military, on the other hand, has seen the largest number of defections to the Free Syrian Army, which is now estimated to number over 70,000. It is headquartered just beyond the Syrian border in Turkey. Lately the Free Syrian Army has faced criticism for attacks that have harmed both the Syrian Army and civilians.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following:

- The Council will face many decisions ahead. How it decides to move forward will have an impact throughout the region. What will the next steps for the council be?
- Does your nation support the continuation of United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria beyond its initial 90 day mission?
- What relationship did your nation have with Syria before the current uprisings? How has it changed due to the uprisings?

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THE SITUATION IN IRAN

In late 2002 the exposure of two clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran brought its nuclear power program under scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community. Following a 2003 IAEA inquiry, Iran was found to have failed to meet the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Iran's initial cooperation with the IAEA investigation revealed facilities and halting enrichment experiments spared it from significant international pressure. However the information provided by Iran over the course of the investigations between 2003 and 2006 raised many questions about the nature of Iran's nuclear program.

Due to the nature of the violations of the Safeguards Agreement, the duration of activities in violation and the secretive nature of the Iranian facilities, diplomatic pressure began to build surrounding Iran's nuclear program. Then in January 2006 cooperation with the IAEA came to a halt with Iran notifying the IAEA that it intended to restart uranium enrichment activities. On 11 April 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had joined the "group of countries which have nuclear technology." The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China developed a package of incentives and disincentives to persuade Iran to halt its enrichment and comply with IAEA resolution GOV/2006/14. Iran flatly rejected this offer. Open defiance of the Security Council's call for Iran to halt enrichment activities provoked the first of many resolutions sanctioning Iran, with each resolution between July 2006 and June 2010 applying further pressure on Iran in an effort to halt its uranium enrichment.

Sanctions have not deterred Iran from enriching uranium. Several rounds of diplomatic efforts have been launched only to meet with failure. Meanwhile, more Iranian nuclear facilities have been exposed by the international community to the IAEA. Additionally, Member



States have provided detailed information regarding possible military aspects to Iran's nuclear program. These claims are rejected by Iran as fabrications, however they include information about green salt projects, high explosive and synchronous detonator testing as well as redesign of the Shabaab-3 missile payload.

As a second round of talks is set to commence in Baghdad following an initial round in Istanbul, Iran is again facing questions from the IAEA Board of Governors about the possibility of nuclear testing on a military complex at Parchin. This complex, a portion of which was originally examined during the 2003 IAEA inquiry, is the site of suspected high explosives tests. These high explosives, described in information provided to the IAEA by intelligence agencies of Member States, are consistent with lensing semi-hemispherical explosives used in an implosion type nuclear device. Neutron initiator testing may also have taken place at the facility. To date Iran has refused the IAEA access to Parchin, claiming such concerns are based on forgeries. Iran's record of failing to reveal nuclear facilities until they are exposed by members of the international community, inconsistent reports on facility purposes and continued 20% enrichment of uranium without an obvious domestic use, have degraded international trust in Iran.

Despite diminished trust between Iran and the international community, the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany still seek a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis in Iran. This goal continues to grow in importance as Iran approaches nuclear breakout capacity and Israel contemplates possible military action to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include the following::

- How does the presence of the Iranian nuclear program affect regional stability? What steps are necessary to prevent military action against Iran by Israel?
- What actions can be taken by the international community to verify the nature of Iran's nuclear program? Should the Non-Proliferation Treaty be modified to prevent other nations from emulating Iran?
- How will further sanctions affect your nation's economy? Will further sanctions be effective?

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 GOV/2011/65 (2011)
 GOV/2009/82 (2009)
 GOV/2006/14 (2006)

ADDITIONAL WEB RESOURCES

- www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaearan/index.shtml - IAEA & Iran
isisnucleariran.org/ - ISIS: Nuclear Iran

OTHER OPEN ISSUES

Any world issue involving international peace and security will be fair game for discussion in the Security Council. Representatives should have broad knowledge of the world events. Topics to consider include any current UN Peacekeeping missions (eg. MINUSTAH, UNIFIL, UNMOGIP), volatile situations (eg. Non-Proliferation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Palestinian Question), terrorist attacks, or humanitarian crises from natural disaster or disease.